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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-10-02 21:38:48 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-10-02 21:38:48 -0700
commit88265322c14cce39f7afbc416726ef4fac413298 (patch)
treee4956f905ef617971f87788d8f8a09dbb66b70a3
parent65b99c74fdd325d1ffa2e5663295888704712604 (diff)
parentbf5308344527d015ac9a6d2bda4ad4d40fd7d943 (diff)
downloadlinux-linaro-stable-88265322c14cce39f7afbc416726ef4fac413298.tar.gz
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline attacks - Integrity: add digital signature verification - Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions) - IBM vTPM support on ppc64 - Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM - Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels" Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits) Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools ima: change flags container data type Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label Smack: remove task_wait() hook. ima: audit log hashes ima: generic IMA action flag handling ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure audit: export audit_log_task_info tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390 ima: digital signature verification support ima: add support for different security.ima data types ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls ima: add inode_post_setattr call ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock ima: allocating iint improvements ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules ima: integrity appraisal extension vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file ...
-rw-r--r--Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy25
-rw-r--r--Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-ppi70
-rw-r--r--Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt8
-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/Smack.txt10
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c62
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig13
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c50
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig19
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/Makefile8
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c74
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h35
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c109
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c (renamed from drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c)147
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h86
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c695
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c749
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h77
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c73
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c461
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c3
-rw-r--r--fs/attr.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/file_table.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/xattr.c6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/audit.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ima.h27
-rw-r--r--include/linux/integrity.h7
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ptrace.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h31
-rw-r--r--include/linux/tpm.h4
-rw-r--r--include/linux/xattr.h3
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c85
-rw-r--r--kernel/ptrace.c3
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/Makefile24
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h15
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c64
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig16
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h39
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c86
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c263
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c8
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c93
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c195
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h22
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c54
-rw-r--r--security/security.c27
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c51
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c75
-rw-r--r--security/yama/Kconfig8
-rw-r--r--security/yama/yama_lsm.c16
52 files changed, 3546 insertions, 463 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 6cd6daefaaed..986946613542 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -12,11 +12,14 @@ Description:
then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after
the file ima/policy is closed.
+ IMA appraisal, if configured, uses these file measurements
+ for local measurement appraisal.
+
rule format: action [condition ...]
- action: measure | dont_measure
+ action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit
condition:= base | lsm
- base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=]]
+ base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=] [fowner]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
@@ -24,36 +27,50 @@ Description:
mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
uid:= decimal value
+ fowner:=decimal value
lsm: are LSM specific
default policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
+ # RAMFS_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+ appraise fowner=0
The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
- open for read by root in do_filp_open.
+ open for read by root in do_filp_open. The default appraisal
+ policy appraises all files owned by root.
Examples of LSM specific definitions:
SELinux:
# SELINUX_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0xF97CFF8C
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
+ dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
+ dont_appraise obj_type=auditd_log_t
measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-ppi b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-ppi
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..97a003ee058b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-ppi
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/
+Date: August 2012
+Kernel Version: 3.6
+Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com
+Description:
+ This folder includes the attributes related with PPI (Physical
+ Presence Interface). Only if TPM is supported by BIOS, this
+ folder makes sence. The folder path can be got by command
+ 'find /sys/ -name 'pcrs''. For the detail information of PPI,
+ please refer to the PPI specification from
+ http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/
+
+What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/version
+Date: August 2012
+Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com
+Description:
+ This attribute shows the version of the PPI supported by the
+ platform.
+ This file is readonly.
+
+What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/request
+Date: August 2012
+Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com
+Description:
+ This attribute shows the request for an operation to be
+ executed in the pre-OS environment. It is the only input from
+ the OS to the pre-OS environment. The request should be an
+ integer value range from 1 to 160, and 0 means no request.
+ This file can be read and written.
+
+What: /sys/devices/pnp0/00:<bus-num>/ppi/response
+Date: August 2012
+Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com
+Description:
+ This attribute shows the response to the most recent operation
+ request it acted upon. The format is "<request> <response num>
+ : <response description>".
+ This file is readonly.
+
+What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/transition_action
+Date: August 2012
+Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com
+Description:
+ This attribute shows the platform-specific action that should
+ take place in order to transition to the BIOS for execution of
+ a requested operation. The format is "<action num>: <action
+ description>".
+ This file is readonly.
+
+What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/tcg_operations
+Date: August 2012
+Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com
+Description:
+ This attribute shows whether it is allowed to request an
+ operation to be executed in the pre-OS environment by the BIOS
+ for the requests defined by TCG, i.e. requests from 1 to 22.
+ The format is "<request> <status num>: <status description>".
+ This attribute is only supported by PPI version 1.2+.
+ This file is readonly.
+
+What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/vs_operations
+Date: August 2012
+Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com
+Description:
+ This attribute shows whether it is allowed to request an
+ operation to be executed in the pre-OS environment by the BIOS
+ for the verdor specific requests, i.e. requests from 128 to
+ 255. The format is same with tcg_operations. This attribute
+ is also only supported by PPI version 1.2+.
+ This file is readonly.
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index aab409f335bf..f777fa96243d 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1051,6 +1051,14 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
ihash_entries= [KNL]
Set number of hash buckets for inode cache.
+ ima_appraise= [IMA] appraise integrity measurements
+ Format: { "off" | "enforce" | "fix" }
+ default: "enforce"
+
+ ima_appraise_tcb [IMA]
+ The builtin appraise policy appraises all files
+ owned by uid=0.
+
ima_audit= [IMA]
Format: { "0" | "1" }
0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
index a416479b8a1c..8a177e4b6e21 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
@@ -28,12 +28,11 @@ Smack kernels use the CIPSO IP option. Some network
configurations are intolerant of IP options and can impede
access to systems that use them as Smack does.
-The current git repositories for Smack user space are:
+The current git repository for Smack user space is:
- git@gitorious.org:meego-platform-security/smackutil.git
- git@gitorious.org:meego-platform-security/libsmack.git
+ git://github.com/smack-team/smack.git
-These should make and install on most modern distributions.
+This should make and install on most modern distributions.
There are three commands included in smackutil:
smackload - properly formats data for writing to /smack/load
@@ -194,6 +193,9 @@ onlycap
these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
+revoke-subject
+ Writing a Smack label here sets the access to '-' for all access
+ rules with that subject label.
You can add access rules in /etc/smack/accesses. They take the form:
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
index 0794a3017b1b..e144498bcddd 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
@@ -1624,6 +1624,63 @@ static void __init prom_instantiate_rtas(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
/*
+ * Allocate room for and instantiate Stored Measurement Log (SML)
+ */
+static void __init prom_instantiate_sml(void)
+{
+ phandle ibmvtpm_node;
+ ihandle ibmvtpm_inst;
+ u32 entry = 0, size = 0;
+ u64 base;
+
+ prom_debug("prom_instantiate_sml: start...\n");
+
+ ibmvtpm_node = call_prom("finddevice", 1, 1, ADDR("/ibm,vtpm"));
+ prom_debug("ibmvtpm_node: %x\n", ibmvtpm_node);
+ if (!PHANDLE_VALID(ibmvtpm_node))
+ return;
+
+ ibmvtpm_inst = call_prom("open", 1, 1, ADDR("/ibm,vtpm"));
+ if (!IHANDLE_VALID(ibmvtpm_inst)) {
+ prom_printf("opening vtpm package failed (%x)\n", ibmvtpm_inst);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (call_prom_ret("call-method", 2, 2, &size,
+ ADDR("sml-get-handover-size"),
+ ibmvtpm_inst) != 0 || size == 0) {
+ prom_printf("SML get handover size failed\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ base = alloc_down(size, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
+ if (base == 0)
+ prom_panic("Could not allocate memory for sml\n");
+
+ prom_printf("instantiating sml at 0x%x...", base);
+
+ if (call_prom_ret("call-method", 4, 2, &entry,
+ ADDR("sml-handover"),
+ ibmvtpm_inst, size, base) != 0 || entry == 0) {
+ prom_printf("SML handover failed\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ prom_printf(" done\n");
+
+ reserve_mem(base, size);
+
+ prom_setprop(ibmvtpm_node, "/ibm,vtpm", "linux,sml-base",
+ &base, sizeof(base));
+ prom_setprop(ibmvtpm_node, "/ibm,vtpm", "linux,sml-size",
+ &size, sizeof(size));
+
+ prom_debug("sml base = 0x%x\n", base);
+ prom_debug("sml size = 0x%x\n", (long)size);
+
+ prom_debug("prom_instantiate_sml: end...\n");
+}
+
+/*
* Allocate room for and initialize TCE tables
*/
static void __init prom_initialize_tce_table(void)
@@ -2916,6 +2973,11 @@ unsigned long __init prom_init(unsigned long r3, unsigned long r4,
prom_instantiate_opal();
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
+ /* instantiate sml */
+ prom_instantiate_sml();
+#endif
+
/*
* On non-powermacs, put all CPUs in spin-loops.
*
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig b/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig
index 7c0d391996b5..fbd9b2b850ef 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig
@@ -289,3 +289,16 @@ config HW_RANDOM_EXYNOS
module will be called exynos-rng.
If unsure, say Y.
+
+config HW_RANDOM_TPM
+ tristate "TPM HW Random Number Generator support"
+ depends on HW_RANDOM && TCG_TPM
+ default HW_RANDOM
+ ---help---
+ This driver provides kernel-side support for the Random Number
+ Generator in the Trusted Platform Module
+
+ To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the
+ module will be called tpm-rng.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile b/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile
index 39a757ca15b6..1fd7eec9fbf6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile
@@ -25,3 +25,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_PICOXCELL) += picoxcell-rng.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_PPC4XX) += ppc4xx-rng.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_PSERIES) += pseries-rng.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_EXYNOS) += exynos-rng.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_TPM) += tpm-rng.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d6d448266f07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Kent Yoder IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * HWRNG interfaces to pull RNG data from a TPM
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/hw_random.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+
+#define MODULE_NAME "tpm-rng"
+
+static int tpm_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
+{
+ return tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, data, max);
+}
+
+static struct hwrng tpm_rng = {
+ .name = MODULE_NAME,
+ .read = tpm_rng_read,
+};
+
+static int __init rng_init(void)
+{
+ return hwrng_register(&tpm_rng);
+}
+module_init(rng_init);
+
+static void __exit rng_exit(void)
+{
+ hwrng_unregister(&tpm_rng);
+}
+module_exit(rng_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("RNG driver for TPM devices");
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index a048199ce866..915875e431d2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -33,6 +33,17 @@ config TCG_TIS
from within Linux. To compile this driver as a module, choose
M here; the module will be called tpm_tis.
+config TCG_TIS_I2C_INFINEON
+ tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface (I2C - Infineon)"
+ depends on I2C
+ ---help---
+ If you have a TPM security chip that is compliant with the
+ TCG TIS 1.2 TPM specification and Infineon's I2C Protocol Stack
+ Specification 0.20 say Yes and it will be accessible from within
+ Linux.
+ To compile this driver as a module, choose M here; the module
+ will be called tpm_tis_i2c_infineon.
+
config TCG_NSC
tristate "National Semiconductor TPM Interface"
depends on X86
@@ -62,4 +73,12 @@ config TCG_INFINEON
Further information on this driver and the supported hardware
can be found at http://www.trust.rub.de/projects/linux-device-driver-infineon-tpm/
+config TCG_IBMVTPM
+ tristate "IBM VTPM Interface"
+ depends on PPC64
+ ---help---
+ If you have IBM virtual TPM (VTPM) support say Yes and it
+ will be accessible from within Linux. To compile this driver
+ as a module, choose M here; the module will be called tpm_ibmvtpm.
+
endif # TCG_TPM
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index ea3a1e02a824..5b3fc8bc6c13 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -4,8 +4,16 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm_bios.o
+ tpm_bios-objs += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_acpi.o tpm_ppi.o
+else
+ifdef CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM
+ obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm_bios.o
+ tpm_bios-objs += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_of.o
+endif
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS) += tpm_tis.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_INFINEON) += tpm_i2c_infineon.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_NSC) += tpm_nsc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_ATMEL) += tpm_atmel.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_INFINEON) += tpm_infineon.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM) += tpm_ibmvtpm.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 3af9f4d1a23f..f26afdb1a702 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -30,12 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include "tpm.h"
-
-enum tpm_const {
- TPM_MINOR = 224, /* officially assigned */
- TPM_BUFSIZE = 4096,
- TPM_NUM_DEVICES = 256,
-};
+#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
enum tpm_duration {
TPM_SHORT = 0,
@@ -482,6 +477,7 @@ static ssize_t transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_cmd_t *cmd,
#define TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE 200
#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND cpu_to_be16(193)
#define TPM_ORD_GET_CAP cpu_to_be32(101)
+#define TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM cpu_to_be32(70)
static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getcap_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
@@ -919,7 +915,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_pcrs);
#define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE 314
#define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK cpu_to_be32(124)
-struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
+static struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
.length = cpu_to_be32(30),
.ordinal = TPM_ORD_READPUBEK
@@ -1175,7 +1171,7 @@ int tpm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
flush_work(&chip->work);
file->private_data = NULL;
atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
- kfree(chip->data_buffer);
+ kzfree(chip->data_buffer);
clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
put_device(chip->dev);
return 0;
@@ -1227,7 +1223,6 @@ ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
del_singleshot_timer_sync(&chip->user_read_timer);
flush_work(&chip->work);
ret_size = atomic_read(&chip->data_pending);
- atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
if (ret_size > 0) { /* relay data */
ssize_t orig_ret_size = ret_size;
if (size < ret_size)
@@ -1242,6 +1237,8 @@ ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
}
+ atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
+
return ret_size;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_read);
@@ -1326,6 +1323,58 @@ int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_resume);
+#define TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE 18
+static struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
+ .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+ .length = cpu_to_be32(14),
+ .ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM
+};
+
+/**
+ * tpm_get_random() - Get random bytes from the tpm's RNG
+ * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
+ * @out: destination buffer for the random bytes
+ * @max: the max number of bytes to write to @out
+ *
+ * Returns < 0 on error and the number of bytes read on success
+ */
+int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+ u32 recd, num_bytes = min_t(u32, max, TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA);
+ int err, total = 0, retries = 5;
+ u8 *dest = out;
+
+ chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+ if (chip == NULL)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (!out || !num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ do {
+ tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getrandom_header;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_in.num_bytes = cpu_to_be32(num_bytes);
+
+ err = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd,
+ TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE + num_bytes,
+ "attempting get random");
+ if (err)
+ break;
+
+ recd = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_out.rng_data_len);
+ memcpy(dest, tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_out.rng_data, recd);
+
+ dest += recd;
+ total += recd;
+ num_bytes -= recd;
+ } while (retries-- && total < max);
+
+ return total ? total : -EIO;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random);
+
/* In case vendor provided release function, call it too.*/
void tpm_dev_vendor_release(struct tpm_chip *chip)
@@ -1346,7 +1395,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_dev_vendor_release);
* Once all references to platform device are down to 0,
* release all allocated structures.
*/
-void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
+static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
{
struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
@@ -1427,6 +1476,11 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_register_hardware(struct device *dev,
goto put_device;
}
+ if (sys_add_ppi(&dev->kobj)) {
+ misc_deregister(&chip->vendor.miscdev);
+ goto put_device;
+ }
+
chip->bios_dir = tpm_bios_log_setup(devname);
/* Make chip available */
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 917f727e6740..02c266aa2bf7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -28,6 +28,12 @@
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
+enum tpm_const {
+ TPM_MINOR = 224, /* officially assigned */
+ TPM_BUFSIZE = 4096,
+ TPM_NUM_DEVICES = 256,
+};
+
enum tpm_timeout {
TPM_TIMEOUT = 5, /* msecs */
};
@@ -94,6 +100,7 @@ struct tpm_vendor_specific {
bool timeout_adjusted;
unsigned long duration[3]; /* jiffies */
bool duration_adjusted;
+ void *data;
wait_queue_head_t read_queue;
wait_queue_head_t int_queue;
@@ -269,6 +276,21 @@ struct tpm_pcrextend_in {
u8 hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
}__attribute__((packed));
+/* 128 bytes is an arbitrary cap. This could be as large as TPM_BUFSIZE - 18
+ * bytes, but 128 is still a relatively large number of random bytes and
+ * anything much bigger causes users of struct tpm_cmd_t to start getting
+ * compiler warnings about stack frame size. */
+#define TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA 128
+
+struct tpm_getrandom_out {
+ __be32 rng_data_len;
+ u8 rng_data[TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA];
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_getrandom_in {
+ __be32 num_bytes;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
typedef union {
struct tpm_getcap_params_out getcap_out;
struct tpm_readpubek_params_out readpubek_out;
@@ -277,6 +299,8 @@ typedef union {
struct tpm_pcrread_in pcrread_in;
struct tpm_pcrread_out pcrread_out;
struct tpm_pcrextend_in pcrextend_in;
+ struct tpm_getrandom_in getrandom_in;
+ struct tpm_getrandom_out getrandom_out;
} tpm_cmd_params;
struct tpm_cmd_t {
@@ -303,15 +327,12 @@ extern int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *);
extern int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *);
extern int wait_for_tpm_stat(struct tpm_chip *, u8, unsigned long,
wait_queue_head_t *);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
-extern struct dentry ** tpm_bios_log_setup(char *);
-extern void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **);
+extern ssize_t sys_add_ppi(struct kobject *parent);
#else
-static inline struct dentry ** tpm_bios_log_setup(char *name)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-static inline void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **dir)
+static inline ssize_t sys_add_ppi(struct kobject *parent)
{
+ return 0;
}
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..56051d0c97a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Seiji Munetoh <munetoh@jp.ibm.com>
+ * Stefan Berger <stefanb@us.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
+ *
+ * Access to the eventlog extended by the TCG BIOS of PC platform
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <acpi/acpi.h>
+
+#include "tpm.h"
+#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
+
+struct acpi_tcpa {
+ struct acpi_table_header hdr;
+ u16 platform_class;
+ union {
+ struct client_hdr {
+ u32 log_max_len __attribute__ ((packed));
+ u64 log_start_addr __attribute__ ((packed));
+ } client;
+ struct server_hdr {
+ u16 reserved;
+ u64 log_max_len __attribute__ ((packed));
+ u64 log_start_addr __attribute__ ((packed));
+ } server;
+ };
+};
+
+/* read binary bios log */
+int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log)
+{
+ struct acpi_tcpa *buff;
+ acpi_status status;
+ void __iomem *virt;
+ u64 len, start;
+
+ if (log->bios_event_log != NULL) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "%s: ERROR - Eventlog already initialized\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /* Find TCPA entry in RSDT (ACPI_LOGICAL_ADDRESSING) */
+ status = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TCPA, 1,
+ (struct acpi_table_header **)&buff);
+
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - Could not get TCPA table\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ switch(buff->platform_class) {
+ case BIOS_SERVER:
+ len = buff->server.log_max_len;
+ start = buff->server.log_start_addr;
+ break;
+ case BIOS_CLIENT:
+ default:
+ len = buff->client.log_max_len;
+ start = buff->client.log_start_addr;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!len) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - TCPA log area empty\n", __func__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ /* malloc EventLog space */
+ log->bios_event_log = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!log->bios_event_log) {
+ printk("%s: ERROR - Not enough Memory for BIOS measurements\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + len;
+
+ virt = acpi_os_map_memory(start, len);
+ if (!virt) {
+ kfree(log->bios_event_log);
+ printk("%s: ERROR - Unable to map memory\n", __func__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ memcpy_fromio(log->bios_event_log, virt, len);
+
+ acpi_os_unmap_memory(virt, len);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
index 0636520fa9bf..84ddc557b8f8 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_bios.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
/*
- * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2005, 2012 IBM Corporation
*
* Authors:
+ * Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* Seiji Munetoh <munetoh@jp.ibm.com>
* Stefan Berger <stefanb@us.ibm.com>
* Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
@@ -9,7 +10,7 @@
*
* Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
*
- * Access to the eventlog extended by the TCG BIOS of PC platform
+ * Access to the eventlog created by a system's firmware / BIOS
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -23,67 +24,10 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <acpi/acpi.h>
-#include "tpm.h"
-
-#define TCG_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255
-#define MAX_TEXT_EVENT 1000 /* Max event string length */
-#define ACPI_TCPA_SIG "TCPA" /* 0x41504354 /'TCPA' */
-
-enum bios_platform_class {
- BIOS_CLIENT = 0x00,
- BIOS_SERVER = 0x01,
-};
-
-struct tpm_bios_log {
- void *bios_event_log;
- void *bios_event_log_end;
-};
-
-struct acpi_tcpa {
- struct acpi_table_header hdr;
- u16 platform_class;
- union {
- struct client_hdr {
- u32 log_max_len __attribute__ ((packed));
- u64 log_start_addr __attribute__ ((packed));
- } client;
- struct server_hdr {
- u16 reserved;
- u64 log_max_len __attribute__ ((packed));
- u64 log_start_addr __attribute__ ((packed));
- } server;
- };
-};
-struct tcpa_event {
- u32 pcr_index;
- u32 event_type;
- u8 pcr_value[20]; /* SHA1 */
- u32 event_size;
- u8 event_data[0];
-};
+#include "tpm.h"
+#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
-enum tcpa_event_types {
- PREBOOT = 0,
- POST_CODE,
- UNUSED,
- NO_ACTION,
- SEPARATOR,
- ACTION,
- EVENT_TAG,
- SCRTM_CONTENTS,
- SCRTM_VERSION,
- CPU_MICROCODE,
- PLATFORM_CONFIG_FLAGS,
- TABLE_OF_DEVICES,
- COMPACT_HASH,
- IPL,
- IPL_PARTITION_DATA,
- NONHOST_CODE,
- NONHOST_CONFIG,
- NONHOST_INFO,
-};
static const char* tcpa_event_type_strings[] = {
"PREBOOT",
@@ -106,28 +50,6 @@ static const char* tcpa_event_type_strings[] = {
"Non-Host Info"
};
-struct tcpa_pc_event {
- u32 event_id;
- u32 event_size;
- u8 event_data[0];
-};
-
-enum tcpa_pc_event_ids {
- SMBIOS = 1,
- BIS_CERT,
- POST_BIOS_ROM,
- ESCD,
- CMOS,
- NVRAM,
- OPTION_ROM_EXEC,
- OPTION_ROM_CONFIG,
- OPTION_ROM_MICROCODE = 10,
- S_CRTM_VERSION,
- S_CRTM_CONTENTS,
- POST_CONTENTS,
- HOST_TABLE_OF_DEVICES,
-};
-
static const char* tcpa_pc_event_id_strings[] = {
"",
"SMBIOS",
@@ -358,65 +280,6 @@ static const struct seq_operations tpm_binary_b_measurments_seqops = {
.show = tpm_binary_bios_measurements_show,
};
-/* read binary bios log */
-static int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log)
-{
- struct acpi_tcpa *buff;
- acpi_status status;
- struct acpi_table_header *virt;
- u64 len, start;
-
- if (log->bios_event_log != NULL) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "%s: ERROR - Eventlog already initialized\n",
- __func__);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- /* Find TCPA entry in RSDT (ACPI_LOGICAL_ADDRESSING) */
- status = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TCPA, 1,
- (struct acpi_table_header **)&buff);
-
- if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - Could not get TCPA table\n",
- __func__);
- return -EIO;
- }
-
- switch(buff->platform_class) {
- case BIOS_SERVER:
- len = buff->server.log_max_len;
- start = buff->server.log_start_addr;
- break;
- case BIOS_CLIENT:
- default:
- len = buff->client.log_max_len;
- start = buff->client.log_start_addr;
- break;
- }
- if (!len) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - TCPA log area empty\n", __func__);
- return -EIO;
- }
-
- /* malloc EventLog space */
- log->bios_event_log = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!log->bios_event_log) {
- printk("%s: ERROR - Not enough Memory for BIOS measurements\n",
- __func__);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + len;
-
- virt = acpi_os_map_memory(start, len);
-
- memcpy(log->bios_event_log, virt, len);
-
- acpi_os_unmap_memory(virt, len);
- return 0;
-}
-
static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode,
struct file *file)
{
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e7da086d6928
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+
+#ifndef __TPM_EVENTLOG_H__
+#define __TPM_EVENTLOG_H__
+
+#define TCG_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255
+#define MAX_TEXT_EVENT 1000 /* Max event string length */
+#define ACPI_TCPA_SIG "TCPA" /* 0x41504354 /'TCPA' */
+
+enum bios_platform_class {
+ BIOS_CLIENT = 0x00,
+ BIOS_SERVER = 0x01,
+};
+
+struct tpm_bios_log {
+ void *bios_event_log;
+ void *bios_event_log_end;
+};
+
+struct tcpa_event {
+ u32 pcr_index;
+ u32 event_type;
+ u8 pcr_value[20]; /* SHA1 */
+ u32 event_size;
+ u8 event_data[0];
+};
+
+enum tcpa_event_types {
+ PREBOOT = 0,
+ POST_CODE,
+ UNUSED,
+ NO_ACTION,
+ SEPARATOR,
+ ACTION,
+ EVENT_TAG,
+ SCRTM_CONTENTS,
+ SCRTM_VERSION,
+ CPU_MICROCODE,
+ PLATFORM_CONFIG_FLAGS,
+ TABLE_OF_DEVICES,
+ COMPACT_HASH,
+ IPL,
+ IPL_PARTITION_DATA,
+ NONHOST_CODE,
+ NONHOST_CONFIG,
+ NONHOST_INFO,
+};
+
+struct tcpa_pc_event {
+ u32 event_id;
+ u32 event_size;
+ u8 event_data[0];
+};
+
+enum tcpa_pc_event_ids {
+ SMBIOS = 1,
+ BIS_CERT,
+ POST_BIOS_ROM,
+ ESCD,
+ CMOS,
+ NVRAM,
+ OPTION_ROM_EXEC,
+ OPTION_ROM_CONFIG,
+ OPTION_ROM_MICROCODE = 10,
+ S_CRTM_VERSION,
+ S_CRTM_CONTENTS,
+ POST_CONTENTS,
+ HOST_TABLE_OF_DEVICES,
+};
+
+int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM_MODULE) || \
+ defined(CONFIG_ACPI)
+extern struct dentry **tpm_bios_log_setup(char *);
+extern void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **);
+#else
+static inline struct dentry **tpm_bios_log_setup(char *name)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+static inline void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **dir)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5a831aec9d4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c
@@ -0,0 +1,695 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Infineon Technologies
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Peter Huewe <peter.huewe@infineon.com>
+ *
+ * Device driver for TCG/TCPA TPM (trusted platform module).
+ * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
+ *
+ * This device driver implements the TPM interface as defined in
+ * the TCG TPM Interface Spec version 1.2, revision 1.0 and the
+ * Infineon I2C Protocol Stack Specification v0.20.
+ *
+ * It is based on the original tpm_tis device driver from Leendert van
+ * Dorn and Kyleen Hall.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/i2c.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include "tpm.h"
+
+/* max. buffer size supported by our TPM */
+#define TPM_BUFSIZE 1260
+
+/* max. number of iterations after I2C NAK */
+#define MAX_COUNT 3
+
+#define SLEEP_DURATION_LOW 55
+#define SLEEP_DURATION_HI 65
+
+/* max. number of iterations after I2C NAK for 'long' commands
+ * we need this especially for sending TPM_READY, since the cleanup after the
+ * transtion to the ready state may take some time, but it is unpredictable
+ * how long it will take.
+ */
+#define MAX_COUNT_LONG 50
+
+#define SLEEP_DURATION_LONG_LOW 200
+#define SLEEP_DURATION_LONG_HI 220
+
+/* After sending TPM_READY to 'reset' the TPM we have to sleep even longer */
+#define SLEEP_DURATION_RESET_LOW 2400
+#define SLEEP_DURATION_RESET_HI 2600
+
+/* we want to use usleep_range instead of msleep for the 5ms TPM_TIMEOUT */
+#define TPM_TIMEOUT_US_LOW (TPM_TIMEOUT * 1000)
+#define TPM_TIMEOUT_US_HI (TPM_TIMEOUT_US_LOW + 2000)
+
+/* expected value for DIDVID register */
+#define TPM_TIS_I2C_DID_VID 0x000b15d1L
+
+/* Structure to store I2C TPM specific stuff */
+struct tpm_inf_dev {
+ struct i2c_client *client;
+ u8 buf[TPM_BUFSIZE + sizeof(u8)]; /* max. buffer size + addr */
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+};
+
+static struct tpm_inf_dev tpm_dev;
+static struct i2c_driver tpm_tis_i2c_driver;
+
+/*
+ * iic_tpm_read() - read from TPM register
+ * @addr: register address to read from
+ * @buffer: provided by caller
+ * @len: number of bytes to read
+ *
+ * Read len bytes from TPM register and put them into
+ * buffer (little-endian format, i.e. first byte is put into buffer[0]).
+ *
+ * NOTE: TPM is big-endian for multi-byte values. Multi-byte
+ * values have to be swapped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: We can't unfortunately use the combined read/write functions
+ * provided by the i2c core as the TPM currently does not support the
+ * repeated start condition and due to it's special requirements.
+ * The i2c_smbus* functions do not work for this chip.
+ *
+ * Return -EIO on error, 0 on success.
+ */
+static int iic_tpm_read(u8 addr, u8 *buffer, size_t len)
+{
+
+ struct i2c_msg msg1 = { tpm_dev.client->addr, 0, 1, &addr };
+ struct i2c_msg msg2 = { tpm_dev.client->addr, I2C_M_RD, len, buffer };
+
+ int rc;
+ int count;
+
+ /* Lock the adapter for the duration of the whole sequence. */
+ if (!tpm_dev.client->adapter->algo->master_xfer)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ i2c_lock_adapter(tpm_dev.client->adapter);
+
+ for (count = 0; count < MAX_COUNT; count++) {
+ rc = __i2c_transfer(tpm_dev.client->adapter, &msg1, 1);
+ if (rc > 0)
+ break; /* break here to skip sleep */
+
+ usleep_range(SLEEP_DURATION_LOW, SLEEP_DURATION_HI);
+ }
+
+ if (rc <= 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* After the TPM has successfully received the register address it needs
+ * some time, thus we're sleeping here again, before retrieving the data
+ */
+ for (count = 0; count < MAX_COUNT; count++) {
+ usleep_range(SLEEP_DURATION_LOW, SLEEP_DURATION_HI);
+ rc = __i2c_transfer(tpm_dev.client->adapter, &msg2, 1);
+ if (rc > 0)
+ break;
+
+ }
+
+out:
+ i2c_unlock_adapter(tpm_dev.client->adapter);
+ if (rc <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int iic_tpm_write_generic(u8 addr, u8 *buffer, size_t len,
+ unsigned int sleep_low,
+ unsigned int sleep_hi, u8 max_count)
+{
+ int rc = -EIO;
+ int count;
+
+ struct i2c_msg msg1 = { tpm_dev.client->addr, 0, len + 1, tpm_dev.buf };
+
+ if (len > TPM_BUFSIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!tpm_dev.client->adapter->algo->master_xfer)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ i2c_lock_adapter(tpm_dev.client->adapter);
+
+ /* prepend the 'register address' to the buffer */
+ tpm_dev.buf[0] = addr;
+ memcpy(&(tpm_dev.buf[1]), buffer, len);
+
+ /*
+ * NOTE: We have to use these special mechanisms here and unfortunately
+ * cannot rely on the standard behavior of i2c_transfer.
+ */
+ for (count = 0; count < max_count; count++) {
+ rc = __i2c_transfer(tpm_dev.client->adapter, &msg1, 1);
+ if (rc > 0)
+ break;
+
+ usleep_range(sleep_low, sleep_hi);
+ }
+
+ i2c_unlock_adapter(tpm_dev.client->adapter);
+ if (rc <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * iic_tpm_write() - write to TPM register
+ * @addr: register address to write to
+ * @buffer: containing data to be written
+ * @len: number of bytes to write
+ *
+ * Write len bytes from provided buffer to TPM register (little
+ * endian format, i.e. buffer[0] is written as first byte).
+ *
+ * NOTE: TPM is big-endian for multi-byte values. Multi-byte
+ * values have to be swapped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: use this function instead of the iic_tpm_write_generic function.
+ *
+ * Return -EIO on error, 0 on success
+ */
+static int iic_tpm_write(u8 addr, u8 *buffer, size_t len)
+{
+ return iic_tpm_write_generic(addr, buffer, len, SLEEP_DURATION_LOW,
+ SLEEP_DURATION_HI, MAX_COUNT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is needed especially for the cleanup situation after
+ * sending TPM_READY
+ * */
+static int iic_tpm_write_long(u8 addr, u8 *buffer, size_t len)
+{
+ return iic_tpm_write_generic(addr, buffer, len, SLEEP_DURATION_LONG_LOW,
+ SLEEP_DURATION_LONG_HI, MAX_COUNT_LONG);
+}
+
+enum tis_access {
+ TPM_ACCESS_VALID = 0x80,
+ TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY = 0x20,
+ TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_PENDING = 0x04,
+ TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE = 0x02,
+};
+
+enum tis_status {
+ TPM_STS_VALID = 0x80,
+ TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY = 0x40,
+ TPM_STS_GO = 0x20,
+ TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL = 0x10,
+ TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT = 0x08,
+};
+
+enum tis_defaults {
+ TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT = 750, /* ms */
+ TIS_LONG_TIMEOUT = 2000, /* 2 sec */
+};
+
+#define TPM_ACCESS(l) (0x0000 | ((l) << 4))
+#define TPM_STS(l) (0x0001 | ((l) << 4))
+#define TPM_DATA_FIFO(l) (0x0005 | ((l) << 4))
+#define TPM_DID_VID(l) (0x0006 | ((l) << 4))
+
+static int check_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int loc)
+{
+ u8 buf;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = iic_tpm_read(TPM_ACCESS(loc), &buf, 1);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ if ((buf & (TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) ==
+ (TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) {
+ chip->vendor.locality = loc;
+ return loc;
+ }
+
+ return -EIO;
+}
+
+/* implementation similar to tpm_tis */
+static void release_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int loc, int force)
+{
+ u8 buf;
+ if (iic_tpm_read(TPM_ACCESS(loc), &buf, 1) < 0)
+ return;
+
+ if (force || (buf & (TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_PENDING | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) ==
+ (TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_PENDING | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) {
+ buf = TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY;
+ iic_tpm_write(TPM_ACCESS(loc), &buf, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+static int request_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int loc)
+{
+ unsigned long stop;
+ u8 buf = TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE;
+
+ if (check_locality(chip, loc) >= 0)
+ return loc;
+
+ iic_tpm_write(TPM_ACCESS(loc), &buf, 1);
+
+ /* wait for burstcount */
+ stop = jiffies + chip->vendor.timeout_a;
+ do {
+ if (check_locality(chip, loc) >= 0)
+ return loc;
+ usleep_range(TPM_TIMEOUT_US_LOW, TPM_TIMEOUT_US_HI);
+ } while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
+
+ return -ETIME;
+}
+
+static u8 tpm_tis_i2c_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ /* NOTE: since I2C read may fail, return 0 in this case --> time-out */
+ u8 buf;
+ if (iic_tpm_read(TPM_STS(chip->vendor.locality), &buf, 1) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return buf;
+}
+
+static void tpm_tis_i2c_ready(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ /* this causes the current command to be aborted */
+ u8 buf = TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY;
+ iic_tpm_write_long(TPM_STS(chip->vendor.locality), &buf, 1);
+}
+
+static ssize_t get_burstcount(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ unsigned long stop;
+ ssize_t burstcnt;
+ u8 buf[3];
+
+ /* wait for burstcount */
+ /* which timeout value, spec has 2 answers (c & d) */
+ stop = jiffies + chip->vendor.timeout_d;
+ do {
+ /* Note: STS is little endian */
+ if (iic_tpm_read(TPM_STS(chip->vendor.locality)+1, buf, 3) < 0)
+ burstcnt = 0;
+ else
+ burstcnt = (buf[2] << 16) + (buf[1] << 8) + buf[0];
+
+ if (burstcnt)
+ return burstcnt;
+
+ usleep_range(TPM_TIMEOUT_US_LOW, TPM_TIMEOUT_US_HI);
+ } while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
+ return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+static int wait_for_stat(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, unsigned long timeout,
+ int *status)
+{
+ unsigned long stop;
+
+ /* check current status */
+ *status = tpm_tis_i2c_status(chip);
+ if ((*status & mask) == mask)
+ return 0;
+
+ stop = jiffies + timeout;
+ do {
+ /* since we just checked the status, give the TPM some time */
+ usleep_range(TPM_TIMEOUT_US_LOW, TPM_TIMEOUT_US_HI);
+ *status = tpm_tis_i2c_status(chip);
+ if ((*status & mask) == mask)
+ return 0;
+
+ } while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
+
+ return -ETIME;
+}
+
+static int recv_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ size_t size = 0;
+ ssize_t burstcnt;
+ u8 retries = 0;
+ int rc;
+
+ while (size < count) {
+ burstcnt = get_burstcount(chip);
+
+ /* burstcnt < 0 = TPM is busy */
+ if (burstcnt < 0)
+ return burstcnt;
+
+ /* limit received data to max. left */
+ if (burstcnt > (count - size))
+ burstcnt = count - size;
+
+ rc = iic_tpm_read(TPM_DATA_FIFO(chip->vendor.locality),
+ &(buf[size]), burstcnt);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ size += burstcnt;
+ else if (rc < 0)
+ retries++;
+
+ /* avoid endless loop in case of broken HW */
+ if (retries > MAX_COUNT_LONG)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ }
+ return size;
+}
+
+static int tpm_tis_i2c_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ int size = 0;
+ int expected, status;
+
+ if (count < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ size = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* read first 10 bytes, including tag, paramsize, and result */
+ size = recv_data(chip, buf, TPM_HEADER_SIZE);
+ if (size < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ dev_err(chip->dev, "Unable to read header\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ expected = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)(buf + 2));
+ if ((size_t) expected > count) {
+ size = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ size += recv_data(chip, &buf[TPM_HEADER_SIZE],
+ expected - TPM_HEADER_SIZE);
+ if (size < expected) {
+ dev_err(chip->dev, "Unable to read remainder of result\n");
+ size = -ETIME;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ wait_for_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->vendor.timeout_c, &status);
+ if (status & TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL) { /* retry? */
+ dev_err(chip->dev, "Error left over data\n");
+ size = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ tpm_tis_i2c_ready(chip);
+ /* The TPM needs some time to clean up here,
+ * so we sleep rather than keeping the bus busy
+ */
+ usleep_range(SLEEP_DURATION_RESET_LOW, SLEEP_DURATION_RESET_HI);
+ release_locality(chip, chip->vendor.locality, 0);
+ return size;
+}
+
+static int tpm_tis_i2c_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int rc, status;
+ ssize_t burstcnt;
+ size_t count = 0;
+ u8 retries = 0;
+ u8 sts = TPM_STS_GO;
+
+ if (len > TPM_BUFSIZE)
+ return -E2BIG; /* command is too long for our tpm, sorry */
+
+ if (request_locality(chip, 0) < 0)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ status = tpm_tis_i2c_status(chip);
+ if ((status & TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY) == 0) {
+ tpm_tis_i2c_ready(chip);
+ if (wait_for_stat
+ (chip, TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY,
+ chip->vendor.timeout_b, &status) < 0) {
+ rc = -ETIME;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (count < len - 1) {
+ burstcnt = get_burstcount(chip);
+
+ /* burstcnt < 0 = TPM is busy */
+ if (burstcnt < 0)
+ return burstcnt;
+
+ if (burstcnt > (len - 1 - count))
+ burstcnt = len - 1 - count;
+
+ rc = iic_tpm_write(TPM_DATA_FIFO(chip->vendor.locality),
+ &(buf[count]), burstcnt);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ count += burstcnt;
+ else if (rc < 0)
+ retries++;
+
+ /* avoid endless loop in case of broken HW */
+ if (retries > MAX_COUNT_LONG) {
+ rc = -EIO;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ wait_for_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID,
+ chip->vendor.timeout_c, &status);
+
+ if ((status & TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT) == 0) {
+ rc = -EIO;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /* write last byte */
+ iic_tpm_write(TPM_DATA_FIFO(chip->vendor.locality), &(buf[count]), 1);
+ wait_for_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->vendor.timeout_c, &status);
+ if ((status & TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT) != 0) {
+ rc = -EIO;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ /* go and do it */
+ iic_tpm_write(TPM_STS(chip->vendor.locality), &sts, 1);
+
+ return len;
+out_err:
+ tpm_tis_i2c_ready(chip);
+ /* The TPM needs some time to clean up here,
+ * so we sleep rather than keeping the bus busy
+ */
+ usleep_range(SLEEP_DURATION_RESET_LOW, SLEEP_DURATION_RESET_HI);
+ release_locality(chip, chip->vendor.locality, 0);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations tis_ops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .llseek = no_llseek,
+ .open = tpm_open,
+ .read = tpm_read,
+ .write = tpm_write,
+ .release = tpm_release,
+};
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(pubek, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_pubek, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(pcrs, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_pcrs, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(enabled, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_enabled, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(active, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_active, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(owned, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_owned, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(temp_deactivated, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_temp_deactivated, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps_1_2, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(cancel, S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP, NULL, tpm_store_cancel);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(durations, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_durations, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(timeouts, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_timeouts, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *tis_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_pubek.attr,
+ &dev_attr_pcrs.attr,
+ &dev_attr_enabled.attr,
+ &dev_attr_active.attr,
+ &dev_attr_owned.attr,
+ &dev_attr_temp_deactivated.attr,
+ &dev_attr_caps.attr,
+ &dev_attr_cancel.attr,
+ &dev_attr_durations.attr,
+ &dev_attr_timeouts.attr,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+static struct attribute_group tis_attr_grp = {
+ .attrs = tis_attrs
+};
+
+static struct tpm_vendor_specific tpm_tis_i2c = {
+ .status = tpm_tis_i2c_status,
+ .recv = tpm_tis_i2c_recv,
+ .send = tpm_tis_i2c_send,
+ .cancel = tpm_tis_i2c_ready,
+ .req_complete_mask = TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID,
+ .req_complete_val = TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID,
+ .req_canceled = TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY,
+ .attr_group = &tis_attr_grp,
+ .miscdev.fops = &tis_ops,
+};
+
+static int __devinit tpm_tis_i2c_init(struct device *dev)
+{
+ u32 vendor;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+
+ chip = tpm_register_hardware(dev, &tpm_tis_i2c);
+ if (!chip) {
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable interrupts */
+ chip->vendor.irq = 0;
+
+ /* Default timeouts */
+ chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+ chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_LONG_TIMEOUT);
+ chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+ chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+
+ if (request_locality(chip, 0) != 0) {
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_vendor;
+ }
+
+ /* read four bytes from DID_VID register */
+ if (iic_tpm_read(TPM_DID_VID(0), (u8 *)&vendor, 4) < 0) {
+ rc = -EIO;
+ goto out_release;
+ }
+
+ /* create DID_VID register value, after swapping to little-endian */
+ vendor = be32_to_cpu((__be32) vendor);
+
+ if (vendor != TPM_TIS_I2C_DID_VID) {
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_release;
+ }
+
+ dev_info(dev, "1.2 TPM (device-id 0x%X)\n", vendor >> 16);
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chip->vendor.list);
+ tpm_dev.chip = chip;
+
+ tpm_get_timeouts(chip);
+ tpm_do_selftest(chip);
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_release:
+ release_locality(chip, chip->vendor.locality, 1);
+
+out_vendor:
+ /* close file handles */
+ tpm_dev_vendor_release(chip);
+
+ /* remove hardware */
+ tpm_remove_hardware(chip->dev);
+
+ /* reset these pointers, otherwise we oops */
+ chip->dev->release = NULL;
+ chip->release = NULL;
+ tpm_dev.client = NULL;
+ dev_set_drvdata(chip->dev, chip);
+out_err:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct i2c_device_id tpm_tis_i2c_table[] = {
+ {"tpm_i2c_infineon", 0},
+ {},
+};
+
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, tpm_tis_i2c_table);
+static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(tpm_tis_i2c_ops, tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_pm_resume);
+
+static int __devinit tpm_tis_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
+ const struct i2c_device_id *id)
+{
+ int rc;
+ if (tpm_dev.client != NULL)
+ return -EBUSY; /* We only support one client */
+
+ if (!i2c_check_functionality(client->adapter, I2C_FUNC_I2C)) {
+ dev_err(&client->dev,
+ "no algorithms associated to the i2c bus\n");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ client->driver = &tpm_tis_i2c_driver;
+ tpm_dev.client = client;
+ rc = tpm_tis_i2c_init(&client->dev);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ client->driver = NULL;
+ tpm_dev.client = NULL;
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int __devexit tpm_tis_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = tpm_dev.chip;
+ release_locality(chip, chip->vendor.locality, 1);
+
+ /* close file handles */
+ tpm_dev_vendor_release(chip);
+
+ /* remove hardware */
+ tpm_remove_hardware(chip->dev);
+
+ /* reset these pointers, otherwise we oops */
+ chip->dev->release = NULL;
+ chip->release = NULL;
+ tpm_dev.client = NULL;
+ dev_set_drvdata(chip->dev, chip);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct i2c_driver tpm_tis_i2c_driver = {
+
+ .id_table = tpm_tis_i2c_table,
+ .probe = tpm_tis_i2c_probe,
+ .remove = tpm_tis_i2c_remove,
+ .driver = {
+ .name = "tpm_i2c_infineon",
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .pm = &tpm_tis_i2c_ops,
+ },
+};
+
+module_i2c_driver(tpm_tis_i2c_driver);
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Peter Huewe <peter.huewe@infineon.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TPM TIS I2C Infineon Driver");
+MODULE_VERSION("2.1.5");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..efc4ab36a9d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,749 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Ashley Lai <adlai@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
+ *
+ * Device driver for TCG/TCPA TPM (trusted platform module).
+ * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/dmapool.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <asm/vio.h>
+#include <asm/irq.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <asm/prom.h>
+
+#include "tpm.h"
+#include "tpm_ibmvtpm.h"
+
+static const char tpm_ibmvtpm_driver_name[] = "tpm_ibmvtpm";
+
+static struct vio_device_id tpm_ibmvtpm_device_table[] __devinitdata = {
+ { "IBM,vtpm", "IBM,vtpm"},
+ { "", "" }
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(vio, tpm_ibmvtpm_device_table);
+
+DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(wq);
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_send_crq - Send a CRQ request
+ * @vdev: vio device struct
+ * @w1: first word
+ * @w2: second word
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0 -Sucess
+ * Non-zero - Failure
+ */
+static int ibmvtpm_send_crq(struct vio_dev *vdev, u64 w1, u64 w2)
+{
+ return plpar_hcall_norets(H_SEND_CRQ, vdev->unit_address, w1, w2);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_get_data - Retrieve ibm vtpm data
+ * @dev: device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * vtpm device struct
+ */
+static struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm_get_data(const struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ if (chip)
+ return (struct ibmvtpm_dev *)chip->vendor.data;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm_ibmvtpm_recv - Receive data after send
+ * @chip: tpm chip struct
+ * @buf: buffer to read
+ * count: size of buffer
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * Number of bytes read
+ */
+static int tpm_ibmvtpm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm;
+ u16 len;
+
+ ibmvtpm = (struct ibmvtpm_dev *)chip->vendor.data;
+
+ if (!ibmvtpm->rtce_buf) {
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "ibmvtpm device is not ready\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ wait_event_interruptible(wq, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len != 0);
+
+ if (count < ibmvtpm->crq_res.len) {
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev,
+ "Invalid size in recv: count=%ld, crq_size=%d\n",
+ count, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
+ memcpy((void *)buf, (void *)ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len);
+ memset(ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, 0, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len);
+ ibmvtpm->crq_res.valid = 0;
+ ibmvtpm->crq_res.msg = 0;
+ len = ibmvtpm->crq_res.len;
+ ibmvtpm->crq_res.len = 0;
+ spin_unlock(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm_ibmvtpm_send - Send tpm request
+ * @chip: tpm chip struct
+ * @buf: buffer contains data to send
+ * count: size of buffer
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * Number of bytes sent
+ */
+static int tpm_ibmvtpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm;
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq crq;
+ u64 *word = (u64 *) &crq;
+ int rc;
+
+ ibmvtpm = (struct ibmvtpm_dev *)chip->vendor.data;
+
+ if (!ibmvtpm->rtce_buf) {
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "ibmvtpm device is not ready\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (count > ibmvtpm->rtce_size) {
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev,
+ "Invalid size in send: count=%ld, rtce_size=%d\n",
+ count, ibmvtpm->rtce_size);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
+ memcpy((void *)ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, (void *)buf, count);
+ crq.valid = (u8)IBMVTPM_VALID_CMD;
+ crq.msg = (u8)VTPM_TPM_COMMAND;
+ crq.len = (u16)count;
+ crq.data = ibmvtpm->rtce_dma_handle;
+
+ rc = ibmvtpm_send_crq(ibmvtpm->vdev, word[0], word[1]);
+ if (rc != H_SUCCESS) {
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "tpm_ibmvtpm_send failed rc=%d\n", rc);
+ rc = 0;
+ } else
+ rc = count;
+
+ spin_unlock(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void tpm_ibmvtpm_cancel(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static u8 tpm_ibmvtpm_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_crq_get_rtce_size - Send a CRQ request to get rtce size
+ * @ibmvtpm: vtpm device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0 - Success
+ * Non-zero - Failure
+ */
+static int ibmvtpm_crq_get_rtce_size(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq crq;
+ u64 *buf = (u64 *) &crq;
+ int rc;
+
+ crq.valid = (u8)IBMVTPM_VALID_CMD;
+ crq.msg = (u8)VTPM_GET_RTCE_BUFFER_SIZE;
+
+ rc = ibmvtpm_send_crq(ibmvtpm->vdev, buf[0], buf[1]);
+ if (rc != H_SUCCESS)
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev,
+ "ibmvtpm_crq_get_rtce_size failed rc=%d\n", rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_crq_get_version - Send a CRQ request to get vtpm version
+ * - Note that this is vtpm version and not tpm version
+ * @ibmvtpm: vtpm device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0 - Success
+ * Non-zero - Failure
+ */
+static int ibmvtpm_crq_get_version(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq crq;
+ u64 *buf = (u64 *) &crq;
+ int rc;
+
+ crq.valid = (u8)IBMVTPM_VALID_CMD;
+ crq.msg = (u8)VTPM_GET_VERSION;
+
+ rc = ibmvtpm_send_crq(ibmvtpm->vdev, buf[0], buf[1]);
+ if (rc != H_SUCCESS)
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev,
+ "ibmvtpm_crq_get_version failed rc=%d\n", rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_crq_send_init_complete - Send a CRQ initialize complete message
+ * @ibmvtpm: vtpm device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0 - Success
+ * Non-zero - Failure
+ */
+static int ibmvtpm_crq_send_init_complete(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = ibmvtpm_send_crq(ibmvtpm->vdev, INIT_CRQ_COMP_CMD, 0);
+ if (rc != H_SUCCESS)
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev,
+ "ibmvtpm_crq_send_init_complete failed rc=%d\n", rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_crq_send_init - Send a CRQ initialize message
+ * @ibmvtpm: vtpm device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0 - Success
+ * Non-zero - Failure
+ */
+static int ibmvtpm_crq_send_init(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = ibmvtpm_send_crq(ibmvtpm->vdev, INIT_CRQ_CMD, 0);
+ if (rc != H_SUCCESS)
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev,
+ "ibmvtpm_crq_send_init failed rc=%d\n", rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm_ibmvtpm_remove - ibm vtpm remove entry point
+ * @vdev: vio device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0
+ */
+static int __devexit tpm_ibmvtpm_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = ibmvtpm_get_data(&vdev->dev);
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ free_irq(vdev->irq, ibmvtpm);
+ tasklet_kill(&ibmvtpm->tasklet);
+
+ do {
+ if (rc)
+ msleep(100);
+ rc = plpar_hcall_norets(H_FREE_CRQ, vdev->unit_address);
+ } while (rc == H_BUSY || H_IS_LONG_BUSY(rc));
+
+ dma_unmap_single(ibmvtpm->dev, ibmvtpm->crq_dma_handle,
+ CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+ free_page((unsigned long)ibmvtpm->crq_queue.crq_addr);
+
+ if (ibmvtpm->rtce_buf) {
+ dma_unmap_single(ibmvtpm->dev, ibmvtpm->rtce_dma_handle,
+ ibmvtpm->rtce_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+ kfree(ibmvtpm->rtce_buf);
+ }
+
+ tpm_remove_hardware(ibmvtpm->dev);
+
+ kfree(ibmvtpm);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm_ibmvtpm_get_desired_dma - Get DMA size needed by this driver
+ * @vdev: vio device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * Number of bytes the driver needs to DMA map
+ */
+static unsigned long tpm_ibmvtpm_get_desired_dma(struct vio_dev *vdev)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = ibmvtpm_get_data(&vdev->dev);
+ return CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE + ibmvtpm->rtce_size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm_ibmvtpm_suspend - Suspend
+ * @dev: device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0
+ */
+static int tpm_ibmvtpm_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = ibmvtpm_get_data(dev);
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq crq;
+ u64 *buf = (u64 *) &crq;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ crq.valid = (u8)IBMVTPM_VALID_CMD;
+ crq.msg = (u8)VTPM_PREPARE_TO_SUSPEND;
+
+ rc = ibmvtpm_send_crq(ibmvtpm->vdev, buf[0], buf[1]);
+ if (rc != H_SUCCESS)
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev,
+ "tpm_ibmvtpm_suspend failed rc=%d\n", rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_reset_crq - Reset CRQ
+ * @ibmvtpm: ibm vtpm struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0 - Success
+ * Non-zero - Failure
+ */
+static int ibmvtpm_reset_crq(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ do {
+ if (rc)
+ msleep(100);
+ rc = plpar_hcall_norets(H_FREE_CRQ,
+ ibmvtpm->vdev->unit_address);
+ } while (rc == H_BUSY || H_IS_LONG_BUSY(rc));
+
+ memset(ibmvtpm->crq_queue.crq_addr, 0, CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE);
+ ibmvtpm->crq_queue.index = 0;
+
+ return plpar_hcall_norets(H_REG_CRQ, ibmvtpm->vdev->unit_address,
+ ibmvtpm->crq_dma_handle, CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm_ibmvtpm_resume - Resume from suspend
+ * @dev: device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0
+ */
+static int tpm_ibmvtpm_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = ibmvtpm_get_data(dev);
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ do {
+ if (rc)
+ msleep(100);
+ rc = plpar_hcall_norets(H_ENABLE_CRQ,
+ ibmvtpm->vdev->unit_address);
+ } while (rc == H_IN_PROGRESS || rc == H_BUSY || H_IS_LONG_BUSY(rc));
+
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Error enabling ibmvtpm rc=%d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
+ vio_disable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev);
+ tasklet_schedule(&ibmvtpm->tasklet);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
+
+ rc = ibmvtpm_crq_send_init(ibmvtpm);
+ if (rc)
+ dev_err(dev, "Error send_init rc=%d\n", rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ibmvtpm_ops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .llseek = no_llseek,
+ .open = tpm_open,
+ .read = tpm_read,
+ .write = tpm_write,
+ .release = tpm_release,
+};
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(pubek, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_pubek, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(pcrs, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_pcrs, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(enabled, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_enabled, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(active, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_active, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(owned, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_owned, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(temp_deactivated, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_temp_deactivated,
+ NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps_1_2, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(cancel, S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP, NULL, tpm_store_cancel);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(durations, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_durations, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(timeouts, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_timeouts, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *ibmvtpm_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_pubek.attr,
+ &dev_attr_pcrs.attr,
+ &dev_attr_enabled.attr,
+ &dev_attr_active.attr,
+ &dev_attr_owned.attr,
+ &dev_attr_temp_deactivated.attr,
+ &dev_attr_caps.attr,
+ &dev_attr_cancel.attr,
+ &dev_attr_durations.attr,
+ &dev_attr_timeouts.attr, NULL,
+};
+
+static struct attribute_group ibmvtpm_attr_grp = { .attrs = ibmvtpm_attrs };
+
+static const struct tpm_vendor_specific tpm_ibmvtpm = {
+ .recv = tpm_ibmvtpm_recv,
+ .send = tpm_ibmvtpm_send,
+ .cancel = tpm_ibmvtpm_cancel,
+ .status = tpm_ibmvtpm_status,
+ .req_complete_mask = 0,
+ .req_complete_val = 0,
+ .req_canceled = 0,
+ .attr_group = &ibmvtpm_attr_grp,
+ .miscdev = { .fops = &ibmvtpm_ops, },
+};
+
+static const struct dev_pm_ops tpm_ibmvtpm_pm_ops = {
+ .suspend = tpm_ibmvtpm_suspend,
+ .resume = tpm_ibmvtpm_resume,
+};
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_crq_get_next - Get next responded crq
+ * @ibmvtpm vtpm device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * vtpm crq pointer
+ */
+static struct ibmvtpm_crq *ibmvtpm_crq_get_next(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq_queue *crq_q = &ibmvtpm->crq_queue;
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq = &crq_q->crq_addr[crq_q->index];
+
+ if (crq->valid & VTPM_MSG_RES) {
+ if (++crq_q->index == crq_q->num_entry)
+ crq_q->index = 0;
+ rmb();
+ } else
+ crq = NULL;
+ return crq;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_crq_process - Process responded crq
+ * @crq crq to be processed
+ * @ibmvtpm vtpm device struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * Nothing
+ */
+static void ibmvtpm_crq_process(struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq,
+ struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ switch (crq->valid) {
+ case VALID_INIT_CRQ:
+ switch (crq->msg) {
+ case INIT_CRQ_RES:
+ dev_info(ibmvtpm->dev, "CRQ initialized\n");
+ rc = ibmvtpm_crq_send_init_complete(ibmvtpm);
+ if (rc)
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "Unable to send CRQ init complete rc=%d\n", rc);
+ return;
+ case INIT_CRQ_COMP_RES:
+ dev_info(ibmvtpm->dev,
+ "CRQ initialization completed\n");
+ return;
+ default:
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "Unknown crq message type: %d\n", crq->msg);
+ return;
+ }
+ return;
+ case IBMVTPM_VALID_CMD:
+ switch (crq->msg) {
+ case VTPM_GET_RTCE_BUFFER_SIZE_RES:
+ if (crq->len <= 0) {
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "Invalid rtce size\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ ibmvtpm->rtce_size = crq->len;
+ ibmvtpm->rtce_buf = kmalloc(ibmvtpm->rtce_size,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ibmvtpm->rtce_buf) {
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "Failed to allocate memory for rtce buffer\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ibmvtpm->rtce_dma_handle = dma_map_single(ibmvtpm->dev,
+ ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, ibmvtpm->rtce_size,
+ DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+
+ if (dma_mapping_error(ibmvtpm->dev,
+ ibmvtpm->rtce_dma_handle)) {
+ kfree(ibmvtpm->rtce_buf);
+ ibmvtpm->rtce_buf = NULL;
+ dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "Failed to dma map rtce buffer\n");
+ }
+
+ return;
+ case VTPM_GET_VERSION_RES:
+ ibmvtpm->vtpm_version = crq->data;
+ return;
+ case VTPM_TPM_COMMAND_RES:
+ ibmvtpm->crq_res.valid = crq->valid;
+ ibmvtpm->crq_res.msg = crq->msg;
+ ibmvtpm->crq_res.len = crq->len;
+ ibmvtpm->crq_res.data = crq->data;
+ wake_up_interruptible(&wq);
+ return;
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_interrupt - Interrupt handler
+ * @irq: irq number to handle
+ * @vtpm_instance: vtpm that received interrupt
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * IRQ_HANDLED
+ **/
+static irqreturn_t ibmvtpm_interrupt(int irq, void *vtpm_instance)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = (struct ibmvtpm_dev *) vtpm_instance;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
+ vio_disable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev);
+ tasklet_schedule(&ibmvtpm->tasklet);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
+
+ return IRQ_HANDLED;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_tasklet - Interrupt handler tasklet
+ * @data: ibm vtpm device struct
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * Nothing
+ **/
+static void ibmvtpm_tasklet(void *data)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = data;
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
+ while ((crq = ibmvtpm_crq_get_next(ibmvtpm)) != NULL) {
+ ibmvtpm_crq_process(crq, ibmvtpm);
+ crq->valid = 0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+
+ vio_enable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm_ibmvtpm_probe - ibm vtpm initialize entry point
+ * @vio_dev: vio device struct
+ * @id: vio device id struct
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0 - Success
+ * Non-zero - Failure
+ */
+static int __devinit tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
+ const struct vio_device_id *id)
+{
+ struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm;
+ struct device *dev = &vio_dev->dev;
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq_queue *crq_q;
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ int rc = -ENOMEM, rc1;
+
+ chip = tpm_register_hardware(dev, &tpm_ibmvtpm);
+ if (!chip) {
+ dev_err(dev, "tpm_register_hardware failed\n");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ ibmvtpm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ibmvtpm_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ibmvtpm) {
+ dev_err(dev, "kzalloc for ibmvtpm failed\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ crq_q = &ibmvtpm->crq_queue;
+ crq_q->crq_addr = (struct ibmvtpm_crq *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!crq_q->crq_addr) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Unable to allocate memory for crq_addr\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ crq_q->num_entry = CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE / sizeof(*crq_q->crq_addr);
+ ibmvtpm->crq_dma_handle = dma_map_single(dev, crq_q->crq_addr,
+ CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE,
+ DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+
+ if (dma_mapping_error(dev, ibmvtpm->crq_dma_handle)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "dma mapping failed\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ rc = plpar_hcall_norets(H_REG_CRQ, vio_dev->unit_address,
+ ibmvtpm->crq_dma_handle, CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (rc == H_RESOURCE)
+ rc = ibmvtpm_reset_crq(ibmvtpm);
+
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Unable to register CRQ rc=%d\n", rc);
+ goto reg_crq_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ tasklet_init(&ibmvtpm->tasklet, (void *)ibmvtpm_tasklet,
+ (unsigned long)ibmvtpm);
+
+ rc = request_irq(vio_dev->irq, ibmvtpm_interrupt, 0,
+ tpm_ibmvtpm_driver_name, ibmvtpm);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Error %d register irq 0x%x\n", rc, vio_dev->irq);
+ goto init_irq_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ rc = vio_enable_interrupts(vio_dev);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Error %d enabling interrupts\n", rc);
+ goto init_irq_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ crq_q->index = 0;
+
+ ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
+ ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
+ chip->vendor.data = (void *)ibmvtpm;
+
+ spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->lock);
+ spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
+
+ rc = ibmvtpm_crq_send_init(ibmvtpm);
+ if (rc)
+ goto init_irq_cleanup;
+
+ rc = ibmvtpm_crq_get_version(ibmvtpm);
+ if (rc)
+ goto init_irq_cleanup;
+
+ rc = ibmvtpm_crq_get_rtce_size(ibmvtpm);
+ if (rc)
+ goto init_irq_cleanup;
+
+ return rc;
+init_irq_cleanup:
+ tasklet_kill(&ibmvtpm->tasklet);
+ do {
+ rc1 = plpar_hcall_norets(H_FREE_CRQ, vio_dev->unit_address);
+ } while (rc1 == H_BUSY || H_IS_LONG_BUSY(rc1));
+reg_crq_cleanup:
+ dma_unmap_single(dev, ibmvtpm->crq_dma_handle, CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE,
+ DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+cleanup:
+ if (ibmvtpm) {
+ if (crq_q->crq_addr)
+ free_page((unsigned long)crq_q->crq_addr);
+ kfree(ibmvtpm);
+ }
+
+ tpm_remove_hardware(dev);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static struct vio_driver ibmvtpm_driver = {
+ .id_table = tpm_ibmvtpm_device_table,
+ .probe = tpm_ibmvtpm_probe,
+ .remove = tpm_ibmvtpm_remove,
+ .get_desired_dma = tpm_ibmvtpm_get_desired_dma,
+ .name = tpm_ibmvtpm_driver_name,
+ .pm = &tpm_ibmvtpm_pm_ops,
+};
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_module_init - Initialize ibm vtpm module
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * 0 -Success
+ * Non-zero - Failure
+ */
+static int __init ibmvtpm_module_init(void)
+{
+ return vio_register_driver(&ibmvtpm_driver);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ibmvtpm_module_exit - Teardown ibm vtpm module
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * Nothing
+ */
+static void __exit ibmvtpm_module_exit(void)
+{
+ vio_unregister_driver(&ibmvtpm_driver);
+}
+
+module_init(ibmvtpm_module_init);
+module_exit(ibmvtpm_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("adlai@us.ibm.com");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("IBM vTPM Driver");
+MODULE_VERSION("1.0");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4296eb4b4d82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Ashley Lai <adlai@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
+ *
+ * Device driver for TCG/TCPA TPM (trusted platform module).
+ * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef __TPM_IBMVTPM_H__
+#define __TPM_IBMVTPM_H__
+
+/* vTPM Message Format 1 */
+struct ibmvtpm_crq {
+ u8 valid;
+ u8 msg;
+ u16 len;
+ u32 data;
+ u64 reserved;
+} __attribute__((packed, aligned(8)));
+
+struct ibmvtpm_crq_queue {
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq_addr;
+ u32 index;
+ u32 num_entry;
+};
+
+struct ibmvtpm_dev {
+ struct device *dev;
+ struct vio_dev *vdev;
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq_queue crq_queue;
+ dma_addr_t crq_dma_handle;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ struct tasklet_struct tasklet;
+ u32 rtce_size;
+ void __iomem *rtce_buf;
+ dma_addr_t rtce_dma_handle;
+ spinlock_t rtce_lock;
+ struct ibmvtpm_crq crq_res;
+ u32 vtpm_version;
+};
+
+#define CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
+
+/* Initialize CRQ */
+#define INIT_CRQ_CMD 0xC001000000000000LL /* Init cmd */
+#define INIT_CRQ_COMP_CMD 0xC002000000000000LL /* Init complete cmd */
+#define INIT_CRQ_RES 0x01 /* Init respond */
+#define INIT_CRQ_COMP_RES 0x02 /* Init complete respond */
+#define VALID_INIT_CRQ 0xC0 /* Valid command for init crq */
+
+/* vTPM CRQ response is the message type | 0x80 */
+#define VTPM_MSG_RES 0x80
+#define IBMVTPM_VALID_CMD 0x80
+
+/* vTPM CRQ message types */
+#define VTPM_GET_VERSION 0x01
+#define VTPM_GET_VERSION_RES (0x01 | VTPM_MSG_RES)
+
+#define VTPM_TPM_COMMAND 0x02
+#define VTPM_TPM_COMMAND_RES (0x02 | VTPM_MSG_RES)
+
+#define VTPM_GET_RTCE_BUFFER_SIZE 0x03
+#define VTPM_GET_RTCE_BUFFER_SIZE_RES (0x03 | VTPM_MSG_RES)
+
+#define VTPM_PREPARE_TO_SUSPEND 0x04
+#define VTPM_PREPARE_TO_SUSPEND_RES (0x04 | VTPM_MSG_RES)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..98ba2bd1a355
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2012 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Ashley Lai <adlai@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
+ *
+ * Read the event log created by the firmware on PPC64
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/of.h>
+
+#include "tpm.h"
+#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
+
+int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log)
+{
+ struct device_node *np;
+ const u32 *sizep;
+ const __be64 *basep;
+
+ if (log->bios_event_log != NULL) {
+ pr_err("%s: ERROR - Eventlog already initialized\n", __func__);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,vtpm");
+ if (!np) {
+ pr_err("%s: ERROR - IBMVTPM not supported\n", __func__);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ sizep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-size", NULL);
+ if (sizep == NULL) {
+ pr_err("%s: ERROR - SML size not found\n", __func__);
+ goto cleanup_eio;
+ }
+ if (*sizep == 0) {
+ pr_err("%s: ERROR - event log area empty\n", __func__);
+ goto cleanup_eio;
+ }
+
+ basep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-base", NULL);
+ if (basep == NULL) {
+ pr_err(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
+ goto cleanup_eio;
+ }
+
+ of_node_put(np);
+ log->bios_event_log = kmalloc(*sizep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!log->bios_event_log) {
+ pr_err("%s: ERROR - Not enough memory for BIOS measurements\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + *sizep;
+
+ memcpy(log->bios_event_log, __va(be64_to_cpup(basep)), *sizep);
+
+ return 0;
+
+cleanup_eio:
+ of_node_put(np);
+ return -EIO;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f27b58cfae98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <acpi/acpi_drivers.h>
+#include "tpm.h"
+
+static const u8 tpm_ppi_uuid[] = {
+ 0xA6, 0xFA, 0xDD, 0x3D,
+ 0x1B, 0x36,
+ 0xB4, 0x4E,
+ 0xA4, 0x24,
+ 0x8D, 0x10, 0x08, 0x9D, 0x16, 0x53
+};
+static char *tpm_device_name = "TPM";
+
+#define TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID 1
+#define TPM_PPI_FN_VERSION 1
+#define TPM_PPI_FN_SUBREQ 2
+#define TPM_PPI_FN_GETREQ 3
+#define TPM_PPI_FN_GETACT 4
+#define TPM_PPI_FN_GETRSP 5
+#define TPM_PPI_FN_SUBREQ2 7
+#define TPM_PPI_FN_GETOPR 8
+#define PPI_TPM_REQ_MAX 22
+#define PPI_VS_REQ_START 128
+#define PPI_VS_REQ_END 255
+#define PPI_VERSION_LEN 3
+
+static acpi_status ppi_callback(acpi_handle handle, u32 level, void *context,
+ void **return_value)
+{
+ acpi_status status;
+ struct acpi_buffer buffer = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
+ status = acpi_get_name(handle, ACPI_FULL_PATHNAME, &buffer);
+ if (strstr(buffer.pointer, context) != NULL) {
+ *return_value = handle;
+ kfree(buffer.pointer);
+ return AE_CTRL_TERMINATE;
+ }
+ return AE_OK;
+}
+
+static inline void ppi_assign_params(union acpi_object params[4],
+ u64 function_num)
+{
+ params[0].type = ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER;
+ params[0].buffer.length = sizeof(tpm_ppi_uuid);
+ params[0].buffer.pointer = (char *)tpm_ppi_uuid;
+ params[1].type = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER;
+ params[1].integer.value = TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID;
+ params[2].type = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER;
+ params[2].integer.value = function_num;
+ params[3].type = ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE;
+ params[3].package.count = 0;
+ params[3].package.elements = NULL;
+}
+
+static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_version(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ acpi_handle handle;
+ acpi_status status;
+ struct acpi_object_list input;
+ struct acpi_buffer output = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
+ union acpi_object params[4];
+ union acpi_object *obj;
+
+ input.count = 4;
+ ppi_assign_params(params, TPM_PPI_FN_VERSION);
+ input.pointer = params;
+ status = acpi_walk_namespace(ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE, ACPI_ROOT_OBJECT,
+ ACPI_UINT32_MAX, ppi_callback, NULL,
+ tpm_device_name, &handle);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ status = acpi_evaluate_object_typed(handle, "_DSM", &input, &output,
+ ACPI_TYPE_STRING);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ obj = (union acpi_object *)output.pointer;
+ status = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", obj->string.pointer);
+ kfree(output.pointer);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_request(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ acpi_handle handle;
+ acpi_status status;
+ struct acpi_object_list input;
+ struct acpi_buffer output = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
+ union acpi_object params[4];
+ union acpi_object *ret_obj;
+
+ input.count = 4;
+ ppi_assign_params(params, TPM_PPI_FN_GETREQ);
+ input.pointer = params;
+ status = acpi_walk_namespace(ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE, ACPI_ROOT_OBJECT,
+ ACPI_UINT32_MAX, ppi_callback, NULL,
+ tpm_device_name, &handle);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ status = acpi_evaluate_object_typed(handle, "_DSM", &input, &output,
+ ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /*
+ * output.pointer should be of package type, including two integers.
+ * The first is function return code, 0 means success and 1 means
+ * error. The second is pending TPM operation requested by the OS, 0
+ * means none and >0 means operation value.
+ */
+ ret_obj = ((union acpi_object *)output.pointer)->package.elements;
+ if (ret_obj->type == ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER) {
+ if (ret_obj->integer.value) {
+ status = -EFAULT;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ret_obj++;
+ if (ret_obj->type == ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER)
+ status = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
+ ret_obj->integer.value);
+ else
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ }
+cleanup:
+ kfree(output.pointer);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static ssize_t tpm_store_ppi_request(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ char version[PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];
+ acpi_handle handle;
+ acpi_status status;
+ struct acpi_object_list input;
+ struct acpi_buffer output = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
+ union acpi_object params[4];
+ union acpi_object obj;
+ u32 req;
+ u64 ret;
+
+ input.count = 4;
+ ppi_assign_params(params, TPM_PPI_FN_VERSION);
+ input.pointer = params;
+ status = acpi_walk_namespace(ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE, ACPI_ROOT_OBJECT,
+ ACPI_UINT32_MAX, ppi_callback, NULL,
+ tpm_device_name, &handle);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ status = acpi_evaluate_object_typed(handle, "_DSM", &input, &output,
+ ACPI_TYPE_STRING);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ strncpy(version,
+ ((union acpi_object *)output.pointer)->string.pointer,
+ PPI_VERSION_LEN);
+ kfree(output.pointer);
+ output.length = ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER;
+ output.pointer = NULL;
+ /*
+ * the function to submit TPM operation request to pre-os environment
+ * is updated with function index from SUBREQ to SUBREQ2 since PPI
+ * version 1.1
+ */
+ if (strcmp(version, "1.1") == -1)
+ params[2].integer.value = TPM_PPI_FN_SUBREQ;
+ else
+ params[2].integer.value = TPM_PPI_FN_SUBREQ2;
+ /*
+ * PPI spec defines params[3].type as ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE. Some BIOS
+ * accept buffer/string/integer type, but some BIOS accept buffer/
+ * string/package type. For PPI version 1.0 and 1.1, use buffer type
+ * for compatibility, and use package type since 1.2 according to spec.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(version, "1.2") == -1) {
+ params[3].type = ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER;
+ params[3].buffer.length = sizeof(req);
+ sscanf(buf, "%d", &req);
+ params[3].buffer.pointer = (char *)&req;
+ } else {
+ params[3].package.count = 1;
+ obj.type = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER;
+ sscanf(buf, "%llu", &obj.integer.value);
+ params[3].package.elements = &obj;
+ }
+
+ status = acpi_evaluate_object_typed(handle, "_DSM", &input, &output,
+ ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ret = ((union acpi_object *)output.pointer)->integer.value;
+ if (ret == 0)
+ status = (acpi_status)count;
+ else if (ret == 1)
+ status = -EPERM;
+ else
+ status = -EFAULT;
+ kfree(output.pointer);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_transition_action(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ char version[PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];
+ acpi_handle handle;
+ acpi_status status;
+ struct acpi_object_list input;
+ struct acpi_buffer output = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
+ union acpi_object params[4];
+ u32 ret;
+ char *info[] = {
+ "None",
+ "Shutdown",
+ "Reboot",
+ "OS Vendor-specific",
+ "Error",
+ };
+ input.count = 4;
+ ppi_assign_params(params, TPM_PPI_FN_VERSION);
+ input.pointer = params;
+ status = acpi_walk_namespace(ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE, ACPI_ROOT_OBJECT,
+ ACPI_UINT32_MAX, ppi_callback, NULL,
+ tpm_device_name, &handle);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ status = acpi_evaluate_object_typed(handle, "_DSM", &input, &output,
+ ACPI_TYPE_STRING);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ strncpy(version,
+ ((union acpi_object *)output.pointer)->string.pointer,
+ PPI_VERSION_LEN);
+ /*
+ * PPI spec defines params[3].type as empty package, but some platforms
+ * (e.g. Capella with PPI 1.0) need integer/string/buffer type, so for
+ * compatibility, define params[3].type as buffer, if PPI version < 1.2
+ */
+ if (strcmp(version, "1.2") == -1) {
+ params[3].type = ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER;
+ params[3].buffer.length = 0;
+ params[3].buffer.pointer = NULL;
+ }
+ params[2].integer.value = TPM_PPI_FN_GETACT;
+ kfree(output.pointer);
+ output.length = ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER;
+ output.pointer = NULL;
+ status = acpi_evaluate_object_typed(handle, "_DSM", &input, &output,
+ ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ret = ((union acpi_object *)output.pointer)->integer.value;
+ if (ret < ARRAY_SIZE(info) - 1)
+ status = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d: %s\n", ret, info[ret]);
+ else
+ status = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d: %s\n", ret,
+ info[ARRAY_SIZE(info)-1]);
+ kfree(output.pointer);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_response(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ acpi_handle handle;
+ acpi_status status;
+ struct acpi_object_list input;
+ struct acpi_buffer output = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
+ union acpi_object params[4];
+ union acpi_object *ret_obj;
+ u64 req;
+
+ input.count = 4;
+ ppi_assign_params(params, TPM_PPI_FN_GETRSP);
+ input.pointer = params;
+ status = acpi_walk_namespace(ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE, ACPI_ROOT_OBJECT,
+ ACPI_UINT32_MAX, ppi_callback, NULL,
+ tpm_device_name, &handle);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ status = acpi_evaluate_object_typed(handle, "_DSM", &input, &output,
+ ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /*
+ * parameter output.pointer should be of package type, including
+ * 3 integers. The first means function return code, the second means
+ * most recent TPM operation request, and the last means response to
+ * the most recent TPM operation request. Only if the first is 0, and
+ * the second integer is not 0, the response makes sense.
+ */
+ ret_obj = ((union acpi_object *)output.pointer)->package.elements;
+ if (ret_obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER) {
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (ret_obj->integer.value) {
+ status = -EFAULT;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ret_obj++;
+ if (ret_obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER) {
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (ret_obj->integer.value) {
+ req = ret_obj->integer.value;
+ ret_obj++;
+ if (ret_obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER) {
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (ret_obj->integer.value == 0)
+ status = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu %s\n", req,
+ "0: Success");
+ else if (ret_obj->integer.value == 0xFFFFFFF0)
+ status = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu %s\n", req,
+ "0xFFFFFFF0: User Abort");
+ else if (ret_obj->integer.value == 0xFFFFFFF1)
+ status = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu %s\n", req,
+ "0xFFFFFFF1: BIOS Failure");
+ else if (ret_obj->integer.value >= 1 &&
+ ret_obj->integer.value <= 0x00000FFF)
+ status = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu %llu: %s\n",
+ req, ret_obj->integer.value,
+ "Corresponding TPM error");
+ else
+ status = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu %llu: %s\n",
+ req, ret_obj->integer.value,
+ "Error");
+ } else {
+ status = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu: %s\n",
+ ret_obj->integer.value, "No Recent Request");
+ }
+cleanup:
+ kfree(output.pointer);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static ssize_t show_ppi_operations(char *buf, u32 start, u32 end)
+{
+ char *str = buf;
+ char version[PPI_VERSION_LEN];
+ acpi_handle handle;
+ acpi_status status;
+ struct acpi_object_list input;
+ struct acpi_buffer output = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
+ union acpi_object params[4];
+ union acpi_object obj;
+ int i;
+ u32 ret;
+ char *info[] = {
+ "Not implemented",
+ "BIOS only",
+ "Blocked for OS by BIOS",
+ "User required",
+ "User not required",
+ };
+ input.count = 4;
+ ppi_assign_params(params, TPM_PPI_FN_VERSION);
+ input.pointer = params;
+ status = acpi_walk_namespace(ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE, ACPI_ROOT_OBJECT,
+ ACPI_UINT32_MAX, ppi_callback, NULL,
+ tpm_device_name, &handle);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ status = acpi_evaluate_object_typed(handle, "_DSM", &input, &output,
+ ACPI_TYPE_STRING);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ strncpy(version,
+ ((union acpi_object *)output.pointer)->string.pointer,
+ PPI_VERSION_LEN);
+ kfree(output.pointer);
+ output.length = ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER;
+ output.pointer = NULL;
+ if (strcmp(version, "1.2") == -1)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ params[2].integer.value = TPM_PPI_FN_GETOPR;
+ params[3].package.count = 1;
+ obj.type = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER;
+ params[3].package.elements = &obj;
+ for (i = start; i <= end; i++) {
+ obj.integer.value = i;
+ status = acpi_evaluate_object_typed(handle, "_DSM",
+ &input, &output, ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = ((union acpi_object *)output.pointer)->integer.value;
+ if (ret > 0 && ret < ARRAY_SIZE(info))
+ str += scnprintf(str, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d: %s\n",
+ i, ret, info[ret]);
+ kfree(output.pointer);
+ output.length = ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER;
+ output.pointer = NULL;
+ }
+ return str - buf;
+}
+
+static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_tcg_operations(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return show_ppi_operations(buf, 0, PPI_TPM_REQ_MAX);
+}
+
+static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_vs_operations(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return show_ppi_operations(buf, PPI_VS_REQ_START, PPI_VS_REQ_END);
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(version, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_ppi_version, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(request, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP,
+ tpm_show_ppi_request, tpm_store_ppi_request);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(transition_action, S_IRUGO,
+ tpm_show_ppi_transition_action, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(response, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_ppi_response, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(tcg_operations, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_ppi_tcg_operations, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(vs_operations, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_ppi_vs_operations, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *ppi_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_version.attr,
+ &dev_attr_request.attr,
+ &dev_attr_transition_action.attr,
+ &dev_attr_response.attr,
+ &dev_attr_tcg_operations.attr,
+ &dev_attr_vs_operations.attr, NULL,
+};
+static struct attribute_group ppi_attr_grp = {
+ .attrs = ppi_attrs
+};
+
+ssize_t sys_add_ppi(struct kobject *parent)
+{
+ struct kobject *ppi;
+ ppi = kobject_create_and_add("ppi", parent);
+ if (sysfs_create_group(ppi, &ppi_attr_grp))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sys_add_ppi);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index c4be3519a587..6bdf2671254f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -705,6 +705,7 @@ out_err:
return rc;
}
+#if defined(CONFIG_PNP) || defined(CONFIG_PM_SLEEP)
static void tpm_tis_reenable_interrupts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
u32 intmask;
@@ -725,7 +726,7 @@ static void tpm_tis_reenable_interrupts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
iowrite32(intmask,
chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality));
}
-
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
static int __devinit tpm_tis_pnp_init(struct pnp_dev *pnp_dev,
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 29e38a1f7f77..cce7df53b694 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
/**
* inode_change_ok - check if attribute changes to an inode are allowed
@@ -247,6 +248,7 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr)
if (!error) {
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
+ ima_inode_post_setattr(dentry);
evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
}
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index c6780163bf3e..dac67923330f 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -243,10 +243,10 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
if (file->f_op && file->f_op->fasync)
file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
}
+ ima_file_free(file);
if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
file->f_op->release(inode, file);
security_file_free(file);
- ima_file_free(file);
if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL &&
!(file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index ca15fbd391c8..1780f062dbaf 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -296,11 +296,13 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
if (error)
return error;
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
- if (error)
+ if (error) {
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return error;
+ }
- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
error = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, name);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 12367cbadfe1..e7c836d961ea 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ extern int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid);
#define audit_get_loginuid(t) ((t)->loginuid)
#define audit_get_sessionid(t) ((t)->sessionid)
extern void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk);
extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode);
extern int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -642,6 +643,7 @@ extern int audit_signals;
#define audit_get_loginuid(t) (INVALID_UID)
#define audit_get_sessionid(t) (-1)
#define audit_log_task_context(b) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_log_task_info(b, t) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_ipc_obj(i) ((void)0)
#define audit_ipc_set_perm(q,u,g,m) ((void)0)
#define audit_bprm(p) ({ 0; })
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 6ac8e50c6cf5..2c7223d7e73b 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -39,5 +39,32 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
return 0;
}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+ const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
+extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
+#else
+static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name,
+ const void *xattr_value,
+ size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_H */
#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index a0c41256cb92..66c5fe9550a5 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -22,13 +22,14 @@ enum integrity_status {
/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
-extern int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
#else
-static inline int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+static inline struct integrity_iint_cache *
+ integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
{
- return 0;
+ return NULL;
}
static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 597e4fdb97fe..3db698aee34c 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -130,8 +130,6 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer);
#define PTRACE_MODE_READ 0x01
#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 0x02
#define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04
-/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
-extern int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
/* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 145accee9236..5b50c4e1a7c2 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -3022,5 +3022,36 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
+extern int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+ unsigned int mode);
+extern int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
+extern void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
+extern int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
+#else
+static inline int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+ unsigned int mode)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
+ unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
+ unsigned long arg5)
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA */
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index fdc718abf83b..fcb627ff8d3e 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen);
+extern int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max);
#else
static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) {
return -ENODEV;
@@ -42,5 +43,8 @@ static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) {
static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) {
return -ENODEV;
}
+static inline int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max) {
+ return -ENODEV;
+}
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h
index 2ace7a60316d..cc13e1115970 100644
--- a/include/linux/xattr.h
+++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
#define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm"
#define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX
+#define XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX "ima"
+#define XATTR_NAME_IMA XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX
+
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ff4798fcb488..29e090cc0e46 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1146,13 +1146,44 @@ error_path:
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
+void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
+ const struct cred *cred;
char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ char *tty;
+
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
/* tsk == current */
+ cred = current_cred();
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+ if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
+ tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
+ else
+ tty = "(none)";
+ spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+
+
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ " ppid=%ld pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
+ " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u ses=%u tty=%s",
+ sys_getppid(),
+ tsk->pid,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, tsk->loginuid),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid),
+ tsk->sessionid, tty);
get_task_comm(name, tsk);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
@@ -1175,6 +1206,8 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk
audit_log_task_context(ab);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_info);
+
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
u32 sid, char *comm)
@@ -1580,26 +1613,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- const struct cred *cred;
int i, call_panic = 0;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
- const char *tty;
struct audit_names *n;
/* tsk == current */
- context->pid = tsk->pid;
- if (!context->ppid)
- context->ppid = sys_getppid();
- cred = current_cred();
- context->uid = cred->uid;
- context->gid = cred->gid;
- context->euid = cred->euid;
- context->suid = cred->suid;
- context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
- context->egid = cred->egid;
- context->sgid = cred->sgid;
- context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
context->personality = tsk->personality;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
@@ -1614,37 +1633,13 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
- spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
- if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
- tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
- else
- tty = "(none)";
- spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
-
audit_log_format(ab,
- " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
- " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
- " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
- context->argv[0],
- context->argv[1],
- context->argv[2],
- context->argv[3],
- context->name_count,
- context->ppid,
- context->pid,
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, tsk->loginuid),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->uid),
- from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->gid),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->euid),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->suid),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->fsuid),
- from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->egid),
- from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->sgid),
- from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->fsgid),
- tty,
- tsk->sessionid);
-
+ " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
+ context->argv[0],
+ context->argv[1],
+ context->argv[2],
+ context->argv[3],
+ context->name_count);
audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index a232bb59d93f..1f5e55dda955 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -180,7 +180,8 @@ static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
}
-int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
+static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/Makefile b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
index 16aa2d424985..bbbd276659ba 100644
--- a/samples/seccomp/Makefile
+++ b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
@@ -18,14 +18,22 @@ HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
bpf-direct-objs := bpf-direct.o
# Try to match the kernel target.
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_64BIT),)
-HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -m32
-HOSTCFLAGS_dropper.o += -m32
-HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-helper.o += -m32
-HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += -m32
-HOSTLOADLIBES_bpf-direct += -m32
-HOSTLOADLIBES_bpf-fancy += -m32
-HOSTLOADLIBES_dropper += -m32
+ifndef CONFIG_64BIT
+
+# s390 has -m31 flag to build 31 bit binaries
+ifndef CONFIG_S390
+MFLAG = -m32
+else
+MFLAG = -m31
+endif
+
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += $(MFLAG)
+HOSTCFLAGS_dropper.o += $(MFLAG)
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-helper.o += $(MFLAG)
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += $(MFLAG)
+HOSTLOADLIBES_bpf-direct += $(MFLAG)
+HOSTLOADLIBES_bpf-fancy += $(MFLAG)
+HOSTLOADLIBES_dropper += $(MFLAG)
endif
# Tell kbuild to always build the programs
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h
index 643279dd30fb..38ee70f3cd5b 100644
--- a/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h
@@ -59,6 +59,16 @@ void seccomp_bpf_print(struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count);
#define FIND_LABEL(labels, label) seccomp_bpf_label((labels), #label)
#define EXPAND(...) __VA_ARGS__
+
+/* Ensure that we load the logically correct offset. */
+#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(__u32)
+#else
+#error "Unknown endianness"
+#endif
+
/* Map all width-sensitive operations */
#if __BITS_PER_LONG == 32
@@ -70,21 +80,16 @@ void seccomp_bpf_print(struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count);
#define JLE(x, jt) JLE32(x, EXPAND(jt))
#define JA(x, jt) JA32(x, EXPAND(jt))
#define ARG(i) ARG_32(i)
-#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
#elif __BITS_PER_LONG == 64
/* Ensure that we load the logically correct offset. */
#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
#define ENDIAN(_lo, _hi) _lo, _hi
-#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
#define HI_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(__u32)
#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
#define ENDIAN(_lo, _hi) _hi, _lo
-#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(__u32)
#define HI_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
-#else
-#error "Unknown endianness"
#endif
union arg64 {
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 8901501425f4..eb5484504f50 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+ XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+#endif
XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
NULL
};
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 399641c3e846..d82a5a13d855 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include "integrity.h"
static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
int iint_initialized;
@@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
- assert_spin_locked(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
while (n) {
iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node);
@@ -63,9 +61,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
if (!IS_IMA(inode))
return NULL;
- spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+ read_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
- spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+ read_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
return iint;
}
@@ -74,59 +72,53 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
iint->version = 0;
iint->flags = 0UL;
+ iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
}
/**
- * integrity_inode_alloc - allocate an iint associated with an inode
+ * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
* @inode: pointer to the inode
+ * @return: allocated iint
+ *
+ * Caller must lock i_mutex
*/
-int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
{
struct rb_node **p;
- struct rb_node *new_node, *parent = NULL;
- struct integrity_iint_cache *new_iint, *test_iint;
- int rc;
+ struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint;
- new_iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!new_iint)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ if (iint)
+ return iint;
- new_iint->inode = inode;
- new_node = &new_iint->rb_node;
+ iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!iint)
+ return NULL;
- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */
- spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+ write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
while (*p) {
parent = *p;
test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache,
rb_node);
- rc = -EEXIST;
if (inode < test_iint->inode)
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
- else if (inode > test_iint->inode)
- p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else
- goto out_err;
+ p = &(*p)->rb_right;
}
+ iint->inode = inode;
+ node = &iint->rb_node;
inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
- rb_link_node(new_node, parent, p);
- rb_insert_color(new_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
+ rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
+ rb_insert_color(node, &integrity_iint_tree);
- spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
- mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */
-
- return 0;
-out_err:
- spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
- mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */
- iint_free(new_iint);
-
- return rc;
+ write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+ return iint;
}
/**
@@ -142,10 +134,10 @@ void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
if (!IS_IMA(inode))
return;
- spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+ write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
- spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+ write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
iint_free(iint);
}
@@ -157,7 +149,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
iint->version = 0;
iint->flags = 0UL;
- mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
+ iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index b9c1219924f1..d232c73647ae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ config IMA
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
+ select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC64
help
The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
@@ -55,3 +56,18 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES
default y
help
Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE
+ bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
+ depends on IMA
+ default n
+ help
+ This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal.
+ It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended
+ attribute containing the file hash measurement. To protect
+ the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable
+ and configure EVM.
+
+ For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
+ <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
+ If unsure, say N.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 5f740f6971e1..3f2ca6bdc384 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e7c99fd0d223..8180adde10b7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
extern int ima_initialized;
extern int ima_used_chip;
extern char *ima_hash;
+extern int ima_appraise;
/* IMA inode template definition */
struct ima_template_data {
@@ -107,11 +108,14 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
}
/* LIM API function definitions */
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file);
void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename);
+void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
struct inode *inode);
void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show);
@@ -123,14 +127,45 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
void ima_delete_rules(void);
+/* Appraise integrity measurements */
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX 0x02
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename);
+int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
+void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
+
+#else
+static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct file *file,
+ const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+ return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode,
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct file *file)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 032ff03ad907..b356884fb3ef 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -9,13 +9,17 @@
* License.
*
* File: ima_api.c
- * Implements must_measure, collect_measurement, store_measurement,
- * and store_template.
+ * Implements must_appraise_or_measure, collect_measurement,
+ * appraise_measurement, store_measurement and store_template.
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "ima.h"
+
static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
/*
@@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ err_out:
}
/**
- * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
+ * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
* @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
@@ -105,15 +109,22 @@ err_out:
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
- * Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy,
- * or other error, return an error code.
-*/
-int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
+ * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
+ *
+ */
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
{
- int must_measure;
+ int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+ if (!ima_appraise)
+ flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
- must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask);
- return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES;
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
+}
+
+int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
+{
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, IMA_MEASURE);
}
/*
@@ -129,16 +140,24 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file)
{
- int result = -EEXIST;
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
+ int result = 0;
- if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
+ if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version;
- memset(iint->digest, 0, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
- result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->digest);
- if (!result)
+ iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+ result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
+ if (!result) {
iint->version = i_version;
+ iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
+ }
}
+ if (result)
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+ filename, "collect_data", "failed",
+ result, 0);
return result;
}
@@ -167,6 +186,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
int violation = 0;
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+ return;
+
entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
@@ -174,7 +196,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
return;
}
memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
- memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
(strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
@@ -185,3 +207,33 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if (result < 0)
kfree(entry);
}
+
+void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char hash[(IMA_DIGEST_SIZE * 2) + 1];
+ int i;
+
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
+ hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_xattr.digest[i]);
+ hash[i * 2] = '\0';
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "file=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " hash=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hash);
+
+ audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+
+ iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0aa43bde441c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
+{
+ if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
+ ima_appraise = 0;
+ else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
+ ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+__setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
+
+/*
+ * ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag
+ *
+ * Return 1 to appraise
+ */
+int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+{
+ if (!ima_appraise)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE);
+}
+
+static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+ iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+ __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
+ sizeof iint->ima_xattr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
+ *
+ * Call evm_verifyxattr() to verify the integrity of 'security.ima'.
+ * Assuming success, compare the xattr hash with the collected measurement.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
+ */
+int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
+ enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ const char *op = "appraise_data";
+ char *cause = "unknown";
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!ima_appraise)
+ return 0;
+ if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
+ return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
+ return iint->ima_status;
+
+ rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value,
+ 0, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (rc <= 0) {
+ if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
+ goto out;
+
+ cause = "missing-hash";
+ status =
+ (inode->i_size == 0) ? INTEGRITY_PASS : INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
+ if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
+ if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
+ || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
+ cause = "missing-HMAC";
+ else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL)
+ cause = "invalid-HMAC";
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (xattr_value->type) {
+ case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
+ rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest,
+ IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (rc) {
+ cause = "invalid-hash";
+ status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ print_hex_dump_bytes("security.ima: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ xattr_value, sizeof(*xattr_value));
+ print_hex_dump_bytes("collected: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
+ sizeof iint->ima_xattr);
+ break;
+ }
+ status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ break;
+ case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+ iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
+ rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
+ xattr_value->digest, rc - 1,
+ iint->ima_xattr.digest,
+ IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+ status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ } else if (rc) {
+ cause = "invalid-signature";
+ status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ } else {
+ status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ cause = "unknown-ima-data";
+ break;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
+ (!xattr_value ||
+ xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
+ ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
+ status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ }
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
+ op, cause, rc, 0);
+ } else {
+ iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISED;
+ }
+ iint->ima_status = status;
+ kfree(xattr_value);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value
+ */
+void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
+ return;
+
+ rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return;
+
+ ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ *
+ * Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise.
+ *
+ * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
+ * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
+ */
+void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ int must_appraise, rc;
+
+ if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
+ || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
+ return;
+
+ must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
+ iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ if (iint) {
+ if (must_appraise)
+ iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE;
+ else
+ iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED);
+ }
+ if (!must_appraise)
+ rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_protect_xattr - protect 'security.ima'
+ *
+ * Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'.
+ */
+static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+ const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+ if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) {
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+ if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return;
+
+ iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ return;
+
+ iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+ return;
+}
+
+int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+ const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+ xattr_value_len);
+ if (result == 1) {
+ ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode);
+ result = 0;
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+ if (result == 1) {
+ ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode);
+ result = 0;
+ }
+ return result;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 9b3ade7468b2..b21ee5b5495a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
struct scatterlist sg[1];
loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
char *rbuf;
- int rc;
+ int rc, read = 0;
rc = init_desc(&desc);
if (rc != 0)
@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+ file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
+ read = 1;
+ }
i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
while (offset < i_size) {
int rbuf_len;
@@ -80,6 +84,8 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
kfree(rbuf);
if (!rc)
rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+ if (read)
+ file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
out:
crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index be8294915cf7..73c9a268253e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -22,12 +22,19 @@
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include "ima.h"
int ima_initialized;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+#else
+int ima_appraise;
+#endif
+
char *ima_hash = "sha1";
static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
{
@@ -52,7 +59,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
- int rc;
+ int must_measure;
bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
@@ -67,8 +74,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
goto out;
}
- rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
- if (rc < 0)
+ must_measure = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
+ if (!must_measure)
goto out;
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
@@ -100,17 +107,21 @@ out:
}
static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct inode *inode,
- struct file *file)
+ struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
- if (mode & FMODE_WRITE &&
- atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
- iint->version != inode->i_version)
- iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
- mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+ if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+ return;
+
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
+ iint->version != inode->i_version) {
+ iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
+ ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
}
/**
@@ -140,28 +151,37 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
- rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
-retry:
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
- if (!iint) {
- rc = integrity_inode_alloc(inode);
- if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST)
- goto retry;
- return rc;
- }
+ /* Determine if in appraise/audit/measurement policy,
+ * returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT bitmask. */
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function);
+ if (!action)
+ return 0;
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+ must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
- rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0;
- if (rc != 0)
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
+ iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
+ * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED,
+ * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) */
+ iint->flags |= action;
+ action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1);
+
+ /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
+ if (!action) {
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
+ rc = iint->ima_status;
goto out;
+ }
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
if (rc != 0)
@@ -177,11 +197,18 @@ retry:
pathname = NULL;
}
}
- ima_store_measurement(iint, file, !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+ if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
+ ima_store_measurement(iint, file,
+ !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+ if (action & IMA_APPRAISE)
+ rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file,
+ !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+ if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
+ ima_audit_measurement(iint, !pathname ? filename : pathname);
kfree(pathbuf);
out:
- mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
- return rc;
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ return (rc && must_appraise) ? -EACCES : 0;
}
/**
@@ -197,14 +224,14 @@ out:
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- int rc;
+ int rc = 0;
if (!file)
return 0;
if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
- return 0;
+ return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
}
/**
@@ -228,7 +255,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
(strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
- return 0;
+ return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
}
/**
@@ -249,7 +276,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
FILE_CHECK);
- return 0;
+ return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c84df05180cb..c7dacd2eab7a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -24,22 +24,29 @@
#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
#define IMA_UID 0x0008
+#define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
-enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };
+#define UNKNOWN 0
+#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
+#define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
+#define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
+#define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
+#define AUDIT 0x0040
#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
};
-struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
+struct ima_rule_entry {
struct list_head list;
- enum ima_action action;
+ int action;
unsigned int flags;
enum ima_hooks func;
int mask;
unsigned long fsmagic;
kuid_t uid;
+ kuid_t fowner;
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
int type; /* audit type */
@@ -48,7 +55,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
/*
* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
- * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
+ * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
*/
/*
@@ -57,7 +64,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
* normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
* and running executables.
*/
-static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@@ -75,19 +82,41 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
};
-static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
-static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
-static struct list_head *ima_measure;
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
+static struct list_head *ima_rules;
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
-static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
+static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
{
ima_use_tcb = 1;
return 1;
}
-__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
+__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
+
+static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
+static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+ ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
/**
* ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
@@ -98,7 +127,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
*
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
-static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
+static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
@@ -114,6 +143,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
return false;
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
+ return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid, sid;
@@ -163,39 +194,61 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
* as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
* change.)
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags)
{
- struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+ int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+
+ if (!(entry->action & actmask))
+ continue;
+
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
+ continue;
- list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
- bool rc;
+ action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
+ if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
+ actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
+ else
+ actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
- rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
- if (rc)
- return entry->action;
+ if (!actmask)
+ break;
}
- return 0;
+
+ return action;
}
/**
* ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
*
- * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
- * the new measure_policy_rules.
+ * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
+ * the new ima_policy_rules.
*/
void __init ima_init_policy(void)
{
- int i, entries;
+ int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
- if (ima_use_tcb)
- entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
- else
- entries = 0;
-
- for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
- list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
- ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
+ measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
+ appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
+ ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
+ if (i < measure_entries)
+ list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
+ &ima_default_rules);
+ else {
+ int j = i - measure_entries;
+
+ list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list,
+ &ima_default_rules);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
}
/**
@@ -212,8 +265,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
int result = 1;
int audit_info = 0;
- if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
- ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
+ if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
+ ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
cause = "complete";
result = 0;
}
@@ -224,14 +277,19 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
enum {
Opt_err = -1,
Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
+ Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
+ Opt_audit,
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
- Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
+ Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner
};
static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_measure, "measure"},
{Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
+ {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
+ {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
+ {Opt_audit, "audit"},
{Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
{Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
{Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
@@ -242,10 +300,11 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
+ {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
-static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
+static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
{
int result;
@@ -269,7 +328,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
audit_log_format(ab, " ");
}
-static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
+static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *p;
@@ -278,6 +337,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
+ entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
entry->action = UNKNOWN;
while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@@ -306,11 +366,35 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
break;
+ case Opt_appraise:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
+
+ if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
+ entry->action = APPRAISE;
+ break;
+ case Opt_dont_appraise:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
+
+ if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
+ entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
+ break;
+ case Opt_audit:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
+
+ if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
+ entry->action = AUDIT;
+ break;
case Opt_func:
ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
if (entry->func)
- result = -EINVAL;
+ result = -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
@@ -375,6 +459,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
}
break;
+ case Opt_fowner:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
+
+ if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+ if (!result) {
+ entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
+ if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
+ }
+ break;
case Opt_obj_user:
ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
@@ -426,7 +527,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
}
/**
- * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
+ * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
* @rule - ima measurement policy rule
*
* Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
@@ -436,12 +537,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
{
const char *op = "update_policy";
char *p;
- struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
- if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
+ if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
NULL, op, "already exists",
-EACCES, audit_info);
@@ -474,9 +575,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
return result;
}
- mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
- list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
- mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
return len;
}
@@ -484,12 +585,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
void ima_delete_rules(void)
{
- struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
- mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
- list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
+ mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
list_del(&entry->list);
kfree(entry);
}
- mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 7a25ecec5aaa..e9db763a875e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -15,8 +15,22 @@
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
+/* iint action cache flags */
+#define IMA_MEASURE 0x0001
+#define IMA_MEASURED 0x0002
+#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x0004
+#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x0008
+/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x0010 do not use this flag */
+#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x0020
+#define IMA_AUDIT 0x0040
+#define IMA_AUDITED 0x0080
+
/* iint cache flags */
-#define IMA_MEASURED 0x01
+#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x0100
+
+#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT)
+#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED \
+ | IMA_COLLECTED)
enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@@ -34,9 +48,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */
u64 version; /* track inode changes */
- unsigned char flags;
- u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
- struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */
+ unsigned short flags;
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr;
+ enum integrity_status ima_status;
enum integrity_status evm_status;
};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 2d5d041f2049..3f163d0489ad 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -369,38 +369,6 @@ static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
}
/*
- * get a random value from TPM
- */
-static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len)
-{
- int ret;
-
- INIT_BUF(tb);
- store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
- store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE);
- store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM);
- store32(tb, len);
- ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data);
- if (!ret)
- memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE, len);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len)
-{
- struct tpm_buf *tb;
- int ret;
-
- tb = kmalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tb)
- return -ENOMEM;
- ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len);
-
- kfree(tb);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
* Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
*
* Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed.
@@ -413,8 +381,8 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- ret = my_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (ret < 0)
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
return ret;
return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
@@ -429,8 +397,8 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
int ret;
- ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
- if (ret < 0)
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
return ret;
INIT_BUF(tb);
@@ -524,8 +492,8 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- ret = tpm_get_random(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
- if (ret < 0)
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
goto out;
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
datsize = htonl(datalen);
@@ -634,8 +602,8 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
- ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
- if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -935,6 +903,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
char *datablob;
int ret = 0;
int key_cmd;
+ size_t key_len;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -974,8 +943,9 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
break;
case Opt_new:
- ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len);
- if (ret < 0) {
+ key_len = payload->key_len;
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len);
+ if (ret != key_len) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f9a2f2ef2454..3724029d0f6d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -136,11 +136,23 @@ int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+ int rc;
+ rc = yama_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+#endif
return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
}
int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+ int rc;
+ rc = yama_ptrace_traceme(parent);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+#endif
return security_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
}
@@ -561,6 +573,9 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
+ ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
}
@@ -596,6 +611,9 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
if (ret)
return ret;
+ ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
}
@@ -761,6 +779,9 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+ yama_task_free(task);
+#endif
security_ops->task_free(task);
}
@@ -876,6 +897,12 @@ int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+ int rc;
+ rc = yama_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+ if (rc != -ENOSYS)
+ return rc;
+#endif
return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 8221514cc997..2874c7316783 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1691,40 +1691,19 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
* smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
* @p: task to wait for
*
- * Returns 0 if current can wait for p, error code otherwise
+ * Returns 0
*/
static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
- struct smk_audit_info ad;
- char *sp = smk_of_current();
- char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p));
- int rc;
-
- /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
- rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
- if (rc == 0)
- goto out_log;
-
/*
- * Allow the operation to succeed if either task
- * has privilege to perform operations that might
- * account for the smack labels having gotten to
- * be different in the first place.
- *
- * This breaks the strict subject/object access
- * control ideal, taking the object's privilege
- * state into account in the decision as well as
- * the smack value.
+ * Allow the operation to succeed.
+ * Zombies are bad.
+ * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
+ * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
+ * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
+ * may expect to know when the child exits.
*/
- if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) ||
- has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
- rc = 0;
- /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
- out_log:
- smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
- smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
- smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
- return rc;
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -2705,9 +2684,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
- int rc;
struct task_smack *tsp;
- struct task_smack *oldtsp;
struct cred *new;
char *newsmack;
@@ -2737,21 +2714,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
return -EPERM;
- oldtsp = p->cred->security;
new = prepare_creds();
if (new == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (tsp == NULL) {
- kfree(new);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
- rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
+ tsp = new->security;
+ tsp->smk_task = newsmack;
- new->security = tsp;
commit_creds(new);
return size;
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index b1b768e4049a..99929a50093a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
SMK_LOAD_SELF2 = 15, /* load task specific rules with long labels */
SMK_ACCESS2 = 16, /* make an access check with long labels */
SMK_CIPSO2 = 17, /* load long label -> CIPSO mapping */
+ SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ = 18, /* set rules with subject label to '-' */
};
/*
@@ -1992,6 +1993,77 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_access2_ops = {
};
/**
+ * smk_write_revoke_subj - write() for /smack/revoke-subject
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *data = NULL;
+ const char *cp = NULL;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_rule *sp;
+ struct list_head *rule_list;
+ struct mutex *rule_lock;
+ int rc = count;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (count == 0 || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+
+ cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count);
+ if (cp == NULL) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+
+ skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
+ if (skp == NULL) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+
+ rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
+ rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
+
+ mutex_lock(rule_lock);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list)
+ sp->smk_access = 0;
+
+ mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
+
+free_out:
+ kfree(data);
+ kfree(cp);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_revoke_subj_ops = {
+ .write = smk_write_revoke_subj,
+ .read = simple_transaction_read,
+ .release = simple_transaction_release,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
* smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
* @sb: the empty superblock
* @data: unused
@@ -2037,6 +2109,9 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
"access2", &smk_access2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
[SMK_CIPSO2] = {
"cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ] = {
+ "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops,
+ S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
/* last one */
{""}
};
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
index 51d6709d8bbd..20ef5143c0c0 100644
--- a/security/yama/Kconfig
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -11,3 +11,11 @@ config SECURITY_YAMA
Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+ bool "Yama stacked with other LSMs"
+ depends on SECURITY_YAMA
+ default n
+ help
+ When Yama is built into the kernel, force it to stack with the
+ selected primary LSM.
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 0cc99a3ea42d..b4c29848b49d 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer,
* yama_task_free - check for task_pid to remove from exception list
* @task: task being removed
*/
-static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{
yama_ptracer_del(task, task);
}
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
* Return 0 on success, -ve on error. -ENOSYS is returned when Yama
* does not handle the given option.
*/
-static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
int rc;
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
if (arg2 == 0) {
yama_ptracer_del(NULL, myself);
rc = 0;
- } else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY) {
+ } else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY || (int)arg2 == -1) {
rc = yama_ptracer_add(NULL, myself);
} else {
struct task_struct *tracer;
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
*
* Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
*/
-static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
int rc;
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
*
* Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
*/
-static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
int rc;
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
return rc;
}
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
.name = "yama",
@@ -332,6 +333,7 @@ static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
.task_prctl = yama_task_prctl,
.task_free = yama_task_free,
};
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
@@ -378,13 +380,17 @@ static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = {
static __init int yama_init(void)
{
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops))
return 0;
+#endif
printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
if (register_security(&yama_ops))
panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n");
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))