diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
60 files changed, 4237 insertions, 2329 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index c7094f813183..e260460210e1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ config X86 select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_MCSAFE if X86_64 && X86_MCE select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY - select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_CORE_BEFORE_USERMODE @@ -90,7 +89,6 @@ config X86 select CLOCKSOURCE_VALIDATE_LAST_CYCLE select CLOCKSOURCE_WATCHDOG select DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS - select DMA_DIRECT_OPS select EDAC_ATOMIC_SCRUB select EDAC_SUPPORT select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS @@ -147,6 +145,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS select HAVE_EBPF_JIT select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS + select HAVE_EISA select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD select HAVE_FENTRY if X86_64 || DYNAMIC_FTRACE select HAVE_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD @@ -180,6 +179,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_PERF_EVENTS select HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI select HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF if PERF_EVENTS && HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI + select HAVE_PCI select HAVE_PERF_REGS select HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP select HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE if PARAVIRT @@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ config X86 select HOTPLUG_SMT if SMP select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH + select PCI_DOMAINS if PCI select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG select PERF_EVENTS select RTC_LIB @@ -1979,7 +1980,7 @@ config SECCOMP If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here. -source kernel/Kconfig.hz +source "kernel/Kconfig.hz" config KEXEC bool "kexec system call" @@ -2576,15 +2577,6 @@ endmenu menu "Bus options (PCI etc.)" -config PCI - bool "PCI support" - default y - ---help--- - Find out whether you have a PCI motherboard. PCI is the name of a - bus system, i.e. the way the CPU talks to the other stuff inside - your box. Other bus systems are ISA, EISA, MicroChannel (MCA) or - VESA. If you have PCI, say Y, otherwise N. - choice prompt "PCI access mode" depends on X86_32 && PCI @@ -2646,10 +2638,6 @@ config PCI_XEN depends on PCI && XEN select SWIOTLB_XEN -config PCI_DOMAINS - def_bool y - depends on PCI - config MMCONF_FAM10H def_bool y depends on X86_64 && PCI_MMCONFIG && ACPI @@ -2667,8 +2655,6 @@ config PCI_CNB20LE_QUIRK You should say N unless you know you need this. -source "drivers/pci/Kconfig" - config ISA_BUS bool "ISA bus support on modern systems" if EXPERT help @@ -2699,24 +2685,6 @@ config ISA (MCA) or VESA. ISA is an older system, now being displaced by PCI; newer boards don't support it. If you have ISA, say Y, otherwise N. -config EISA - bool "EISA support" - depends on ISA - ---help--- - The Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus was - developed as an open alternative to the IBM MicroChannel bus. - - The EISA bus provided some of the features of the IBM MicroChannel - bus while maintaining backward compatibility with cards made for - the older ISA bus. The EISA bus saw limited use between 1988 and - 1995 when it was made obsolete by the PCI bus. - - Say Y here if you are building a kernel for an EISA-based machine. - - Otherwise, say N. - -source "drivers/eisa/Kconfig" - config SCx200 tristate "NatSemi SCx200 support" ---help--- @@ -2828,17 +2796,6 @@ config AMD_NB def_bool y depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && PCI -source "drivers/pcmcia/Kconfig" - -config RAPIDIO - tristate "RapidIO support" - depends on PCI - help - If enabled this option will include drivers and the core - infrastructure code to support RapidIO interconnect devices. - -source "drivers/rapidio/Kconfig" - config X86_SYSFB bool "Mark VGA/VBE/EFI FB as generic system framebuffer" help diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig index 6c3ab05c231d..4bb95d7ad947 100644 --- a/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig +++ b/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_DEFAULT_GOV_USERSPACE=y CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_PERFORMANCE=y CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_ONDEMAND=y CONFIG_X86_ACPI_CPUFREQ=y +CONFIG_PCI=y CONFIG_PCIEPORTBUS=y CONFIG_PCI_MSI=y CONFIG_PCCARD=y diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig index ac9ae487cfeb..0fed049422a8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig +++ b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_DEFAULT_GOV_USERSPACE=y CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_PERFORMANCE=y CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_ONDEMAND=y CONFIG_X86_ACPI_CPUFREQ=y +CONFIG_PCI=y CONFIG_PCI_MMCONFIG=y CONFIG_PCIEPORTBUS=y CONFIG_PCCARD=y diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile index a4b0007a54e1..45734e1cf967 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y avx_supported := $(call as-instr,vpxor %xmm0$(comma)%xmm0$(comma)%xmm0,yes,no) avx2_supported := $(call as-instr,vpgatherdd %ymm0$(comma)(%eax$(comma)%ymm1\ $(comma)4)$(comma)%ymm2,yes,no) +avx512_supported :=$(call as-instr,vpmovm2b %k1$(comma)%zmm5,yes,no) sha1_ni_supported :=$(call as-instr,sha1msg1 %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1,yes,no) sha256_ni_supported :=$(call as-instr,sha256msg1 %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1,yes,no) @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_X86_64) += camellia-x86_64.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_X86_64) += blowfish-x86_64.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64) += twofish-x86_64.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64_3WAY) += twofish-x86_64-3way.o -obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64) += chacha20-x86_64.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64) += chacha-x86_64.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT_SSE2_X86_64) += serpent-sse2-x86_64.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL) += aesni-intel.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_CLMUL_NI_INTEL) += ghash-clmulni-intel.o @@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MORUS1280_GLUE) += morus1280_glue.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MORUS640_SSE2) += morus640-sse2.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MORUS1280_SSE2) += morus1280-sse2.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_SSE2) += nhpoly1305-sse2.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_AVX2) += nhpoly1305-avx2.o + # These modules require assembler to support AVX. ifeq ($(avx_supported),yes) obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64) += \ @@ -74,7 +78,7 @@ camellia-x86_64-y := camellia-x86_64-asm_64.o camellia_glue.o blowfish-x86_64-y := blowfish-x86_64-asm_64.o blowfish_glue.o twofish-x86_64-y := twofish-x86_64-asm_64.o twofish_glue.o twofish-x86_64-3way-y := twofish-x86_64-asm_64-3way.o twofish_glue_3way.o -chacha20-x86_64-y := chacha20-ssse3-x86_64.o chacha20_glue.o +chacha-x86_64-y := chacha-ssse3-x86_64.o chacha_glue.o serpent-sse2-x86_64-y := serpent-sse2-x86_64-asm_64.o serpent_sse2_glue.o aegis128-aesni-y := aegis128-aesni-asm.o aegis128-aesni-glue.o @@ -84,6 +88,8 @@ aegis256-aesni-y := aegis256-aesni-asm.o aegis256-aesni-glue.o morus640-sse2-y := morus640-sse2-asm.o morus640-sse2-glue.o morus1280-sse2-y := morus1280-sse2-asm.o morus1280-sse2-glue.o +nhpoly1305-sse2-y := nh-sse2-x86_64.o nhpoly1305-sse2-glue.o + ifeq ($(avx_supported),yes) camellia-aesni-avx-x86_64-y := camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.o \ camellia_aesni_avx_glue.o @@ -97,10 +103,16 @@ endif ifeq ($(avx2_supported),yes) camellia-aesni-avx2-y := camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.o camellia_aesni_avx2_glue.o - chacha20-x86_64-y += chacha20-avx2-x86_64.o + chacha-x86_64-y += chacha-avx2-x86_64.o serpent-avx2-y := serpent-avx2-asm_64.o serpent_avx2_glue.o morus1280-avx2-y := morus1280-avx2-asm.o morus1280-avx2-glue.o + + nhpoly1305-avx2-y := nh-avx2-x86_64.o nhpoly1305-avx2-glue.o +endif + +ifeq ($(avx512_supported),yes) + chacha-x86_64-y += chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.o endif aesni-intel-y := aesni-intel_asm.o aesni-intel_glue.o diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S index 1985ea0b551b..91c039ab5699 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S @@ -182,43 +182,30 @@ aad_shift_arr: .text -##define the fields of the gcm aes context -#{ -# u8 expanded_keys[16*11] store expanded keys -# u8 shifted_hkey_1[16] store HashKey <<1 mod poly here -# u8 shifted_hkey_2[16] store HashKey^2 <<1 mod poly here -# u8 shifted_hkey_3[16] store HashKey^3 <<1 mod poly here -# u8 shifted_hkey_4[16] store HashKey^4 <<1 mod poly here -# u8 shifted_hkey_5[16] store HashKey^5 <<1 mod poly here -# u8 shifted_hkey_6[16] store HashKey^6 <<1 mod poly here -# u8 shifted_hkey_7[16] store HashKey^7 <<1 mod poly here -# u8 shifted_hkey_8[16] store HashKey^8 <<1 mod poly here -# u8 shifted_hkey_1_k[16] store XOR HashKey <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -# u8 shifted_hkey_2_k[16] store XOR HashKey^2 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -# u8 shifted_hkey_3_k[16] store XOR HashKey^3 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -# u8 shifted_hkey_4_k[16] store XOR HashKey^4 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -# u8 shifted_hkey_5_k[16] store XOR HashKey^5 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -# u8 shifted_hkey_6_k[16] store XOR HashKey^6 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -# u8 shifted_hkey_7_k[16] store XOR HashKey^7 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -# u8 shifted_hkey_8_k[16] store XOR HashKey^8 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -#} gcm_ctx# - -HashKey = 16*11 # store HashKey <<1 mod poly here -HashKey_2 = 16*12 # store HashKey^2 <<1 mod poly here -HashKey_3 = 16*13 # store HashKey^3 <<1 mod poly here -HashKey_4 = 16*14 # store HashKey^4 <<1 mod poly here -HashKey_5 = 16*15 # store HashKey^5 <<1 mod poly here -HashKey_6 = 16*16 # store HashKey^6 <<1 mod poly here -HashKey_7 = 16*17 # store HashKey^7 <<1 mod poly here -HashKey_8 = 16*18 # store HashKey^8 <<1 mod poly here -HashKey_k = 16*19 # store XOR of HashKey <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -HashKey_2_k = 16*20 # store XOR of HashKey^2 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -HashKey_3_k = 16*21 # store XOR of HashKey^3 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -HashKey_4_k = 16*22 # store XOR of HashKey^4 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -HashKey_5_k = 16*23 # store XOR of HashKey^5 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -HashKey_6_k = 16*24 # store XOR of HashKey^6 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -HashKey_7_k = 16*25 # store XOR of HashKey^7 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) -HashKey_8_k = 16*26 # store XOR of HashKey^8 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) +#define AadHash 16*0 +#define AadLen 16*1 +#define InLen (16*1)+8 +#define PBlockEncKey 16*2 +#define OrigIV 16*3 +#define CurCount 16*4 +#define PBlockLen 16*5 + +HashKey = 16*6 # store HashKey <<1 mod poly here +HashKey_2 = 16*7 # store HashKey^2 <<1 mod poly here +HashKey_3 = 16*8 # store HashKey^3 <<1 mod poly here +HashKey_4 = 16*9 # store HashKey^4 <<1 mod poly here +HashKey_5 = 16*10 # store HashKey^5 <<1 mod poly here +HashKey_6 = 16*11 # store HashKey^6 <<1 mod poly here +HashKey_7 = 16*12 # store HashKey^7 <<1 mod poly here +HashKey_8 = 16*13 # store HashKey^8 <<1 mod poly here +HashKey_k = 16*14 # store XOR of HashKey <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) +HashKey_2_k = 16*15 # store XOR of HashKey^2 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) +HashKey_3_k = 16*16 # store XOR of HashKey^3 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) +HashKey_4_k = 16*17 # store XOR of HashKey^4 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) +HashKey_5_k = 16*18 # store XOR of HashKey^5 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) +HashKey_6_k = 16*19 # store XOR of HashKey^6 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) +HashKey_7_k = 16*20 # store XOR of HashKey^7 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) +HashKey_8_k = 16*21 # store XOR of HashKey^8 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsuba purposes) #define arg1 %rdi #define arg2 %rsi @@ -229,6 +216,8 @@ HashKey_8_k = 16*26 # store XOR of HashKey^8 <<1 mod poly here (for Karatsu #define arg7 STACK_OFFSET+8*1(%r14) #define arg8 STACK_OFFSET+8*2(%r14) #define arg9 STACK_OFFSET+8*3(%r14) +#define arg10 STACK_OFFSET+8*4(%r14) +#define keysize 2*15*16(arg1) i = 0 j = 0 @@ -267,19 +256,636 @@ VARIABLE_OFFSET = 16*8 # Utility Macros ################################ +.macro FUNC_SAVE + #the number of pushes must equal STACK_OFFSET + push %r12 + push %r13 + push %r14 + push %r15 + + mov %rsp, %r14 + + + + sub $VARIABLE_OFFSET, %rsp + and $~63, %rsp # align rsp to 64 bytes +.endm + +.macro FUNC_RESTORE + mov %r14, %rsp + + pop %r15 + pop %r14 + pop %r13 + pop %r12 +.endm + # Encryption of a single block -.macro ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK XMM0 +.macro ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK REP XMM0 vpxor (arg1), \XMM0, \XMM0 - i = 1 - setreg -.rep 9 + i = 1 + setreg +.rep \REP vaesenc 16*i(arg1), \XMM0, \XMM0 - i = (i+1) - setreg + i = (i+1) + setreg .endr - vaesenclast 16*10(arg1), \XMM0, \XMM0 + vaesenclast 16*i(arg1), \XMM0, \XMM0 .endm +# combined for GCM encrypt and decrypt functions +# clobbering all xmm registers +# clobbering r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15 +.macro GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL GHASH_LAST_8 GHASH_MUL ENC_DEC REP + vmovdqu AadHash(arg2), %xmm8 + vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), %xmm13 # xmm13 = HashKey + add arg5, InLen(arg2) + + # initialize the data pointer offset as zero + xor %r11d, %r11d + + PARTIAL_BLOCK \GHASH_MUL, arg3, arg4, arg5, %r11, %xmm8, \ENC_DEC + sub %r11, arg5 + + mov arg5, %r13 # save the number of bytes of plaintext/ciphertext + and $-16, %r13 # r13 = r13 - (r13 mod 16) + + mov %r13, %r12 + shr $4, %r12 + and $7, %r12 + jz _initial_num_blocks_is_0\@ + + cmp $7, %r12 + je _initial_num_blocks_is_7\@ + cmp $6, %r12 + je _initial_num_blocks_is_6\@ + cmp $5, %r12 + je _initial_num_blocks_is_5\@ + cmp $4, %r12 + je _initial_num_blocks_is_4\@ + cmp $3, %r12 + je _initial_num_blocks_is_3\@ + cmp $2, %r12 + je _initial_num_blocks_is_2\@ + + jmp _initial_num_blocks_is_1\@ + +_initial_num_blocks_is_7\@: + \INITIAL_BLOCKS \REP, 7, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC + sub $16*7, %r13 + jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ + +_initial_num_blocks_is_6\@: + \INITIAL_BLOCKS \REP, 6, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC + sub $16*6, %r13 + jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ + +_initial_num_blocks_is_5\@: + \INITIAL_BLOCKS \REP, 5, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC + sub $16*5, %r13 + jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ + +_initial_num_blocks_is_4\@: + \INITIAL_BLOCKS \REP, 4, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC + sub $16*4, %r13 + jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ + +_initial_num_blocks_is_3\@: + \INITIAL_BLOCKS \REP, 3, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC + sub $16*3, %r13 + jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ + +_initial_num_blocks_is_2\@: + \INITIAL_BLOCKS \REP, 2, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC + sub $16*2, %r13 + jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ + +_initial_num_blocks_is_1\@: + \INITIAL_BLOCKS \REP, 1, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC + sub $16*1, %r13 + jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ + +_initial_num_blocks_is_0\@: + \INITIAL_BLOCKS \REP, 0, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC + + +_initial_blocks_encrypted\@: + cmp $0, %r13 + je _zero_cipher_left\@ + + sub $128, %r13 + je _eight_cipher_left\@ + + + + + vmovd %xmm9, %r15d + and $255, %r15d + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 + + +_encrypt_by_8_new\@: + cmp $(255-8), %r15d + jg _encrypt_by_8\@ + + + + add $8, %r15b + \GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL \REP, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm15, out_order, \ENC_DEC + add $128, %r11 + sub $128, %r13 + jne _encrypt_by_8_new\@ + + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 + jmp _eight_cipher_left\@ + +_encrypt_by_8\@: + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 + add $8, %r15b + \GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL \REP, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm15, in_order, \ENC_DEC + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 + add $128, %r11 + sub $128, %r13 + jne _encrypt_by_8_new\@ + + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 + + + + +_eight_cipher_left\@: + \GHASH_LAST_8 %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8 + + +_zero_cipher_left\@: + vmovdqu %xmm14, AadHash(arg2) + vmovdqu %xmm9, CurCount(arg2) + + # check for 0 length + mov arg5, %r13 + and $15, %r13 # r13 = (arg5 mod 16) + + je _multiple_of_16_bytes\@ + + # handle the last <16 Byte block separately + + mov %r13, PBlockLen(arg2) + + vpaddd ONE(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 # INCR CNT to get Yn + vmovdqu %xmm9, CurCount(arg2) + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 + + ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK \REP, %xmm9 # E(K, Yn) + vmovdqu %xmm9, PBlockEncKey(arg2) + + cmp $16, arg5 + jge _large_enough_update\@ + + lea (arg4,%r11,1), %r10 + mov %r13, %r12 + + READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10 %r12 %xmm1 + + lea SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12 + sub %r13, %r12 # adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be + # able to shift 16-r13 bytes (r13 is the + # number of bytes in plaintext mod 16) + + jmp _final_ghash_mul\@ + +_large_enough_update\@: + sub $16, %r11 + add %r13, %r11 + + # receive the last <16 Byte block + vmovdqu (arg4, %r11, 1), %xmm1 + + sub %r13, %r11 + add $16, %r11 + + lea SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12 + # adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be able to shift 16-r13 bytes + # (r13 is the number of bytes in plaintext mod 16) + sub %r13, %r12 + # get the appropriate shuffle mask + vmovdqu (%r12), %xmm2 + # shift right 16-r13 bytes + vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm1, %xmm1 + +_final_ghash_mul\@: + .if \ENC_DEC == DEC + vmovdqa %xmm1, %xmm2 + vpxor %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn) + vmovdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1 # get the appropriate mask to + # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 + vpand %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 + vpand %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2 + vpxor %xmm2, %xmm14, %xmm14 + + vmovdqu %xmm14, AadHash(arg2) + .else + vpxor %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn) + vmovdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1 # get the appropriate mask to + # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 + vpand %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 + vpxor %xmm9, %xmm14, %xmm14 + + vmovdqu %xmm14, AadHash(arg2) + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 # shuffle xmm9 back to output as ciphertext + .endif + + + ############################# + # output r13 Bytes + vmovq %xmm9, %rax + cmp $8, %r13 + jle _less_than_8_bytes_left\@ + + mov %rax, (arg3 , %r11) + add $8, %r11 + vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9 + vmovq %xmm9, %rax + sub $8, %r13 + +_less_than_8_bytes_left\@: + movb %al, (arg3 , %r11) + add $1, %r11 + shr $8, %rax + sub $1, %r13 + jne _less_than_8_bytes_left\@ + ############################# + +_multiple_of_16_bytes\@: +.endm + + +# GCM_COMPLETE Finishes update of tag of last partial block +# Output: Authorization Tag (AUTH_TAG) +# Clobbers rax, r10-r12, and xmm0, xmm1, xmm5-xmm15 +.macro GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL REP AUTH_TAG AUTH_TAG_LEN + vmovdqu AadHash(arg2), %xmm14 + vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), %xmm13 + + mov PBlockLen(arg2), %r12 + cmp $0, %r12 + je _partial_done\@ + + #GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block + \GHASH_MUL %xmm14, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 + +_partial_done\@: + mov AadLen(arg2), %r12 # r12 = aadLen (number of bytes) + shl $3, %r12 # convert into number of bits + vmovd %r12d, %xmm15 # len(A) in xmm15 + + mov InLen(arg2), %r12 + shl $3, %r12 # len(C) in bits (*128) + vmovq %r12, %xmm1 + vpslldq $8, %xmm15, %xmm15 # xmm15 = len(A)|| 0x0000000000000000 + vpxor %xmm1, %xmm15, %xmm15 # xmm15 = len(A)||len(C) + + vpxor %xmm15, %xmm14, %xmm14 + \GHASH_MUL %xmm14, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 # final GHASH computation + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm14, %xmm14 # perform a 16Byte swap + + vmovdqu OrigIV(arg2), %xmm9 + + ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK \REP, %xmm9 # E(K, Y0) + + vpxor %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm9 + + + +_return_T\@: + mov \AUTH_TAG, %r10 # r10 = authTag + mov \AUTH_TAG_LEN, %r11 # r11 = auth_tag_len + + cmp $16, %r11 + je _T_16\@ + + cmp $8, %r11 + jl _T_4\@ + +_T_8\@: + vmovq %xmm9, %rax + mov %rax, (%r10) + add $8, %r10 + sub $8, %r11 + vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9 + cmp $0, %r11 + je _return_T_done\@ +_T_4\@: + vmovd %xmm9, %eax + mov %eax, (%r10) + add $4, %r10 + sub $4, %r11 + vpsrldq $4, %xmm9, %xmm9 + cmp $0, %r11 + je _return_T_done\@ +_T_123\@: + vmovd %xmm9, %eax + cmp $2, %r11 + jl _T_1\@ + mov %ax, (%r10) + cmp $2, %r11 + je _return_T_done\@ + add $2, %r10 + sar $16, %eax +_T_1\@: + mov %al, (%r10) + jmp _return_T_done\@ + +_T_16\@: + vmovdqu %xmm9, (%r10) + +_return_T_done\@: +.endm + +.macro CALC_AAD_HASH GHASH_MUL AAD AADLEN T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 + + mov \AAD, %r10 # r10 = AAD + mov \AADLEN, %r12 # r12 = aadLen + + + mov %r12, %r11 + + vpxor \T8, \T8, \T8 + vpxor \T7, \T7, \T7 + cmp $16, %r11 + jl _get_AAD_rest8\@ +_get_AAD_blocks\@: + vmovdqu (%r10), \T7 + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \T7, \T7 + vpxor \T7, \T8, \T8 + \GHASH_MUL \T8, \T2, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T5, \T6 + add $16, %r10 + sub $16, %r12 + sub $16, %r11 + cmp $16, %r11 + jge _get_AAD_blocks\@ + vmovdqu \T8, \T7 + cmp $0, %r11 + je _get_AAD_done\@ + + vpxor \T7, \T7, \T7 + + /* read the last <16B of AAD. since we have at least 4B of + data right after the AAD (the ICV, and maybe some CT), we can + read 4B/8B blocks safely, and then get rid of the extra stuff */ +_get_AAD_rest8\@: + cmp $4, %r11 + jle _get_AAD_rest4\@ + movq (%r10), \T1 + add $8, %r10 + sub $8, %r11 + vpslldq $8, \T1, \T1 + vpsrldq $8, \T7, \T7 + vpxor \T1, \T7, \T7 + jmp _get_AAD_rest8\@ +_get_AAD_rest4\@: + cmp $0, %r11 + jle _get_AAD_rest0\@ + mov (%r10), %eax + movq %rax, \T1 + add $4, %r10 + sub $4, %r11 + vpslldq $12, \T1, \T1 + vpsrldq $4, \T7, \T7 + vpxor \T1, \T7, \T7 +_get_AAD_rest0\@: + /* finalize: shift out the extra bytes we read, and align + left. since pslldq can only shift by an immediate, we use + vpshufb and an array of shuffle masks */ + movq %r12, %r11 + salq $4, %r11 + vmovdqu aad_shift_arr(%r11), \T1 + vpshufb \T1, \T7, \T7 +_get_AAD_rest_final\@: + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \T7, \T7 + vpxor \T8, \T7, \T7 + \GHASH_MUL \T7, \T2, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T5, \T6 + +_get_AAD_done\@: + vmovdqu \T7, AadHash(arg2) +.endm + +.macro INIT GHASH_MUL PRECOMPUTE + mov arg6, %r11 + mov %r11, AadLen(arg2) # ctx_data.aad_length = aad_length + xor %r11d, %r11d + mov %r11, InLen(arg2) # ctx_data.in_length = 0 + + mov %r11, PBlockLen(arg2) # ctx_data.partial_block_length = 0 + mov %r11, PBlockEncKey(arg2) # ctx_data.partial_block_enc_key = 0 + mov arg3, %rax + movdqu (%rax), %xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0, OrigIV(arg2) # ctx_data.orig_IV = iv + + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm0, %xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0, CurCount(arg2) # ctx_data.current_counter = iv + + vmovdqu (arg4), %xmm6 # xmm6 = HashKey + + vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm6, %xmm6 + ############### PRECOMPUTATION of HashKey<<1 mod poly from the HashKey + vmovdqa %xmm6, %xmm2 + vpsllq $1, %xmm6, %xmm6 + vpsrlq $63, %xmm2, %xmm2 + vmovdqa %xmm2, %xmm1 + vpslldq $8, %xmm2, %xmm2 + vpsrldq $8, %xmm1, %xmm1 + vpor %xmm2, %xmm6, %xmm6 + #reduction + vpshufd $0b00100100, %xmm1, %xmm2 + vpcmpeqd TWOONE(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2 + vpand POLY(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2 + vpxor %xmm2, %xmm6, %xmm6 # xmm6 holds the HashKey<<1 mod poly + ####################################################################### + vmovdqu %xmm6, HashKey(arg2) # store HashKey<<1 mod poly + + CALC_AAD_HASH \GHASH_MUL, arg5, arg6, %xmm2, %xmm6, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm7, %xmm1, %xmm0 + + \PRECOMPUTE %xmm6, %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5 +.endm + + +# Reads DLEN bytes starting at DPTR and stores in XMMDst +# where 0 < DLEN < 16 +# Clobbers %rax, DLEN +.macro READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK DPTR DLEN XMMDst + vpxor \XMMDst, \XMMDst, \XMMDst + + cmp $8, \DLEN + jl _read_lt8_\@ + mov (\DPTR), %rax + vpinsrq $0, %rax, \XMMDst, \XMMDst + sub $8, \DLEN + jz _done_read_partial_block_\@ + xor %eax, %eax +_read_next_byte_\@: + shl $8, %rax + mov 7(\DPTR, \DLEN, 1), %al + dec \DLEN + jnz _read_next_byte_\@ + vpinsrq $1, %rax, \XMMDst, \XMMDst + jmp _done_read_partial_block_\@ +_read_lt8_\@: + xor %eax, %eax +_read_next_byte_lt8_\@: + shl $8, %rax + mov -1(\DPTR, \DLEN, 1), %al + dec \DLEN + jnz _read_next_byte_lt8_\@ + vpinsrq $0, %rax, \XMMDst, \XMMDst +_done_read_partial_block_\@: +.endm + +# PARTIAL_BLOCK: Handles encryption/decryption and the tag partial blocks +# between update calls. +# Requires the input data be at least 1 byte long due to READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK +# Outputs encrypted bytes, and updates hash and partial info in gcm_data_context +# Clobbers rax, r10, r12, r13, xmm0-6, xmm9-13 +.macro PARTIAL_BLOCK GHASH_MUL CYPH_PLAIN_OUT PLAIN_CYPH_IN PLAIN_CYPH_LEN DATA_OFFSET \ + AAD_HASH ENC_DEC + mov PBlockLen(arg2), %r13 + cmp $0, %r13 + je _partial_block_done_\@ # Leave Macro if no partial blocks + # Read in input data without over reading + cmp $16, \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN + jl _fewer_than_16_bytes_\@ + vmovdqu (\PLAIN_CYPH_IN), %xmm1 # If more than 16 bytes, just fill xmm + jmp _data_read_\@ + +_fewer_than_16_bytes_\@: + lea (\PLAIN_CYPH_IN, \DATA_OFFSET, 1), %r10 + mov \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r12 + READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10 %r12 %xmm1 + + mov PBlockLen(arg2), %r13 + +_data_read_\@: # Finished reading in data + + vmovdqu PBlockEncKey(arg2), %xmm9 + vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), %xmm13 + + lea SHIFT_MASK(%rip), %r12 + + # adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be able to shift r13 bytes + # r16-r13 is the number of bytes in plaintext mod 16) + add %r13, %r12 + vmovdqu (%r12), %xmm2 # get the appropriate shuffle mask + vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9 # shift right r13 bytes + +.if \ENC_DEC == DEC + vmovdqa %xmm1, %xmm3 + pxor %xmm1, %xmm9 # Cyphertext XOR E(K, Yn) + + mov \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r10 + add %r13, %r10 + # Set r10 to be the amount of data left in CYPH_PLAIN_IN after filling + sub $16, %r10 + # Determine if if partial block is not being filled and + # shift mask accordingly + jge _no_extra_mask_1_\@ + sub %r10, %r12 +_no_extra_mask_1_\@: + + vmovdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1 + # get the appropriate mask to mask out bottom r13 bytes of xmm9 + vpand %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # mask out bottom r13 bytes of xmm9 + + vpand %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 + vmovdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10 + vpshufb %xmm10, %xmm3, %xmm3 + vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 + vpxor %xmm3, \AAD_HASH, \AAD_HASH + + cmp $0, %r10 + jl _partial_incomplete_1_\@ + + # GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block + \GHASH_MUL \AAD_HASH, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 + xor %eax,%eax + + mov %rax, PBlockLen(arg2) + jmp _dec_done_\@ +_partial_incomplete_1_\@: + add \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, PBlockLen(arg2) +_dec_done_\@: + vmovdqu \AAD_HASH, AadHash(arg2) +.else + vpxor %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn) + + mov \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r10 + add %r13, %r10 + # Set r10 to be the amount of data left in CYPH_PLAIN_IN after filling + sub $16, %r10 + # Determine if if partial block is not being filled and + # shift mask accordingly + jge _no_extra_mask_2_\@ + sub %r10, %r12 +_no_extra_mask_2_\@: + + vmovdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1 + # get the appropriate mask to mask out bottom r13 bytes of xmm9 + vpand %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 + + vmovdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm1 + vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 + vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9 + vpxor %xmm9, \AAD_HASH, \AAD_HASH + + cmp $0, %r10 + jl _partial_incomplete_2_\@ + + # GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block + \GHASH_MUL \AAD_HASH, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 + xor %eax,%eax + + mov %rax, PBlockLen(arg2) + jmp _encode_done_\@ +_partial_incomplete_2_\@: + add \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, PBlockLen(arg2) +_encode_done_\@: + vmovdqu \AAD_HASH, AadHash(arg2) + + vmovdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10 + # shuffle xmm9 back to output as ciphertext + vpshufb %xmm10, %xmm9, %xmm9 + vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9 +.endif + # output encrypted Bytes + cmp $0, %r10 + jl _partial_fill_\@ + mov %r13, %r12 + mov $16, %r13 + # Set r13 to be the number of bytes to write out + sub %r12, %r13 + jmp _count_set_\@ +_partial_fill_\@: + mov \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r13 +_count_set_\@: + vmovdqa %xmm9, %xmm0 + vmovq %xmm0, %rax + cmp $8, %r13 + jle _less_than_8_bytes_left_\@ + + mov %rax, (\CYPH_PLAIN_OUT, \DATA_OFFSET, 1) + add $8, \DATA_OFFSET + psrldq $8, %xmm0 + vmovq %xmm0, %rax + sub $8, %r13 +_less_than_8_bytes_left_\@: + movb %al, (\CYPH_PLAIN_OUT, \DATA_OFFSET, 1) + add $1, \DATA_OFFSET + shr $8, %rax + sub $1, %r13 + jne _less_than_8_bytes_left_\@ +_partial_block_done_\@: +.endm # PARTIAL_BLOCK + #ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX ############################################################################### # GHASH_MUL MACRO to implement: Data*HashKey mod (128,127,126,121,0) @@ -341,49 +947,49 @@ VARIABLE_OFFSET = 16*8 vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T1 vpxor \T5, \T1, \T1 - vmovdqa \T1, HashKey_k(arg1) + vmovdqu \T1, HashKey_k(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^2<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_2(arg1) # [HashKey_2] = HashKey^2<<1 mod poly + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_2(arg2) # [HashKey_2] = HashKey^2<<1 mod poly vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T1 vpxor \T5, \T1, \T1 - vmovdqa \T1, HashKey_2_k(arg1) + vmovdqu \T1, HashKey_2_k(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^3<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_3(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_3(arg2) vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T1 vpxor \T5, \T1, \T1 - vmovdqa \T1, HashKey_3_k(arg1) + vmovdqu \T1, HashKey_3_k(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^4<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_4(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_4(arg2) vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T1 vpxor \T5, \T1, \T1 - vmovdqa \T1, HashKey_4_k(arg1) + vmovdqu \T1, HashKey_4_k(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^5<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_5(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_5(arg2) vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T1 vpxor \T5, \T1, \T1 - vmovdqa \T1, HashKey_5_k(arg1) + vmovdqu \T1, HashKey_5_k(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^6<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_6(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_6(arg2) vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T1 vpxor \T5, \T1, \T1 - vmovdqa \T1, HashKey_6_k(arg1) + vmovdqu \T1, HashKey_6_k(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^7<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_7(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_7(arg2) vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T1 vpxor \T5, \T1, \T1 - vmovdqa \T1, HashKey_7_k(arg1) + vmovdqu \T1, HashKey_7_k(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^8<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_8(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_8(arg2) vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T1 vpxor \T5, \T1, \T1 - vmovdqa \T1, HashKey_8_k(arg1) + vmovdqu \T1, HashKey_8_k(arg2) .endm @@ -392,84 +998,15 @@ VARIABLE_OFFSET = 16*8 ## num_initial_blocks = b mod 4# ## encrypt the initial num_initial_blocks blocks and apply ghash on the ciphertext ## r10, r11, r12, rax are clobbered -## arg1, arg2, arg3, r14 are used as a pointer only, not modified +## arg1, arg3, arg4, r14 are used as a pointer only, not modified -.macro INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX num_initial_blocks T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T6 T_key ENC_DEC +.macro INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX REP num_initial_blocks T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T6 T_key ENC_DEC i = (8-\num_initial_blocks) - j = 0 setreg - - mov arg6, %r10 # r10 = AAD - mov arg7, %r12 # r12 = aadLen - - - mov %r12, %r11 - - vpxor reg_j, reg_j, reg_j - vpxor reg_i, reg_i, reg_i - cmp $16, %r11 - jl _get_AAD_rest8\@ -_get_AAD_blocks\@: - vmovdqu (%r10), reg_i - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), reg_i, reg_i - vpxor reg_i, reg_j, reg_j - GHASH_MUL_AVX reg_j, \T2, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T5, \T6 - add $16, %r10 - sub $16, %r12 - sub $16, %r11 - cmp $16, %r11 - jge _get_AAD_blocks\@ - vmovdqu reg_j, reg_i - cmp $0, %r11 - je _get_AAD_done\@ - - vpxor reg_i, reg_i, reg_i - - /* read the last <16B of AAD. since we have at least 4B of - data right after the AAD (the ICV, and maybe some CT), we can - read 4B/8B blocks safely, and then get rid of the extra stuff */ -_get_AAD_rest8\@: - cmp $4, %r11 - jle _get_AAD_rest4\@ - movq (%r10), \T1 - add $8, %r10 - sub $8, %r11 - vpslldq $8, \T1, \T1 - vpsrldq $8, reg_i, reg_i - vpxor \T1, reg_i, reg_i - jmp _get_AAD_rest8\@ -_get_AAD_rest4\@: - cmp $0, %r11 - jle _get_AAD_rest0\@ - mov (%r10), %eax - movq %rax, \T1 - add $4, %r10 - sub $4, %r11 - vpslldq $12, \T1, \T1 - vpsrldq $4, reg_i, reg_i - vpxor \T1, reg_i, reg_i -_get_AAD_rest0\@: - /* finalize: shift out the extra bytes we read, and align - left. since pslldq can only shift by an immediate, we use - vpshufb and an array of shuffle masks */ - movq %r12, %r11 - salq $4, %r11 - movdqu aad_shift_arr(%r11), \T1 - vpshufb \T1, reg_i, reg_i -_get_AAD_rest_final\@: - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), reg_i, reg_i - vpxor reg_j, reg_i, reg_i - GHASH_MUL_AVX reg_i, \T2, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T5, \T6 - -_get_AAD_done\@: - # initialize the data pointer offset as zero - xor %r11d, %r11d + vmovdqu AadHash(arg2), reg_i # start AES for num_initial_blocks blocks - mov arg5, %rax # rax = *Y0 - vmovdqu (%rax), \CTR # CTR = Y0 - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \CTR, \CTR - + vmovdqu CurCount(arg2), \CTR i = (9-\num_initial_blocks) setreg @@ -490,10 +1027,10 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: setreg .endr - j = 1 - setreg -.rep 9 - vmovdqa 16*j(arg1), \T_key + j = 1 + setreg +.rep \REP + vmovdqa 16*j(arg1), \T_key i = (9-\num_initial_blocks) setreg .rep \num_initial_blocks @@ -502,12 +1039,11 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: setreg .endr - j = (j+1) - setreg + j = (j+1) + setreg .endr - - vmovdqa 16*10(arg1), \T_key + vmovdqa 16*j(arg1), \T_key i = (9-\num_initial_blocks) setreg .rep \num_initial_blocks @@ -519,9 +1055,9 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: i = (9-\num_initial_blocks) setreg .rep \num_initial_blocks - vmovdqu (arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu (arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, reg_i, reg_i - vmovdqu reg_i, (arg2 , %r11) # write back ciphertext for num_initial_blocks blocks + vmovdqu reg_i, (arg3 , %r11) # write back ciphertext for num_initial_blocks blocks add $16, %r11 .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, reg_i @@ -595,9 +1131,9 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: vpxor \T_key, \XMM7, \XMM7 vpxor \T_key, \XMM8, \XMM8 - i = 1 - setreg -.rep 9 # do 9 rounds + i = 1 + setreg +.rep \REP # do REP rounds vmovdqa 16*i(arg1), \T_key vaesenc \T_key, \XMM1, \XMM1 vaesenc \T_key, \XMM2, \XMM2 @@ -607,11 +1143,10 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: vaesenc \T_key, \XMM6, \XMM6 vaesenc \T_key, \XMM7, \XMM7 vaesenc \T_key, \XMM8, \XMM8 - i = (i+1) - setreg + i = (i+1) + setreg .endr - vmovdqa 16*i(arg1), \T_key vaesenclast \T_key, \XMM1, \XMM1 vaesenclast \T_key, \XMM2, \XMM2 @@ -622,58 +1157,58 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: vaesenclast \T_key, \XMM7, \XMM7 vaesenclast \T_key, \XMM8, \XMM8 - vmovdqu (arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu (arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1 - vmovdqu \XMM1, (arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM1, (arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM1 .endif - vmovdqu 16*1(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*1(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2 - vmovdqu \XMM2, 16*1(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM2, 16*1(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM2 .endif - vmovdqu 16*2(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*2(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3 - vmovdqu \XMM3, 16*2(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM3, 16*2(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM3 .endif - vmovdqu 16*3(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*3(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4 - vmovdqu \XMM4, 16*3(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM4, 16*3(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM4 .endif - vmovdqu 16*4(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*4(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5 - vmovdqu \XMM5, 16*4(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM5, 16*4(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM5 .endif - vmovdqu 16*5(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*5(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6 - vmovdqu \XMM6, 16*5(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM6, 16*5(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM6 .endif - vmovdqu 16*6(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*6(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7 - vmovdqu \XMM7, 16*6(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM7, 16*6(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM7 .endif - vmovdqu 16*7(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*7(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8 - vmovdqu \XMM8, 16*7(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM8, 16*7(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM8 .endif @@ -698,9 +1233,9 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: # encrypt 8 blocks at a time # ghash the 8 previously encrypted ciphertext blocks -# arg1, arg2, arg3 are used as pointers only, not modified +# arg1, arg3, arg4 are used as pointers only, not modified # r11 is the data offset value -.macro GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T7 loop_idx ENC_DEC +.macro GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX REP T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T7 loop_idx ENC_DEC vmovdqa \XMM1, \T2 vmovdqa \XMM2, TMP2(%rsp) @@ -784,14 +1319,14 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ####################################################################### - vmovdqa HashKey_8(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_8(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T2, \T4 # T4 = a1*b1 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T2, \T7 # T7 = a0*b0 vpshufd $0b01001110, \T2, \T6 vpxor \T2, \T6, \T6 - vmovdqa HashKey_8_k(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_8_k(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T6, \T6 vmovdqu 16*3(arg1), \T1 @@ -805,7 +1340,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8 vmovdqa TMP2(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_7(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_7(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3 @@ -813,7 +1348,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T1, \T3, \T3 - vmovdqa HashKey_7_k(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_7_k(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T6, \T6 @@ -830,7 +1365,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ####################################################################### vmovdqa TMP3(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_6(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_6(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3 @@ -838,7 +1373,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T1, \T3, \T3 - vmovdqa HashKey_6_k(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_6_k(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T6, \T6 @@ -853,7 +1388,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8 vmovdqa TMP4(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_5(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_5(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3 @@ -861,7 +1396,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T1, \T3, \T3 - vmovdqa HashKey_5_k(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_5_k(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T6, \T6 @@ -877,7 +1412,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vmovdqa TMP5(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_4(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_4(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3 @@ -885,7 +1420,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T1, \T3, \T3 - vmovdqa HashKey_4_k(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_4_k(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T6, \T6 @@ -900,7 +1435,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8 vmovdqa TMP6(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_3(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_3(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3 @@ -908,7 +1443,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T1, \T3, \T3 - vmovdqa HashKey_3_k(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_3_k(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T6, \T6 @@ -924,7 +1459,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8 vmovdqa TMP7(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_2(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_2(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3 @@ -932,7 +1467,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T1, \T3, \T3 - vmovdqa HashKey_2_k(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_2_k(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T6, \T6 @@ -949,7 +1484,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vaesenc \T5, \XMM8, \XMM8 vmovdqa TMP8(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3 @@ -957,7 +1492,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T1, \T3, \T3 - vmovdqa HashKey_k(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_k(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x10, \T5, \T3, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T6, \T6 @@ -966,17 +1501,35 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vmovdqu 16*10(arg1), \T5 + i = 11 + setreg +.rep (\REP-9) + + vaesenc \T5, \XMM1, \XMM1 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM2, \XMM2 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM3, \XMM3 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM4, \XMM4 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM5, \XMM5 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM6, \XMM6 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM7, \XMM7 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM8, \XMM8 + + vmovdqu 16*i(arg1), \T5 + i = i + 1 + setreg +.endr + i = 0 j = 1 setreg .rep 8 - vpxor 16*i(arg3, %r11), \T5, \T2 + vpxor 16*i(arg4, %r11), \T5, \T2 .if \ENC_DEC == ENC vaesenclast \T2, reg_j, reg_j .else vaesenclast \T2, reg_j, \T3 - vmovdqu 16*i(arg3, %r11), reg_j - vmovdqu \T3, 16*i(arg2, %r11) + vmovdqu 16*i(arg4, %r11), reg_j + vmovdqu \T3, 16*i(arg3, %r11) .endif i = (i+1) j = (j+1) @@ -1008,14 +1561,14 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpxor \T2, \T7, \T7 # first phase of the reduction complete ####################################################################### .if \ENC_DEC == ENC - vmovdqu \XMM1, 16*0(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM2, 16*1(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM3, 16*2(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM4, 16*3(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM5, 16*4(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM6, 16*5(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM7, 16*6(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM8, 16*7(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM1, 16*0(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM2, 16*1(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM3, 16*2(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM4, 16*3(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM5, 16*4(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM6, 16*5(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM7, 16*6(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM8, 16*7(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer .endif ####################################################################### @@ -1056,25 +1609,25 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM1, \T2 vpxor \XMM1, \T2, \T2 - vmovdqa HashKey_8(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_8(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \XMM1, \T6 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \XMM1, \T7 - vmovdqa HashKey_8_k(arg1), \T3 + vmovdqu HashKey_8_k(arg2), \T3 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T3, \T2, \XMM1 ###################### vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM2, \T2 vpxor \XMM2, \T2, \T2 - vmovdqa HashKey_7(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_7(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \XMM2, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T6, \T6 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \XMM2, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T7, \T7 - vmovdqa HashKey_7_k(arg1), \T3 + vmovdqu HashKey_7_k(arg2), \T3 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2 vpxor \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1 @@ -1082,14 +1635,14 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM3, \T2 vpxor \XMM3, \T2, \T2 - vmovdqa HashKey_6(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_6(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \XMM3, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T6, \T6 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \XMM3, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T7, \T7 - vmovdqa HashKey_6_k(arg1), \T3 + vmovdqu HashKey_6_k(arg2), \T3 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2 vpxor \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1 @@ -1097,14 +1650,14 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM4, \T2 vpxor \XMM4, \T2, \T2 - vmovdqa HashKey_5(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_5(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \XMM4, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T6, \T6 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \XMM4, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T7, \T7 - vmovdqa HashKey_5_k(arg1), \T3 + vmovdqu HashKey_5_k(arg2), \T3 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2 vpxor \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1 @@ -1112,14 +1665,14 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM5, \T2 vpxor \XMM5, \T2, \T2 - vmovdqa HashKey_4(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_4(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \XMM5, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T6, \T6 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \XMM5, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T7, \T7 - vmovdqa HashKey_4_k(arg1), \T3 + vmovdqu HashKey_4_k(arg2), \T3 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2 vpxor \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1 @@ -1127,14 +1680,14 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM6, \T2 vpxor \XMM6, \T2, \T2 - vmovdqa HashKey_3(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_3(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \XMM6, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T6, \T6 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \XMM6, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T7, \T7 - vmovdqa HashKey_3_k(arg1), \T3 + vmovdqu HashKey_3_k(arg2), \T3 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2 vpxor \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1 @@ -1142,14 +1695,14 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM7, \T2 vpxor \XMM7, \T2, \T2 - vmovdqa HashKey_2(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_2(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \XMM7, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T6, \T6 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \XMM7, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T7, \T7 - vmovdqa HashKey_2_k(arg1), \T3 + vmovdqu HashKey_2_k(arg2), \T3 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2 vpxor \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1 @@ -1157,14 +1710,14 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM8, \T2 vpxor \XMM8, \T2, \T2 - vmovdqa HashKey(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \XMM8, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T6, \T6 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \XMM8, \T4 vpxor \T4, \T7, \T7 - vmovdqa HashKey_k(arg1), \T3 + vmovdqu HashKey_k(arg2), \T3 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T3, \T2, \T2 vpxor \T2, \XMM1, \XMM1 @@ -1210,413 +1763,112 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: .endm - -# combined for GCM encrypt and decrypt functions -# clobbering all xmm registers -# clobbering r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15 -.macro GCM_ENC_DEC_AVX ENC_DEC - - #the number of pushes must equal STACK_OFFSET - push %r12 - push %r13 - push %r14 - push %r15 - - mov %rsp, %r14 - - - - - sub $VARIABLE_OFFSET, %rsp - and $~63, %rsp # align rsp to 64 bytes - - - vmovdqu HashKey(arg1), %xmm13 # xmm13 = HashKey - - mov arg4, %r13 # save the number of bytes of plaintext/ciphertext - and $-16, %r13 # r13 = r13 - (r13 mod 16) - - mov %r13, %r12 - shr $4, %r12 - and $7, %r12 - jz _initial_num_blocks_is_0\@ - - cmp $7, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_7\@ - cmp $6, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_6\@ - cmp $5, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_5\@ - cmp $4, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_4\@ - cmp $3, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_3\@ - cmp $2, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_2\@ - - jmp _initial_num_blocks_is_1\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_7\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX 7, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*7, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_6\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX 6, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*6, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_5\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX 5, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*5, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_4\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX 4, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*4, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_3\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX 3, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*3, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_2\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX 2, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*2, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_1\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX 1, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*1, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_0\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX 0, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - - -_initial_blocks_encrypted\@: - cmp $0, %r13 - je _zero_cipher_left\@ - - sub $128, %r13 - je _eight_cipher_left\@ - - - - - vmovd %xmm9, %r15d - and $255, %r15d - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - - -_encrypt_by_8_new\@: - cmp $(255-8), %r15d - jg _encrypt_by_8\@ - - - - add $8, %r15b - GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm15, out_order, \ENC_DEC - add $128, %r11 - sub $128, %r13 - jne _encrypt_by_8_new\@ - - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - jmp _eight_cipher_left\@ - -_encrypt_by_8\@: - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - add $8, %r15b - GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm15, in_order, \ENC_DEC - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - add $128, %r11 - sub $128, %r13 - jne _encrypt_by_8_new\@ - - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - - - - -_eight_cipher_left\@: - GHASH_LAST_8_AVX %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8 - - -_zero_cipher_left\@: - cmp $16, arg4 - jl _only_less_than_16\@ - - mov arg4, %r13 - and $15, %r13 # r13 = (arg4 mod 16) - - je _multiple_of_16_bytes\@ - - # handle the last <16 Byte block seperately - - - vpaddd ONE(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 # INCR CNT to get Yn - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK %xmm9 # E(K, Yn) - - sub $16, %r11 - add %r13, %r11 - vmovdqu (arg3, %r11), %xmm1 # receive the last <16 Byte block - - lea SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12 - sub %r13, %r12 # adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be - # able to shift 16-r13 bytes (r13 is the - # number of bytes in plaintext mod 16) - vmovdqu (%r12), %xmm2 # get the appropriate shuffle mask - vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm1, %xmm1 # shift right 16-r13 bytes - jmp _final_ghash_mul\@ - -_only_less_than_16\@: - # check for 0 length - mov arg4, %r13 - and $15, %r13 # r13 = (arg4 mod 16) - - je _multiple_of_16_bytes\@ - - # handle the last <16 Byte block seperately - - - vpaddd ONE(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 # INCR CNT to get Yn - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK %xmm9 # E(K, Yn) - - - lea SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12 - sub %r13, %r12 # adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be - # able to shift 16-r13 bytes (r13 is the - # number of bytes in plaintext mod 16) - -_get_last_16_byte_loop\@: - movb (arg3, %r11), %al - movb %al, TMP1 (%rsp , %r11) - add $1, %r11 - cmp %r13, %r11 - jne _get_last_16_byte_loop\@ - - vmovdqu TMP1(%rsp), %xmm1 - - sub $16, %r11 - -_final_ghash_mul\@: - .if \ENC_DEC == DEC - vmovdqa %xmm1, %xmm2 - vpxor %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn) - vmovdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1 # get the appropriate mask to - # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 - vpand %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 - vpand %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2 - vpxor %xmm2, %xmm14, %xmm14 - #GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block - GHASH_MUL_AVX %xmm14, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 - sub %r13, %r11 - add $16, %r11 - .else - vpxor %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn) - vmovdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1 # get the appropriate mask to - # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 - vpand %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - vpxor %xmm9, %xmm14, %xmm14 - #GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block - GHASH_MUL_AVX %xmm14, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 - sub %r13, %r11 - add $16, %r11 - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 # shuffle xmm9 back to output as ciphertext - .endif - - - ############################# - # output r13 Bytes - vmovq %xmm9, %rax - cmp $8, %r13 - jle _less_than_8_bytes_left\@ - - mov %rax, (arg2 , %r11) - add $8, %r11 - vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9 - vmovq %xmm9, %rax - sub $8, %r13 - -_less_than_8_bytes_left\@: - movb %al, (arg2 , %r11) - add $1, %r11 - shr $8, %rax - sub $1, %r13 - jne _less_than_8_bytes_left\@ - ############################# - -_multiple_of_16_bytes\@: - mov arg7, %r12 # r12 = aadLen (number of bytes) - shl $3, %r12 # convert into number of bits - vmovd %r12d, %xmm15 # len(A) in xmm15 - - shl $3, arg4 # len(C) in bits (*128) - vmovq arg4, %xmm1 - vpslldq $8, %xmm15, %xmm15 # xmm15 = len(A)|| 0x0000000000000000 - vpxor %xmm1, %xmm15, %xmm15 # xmm15 = len(A)||len(C) - - vpxor %xmm15, %xmm14, %xmm14 - GHASH_MUL_AVX %xmm14, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 # final GHASH computation - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm14, %xmm14 # perform a 16Byte swap - - mov arg5, %rax # rax = *Y0 - vmovdqu (%rax), %xmm9 # xmm9 = Y0 - - ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK %xmm9 # E(K, Y0) - - vpxor %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm9 - - - -_return_T\@: - mov arg8, %r10 # r10 = authTag - mov arg9, %r11 # r11 = auth_tag_len - - cmp $16, %r11 - je _T_16\@ - - cmp $8, %r11 - jl _T_4\@ - -_T_8\@: - vmovq %xmm9, %rax - mov %rax, (%r10) - add $8, %r10 - sub $8, %r11 - vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9 - cmp $0, %r11 - je _return_T_done\@ -_T_4\@: - vmovd %xmm9, %eax - mov %eax, (%r10) - add $4, %r10 - sub $4, %r11 - vpsrldq $4, %xmm9, %xmm9 - cmp $0, %r11 - je _return_T_done\@ -_T_123\@: - vmovd %xmm9, %eax - cmp $2, %r11 - jl _T_1\@ - mov %ax, (%r10) - cmp $2, %r11 - je _return_T_done\@ - add $2, %r10 - sar $16, %eax -_T_1\@: - mov %al, (%r10) - jmp _return_T_done\@ - -_T_16\@: - vmovdqu %xmm9, (%r10) - -_return_T_done\@: - mov %r14, %rsp - - pop %r15 - pop %r14 - pop %r13 - pop %r12 -.endm - - ############################################################# #void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2 # (gcm_data *my_ctx_data, -# u8 *hash_subkey)# /* H, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. */ +# gcm_context_data *data, +# u8 *hash_subkey# /* H, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. */ +# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt +# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte +# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload) +# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */ +# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/ +# u64 aad_len) /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */ ############################################################# -ENTRY(aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2) - #the number of pushes must equal STACK_OFFSET - push %r12 - push %r13 - push %r14 - push %r15 - - mov %rsp, %r14 - - - - sub $VARIABLE_OFFSET, %rsp - and $~63, %rsp # align rsp to 64 bytes - - vmovdqu (arg2), %xmm6 # xmm6 = HashKey - - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm6, %xmm6 - ############### PRECOMPUTATION of HashKey<<1 mod poly from the HashKey - vmovdqa %xmm6, %xmm2 - vpsllq $1, %xmm6, %xmm6 - vpsrlq $63, %xmm2, %xmm2 - vmovdqa %xmm2, %xmm1 - vpslldq $8, %xmm2, %xmm2 - vpsrldq $8, %xmm1, %xmm1 - vpor %xmm2, %xmm6, %xmm6 - #reduction - vpshufd $0b00100100, %xmm1, %xmm2 - vpcmpeqd TWOONE(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2 - vpand POLY(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2 - vpxor %xmm2, %xmm6, %xmm6 # xmm6 holds the HashKey<<1 mod poly - ####################################################################### - vmovdqa %xmm6, HashKey(arg1) # store HashKey<<1 mod poly - - - PRECOMPUTE_AVX %xmm6, %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5 - - mov %r14, %rsp - - pop %r15 - pop %r14 - pop %r13 - pop %r12 +ENTRY(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2) + FUNC_SAVE + INIT GHASH_MUL_AVX, PRECOMPUTE_AVX + FUNC_RESTORE ret -ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2) +ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2) ############################################################################### -#void aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2( +#void aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2( # gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */ +# gcm_context_data *data, # u8 *out, /* Ciphertext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed. */ # const u8 *in, /* Plaintext input */ -# u64 plaintext_len, /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */ -# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt -# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte -# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload) -# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */ -# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/ -# u64 aad_len, /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */ -# u8 *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */ -# u64 auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes. -# Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */ +# u64 plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */ ############################################################################### -ENTRY(aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2) - GCM_ENC_DEC_AVX ENC - ret -ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2) +ENTRY(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2) + FUNC_SAVE + mov keysize, %eax + cmp $32, %eax + je key_256_enc_update + cmp $16, %eax + je key_128_enc_update + # must be 192 + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 11 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_128_enc_update: + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 9 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_256_enc_update: + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 13 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2) ############################################################################### -#void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2( +#void aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2( # gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */ +# gcm_context_data *data, # u8 *out, /* Plaintext output. Decrypt in-place is allowed. */ # const u8 *in, /* Ciphertext input */ -# u64 plaintext_len, /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */ -# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt -# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte -# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload) -# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */ -# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/ -# u64 aad_len, /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */ +# u64 plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */ +############################################################################### +ENTRY(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2) + FUNC_SAVE + mov keysize,%eax + cmp $32, %eax + je key_256_dec_update + cmp $16, %eax + je key_128_dec_update + # must be 192 + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 11 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_128_dec_update: + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 9 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_256_dec_update: + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 13 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2) + +############################################################################### +#void aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2( +# gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */ +# gcm_context_data *data, # u8 *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */ # u64 auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes. # Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */ ############################################################################### -ENTRY(aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2) - GCM_ENC_DEC_AVX DEC - ret -ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2) +ENTRY(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2) + FUNC_SAVE + mov keysize,%eax + cmp $32, %eax + je key_256_finalize + cmp $16, %eax + je key_128_finalize + # must be 192 + GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 11, arg3, arg4 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_128_finalize: + GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 9, arg3, arg4 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_256_finalize: + GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 13, arg3, arg4 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2) + #endif /* CONFIG_AS_AVX */ #ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 @@ -1670,113 +1922,42 @@ ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2) # Haskey_i_k holds XORed values of the low and high parts of the Haskey_i vmovdqa \HK, \T5 GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^2<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_2(arg1) # [HashKey_2] = HashKey^2<<1 mod poly + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_2(arg2) # [HashKey_2] = HashKey^2<<1 mod poly GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^3<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_3(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_3(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^4<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_4(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_4(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^5<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_5(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_5(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^6<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_6(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_6(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^7<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_7(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_7(arg2) GHASH_MUL_AVX2 \T5, \HK, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T6, \T2 # T5 = HashKey^8<<1 mod poly - vmovdqa \T5, HashKey_8(arg1) + vmovdqu \T5, HashKey_8(arg2) .endm - ## if a = number of total plaintext bytes ## b = floor(a/16) ## num_initial_blocks = b mod 4# ## encrypt the initial num_initial_blocks blocks and apply ghash on the ciphertext ## r10, r11, r12, rax are clobbered -## arg1, arg2, arg3, r14 are used as a pointer only, not modified +## arg1, arg3, arg4, r14 are used as a pointer only, not modified -.macro INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 num_initial_blocks T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T6 T_key ENC_DEC VER +.macro INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 REP num_initial_blocks T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T6 T_key ENC_DEC VER i = (8-\num_initial_blocks) - j = 0 setreg - - mov arg6, %r10 # r10 = AAD - mov arg7, %r12 # r12 = aadLen - - - mov %r12, %r11 - - vpxor reg_j, reg_j, reg_j - vpxor reg_i, reg_i, reg_i - - cmp $16, %r11 - jl _get_AAD_rest8\@ -_get_AAD_blocks\@: - vmovdqu (%r10), reg_i - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), reg_i, reg_i - vpxor reg_i, reg_j, reg_j - GHASH_MUL_AVX2 reg_j, \T2, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T5, \T6 - add $16, %r10 - sub $16, %r12 - sub $16, %r11 - cmp $16, %r11 - jge _get_AAD_blocks\@ - vmovdqu reg_j, reg_i - cmp $0, %r11 - je _get_AAD_done\@ - - vpxor reg_i, reg_i, reg_i - - /* read the last <16B of AAD. since we have at least 4B of - data right after the AAD (the ICV, and maybe some CT), we can - read 4B/8B blocks safely, and then get rid of the extra stuff */ -_get_AAD_rest8\@: - cmp $4, %r11 - jle _get_AAD_rest4\@ - movq (%r10), \T1 - add $8, %r10 - sub $8, %r11 - vpslldq $8, \T1, \T1 - vpsrldq $8, reg_i, reg_i - vpxor \T1, reg_i, reg_i - jmp _get_AAD_rest8\@ -_get_AAD_rest4\@: - cmp $0, %r11 - jle _get_AAD_rest0\@ - mov (%r10), %eax - movq %rax, \T1 - add $4, %r10 - sub $4, %r11 - vpslldq $12, \T1, \T1 - vpsrldq $4, reg_i, reg_i - vpxor \T1, reg_i, reg_i -_get_AAD_rest0\@: - /* finalize: shift out the extra bytes we read, and align - left. since pslldq can only shift by an immediate, we use - vpshufb and an array of shuffle masks */ - movq %r12, %r11 - salq $4, %r11 - movdqu aad_shift_arr(%r11), \T1 - vpshufb \T1, reg_i, reg_i -_get_AAD_rest_final\@: - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), reg_i, reg_i - vpxor reg_j, reg_i, reg_i - GHASH_MUL_AVX2 reg_i, \T2, \T1, \T3, \T4, \T5, \T6 - -_get_AAD_done\@: - # initialize the data pointer offset as zero - xor %r11d, %r11d + vmovdqu AadHash(arg2), reg_i # start AES for num_initial_blocks blocks - mov arg5, %rax # rax = *Y0 - vmovdqu (%rax), \CTR # CTR = Y0 - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), \CTR, \CTR - + vmovdqu CurCount(arg2), \CTR i = (9-\num_initial_blocks) setreg @@ -1799,7 +1980,7 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: j = 1 setreg -.rep 9 +.rep \REP vmovdqa 16*j(arg1), \T_key i = (9-\num_initial_blocks) setreg @@ -1814,7 +1995,7 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: .endr - vmovdqa 16*10(arg1), \T_key + vmovdqa 16*j(arg1), \T_key i = (9-\num_initial_blocks) setreg .rep \num_initial_blocks @@ -1826,9 +2007,9 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: i = (9-\num_initial_blocks) setreg .rep \num_initial_blocks - vmovdqu (arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu (arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, reg_i, reg_i - vmovdqu reg_i, (arg2 , %r11) # write back ciphertext for + vmovdqu reg_i, (arg3 , %r11) # write back ciphertext for # num_initial_blocks blocks add $16, %r11 .if \ENC_DEC == DEC @@ -1905,7 +2086,7 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: i = 1 setreg -.rep 9 # do 9 rounds +.rep \REP # do REP rounds vmovdqa 16*i(arg1), \T_key vaesenc \T_key, \XMM1, \XMM1 vaesenc \T_key, \XMM2, \XMM2 @@ -1930,58 +2111,58 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: vaesenclast \T_key, \XMM7, \XMM7 vaesenclast \T_key, \XMM8, \XMM8 - vmovdqu (arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu (arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM1, \XMM1 - vmovdqu \XMM1, (arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM1, (arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM1 .endif - vmovdqu 16*1(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*1(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM2, \XMM2 - vmovdqu \XMM2, 16*1(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM2, 16*1(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM2 .endif - vmovdqu 16*2(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*2(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM3, \XMM3 - vmovdqu \XMM3, 16*2(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM3, 16*2(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM3 .endif - vmovdqu 16*3(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*3(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM4, \XMM4 - vmovdqu \XMM4, 16*3(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM4, 16*3(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM4 .endif - vmovdqu 16*4(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*4(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM5, \XMM5 - vmovdqu \XMM5, 16*4(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM5, 16*4(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM5 .endif - vmovdqu 16*5(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*5(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM6, \XMM6 - vmovdqu \XMM6, 16*5(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM6, 16*5(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM6 .endif - vmovdqu 16*6(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*6(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM7, \XMM7 - vmovdqu \XMM7, 16*6(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM7, 16*6(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM7 .endif - vmovdqu 16*7(arg3, %r11), \T1 + vmovdqu 16*7(arg4, %r11), \T1 vpxor \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8 - vmovdqu \XMM8, 16*7(arg2 , %r11) + vmovdqu \XMM8, 16*7(arg3 , %r11) .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa \T1, \XMM8 .endif @@ -2010,9 +2191,9 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: # encrypt 8 blocks at a time # ghash the 8 previously encrypted ciphertext blocks -# arg1, arg2, arg3 are used as pointers only, not modified +# arg1, arg3, arg4 are used as pointers only, not modified # r11 is the data offset value -.macro GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T7 loop_idx ENC_DEC +.macro GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2 REP T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 CTR XMM1 XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMM5 XMM6 XMM7 XMM8 T7 loop_idx ENC_DEC vmovdqa \XMM1, \T2 vmovdqa \XMM2, TMP2(%rsp) @@ -2096,7 +2277,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ####################################################################### - vmovdqa HashKey_8(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_8(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T2, \T4 # T4 = a1*b1 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T2, \T7 # T7 = a0*b0 vpclmulqdq $0x01, \T5, \T2, \T6 # T6 = a1*b0 @@ -2114,7 +2295,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8 vmovdqa TMP2(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_7(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_7(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 @@ -2140,7 +2321,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ####################################################################### vmovdqa TMP3(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_6(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_6(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 @@ -2164,7 +2345,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8 vmovdqa TMP4(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_5(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_5(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 @@ -2189,7 +2370,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vmovdqa TMP5(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_4(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_4(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 @@ -2213,7 +2394,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8 vmovdqa TMP6(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_3(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_3(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 @@ -2237,7 +2418,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vaesenc \T1, \XMM8, \XMM8 vmovdqa TMP7(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey_2(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_2(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x11, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T4, \T4 @@ -2264,7 +2445,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vaesenc \T5, \XMM8, \XMM8 vmovdqa TMP8(%rsp), \T1 - vmovdqa HashKey(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), \T5 vpclmulqdq $0x00, \T5, \T1, \T3 vpxor \T3, \T7, \T7 @@ -2281,17 +2462,34 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vmovdqu 16*10(arg1), \T5 + i = 11 + setreg +.rep (\REP-9) + vaesenc \T5, \XMM1, \XMM1 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM2, \XMM2 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM3, \XMM3 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM4, \XMM4 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM5, \XMM5 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM6, \XMM6 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM7, \XMM7 + vaesenc \T5, \XMM8, \XMM8 + + vmovdqu 16*i(arg1), \T5 + i = i + 1 + setreg +.endr + i = 0 j = 1 setreg .rep 8 - vpxor 16*i(arg3, %r11), \T5, \T2 + vpxor 16*i(arg4, %r11), \T5, \T2 .if \ENC_DEC == ENC vaesenclast \T2, reg_j, reg_j .else vaesenclast \T2, reg_j, \T3 - vmovdqu 16*i(arg3, %r11), reg_j - vmovdqu \T3, 16*i(arg2, %r11) + vmovdqu 16*i(arg4, %r11), reg_j + vmovdqu \T3, 16*i(arg3, %r11) .endif i = (i+1) j = (j+1) @@ -2317,14 +2515,14 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: vpxor \T2, \T7, \T7 # first phase of the reduction complete ####################################################################### .if \ENC_DEC == ENC - vmovdqu \XMM1, 16*0(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM2, 16*1(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM3, 16*2(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM4, 16*3(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM5, 16*4(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM6, 16*5(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM7, 16*6(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer - vmovdqu \XMM8, 16*7(arg2,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM1, 16*0(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM2, 16*1(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM3, 16*2(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM4, 16*3(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM5, 16*4(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM6, 16*5(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM7, 16*6(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer + vmovdqu \XMM8, 16*7(arg3,%r11) # Write to the Ciphertext buffer .endif ####################################################################### @@ -2361,7 +2559,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ## Karatsuba Method - vmovdqa HashKey_8(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_8(arg2), \T5 vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM1, \T2 vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T3 @@ -2375,7 +2573,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ###################### - vmovdqa HashKey_7(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_7(arg2), \T5 vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM2, \T2 vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T3 vpxor \XMM2, \T2, \T2 @@ -2393,7 +2591,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ###################### - vmovdqa HashKey_6(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_6(arg2), \T5 vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM3, \T2 vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T3 vpxor \XMM3, \T2, \T2 @@ -2411,7 +2609,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ###################### - vmovdqa HashKey_5(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_5(arg2), \T5 vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM4, \T2 vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T3 vpxor \XMM4, \T2, \T2 @@ -2429,7 +2627,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ###################### - vmovdqa HashKey_4(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_4(arg2), \T5 vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM5, \T2 vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T3 vpxor \XMM5, \T2, \T2 @@ -2447,7 +2645,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ###################### - vmovdqa HashKey_3(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_3(arg2), \T5 vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM6, \T2 vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T3 vpxor \XMM6, \T2, \T2 @@ -2465,7 +2663,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ###################### - vmovdqa HashKey_2(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey_2(arg2), \T5 vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM7, \T2 vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T3 vpxor \XMM7, \T2, \T2 @@ -2483,7 +2681,7 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: ###################### - vmovdqa HashKey(arg1), \T5 + vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), \T5 vpshufd $0b01001110, \XMM8, \T2 vpshufd $0b01001110, \T5, \T3 vpxor \XMM8, \T2, \T2 @@ -2536,411 +2734,110 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@: -# combined for GCM encrypt and decrypt functions -# clobbering all xmm registers -# clobbering r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15 -.macro GCM_ENC_DEC_AVX2 ENC_DEC - - #the number of pushes must equal STACK_OFFSET - push %r12 - push %r13 - push %r14 - push %r15 - - mov %rsp, %r14 - - - - - sub $VARIABLE_OFFSET, %rsp - and $~63, %rsp # align rsp to 64 bytes - - - vmovdqu HashKey(arg1), %xmm13 # xmm13 = HashKey - - mov arg4, %r13 # save the number of bytes of plaintext/ciphertext - and $-16, %r13 # r13 = r13 - (r13 mod 16) - - mov %r13, %r12 - shr $4, %r12 - and $7, %r12 - jz _initial_num_blocks_is_0\@ - - cmp $7, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_7\@ - cmp $6, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_6\@ - cmp $5, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_5\@ - cmp $4, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_4\@ - cmp $3, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_3\@ - cmp $2, %r12 - je _initial_num_blocks_is_2\@ - - jmp _initial_num_blocks_is_1\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_7\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 7, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*7, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_6\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 6, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*6, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_5\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 5, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*5, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_4\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 4, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*4, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_3\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 3, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*3, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_2\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 2, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*2, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_1\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 1, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - sub $16*1, %r13 - jmp _initial_blocks_encrypted\@ - -_initial_num_blocks_is_0\@: - INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2 0, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm11, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm10, %xmm0, \ENC_DEC - - -_initial_blocks_encrypted\@: - cmp $0, %r13 - je _zero_cipher_left\@ - - sub $128, %r13 - je _eight_cipher_left\@ - - - - - vmovd %xmm9, %r15d - and $255, %r15d - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - - -_encrypt_by_8_new\@: - cmp $(255-8), %r15d - jg _encrypt_by_8\@ - - - - add $8, %r15b - GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2 %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm15, out_order, \ENC_DEC - add $128, %r11 - sub $128, %r13 - jne _encrypt_by_8_new\@ - - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - jmp _eight_cipher_left\@ - -_encrypt_by_8\@: - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - add $8, %r15b - GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2 %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm15, in_order, \ENC_DEC - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - add $128, %r11 - sub $128, %r13 - jne _encrypt_by_8_new\@ - - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - - - - -_eight_cipher_left\@: - GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2 %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8 - - -_zero_cipher_left\@: - cmp $16, arg4 - jl _only_less_than_16\@ - - mov arg4, %r13 - and $15, %r13 # r13 = (arg4 mod 16) - - je _multiple_of_16_bytes\@ - - # handle the last <16 Byte block seperately - - - vpaddd ONE(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 # INCR CNT to get Yn - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK %xmm9 # E(K, Yn) - - sub $16, %r11 - add %r13, %r11 - vmovdqu (arg3, %r11), %xmm1 # receive the last <16 Byte block - - lea SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12 - sub %r13, %r12 # adjust the shuffle mask pointer - # to be able to shift 16-r13 bytes - # (r13 is the number of bytes in plaintext mod 16) - vmovdqu (%r12), %xmm2 # get the appropriate shuffle mask - vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm1, %xmm1 # shift right 16-r13 bytes - jmp _final_ghash_mul\@ - -_only_less_than_16\@: - # check for 0 length - mov arg4, %r13 - and $15, %r13 # r13 = (arg4 mod 16) - - je _multiple_of_16_bytes\@ - - # handle the last <16 Byte block seperately - - - vpaddd ONE(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 # INCR CNT to get Yn - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK %xmm9 # E(K, Yn) - - - lea SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12 - sub %r13, %r12 # adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be - # able to shift 16-r13 bytes (r13 is the - # number of bytes in plaintext mod 16) - -_get_last_16_byte_loop\@: - movb (arg3, %r11), %al - movb %al, TMP1 (%rsp , %r11) - add $1, %r11 - cmp %r13, %r11 - jne _get_last_16_byte_loop\@ - - vmovdqu TMP1(%rsp), %xmm1 - - sub $16, %r11 - -_final_ghash_mul\@: - .if \ENC_DEC == DEC - vmovdqa %xmm1, %xmm2 - vpxor %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn) - vmovdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1 # get the appropriate mask to mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 - vpand %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 - vpand %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2 - vpxor %xmm2, %xmm14, %xmm14 - #GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block - GHASH_MUL_AVX2 %xmm14, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 - sub %r13, %r11 - add $16, %r11 - .else - vpxor %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # Plaintext XOR E(K, Yn) - vmovdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1 # get the appropriate mask to mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 - vpand %xmm1, %xmm9, %xmm9 # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm9 - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 - vpxor %xmm9, %xmm14, %xmm14 - #GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block - GHASH_MUL_AVX2 %xmm14, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 - sub %r13, %r11 - add $16, %r11 - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm9, %xmm9 # shuffle xmm9 back to output as ciphertext - .endif - - - ############################# - # output r13 Bytes - vmovq %xmm9, %rax - cmp $8, %r13 - jle _less_than_8_bytes_left\@ - - mov %rax, (arg2 , %r11) - add $8, %r11 - vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9 - vmovq %xmm9, %rax - sub $8, %r13 - -_less_than_8_bytes_left\@: - movb %al, (arg2 , %r11) - add $1, %r11 - shr $8, %rax - sub $1, %r13 - jne _less_than_8_bytes_left\@ - ############################# - -_multiple_of_16_bytes\@: - mov arg7, %r12 # r12 = aadLen (number of bytes) - shl $3, %r12 # convert into number of bits - vmovd %r12d, %xmm15 # len(A) in xmm15 - - shl $3, arg4 # len(C) in bits (*128) - vmovq arg4, %xmm1 - vpslldq $8, %xmm15, %xmm15 # xmm15 = len(A)|| 0x0000000000000000 - vpxor %xmm1, %xmm15, %xmm15 # xmm15 = len(A)||len(C) - - vpxor %xmm15, %xmm14, %xmm14 - GHASH_MUL_AVX2 %xmm14, %xmm13, %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 # final GHASH computation - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm14, %xmm14 # perform a 16Byte swap - - mov arg5, %rax # rax = *Y0 - vmovdqu (%rax), %xmm9 # xmm9 = Y0 - - ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK %xmm9 # E(K, Y0) - - vpxor %xmm14, %xmm9, %xmm9 - - - -_return_T\@: - mov arg8, %r10 # r10 = authTag - mov arg9, %r11 # r11 = auth_tag_len - - cmp $16, %r11 - je _T_16\@ - - cmp $8, %r11 - jl _T_4\@ - -_T_8\@: - vmovq %xmm9, %rax - mov %rax, (%r10) - add $8, %r10 - sub $8, %r11 - vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9 - cmp $0, %r11 - je _return_T_done\@ -_T_4\@: - vmovd %xmm9, %eax - mov %eax, (%r10) - add $4, %r10 - sub $4, %r11 - vpsrldq $4, %xmm9, %xmm9 - cmp $0, %r11 - je _return_T_done\@ -_T_123\@: - vmovd %xmm9, %eax - cmp $2, %r11 - jl _T_1\@ - mov %ax, (%r10) - cmp $2, %r11 - je _return_T_done\@ - add $2, %r10 - sar $16, %eax -_T_1\@: - mov %al, (%r10) - jmp _return_T_done\@ - -_T_16\@: - vmovdqu %xmm9, (%r10) - -_return_T_done\@: - mov %r14, %rsp - - pop %r15 - pop %r14 - pop %r13 - pop %r12 -.endm - - ############################################################# -#void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4 +#void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4 # (gcm_data *my_ctx_data, -# u8 *hash_subkey)# /* H, the Hash sub key input. -# Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. */ +# gcm_context_data *data, +# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt +# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte +# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload) +# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */ +# u8 *hash_subkey# /* H, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. */ +# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/ +# u64 aad_len) /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */ ############################################################# -ENTRY(aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4) - #the number of pushes must equal STACK_OFFSET - push %r12 - push %r13 - push %r14 - push %r15 - - mov %rsp, %r14 - - - - sub $VARIABLE_OFFSET, %rsp - and $~63, %rsp # align rsp to 64 bytes - - vmovdqu (arg2), %xmm6 # xmm6 = HashKey - - vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm6, %xmm6 - ############### PRECOMPUTATION of HashKey<<1 mod poly from the HashKey - vmovdqa %xmm6, %xmm2 - vpsllq $1, %xmm6, %xmm6 - vpsrlq $63, %xmm2, %xmm2 - vmovdqa %xmm2, %xmm1 - vpslldq $8, %xmm2, %xmm2 - vpsrldq $8, %xmm1, %xmm1 - vpor %xmm2, %xmm6, %xmm6 - #reduction - vpshufd $0b00100100, %xmm1, %xmm2 - vpcmpeqd TWOONE(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2 - vpand POLY(%rip), %xmm2, %xmm2 - vpxor %xmm2, %xmm6, %xmm6 # xmm6 holds the HashKey<<1 mod poly - ####################################################################### - vmovdqa %xmm6, HashKey(arg1) # store HashKey<<1 mod poly - - - PRECOMPUTE_AVX2 %xmm6, %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5 - - mov %r14, %rsp - - pop %r15 - pop %r14 - pop %r13 - pop %r12 +ENTRY(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4) + FUNC_SAVE + INIT GHASH_MUL_AVX2, PRECOMPUTE_AVX2 + FUNC_RESTORE ret -ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4) - +ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4) ############################################################################### #void aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4( # gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */ +# gcm_context_data *data, # u8 *out, /* Ciphertext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed. */ # const u8 *in, /* Plaintext input */ -# u64 plaintext_len, /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */ -# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt -# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte -# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload) -# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */ -# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/ -# u64 aad_len, /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */ -# u8 *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */ -# u64 auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes. -# Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */ +# u64 plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */ ############################################################################### -ENTRY(aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4) - GCM_ENC_DEC_AVX2 ENC +ENTRY(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4) + FUNC_SAVE + mov keysize,%eax + cmp $32, %eax + je key_256_enc_update4 + cmp $16, %eax + je key_128_enc_update4 + # must be 192 + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 11 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_128_enc_update4: + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 9 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_256_enc_update4: + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 13 + FUNC_RESTORE ret -ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4) +ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4) ############################################################################### -#void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4( +#void aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4( # gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */ +# gcm_context_data *data, # u8 *out, /* Plaintext output. Decrypt in-place is allowed. */ # const u8 *in, /* Ciphertext input */ -# u64 plaintext_len, /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */ -# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt -# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte -# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload) -# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */ -# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/ -# u64 aad_len, /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */ +# u64 plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */ +############################################################################### +ENTRY(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4) + FUNC_SAVE + mov keysize,%eax + cmp $32, %eax + je key_256_dec_update4 + cmp $16, %eax + je key_128_dec_update4 + # must be 192 + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 11 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_128_dec_update4: + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 9 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_256_dec_update4: + GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 13 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4) + +############################################################################### +#void aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4( +# gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */ +# gcm_context_data *data, # u8 *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */ # u64 auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes. -# Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */ +# Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */ ############################################################################### -ENTRY(aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4) - GCM_ENC_DEC_AVX2 DEC - ret -ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4) +ENTRY(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4) + FUNC_SAVE + mov keysize,%eax + cmp $32, %eax + je key_256_finalize4 + cmp $16, %eax + je key_128_finalize4 + # must be 192 + GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 11, arg3, arg4 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_128_finalize4: + GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 9, arg3, arg4 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +key_256_finalize4: + GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 13, arg3, arg4 + FUNC_RESTORE + ret +ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4) #endif /* CONFIG_AS_AVX2 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c index 661f7daf43da..1321700d6647 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct gcm_context_data { u8 current_counter[GCM_BLOCK_LEN]; u64 partial_block_len; u64 unused; - u8 hash_keys[GCM_BLOCK_LEN * 8]; + u8 hash_keys[GCM_BLOCK_LEN * 16]; }; asmlinkage int aesni_set_key(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, @@ -175,6 +175,32 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_finalize(void *ctx, struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len); +static struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s { +void (*init)(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, + u8 *iv, + u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, + unsigned long aad_len); +void (*enc_update)(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out, + const u8 *in, + unsigned long plaintext_len); +void (*dec_update)(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out, + const u8 *in, + unsigned long ciphertext_len); +void (*finalize)(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, + u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len); +} *aesni_gcm_tfm; + +struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_sse = { + .init = &aesni_gcm_init, + .enc_update = &aesni_gcm_enc_update, + .dec_update = &aesni_gcm_dec_update, + .finalize = &aesni_gcm_finalize, +}; + #ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX asmlinkage void aes_ctr_enc_128_avx_by8(const u8 *in, u8 *iv, void *keys, u8 *out, unsigned int num_bytes); @@ -183,136 +209,94 @@ asmlinkage void aes_ctr_enc_192_avx_by8(const u8 *in, u8 *iv, asmlinkage void aes_ctr_enc_256_avx_by8(const u8 *in, u8 *iv, void *keys, u8 *out, unsigned int num_bytes); /* - * asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2() + * asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2() * gcm_data *my_ctx_data, context data * u8 *hash_subkey, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. */ -asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(void *my_ctx_data, u8 *hash_subkey); +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2(void *my_ctx_data, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, + u8 *iv, + u8 *hash_subkey, + const u8 *aad, + unsigned long aad_len); + +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out, + const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len); +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out, + const u8 *in, + unsigned long ciphertext_len); +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, + u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len); -asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2(void *ctx, u8 *out, +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len, u8 *iv, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len); -asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2(void *ctx, u8 *out, +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned long ciphertext_len, u8 *iv, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len); -static void aesni_gcm_enc_avx(void *ctx, - struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out, - const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len, u8 *iv, - u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, - u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len) -{ - struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx = (struct crypto_aes_ctx*)ctx; - if ((plaintext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) || (aes_ctx-> key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128)){ - aesni_gcm_enc(ctx, data, out, in, - plaintext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad, - aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); - } else { - aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(ctx, hash_subkey); - aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2(ctx, out, in, plaintext_len, iv, aad, - aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); - } -} +struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2 = { + .init = &aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2, + .enc_update = &aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2, + .dec_update = &aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2, + .finalize = &aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2, +}; -static void aesni_gcm_dec_avx(void *ctx, - struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out, - const u8 *in, unsigned long ciphertext_len, u8 *iv, - u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, - u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len) -{ - struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx = (struct crypto_aes_ctx*)ctx; - if ((ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) || (aes_ctx-> key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) { - aesni_gcm_dec(ctx, data, out, in, - ciphertext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad, - aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); - } else { - aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(ctx, hash_subkey); - aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2(ctx, out, in, ciphertext_len, iv, aad, - aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); - } -} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 /* - * asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4() + * asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4() * gcm_data *my_ctx_data, context data * u8 *hash_subkey, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. */ -asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4(void *my_ctx_data, u8 *hash_subkey); +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4(void *my_ctx_data, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, + u8 *iv, + u8 *hash_subkey, + const u8 *aad, + unsigned long aad_len); + +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out, + const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len); +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out, + const u8 *in, + unsigned long ciphertext_len); +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, + u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len); -asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4(void *ctx, u8 *out, +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len, u8 *iv, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len); -asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4(void *ctx, u8 *out, +asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4(void *ctx, + struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned long ciphertext_len, u8 *iv, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len); -static void aesni_gcm_enc_avx2(void *ctx, - struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out, - const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len, u8 *iv, - u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, - u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len) -{ - struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx = (struct crypto_aes_ctx*)ctx; - if ((plaintext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) || (aes_ctx-> key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) { - aesni_gcm_enc(ctx, data, out, in, - plaintext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad, - aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); - } else if (plaintext_len < AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE) { - aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(ctx, hash_subkey); - aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2(ctx, out, in, plaintext_len, iv, aad, - aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); - } else { - aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4(ctx, hash_subkey); - aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4(ctx, out, in, plaintext_len, iv, aad, - aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); - } -} +struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen4 = { + .init = &aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4, + .enc_update = &aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4, + .dec_update = &aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4, + .finalize = &aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4, +}; -static void aesni_gcm_dec_avx2(void *ctx, - struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out, - const u8 *in, unsigned long ciphertext_len, u8 *iv, - u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, - u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len) -{ - struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx = (struct crypto_aes_ctx*)ctx; - if ((ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) || (aes_ctx-> key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) { - aesni_gcm_dec(ctx, data, out, in, - ciphertext_len, iv, hash_subkey, - aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); - } else if (ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE) { - aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(ctx, hash_subkey); - aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2(ctx, out, in, ciphertext_len, iv, aad, - aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); - } else { - aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4(ctx, hash_subkey); - aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4(ctx, out, in, ciphertext_len, iv, aad, - aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); - } -} #endif -static void (*aesni_gcm_enc_tfm)(void *ctx, - struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out, - const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len, - u8 *iv, u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, - unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag, - unsigned long auth_tag_len); - -static void (*aesni_gcm_dec_tfm)(void *ctx, - struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out, - const u8 *in, unsigned long ciphertext_len, - u8 *iv, u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, - unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag, - unsigned long auth_tag_len); - static inline struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(struct crypto_aead *tfm) { @@ -794,6 +778,7 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req, { struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); + struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s *gcm_tfm = aesni_gcm_tfm; struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR; struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {}; unsigned long left = req->cryptlen; @@ -811,6 +796,15 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req, if (!enc) left -= auth_tag_len; +#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 + if (left < AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE && gcm_tfm == &aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen4) + gcm_tfm = &aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX + if (left < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE && gcm_tfm == &aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2) + gcm_tfm = &aesni_gcm_tfm_sse; +#endif + /* Linearize assoc, if not already linear */ if (req->src->length >= assoclen && req->src->length && (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->src)) || @@ -835,7 +829,7 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req, } kernel_fpu_begin(); - aesni_gcm_init(aes_ctx, &data, iv, + gcm_tfm->init(aes_ctx, &data, iv, hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen); if (req->src != req->dst) { while (left) { @@ -846,10 +840,10 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req, len = min(srclen, dstlen); if (len) { if (enc) - aesni_gcm_enc_update(aes_ctx, &data, + gcm_tfm->enc_update(aes_ctx, &data, dst, src, len); else - aesni_gcm_dec_update(aes_ctx, &data, + gcm_tfm->dec_update(aes_ctx, &data, dst, src, len); } left -= len; @@ -867,10 +861,10 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req, len = scatterwalk_clamp(&src_sg_walk, left); if (len) { if (enc) - aesni_gcm_enc_update(aes_ctx, &data, + gcm_tfm->enc_update(aes_ctx, &data, src, src, len); else - aesni_gcm_dec_update(aes_ctx, &data, + gcm_tfm->dec_update(aes_ctx, &data, src, src, len); } left -= len; @@ -879,7 +873,7 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req, scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 1, left); } } - aesni_gcm_finalize(aes_ctx, &data, authTag, auth_tag_len); + gcm_tfm->finalize(aes_ctx, &data, authTag, auth_tag_len); kernel_fpu_end(); if (!assocmem) @@ -912,147 +906,15 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req, static int gcmaes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen, u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx) { - u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0; - u8 *src, *dst, *assoc; - struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); - unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); - struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk; - struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {}; - struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR; - - if (((struct crypto_aes_ctx *)aes_ctx)->key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128 || - aesni_gcm_enc_tfm == aesni_gcm_enc || - req->cryptlen < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) { - return gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(true, req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv, - aes_ctx); - } - if (sg_is_last(req->src) && - (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->src)) || - req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE) && - sg_is_last(req->dst) && - (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->dst)) || - req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE)) { - one_entry_in_sg = 1; - scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src); - assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk); - src = assoc + req->assoclen; - dst = src; - if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) { - scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst); - dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen; - } - } else { - /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */ - assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen, - GFP_ATOMIC); - if (unlikely(!assoc)) - return -ENOMEM; - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0, - req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0); - src = assoc + req->assoclen; - dst = src; - } - - kernel_fpu_begin(); - aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, &data, dst, src, req->cryptlen, iv, - hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen, - dst + req->cryptlen, auth_tag_len); - kernel_fpu_end(); - - /* The authTag (aka the Integrity Check Value) needs to be written - * back to the packet. */ - if (one_entry_in_sg) { - if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) { - scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen); - scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length); - scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0); - } - scatterwalk_unmap(assoc); - scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length); - scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0); - } else { - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen, - req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1); - kfree(assoc); - } - return 0; + return gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(true, req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv, + aes_ctx); } static int gcmaes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen, u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx) { - u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0; - u8 *src, *dst, *assoc; - unsigned long tempCipherLen = 0; - struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); - unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); - u8 authTag[16]; - struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk; - struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {}; - struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR; - int retval = 0; - - if (((struct crypto_aes_ctx *)aes_ctx)->key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128 || - aesni_gcm_enc_tfm == aesni_gcm_enc || - req->cryptlen < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) { - return gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(false, req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv, - aes_ctx); - } - tempCipherLen = (unsigned long)(req->cryptlen - auth_tag_len); - - if (sg_is_last(req->src) && - (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->src)) || - req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE) && - sg_is_last(req->dst) && req->dst->length && - (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->dst)) || - req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE)) { - one_entry_in_sg = 1; - scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src); - assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk); - src = assoc + req->assoclen; - dst = src; - if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) { - scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst); - dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen; - } - } else { - /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */ - assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!assoc) - return -ENOMEM; - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0, - req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0); - src = assoc + req->assoclen; - dst = src; - } - - - kernel_fpu_begin(); - aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, &data, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv, - hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen, - authTag, auth_tag_len); - kernel_fpu_end(); - - /* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */ - retval = crypto_memneq(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ? - -EBADMSG : 0; - - if (one_entry_in_sg) { - if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) { - scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen); - scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length); - scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0); - } - scatterwalk_unmap(assoc); - scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length); - scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0); - } else { - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen, - tempCipherLen, 1); - kfree(assoc); - } - return retval; - + return gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(false, req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv, + aes_ctx); } static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) @@ -1420,21 +1282,18 @@ static int __init aesni_init(void) #ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2)) { pr_info("AVX2 version of gcm_enc/dec engaged.\n"); - aesni_gcm_enc_tfm = aesni_gcm_enc_avx2; - aesni_gcm_dec_tfm = aesni_gcm_dec_avx2; + aesni_gcm_tfm = &aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen4; } else #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) { pr_info("AVX version of gcm_enc/dec engaged.\n"); - aesni_gcm_enc_tfm = aesni_gcm_enc_avx; - aesni_gcm_dec_tfm = aesni_gcm_dec_avx; + aesni_gcm_tfm = &aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2; } else #endif { pr_info("SSE version of gcm_enc/dec engaged.\n"); - aesni_gcm_enc_tfm = aesni_gcm_enc; - aesni_gcm_dec_tfm = aesni_gcm_dec; + aesni_gcm_tfm = &aesni_gcm_tfm_sse; } aesni_ctr_enc_tfm = aesni_ctr_enc; #ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx2-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx2-x86_64.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..32903fd450af --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx2-x86_64.S @@ -0,0 +1,1025 @@ +/* + * ChaCha 256-bit cipher algorithm, x64 AVX2 functions + * + * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +.section .rodata.cst32.ROT8, "aM", @progbits, 32 +.align 32 +ROT8: .octa 0x0e0d0c0f0a09080b0605040702010003 + .octa 0x0e0d0c0f0a09080b0605040702010003 + +.section .rodata.cst32.ROT16, "aM", @progbits, 32 +.align 32 +ROT16: .octa 0x0d0c0f0e09080b0a0504070601000302 + .octa 0x0d0c0f0e09080b0a0504070601000302 + +.section .rodata.cst32.CTRINC, "aM", @progbits, 32 +.align 32 +CTRINC: .octa 0x00000003000000020000000100000000 + .octa 0x00000007000000060000000500000004 + +.section .rodata.cst32.CTR2BL, "aM", @progbits, 32 +.align 32 +CTR2BL: .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 + .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000001 + +.section .rodata.cst32.CTR4BL, "aM", @progbits, 32 +.align 32 +CTR4BL: .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000002 + .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000003 + +.text + +ENTRY(chacha_2block_xor_avx2) + # %rdi: Input state matrix, s + # %rsi: up to 2 data blocks output, o + # %rdx: up to 2 data blocks input, i + # %rcx: input/output length in bytes + # %r8d: nrounds + + # This function encrypts two ChaCha blocks by loading the state + # matrix twice across four AVX registers. It performs matrix operations + # on four words in each matrix in parallel, but requires shuffling to + # rearrange the words after each round. + + vzeroupper + + # x0..3[0-2] = s0..3 + vbroadcasti128 0x00(%rdi),%ymm0 + vbroadcasti128 0x10(%rdi),%ymm1 + vbroadcasti128 0x20(%rdi),%ymm2 + vbroadcasti128 0x30(%rdi),%ymm3 + + vpaddd CTR2BL(%rip),%ymm3,%ymm3 + + vmovdqa %ymm0,%ymm8 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm9 + vmovdqa %ymm2,%ymm10 + vmovdqa %ymm3,%ymm11 + + vmovdqa ROT8(%rip),%ymm4 + vmovdqa ROT16(%rip),%ymm5 + + mov %rcx,%rax + +.Ldoubleround: + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufb %ymm5,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 12) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxor %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm6 + vpslld $12,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpsrld $20,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpor %ymm6,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufb %ymm4,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 7) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxor %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm7 + vpslld $7,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpsrld $25,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpor %ymm7,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + # x1 = shuffle32(x1, MASK(0, 3, 2, 1)) + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm1,%ymm1 + # x2 = shuffle32(x2, MASK(1, 0, 3, 2)) + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm2,%ymm2 + # x3 = shuffle32(x3, MASK(2, 1, 0, 3)) + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufb %ymm5,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 12) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxor %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm6 + vpslld $12,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpsrld $20,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpor %ymm6,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufb %ymm4,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 7) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxor %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm7 + vpslld $7,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpsrld $25,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpor %ymm7,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + # x1 = shuffle32(x1, MASK(2, 1, 0, 3)) + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm1,%ymm1 + # x2 = shuffle32(x2, MASK(1, 0, 3, 2)) + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm2,%ymm2 + # x3 = shuffle32(x3, MASK(0, 3, 2, 1)) + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + sub $2,%r8d + jnz .Ldoubleround + + # o0 = i0 ^ (x0 + s0) + vpaddd %ymm8,%ymm0,%ymm7 + cmp $0x10,%rax + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxor 0x00(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x00(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm7,%xmm0 + # o1 = i1 ^ (x1 + s1) + vpaddd %ymm9,%ymm1,%ymm7 + cmp $0x20,%rax + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxor 0x10(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x10(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm7,%xmm1 + # o2 = i2 ^ (x2 + s2) + vpaddd %ymm10,%ymm2,%ymm7 + cmp $0x30,%rax + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxor 0x20(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x20(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm7,%xmm2 + # o3 = i3 ^ (x3 + s3) + vpaddd %ymm11,%ymm3,%ymm7 + cmp $0x40,%rax + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxor 0x30(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x30(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm7,%xmm3 + + # xor and write second block + vmovdqa %xmm0,%xmm7 + cmp $0x50,%rax + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxor 0x40(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x40(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm1,%xmm7 + cmp $0x60,%rax + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxor 0x50(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x50(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm2,%xmm7 + cmp $0x70,%rax + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxor 0x60(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x60(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm3,%xmm7 + cmp $0x80,%rax + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxor 0x70(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x70(%rsi) + +.Ldone2: + vzeroupper + ret + +.Lxorpart2: + # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output + mov %rax,%r9 + and $0x0f,%r9 + jz .Ldone2 + and $~0x0f,%rax + + mov %rsi,%r11 + + lea 8(%rsp),%r10 + sub $0x10,%rsp + and $~31,%rsp + + lea (%rdx,%rax),%rsi + mov %rsp,%rdi + mov %r9,%rcx + rep movsb + + vpxor 0x00(%rsp),%xmm7,%xmm7 + vmovdqa %xmm7,0x00(%rsp) + + mov %rsp,%rsi + lea (%r11,%rax),%rdi + mov %r9,%rcx + rep movsb + + lea -8(%r10),%rsp + jmp .Ldone2 + +ENDPROC(chacha_2block_xor_avx2) + +ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_avx2) + # %rdi: Input state matrix, s + # %rsi: up to 4 data blocks output, o + # %rdx: up to 4 data blocks input, i + # %rcx: input/output length in bytes + # %r8d: nrounds + + # This function encrypts four ChaCha blocks by loading the state + # matrix four times across eight AVX registers. It performs matrix + # operations on four words in two matrices in parallel, sequentially + # to the operations on the four words of the other two matrices. The + # required word shuffling has a rather high latency, we can do the + # arithmetic on two matrix-pairs without much slowdown. + + vzeroupper + + # x0..3[0-4] = s0..3 + vbroadcasti128 0x00(%rdi),%ymm0 + vbroadcasti128 0x10(%rdi),%ymm1 + vbroadcasti128 0x20(%rdi),%ymm2 + vbroadcasti128 0x30(%rdi),%ymm3 + + vmovdqa %ymm0,%ymm4 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm5 + vmovdqa %ymm2,%ymm6 + vmovdqa %ymm3,%ymm7 + + vpaddd CTR2BL(%rip),%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpaddd CTR4BL(%rip),%ymm7,%ymm7 + + vmovdqa %ymm0,%ymm11 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm12 + vmovdqa %ymm2,%ymm13 + vmovdqa %ymm3,%ymm14 + vmovdqa %ymm7,%ymm15 + + vmovdqa ROT8(%rip),%ymm8 + vmovdqa ROT16(%rip),%ymm9 + + mov %rcx,%rax + +.Ldoubleround4: + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufb %ymm9,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + vpaddd %ymm5,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpxor %ymm4,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpshufb %ymm9,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 12) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxor %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm10 + vpslld $12,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpsrld $20,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpor %ymm10,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + vpaddd %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpxor %ymm6,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vmovdqa %ymm5,%ymm10 + vpslld $12,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpsrld $20,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpor %ymm10,%ymm5,%ymm5 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufb %ymm8,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + vpaddd %ymm5,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpxor %ymm4,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpshufb %ymm8,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 7) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxor %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm10 + vpslld $7,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpsrld $25,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpor %ymm10,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + vpaddd %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpxor %ymm6,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vmovdqa %ymm5,%ymm10 + vpslld $7,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpsrld $25,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpor %ymm10,%ymm5,%ymm5 + + # x1 = shuffle32(x1, MASK(0, 3, 2, 1)) + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x2 = shuffle32(x2, MASK(1, 0, 3, 2)) + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x3 = shuffle32(x3, MASK(2, 1, 0, 3)) + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufb %ymm9,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + vpaddd %ymm5,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpxor %ymm4,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpshufb %ymm9,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 12) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxor %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm10 + vpslld $12,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpsrld $20,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpor %ymm10,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + vpaddd %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpxor %ymm6,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vmovdqa %ymm5,%ymm10 + vpslld $12,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpsrld $20,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpor %ymm10,%ymm5,%ymm5 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufb %ymm8,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + vpaddd %ymm5,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpxor %ymm4,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpshufb %ymm8,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 7) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxor %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm10 + vpslld $7,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpsrld $25,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpor %ymm10,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + vpaddd %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpxor %ymm6,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vmovdqa %ymm5,%ymm10 + vpslld $7,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpsrld $25,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpor %ymm10,%ymm5,%ymm5 + + # x1 = shuffle32(x1, MASK(2, 1, 0, 3)) + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x2 = shuffle32(x2, MASK(1, 0, 3, 2)) + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x3 = shuffle32(x3, MASK(0, 3, 2, 1)) + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + sub $2,%r8d + jnz .Ldoubleround4 + + # o0 = i0 ^ (x0 + s0), first block + vpaddd %ymm11,%ymm0,%ymm10 + cmp $0x10,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0x00(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x00(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm0 + # o1 = i1 ^ (x1 + s1), first block + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm1,%ymm10 + cmp $0x20,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0x10(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x10(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm1 + # o2 = i2 ^ (x2 + s2), first block + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm2,%ymm10 + cmp $0x30,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0x20(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x20(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm2 + # o3 = i3 ^ (x3 + s3), first block + vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm3,%ymm10 + cmp $0x40,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0x30(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x30(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm3 + + # xor and write second block + vmovdqa %xmm0,%xmm10 + cmp $0x50,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0x40(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x40(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm1,%xmm10 + cmp $0x60,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0x50(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x50(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm2,%xmm10 + cmp $0x70,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0x60(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x60(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm3,%xmm10 + cmp $0x80,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0x70(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x70(%rsi) + + # o0 = i0 ^ (x0 + s0), third block + vpaddd %ymm11,%ymm4,%ymm10 + cmp $0x90,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0x80(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x80(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm4 + # o1 = i1 ^ (x1 + s1), third block + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm5,%ymm10 + cmp $0xa0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0x90(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x90(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm5 + # o2 = i2 ^ (x2 + s2), third block + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm6,%ymm10 + cmp $0xb0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0xa0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xa0(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm6 + # o3 = i3 ^ (x3 + s3), third block + vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm7,%ymm10 + cmp $0xc0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0xb0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xb0(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm7 + + # xor and write fourth block + vmovdqa %xmm4,%xmm10 + cmp $0xd0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0xc0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xc0(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm5,%xmm10 + cmp $0xe0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0xd0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xd0(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm6,%xmm10 + cmp $0xf0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0xe0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xe0(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm7,%xmm10 + cmp $0x100,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxor 0xf0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xf0(%rsi) + +.Ldone4: + vzeroupper + ret + +.Lxorpart4: + # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output + mov %rax,%r9 + and $0x0f,%r9 + jz .Ldone4 + and $~0x0f,%rax + + mov %rsi,%r11 + + lea 8(%rsp),%r10 + sub $0x10,%rsp + and $~31,%rsp + + lea (%rdx,%rax),%rsi + mov %rsp,%rdi + mov %r9,%rcx + rep movsb + + vpxor 0x00(%rsp),%xmm10,%xmm10 + vmovdqa %xmm10,0x00(%rsp) + + mov %rsp,%rsi + lea (%r11,%rax),%rdi + mov %r9,%rcx + rep movsb + + lea -8(%r10),%rsp + jmp .Ldone4 + +ENDPROC(chacha_4block_xor_avx2) + +ENTRY(chacha_8block_xor_avx2) + # %rdi: Input state matrix, s + # %rsi: up to 8 data blocks output, o + # %rdx: up to 8 data blocks input, i + # %rcx: input/output length in bytes + # %r8d: nrounds + + # This function encrypts eight consecutive ChaCha blocks by loading + # the state matrix in AVX registers eight times. As we need some + # scratch registers, we save the first four registers on the stack. The + # algorithm performs each operation on the corresponding word of each + # state matrix, hence requires no word shuffling. For final XORing step + # we transpose the matrix by interleaving 32-, 64- and then 128-bit + # words, which allows us to do XOR in AVX registers. 8/16-bit word + # rotation is done with the slightly better performing byte shuffling, + # 7/12-bit word rotation uses traditional shift+OR. + + vzeroupper + # 4 * 32 byte stack, 32-byte aligned + lea 8(%rsp),%r10 + and $~31, %rsp + sub $0x80, %rsp + mov %rcx,%rax + + # x0..15[0-7] = s[0..15] + vpbroadcastd 0x00(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpbroadcastd 0x04(%rdi),%ymm1 + vpbroadcastd 0x08(%rdi),%ymm2 + vpbroadcastd 0x0c(%rdi),%ymm3 + vpbroadcastd 0x10(%rdi),%ymm4 + vpbroadcastd 0x14(%rdi),%ymm5 + vpbroadcastd 0x18(%rdi),%ymm6 + vpbroadcastd 0x1c(%rdi),%ymm7 + vpbroadcastd 0x20(%rdi),%ymm8 + vpbroadcastd 0x24(%rdi),%ymm9 + vpbroadcastd 0x28(%rdi),%ymm10 + vpbroadcastd 0x2c(%rdi),%ymm11 + vpbroadcastd 0x30(%rdi),%ymm12 + vpbroadcastd 0x34(%rdi),%ymm13 + vpbroadcastd 0x38(%rdi),%ymm14 + vpbroadcastd 0x3c(%rdi),%ymm15 + # x0..3 on stack + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) + vmovdqa %ymm1,0x20(%rsp) + vmovdqa %ymm2,0x40(%rsp) + vmovdqa %ymm3,0x60(%rsp) + + vmovdqa CTRINC(%rip),%ymm1 + vmovdqa ROT8(%rip),%ymm2 + vmovdqa ROT16(%rip),%ymm3 + + # x12 += counter values 0-3 + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm12,%ymm12 + +.Ldoubleround8: + # x0 += x4, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd 0x00(%rsp),%ymm4,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 + vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm12,%ymm12 + # x1 += x5, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x1, 16) + vpaddd 0x20(%rsp),%ymm5,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x20(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm13,%ymm13 + vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm13,%ymm13 + # x2 += x6, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x2, 16) + vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),%ymm6,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x40(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm14,%ymm14 + vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm14,%ymm14 + # x3 += x7, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x3, 16) + vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),%ymm7,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x60(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 + vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm15,%ymm15 + + # x8 += x12, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x8, 12) + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm8 + vpxor %ymm8,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpslld $12,%ymm4,%ymm0 + vpsrld $20,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm4 + # x9 += x13, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x9, 12) + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm9 + vpxor %ymm9,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpslld $12,%ymm5,%ymm0 + vpsrld $20,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x10 += x14, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x10, 12) + vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpxor %ymm10,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpslld $12,%ymm6,%ymm0 + vpsrld $20,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x11 += x15, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x11, 12) + vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm11 + vpxor %ymm11,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpslld $12,%ymm7,%ymm0 + vpsrld $20,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x0 += x4, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd 0x00(%rsp),%ymm4,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 + vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm12,%ymm12 + # x1 += x5, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x1, 8) + vpaddd 0x20(%rsp),%ymm5,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x20(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm13,%ymm13 + vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm13,%ymm13 + # x2 += x6, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x2, 8) + vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),%ymm6,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x40(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm14,%ymm14 + vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm14,%ymm14 + # x3 += x7, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x3, 8) + vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),%ymm7,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x60(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 + vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm15,%ymm15 + + # x8 += x12, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x8, 7) + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm8 + vpxor %ymm8,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpslld $7,%ymm4,%ymm0 + vpsrld $25,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm4 + # x9 += x13, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x9, 7) + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm9 + vpxor %ymm9,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpslld $7,%ymm5,%ymm0 + vpsrld $25,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x10 += x14, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x10, 7) + vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpxor %ymm10,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpslld $7,%ymm6,%ymm0 + vpsrld $25,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x11 += x15, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x11, 7) + vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm11 + vpxor %ymm11,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpslld $7,%ymm7,%ymm0 + vpsrld $25,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x0 += x5, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd 0x00(%rsp),%ymm5,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 + vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm15,%ymm15 + # x1 += x6, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x1, 16)%ymm0 + vpaddd 0x20(%rsp),%ymm6,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x20(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 + vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm12,%ymm12 + # x2 += x7, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x2, 16) + vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),%ymm7,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x40(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm13,%ymm13 + vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm13,%ymm13 + # x3 += x4, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x3, 16) + vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),%ymm4,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x60(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm14,%ymm14 + vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm14,%ymm14 + + # x10 += x15, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x10, 12) + vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpxor %ymm10,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpslld $12,%ymm5,%ymm0 + vpsrld $20,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x11 += x12, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x11, 12) + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm11,%ymm11 + vpxor %ymm11,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpslld $12,%ymm6,%ymm0 + vpsrld $20,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x8 += x13, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x8, 12) + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm8,%ymm8 + vpxor %ymm8,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpslld $12,%ymm7,%ymm0 + vpsrld $20,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm7,%ymm7 + # x9 += x14, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x9, 12) + vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm9,%ymm9 + vpxor %ymm9,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpslld $12,%ymm4,%ymm0 + vpsrld $20,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm4 + + # x0 += x5, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd 0x00(%rsp),%ymm5,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 + vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm15,%ymm15 + # x1 += x6, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x1, 8) + vpaddd 0x20(%rsp),%ymm6,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x20(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 + vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm12,%ymm12 + # x2 += x7, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x2, 8) + vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),%ymm7,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x40(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm13,%ymm13 + vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm13,%ymm13 + # x3 += x4, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x3, 8) + vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),%ymm4,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x60(%rsp) + vpxor %ymm0,%ymm14,%ymm14 + vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm14,%ymm14 + + # x10 += x15, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x10, 7) + vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpxor %ymm10,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpslld $7,%ymm5,%ymm0 + vpsrld $25,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x11 += x12, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x11, 7) + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm11,%ymm11 + vpxor %ymm11,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpslld $7,%ymm6,%ymm0 + vpsrld $25,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x8 += x13, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x8, 7) + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm8,%ymm8 + vpxor %ymm8,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpslld $7,%ymm7,%ymm0 + vpsrld $25,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm7,%ymm7 + # x9 += x14, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x9, 7) + vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm9,%ymm9 + vpxor %ymm9,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpslld $7,%ymm4,%ymm0 + vpsrld $25,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpor %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm4 + + sub $2,%r8d + jnz .Ldoubleround8 + + # x0..15[0-3] += s[0..15] + vpbroadcastd 0x00(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd 0x00(%rsp),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) + vpbroadcastd 0x04(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd 0x20(%rsp),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x20(%rsp) + vpbroadcastd 0x08(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x40(%rsp) + vpbroadcastd 0x0c(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x60(%rsp) + vpbroadcastd 0x10(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpbroadcastd 0x14(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpbroadcastd 0x18(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpbroadcastd 0x1c(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpbroadcastd 0x20(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm8,%ymm8 + vpbroadcastd 0x24(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm9,%ymm9 + vpbroadcastd 0x28(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpbroadcastd 0x2c(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm11,%ymm11 + vpbroadcastd 0x30(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 + vpbroadcastd 0x34(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm13,%ymm13 + vpbroadcastd 0x38(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm14,%ymm14 + vpbroadcastd 0x3c(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 + + # x12 += counter values 0-3 + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm12,%ymm12 + + # interleave 32-bit words in state n, n+1 + vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),%ymm0 + vmovdqa 0x20(%rsp),%ymm1 + vpunpckldq %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm2 + vpunpckhdq %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm1 + vmovdqa %ymm2,0x00(%rsp) + vmovdqa %ymm1,0x20(%rsp) + vmovdqa 0x40(%rsp),%ymm0 + vmovdqa 0x60(%rsp),%ymm1 + vpunpckldq %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm2 + vpunpckhdq %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm1 + vmovdqa %ymm2,0x40(%rsp) + vmovdqa %ymm1,0x60(%rsp) + vmovdqa %ymm4,%ymm0 + vpunpckldq %ymm5,%ymm0,%ymm4 + vpunpckhdq %ymm5,%ymm0,%ymm5 + vmovdqa %ymm6,%ymm0 + vpunpckldq %ymm7,%ymm0,%ymm6 + vpunpckhdq %ymm7,%ymm0,%ymm7 + vmovdqa %ymm8,%ymm0 + vpunpckldq %ymm9,%ymm0,%ymm8 + vpunpckhdq %ymm9,%ymm0,%ymm9 + vmovdqa %ymm10,%ymm0 + vpunpckldq %ymm11,%ymm0,%ymm10 + vpunpckhdq %ymm11,%ymm0,%ymm11 + vmovdqa %ymm12,%ymm0 + vpunpckldq %ymm13,%ymm0,%ymm12 + vpunpckhdq %ymm13,%ymm0,%ymm13 + vmovdqa %ymm14,%ymm0 + vpunpckldq %ymm15,%ymm0,%ymm14 + vpunpckhdq %ymm15,%ymm0,%ymm15 + + # interleave 64-bit words in state n, n+2 + vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),%ymm0 + vmovdqa 0x40(%rsp),%ymm2 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm2,%ymm0,%ymm1 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm2,%ymm0,%ymm2 + vmovdqa %ymm1,0x00(%rsp) + vmovdqa %ymm2,0x40(%rsp) + vmovdqa 0x20(%rsp),%ymm0 + vmovdqa 0x60(%rsp),%ymm2 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm2,%ymm0,%ymm1 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm2,%ymm0,%ymm2 + vmovdqa %ymm1,0x20(%rsp) + vmovdqa %ymm2,0x60(%rsp) + vmovdqa %ymm4,%ymm0 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm6,%ymm0,%ymm4 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm6,%ymm0,%ymm6 + vmovdqa %ymm5,%ymm0 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm7,%ymm0,%ymm5 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm7,%ymm0,%ymm7 + vmovdqa %ymm8,%ymm0 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm10,%ymm0,%ymm8 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm10,%ymm0,%ymm10 + vmovdqa %ymm9,%ymm0 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm11,%ymm0,%ymm9 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm11,%ymm0,%ymm11 + vmovdqa %ymm12,%ymm0 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm14,%ymm0,%ymm12 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm14,%ymm0,%ymm14 + vmovdqa %ymm13,%ymm0 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm15,%ymm0,%ymm13 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm15,%ymm0,%ymm15 + + # interleave 128-bit words in state n, n+4 + # xor/write first four blocks + vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),%ymm1 + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm4,%ymm1,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0020,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x0000(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0000(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm4,%ymm1,%ymm4 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0040,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x0020(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0020(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm12 + + vmovdqa 0x40(%rsp),%ymm1 + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm6,%ymm1,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0060,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x0040(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0040(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm6,%ymm1,%ymm6 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0080,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x0060(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0060(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm14 + + vmovdqa 0x20(%rsp),%ymm1 + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm5,%ymm1,%ymm0 + cmp $0x00a0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x0080(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0080(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm5,%ymm1,%ymm5 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm0 + cmp $0x00c0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x00a0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x00a0(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm13 + + vmovdqa 0x60(%rsp),%ymm1 + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm7,%ymm1,%ymm0 + cmp $0x00e0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x00c0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x00c0(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm7,%ymm1,%ymm7 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0100,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x00e0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x00e0(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm15 + + # xor remaining blocks, write to output + vmovdqa %ymm4,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0120,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x0100(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0100(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %ymm12,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0140,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x0120(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0120(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %ymm6,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0160,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x0140(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0140(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %ymm14,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0180,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x0160(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0160(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %ymm5,%ymm0 + cmp $0x01a0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x0180(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0180(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %ymm13,%ymm0 + cmp $0x01c0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x01a0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x01a0(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %ymm7,%ymm0 + cmp $0x01e0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x01c0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x01c0(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %ymm15,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0200,%rax + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxor 0x01e0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu %ymm0,0x01e0(%rsi) + +.Ldone8: + vzeroupper + lea -8(%r10),%rsp + ret + +.Lxorpart8: + # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output + mov %rax,%r9 + and $0x1f,%r9 + jz .Ldone8 + and $~0x1f,%rax + + mov %rsi,%r11 + + lea (%rdx,%rax),%rsi + mov %rsp,%rdi + mov %r9,%rcx + rep movsb + + vpxor 0x00(%rsp),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) + + mov %rsp,%rsi + lea (%r11,%rax),%rdi + mov %r9,%rcx + rep movsb + + jmp .Ldone8 + +ENDPROC(chacha_8block_xor_avx2) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..848f9c75fd4f --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S @@ -0,0 +1,836 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * ChaCha 256-bit cipher algorithm, x64 AVX-512VL functions + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 Martin Willi + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +.section .rodata.cst32.CTR2BL, "aM", @progbits, 32 +.align 32 +CTR2BL: .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 + .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000001 + +.section .rodata.cst32.CTR4BL, "aM", @progbits, 32 +.align 32 +CTR4BL: .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000002 + .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000003 + +.section .rodata.cst32.CTR8BL, "aM", @progbits, 32 +.align 32 +CTR8BL: .octa 0x00000003000000020000000100000000 + .octa 0x00000007000000060000000500000004 + +.text + +ENTRY(chacha_2block_xor_avx512vl) + # %rdi: Input state matrix, s + # %rsi: up to 2 data blocks output, o + # %rdx: up to 2 data blocks input, i + # %rcx: input/output length in bytes + # %r8d: nrounds + + # This function encrypts two ChaCha blocks by loading the state + # matrix twice across four AVX registers. It performs matrix operations + # on four words in each matrix in parallel, but requires shuffling to + # rearrange the words after each round. + + vzeroupper + + # x0..3[0-2] = s0..3 + vbroadcasti128 0x00(%rdi),%ymm0 + vbroadcasti128 0x10(%rdi),%ymm1 + vbroadcasti128 0x20(%rdi),%ymm2 + vbroadcasti128 0x30(%rdi),%ymm3 + + vpaddd CTR2BL(%rip),%ymm3,%ymm3 + + vmovdqa %ymm0,%ymm8 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm9 + vmovdqa %ymm2,%ymm10 + vmovdqa %ymm3,%ymm11 + +.Ldoubleround: + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vprold $16,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 12) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vprold $12,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vprold $8,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 7) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vprold $7,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + # x1 = shuffle32(x1, MASK(0, 3, 2, 1)) + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm1,%ymm1 + # x2 = shuffle32(x2, MASK(1, 0, 3, 2)) + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm2,%ymm2 + # x3 = shuffle32(x3, MASK(2, 1, 0, 3)) + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vprold $16,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 12) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vprold $12,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vprold $8,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 7) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vprold $7,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + # x1 = shuffle32(x1, MASK(2, 1, 0, 3)) + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm1,%ymm1 + # x2 = shuffle32(x2, MASK(1, 0, 3, 2)) + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm2,%ymm2 + # x3 = shuffle32(x3, MASK(0, 3, 2, 1)) + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + sub $2,%r8d + jnz .Ldoubleround + + # o0 = i0 ^ (x0 + s0) + vpaddd %ymm8,%ymm0,%ymm7 + cmp $0x10,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxord 0x00(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x00(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm7,%xmm0 + # o1 = i1 ^ (x1 + s1) + vpaddd %ymm9,%ymm1,%ymm7 + cmp $0x20,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxord 0x10(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x10(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm7,%xmm1 + # o2 = i2 ^ (x2 + s2) + vpaddd %ymm10,%ymm2,%ymm7 + cmp $0x30,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxord 0x20(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x20(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm7,%xmm2 + # o3 = i3 ^ (x3 + s3) + vpaddd %ymm11,%ymm3,%ymm7 + cmp $0x40,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxord 0x30(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x30(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm7,%xmm3 + + # xor and write second block + vmovdqa %xmm0,%xmm7 + cmp $0x50,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxord 0x40(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x40(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm1,%xmm7 + cmp $0x60,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxord 0x50(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x50(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm2,%xmm7 + cmp $0x70,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxord 0x60(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x60(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm3,%xmm7 + cmp $0x80,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart2 + vpxord 0x70(%rdx),%xmm7,%xmm6 + vmovdqu %xmm6,0x70(%rsi) + +.Ldone2: + vzeroupper + ret + +.Lxorpart2: + # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output + mov %rcx,%rax + and $0xf,%rcx + jz .Ldone8 + mov %rax,%r9 + and $~0xf,%r9 + + mov $1,%rax + shld %cl,%rax,%rax + sub $1,%rax + kmovq %rax,%k1 + + vmovdqu8 (%rdx,%r9),%xmm1{%k1}{z} + vpxord %xmm7,%xmm1,%xmm1 + vmovdqu8 %xmm1,(%rsi,%r9){%k1} + + jmp .Ldone2 + +ENDPROC(chacha_2block_xor_avx512vl) + +ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_avx512vl) + # %rdi: Input state matrix, s + # %rsi: up to 4 data blocks output, o + # %rdx: up to 4 data blocks input, i + # %rcx: input/output length in bytes + # %r8d: nrounds + + # This function encrypts four ChaCha blocks by loading the state + # matrix four times across eight AVX registers. It performs matrix + # operations on four words in two matrices in parallel, sequentially + # to the operations on the four words of the other two matrices. The + # required word shuffling has a rather high latency, we can do the + # arithmetic on two matrix-pairs without much slowdown. + + vzeroupper + + # x0..3[0-4] = s0..3 + vbroadcasti128 0x00(%rdi),%ymm0 + vbroadcasti128 0x10(%rdi),%ymm1 + vbroadcasti128 0x20(%rdi),%ymm2 + vbroadcasti128 0x30(%rdi),%ymm3 + + vmovdqa %ymm0,%ymm4 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm5 + vmovdqa %ymm2,%ymm6 + vmovdqa %ymm3,%ymm7 + + vpaddd CTR2BL(%rip),%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpaddd CTR4BL(%rip),%ymm7,%ymm7 + + vmovdqa %ymm0,%ymm11 + vmovdqa %ymm1,%ymm12 + vmovdqa %ymm2,%ymm13 + vmovdqa %ymm3,%ymm14 + vmovdqa %ymm7,%ymm15 + +.Ldoubleround4: + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vprold $16,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + vpaddd %ymm5,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpxord %ymm4,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vprold $16,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 12) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vprold $12,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + vpaddd %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpxord %ymm6,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vprold $12,%ymm5,%ymm5 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vprold $8,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + vpaddd %ymm5,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpxord %ymm4,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vprold $8,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 7) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vprold $7,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + vpaddd %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpxord %ymm6,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vprold $7,%ymm5,%ymm5 + + # x1 = shuffle32(x1, MASK(0, 3, 2, 1)) + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x2 = shuffle32(x2, MASK(1, 0, 3, 2)) + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x3 = shuffle32(x3, MASK(2, 1, 0, 3)) + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vprold $16,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + vpaddd %ymm5,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpxord %ymm4,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vprold $16,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 12) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vprold $12,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + vpaddd %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpxord %ymm6,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vprold $12,%ymm5,%ymm5 + + # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vprold $8,%ymm3,%ymm3 + + vpaddd %ymm5,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpxord %ymm4,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vprold $8,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x2 += x3, x1 = rotl32(x1 ^ x2, 7) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vprold $7,%ymm1,%ymm1 + + vpaddd %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpxord %ymm6,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vprold $7,%ymm5,%ymm5 + + # x1 = shuffle32(x1, MASK(2, 1, 0, 3)) + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpshufd $0x93,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x2 = shuffle32(x2, MASK(1, 0, 3, 2)) + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpshufd $0x4e,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x3 = shuffle32(x3, MASK(0, 3, 2, 1)) + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpshufd $0x39,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + sub $2,%r8d + jnz .Ldoubleround4 + + # o0 = i0 ^ (x0 + s0), first block + vpaddd %ymm11,%ymm0,%ymm10 + cmp $0x10,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0x00(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x00(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm0 + # o1 = i1 ^ (x1 + s1), first block + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm1,%ymm10 + cmp $0x20,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0x10(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x10(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm1 + # o2 = i2 ^ (x2 + s2), first block + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm2,%ymm10 + cmp $0x30,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0x20(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x20(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm2 + # o3 = i3 ^ (x3 + s3), first block + vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm3,%ymm10 + cmp $0x40,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0x30(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x30(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm3 + + # xor and write second block + vmovdqa %xmm0,%xmm10 + cmp $0x50,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0x40(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x40(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm1,%xmm10 + cmp $0x60,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0x50(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x50(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm2,%xmm10 + cmp $0x70,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0x60(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x60(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm3,%xmm10 + cmp $0x80,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0x70(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x70(%rsi) + + # o0 = i0 ^ (x0 + s0), third block + vpaddd %ymm11,%ymm4,%ymm10 + cmp $0x90,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0x80(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x80(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm4 + # o1 = i1 ^ (x1 + s1), third block + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm5,%ymm10 + cmp $0xa0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0x90(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0x90(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm5 + # o2 = i2 ^ (x2 + s2), third block + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm6,%ymm10 + cmp $0xb0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0xa0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xa0(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm6 + # o3 = i3 ^ (x3 + s3), third block + vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm7,%ymm10 + cmp $0xc0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0xb0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xb0(%rsi) + vextracti128 $1,%ymm10,%xmm7 + + # xor and write fourth block + vmovdqa %xmm4,%xmm10 + cmp $0xd0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0xc0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xc0(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm5,%xmm10 + cmp $0xe0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0xd0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xd0(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm6,%xmm10 + cmp $0xf0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0xe0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xe0(%rsi) + + vmovdqa %xmm7,%xmm10 + cmp $0x100,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart4 + vpxord 0xf0(%rdx),%xmm10,%xmm9 + vmovdqu %xmm9,0xf0(%rsi) + +.Ldone4: + vzeroupper + ret + +.Lxorpart4: + # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output + mov %rcx,%rax + and $0xf,%rcx + jz .Ldone8 + mov %rax,%r9 + and $~0xf,%r9 + + mov $1,%rax + shld %cl,%rax,%rax + sub $1,%rax + kmovq %rax,%k1 + + vmovdqu8 (%rdx,%r9),%xmm1{%k1}{z} + vpxord %xmm10,%xmm1,%xmm1 + vmovdqu8 %xmm1,(%rsi,%r9){%k1} + + jmp .Ldone4 + +ENDPROC(chacha_4block_xor_avx512vl) + +ENTRY(chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl) + # %rdi: Input state matrix, s + # %rsi: up to 8 data blocks output, o + # %rdx: up to 8 data blocks input, i + # %rcx: input/output length in bytes + # %r8d: nrounds + + # This function encrypts eight consecutive ChaCha blocks by loading + # the state matrix in AVX registers eight times. Compared to AVX2, this + # mostly benefits from the new rotate instructions in VL and the + # additional registers. + + vzeroupper + + # x0..15[0-7] = s[0..15] + vpbroadcastd 0x00(%rdi),%ymm0 + vpbroadcastd 0x04(%rdi),%ymm1 + vpbroadcastd 0x08(%rdi),%ymm2 + vpbroadcastd 0x0c(%rdi),%ymm3 + vpbroadcastd 0x10(%rdi),%ymm4 + vpbroadcastd 0x14(%rdi),%ymm5 + vpbroadcastd 0x18(%rdi),%ymm6 + vpbroadcastd 0x1c(%rdi),%ymm7 + vpbroadcastd 0x20(%rdi),%ymm8 + vpbroadcastd 0x24(%rdi),%ymm9 + vpbroadcastd 0x28(%rdi),%ymm10 + vpbroadcastd 0x2c(%rdi),%ymm11 + vpbroadcastd 0x30(%rdi),%ymm12 + vpbroadcastd 0x34(%rdi),%ymm13 + vpbroadcastd 0x38(%rdi),%ymm14 + vpbroadcastd 0x3c(%rdi),%ymm15 + + # x12 += counter values 0-3 + vpaddd CTR8BL(%rip),%ymm12,%ymm12 + + vmovdqa64 %ymm0,%ymm16 + vmovdqa64 %ymm1,%ymm17 + vmovdqa64 %ymm2,%ymm18 + vmovdqa64 %ymm3,%ymm19 + vmovdqa64 %ymm4,%ymm20 + vmovdqa64 %ymm5,%ymm21 + vmovdqa64 %ymm6,%ymm22 + vmovdqa64 %ymm7,%ymm23 + vmovdqa64 %ymm8,%ymm24 + vmovdqa64 %ymm9,%ymm25 + vmovdqa64 %ymm10,%ymm26 + vmovdqa64 %ymm11,%ymm27 + vmovdqa64 %ymm12,%ymm28 + vmovdqa64 %ymm13,%ymm29 + vmovdqa64 %ymm14,%ymm30 + vmovdqa64 %ymm15,%ymm31 + +.Ldoubleround8: + # x0 += x4, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 + vprold $16,%ymm12,%ymm12 + # x1 += x5, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x1, 16) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm5,%ymm1 + vpxord %ymm1,%ymm13,%ymm13 + vprold $16,%ymm13,%ymm13 + # x2 += x6, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x2, 16) + vpaddd %ymm2,%ymm6,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm14,%ymm14 + vprold $16,%ymm14,%ymm14 + # x3 += x7, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x3, 16) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm7,%ymm3 + vpxord %ymm3,%ymm15,%ymm15 + vprold $16,%ymm15,%ymm15 + + # x8 += x12, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x8, 12) + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm8 + vpxord %ymm8,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vprold $12,%ymm4,%ymm4 + # x9 += x13, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x9, 12) + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm9 + vpxord %ymm9,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vprold $12,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x10 += x14, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x10, 12) + vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpxord %ymm10,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vprold $12,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x11 += x15, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x11, 12) + vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm11 + vpxord %ymm11,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vprold $12,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x0 += x4, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 + vprold $8,%ymm12,%ymm12 + # x1 += x5, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x1, 8) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm5,%ymm1 + vpxord %ymm1,%ymm13,%ymm13 + vprold $8,%ymm13,%ymm13 + # x2 += x6, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x2, 8) + vpaddd %ymm2,%ymm6,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm14,%ymm14 + vprold $8,%ymm14,%ymm14 + # x3 += x7, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x3, 8) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm7,%ymm3 + vpxord %ymm3,%ymm15,%ymm15 + vprold $8,%ymm15,%ymm15 + + # x8 += x12, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x8, 7) + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm8 + vpxord %ymm8,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vprold $7,%ymm4,%ymm4 + # x9 += x13, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x9, 7) + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm9 + vpxord %ymm9,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vprold $7,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x10 += x14, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x10, 7) + vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpxord %ymm10,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vprold $7,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x11 += x15, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x11, 7) + vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm11 + vpxord %ymm11,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vprold $7,%ymm7,%ymm7 + + # x0 += x5, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x0, 16) + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 + vprold $16,%ymm15,%ymm15 + # x1 += x6, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x1, 16) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm6,%ymm1 + vpxord %ymm1,%ymm12,%ymm12 + vprold $16,%ymm12,%ymm12 + # x2 += x7, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x2, 16) + vpaddd %ymm2,%ymm7,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm13,%ymm13 + vprold $16,%ymm13,%ymm13 + # x3 += x4, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x3, 16) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm4,%ymm3 + vpxord %ymm3,%ymm14,%ymm14 + vprold $16,%ymm14,%ymm14 + + # x10 += x15, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x10, 12) + vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpxord %ymm10,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vprold $12,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x11 += x12, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x11, 12) + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm11,%ymm11 + vpxord %ymm11,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vprold $12,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x8 += x13, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x8, 12) + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm8,%ymm8 + vpxord %ymm8,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vprold $12,%ymm7,%ymm7 + # x9 += x14, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x9, 12) + vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm9,%ymm9 + vpxord %ymm9,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vprold $12,%ymm4,%ymm4 + + # x0 += x5, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x0, 8) + vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm0 + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 + vprold $8,%ymm15,%ymm15 + # x1 += x6, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x1, 8) + vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm6,%ymm1 + vpxord %ymm1,%ymm12,%ymm12 + vprold $8,%ymm12,%ymm12 + # x2 += x7, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x2, 8) + vpaddd %ymm2,%ymm7,%ymm2 + vpxord %ymm2,%ymm13,%ymm13 + vprold $8,%ymm13,%ymm13 + # x3 += x4, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x3, 8) + vpaddd %ymm3,%ymm4,%ymm3 + vpxord %ymm3,%ymm14,%ymm14 + vprold $8,%ymm14,%ymm14 + + # x10 += x15, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x10, 7) + vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpxord %ymm10,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vprold $7,%ymm5,%ymm5 + # x11 += x12, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x11, 7) + vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm11,%ymm11 + vpxord %ymm11,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vprold $7,%ymm6,%ymm6 + # x8 += x13, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x8, 7) + vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm8,%ymm8 + vpxord %ymm8,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vprold $7,%ymm7,%ymm7 + # x9 += x14, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x9, 7) + vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm9,%ymm9 + vpxord %ymm9,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vprold $7,%ymm4,%ymm4 + + sub $2,%r8d + jnz .Ldoubleround8 + + # x0..15[0-3] += s[0..15] + vpaddd %ymm16,%ymm0,%ymm0 + vpaddd %ymm17,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vpaddd %ymm18,%ymm2,%ymm2 + vpaddd %ymm19,%ymm3,%ymm3 + vpaddd %ymm20,%ymm4,%ymm4 + vpaddd %ymm21,%ymm5,%ymm5 + vpaddd %ymm22,%ymm6,%ymm6 + vpaddd %ymm23,%ymm7,%ymm7 + vpaddd %ymm24,%ymm8,%ymm8 + vpaddd %ymm25,%ymm9,%ymm9 + vpaddd %ymm26,%ymm10,%ymm10 + vpaddd %ymm27,%ymm11,%ymm11 + vpaddd %ymm28,%ymm12,%ymm12 + vpaddd %ymm29,%ymm13,%ymm13 + vpaddd %ymm30,%ymm14,%ymm14 + vpaddd %ymm31,%ymm15,%ymm15 + + # interleave 32-bit words in state n, n+1 + vpunpckldq %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm16 + vpunpckhdq %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm17 + vpunpckldq %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm18 + vpunpckhdq %ymm3,%ymm2,%ymm19 + vpunpckldq %ymm5,%ymm4,%ymm20 + vpunpckhdq %ymm5,%ymm4,%ymm21 + vpunpckldq %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm22 + vpunpckhdq %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm23 + vpunpckldq %ymm9,%ymm8,%ymm24 + vpunpckhdq %ymm9,%ymm8,%ymm25 + vpunpckldq %ymm11,%ymm10,%ymm26 + vpunpckhdq %ymm11,%ymm10,%ymm27 + vpunpckldq %ymm13,%ymm12,%ymm28 + vpunpckhdq %ymm13,%ymm12,%ymm29 + vpunpckldq %ymm15,%ymm14,%ymm30 + vpunpckhdq %ymm15,%ymm14,%ymm31 + + # interleave 64-bit words in state n, n+2 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm18,%ymm16,%ymm0 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm19,%ymm17,%ymm1 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm18,%ymm16,%ymm2 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm19,%ymm17,%ymm3 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm22,%ymm20,%ymm4 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm23,%ymm21,%ymm5 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm22,%ymm20,%ymm6 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm23,%ymm21,%ymm7 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm26,%ymm24,%ymm8 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm27,%ymm25,%ymm9 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm26,%ymm24,%ymm10 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm27,%ymm25,%ymm11 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm30,%ymm28,%ymm12 + vpunpcklqdq %ymm31,%ymm29,%ymm13 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm30,%ymm28,%ymm14 + vpunpckhqdq %ymm31,%ymm29,%ymm15 + + # interleave 128-bit words in state n, n+4 + # xor/write first four blocks + vmovdqa64 %ymm0,%ymm16 + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm4,%ymm0,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0020,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x0000(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x0000(%rsi) + vmovdqa64 %ymm16,%ymm0 + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm4,%ymm0,%ymm4 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0040,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x0020(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x0020(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm12 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm6,%ymm2,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0060,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x0040(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x0040(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm6,%ymm2,%ymm6 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0080,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x0060(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x0060(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm14 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm5,%ymm1,%ymm0 + cmp $0x00a0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x0080(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x0080(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm5,%ymm1,%ymm5 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm0 + cmp $0x00c0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x00a0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x00a0(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm13 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm7,%ymm3,%ymm0 + cmp $0x00e0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x00c0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x00c0(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm7,%ymm3,%ymm7 + + vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0100,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x00e0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x00e0(%rsi) + vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm15 + + # xor remaining blocks, write to output + vmovdqa64 %ymm4,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0120,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x0100(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x0100(%rsi) + + vmovdqa64 %ymm12,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0140,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x0120(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x0120(%rsi) + + vmovdqa64 %ymm6,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0160,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x0140(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x0140(%rsi) + + vmovdqa64 %ymm14,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0180,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x0160(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x0160(%rsi) + + vmovdqa64 %ymm5,%ymm0 + cmp $0x01a0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x0180(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x0180(%rsi) + + vmovdqa64 %ymm13,%ymm0 + cmp $0x01c0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x01a0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x01a0(%rsi) + + vmovdqa64 %ymm7,%ymm0 + cmp $0x01e0,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x01c0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x01c0(%rsi) + + vmovdqa64 %ymm15,%ymm0 + cmp $0x0200,%rcx + jl .Lxorpart8 + vpxord 0x01e0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 + vmovdqu64 %ymm0,0x01e0(%rsi) + +.Ldone8: + vzeroupper + ret + +.Lxorpart8: + # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output + mov %rcx,%rax + and $0x1f,%rcx + jz .Ldone8 + mov %rax,%r9 + and $~0x1f,%r9 + + mov $1,%rax + shld %cl,%rax,%rax + sub $1,%rax + kmovq %rax,%k1 + + vmovdqu8 (%rdx,%r9),%ymm1{%k1}{z} + vpxord %ymm0,%ymm1,%ymm1 + vmovdqu8 %ymm1,(%rsi,%r9){%k1} + + jmp .Ldone8 + +ENDPROC(chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20-ssse3-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S index 512a2b500fd1..c05a7a963dc3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20-ssse3-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * ChaCha20 256-bit cipher algorithm, RFC7539, x64 SSSE3 functions + * ChaCha 256-bit cipher algorithm, x64 SSSE3 functions * * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi * @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/frame.h> .section .rodata.cst16.ROT8, "aM", @progbits, 16 .align 16 @@ -23,35 +24,25 @@ CTRINC: .octa 0x00000003000000020000000100000000 .text -ENTRY(chacha20_block_xor_ssse3) - # %rdi: Input state matrix, s - # %rsi: 1 data block output, o - # %rdx: 1 data block input, i - - # This function encrypts one ChaCha20 block by loading the state matrix - # in four SSE registers. It performs matrix operation on four words in - # parallel, but requireds shuffling to rearrange the words after each - # round. 8/16-bit word rotation is done with the slightly better - # performing SSSE3 byte shuffling, 7/12-bit word rotation uses - # traditional shift+OR. - - # x0..3 = s0..3 - movdqa 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0 - movdqa 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1 - movdqa 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2 - movdqa 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3 - movdqa %xmm0,%xmm8 - movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9 - movdqa %xmm2,%xmm10 - movdqa %xmm3,%xmm11 +/* + * chacha_permute - permute one block + * + * Permute one 64-byte block where the state matrix is in %xmm0-%xmm3. This + * function performs matrix operations on four words in parallel, but requires + * shuffling to rearrange the words after each round. 8/16-bit word rotation is + * done with the slightly better performing SSSE3 byte shuffling, 7/12-bit word + * rotation uses traditional shift+OR. + * + * The round count is given in %r8d. + * + * Clobbers: %r8d, %xmm4-%xmm7 + */ +chacha_permute: movdqa ROT8(%rip),%xmm4 movdqa ROT16(%rip),%xmm5 - mov $10,%ecx - .Ldoubleround: - # x0 += x1, x3 = rotl32(x3 ^ x0, 16) paddd %xmm1,%xmm0 pxor %xmm0,%xmm3 @@ -118,39 +109,129 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_block_xor_ssse3) # x3 = shuffle32(x3, MASK(0, 3, 2, 1)) pshufd $0x39,%xmm3,%xmm3 - dec %ecx + sub $2,%r8d jnz .Ldoubleround + ret +ENDPROC(chacha_permute) + +ENTRY(chacha_block_xor_ssse3) + # %rdi: Input state matrix, s + # %rsi: up to 1 data block output, o + # %rdx: up to 1 data block input, i + # %rcx: input/output length in bytes + # %r8d: nrounds + FRAME_BEGIN + + # x0..3 = s0..3 + movdqa 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0 + movdqa 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1 + movdqa 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2 + movdqa 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3 + movdqa %xmm0,%xmm8 + movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9 + movdqa %xmm2,%xmm10 + movdqa %xmm3,%xmm11 + + mov %rcx,%rax + call chacha_permute + # o0 = i0 ^ (x0 + s0) - movdqu 0x00(%rdx),%xmm4 paddd %xmm8,%xmm0 + cmp $0x10,%rax + jl .Lxorpart + movdqu 0x00(%rdx),%xmm4 pxor %xmm4,%xmm0 movdqu %xmm0,0x00(%rsi) # o1 = i1 ^ (x1 + s1) - movdqu 0x10(%rdx),%xmm5 paddd %xmm9,%xmm1 - pxor %xmm5,%xmm1 - movdqu %xmm1,0x10(%rsi) + movdqa %xmm1,%xmm0 + cmp $0x20,%rax + jl .Lxorpart + movdqu 0x10(%rdx),%xmm0 + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0x10(%rsi) # o2 = i2 ^ (x2 + s2) - movdqu 0x20(%rdx),%xmm6 paddd %xmm10,%xmm2 - pxor %xmm6,%xmm2 - movdqu %xmm2,0x20(%rsi) + movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0 + cmp $0x30,%rax + jl .Lxorpart + movdqu 0x20(%rdx),%xmm0 + pxor %xmm2,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0x20(%rsi) # o3 = i3 ^ (x3 + s3) - movdqu 0x30(%rdx),%xmm7 paddd %xmm11,%xmm3 - pxor %xmm7,%xmm3 - movdqu %xmm3,0x30(%rsi) + movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0 + cmp $0x40,%rax + jl .Lxorpart + movdqu 0x30(%rdx),%xmm0 + pxor %xmm3,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0x30(%rsi) + +.Ldone: + FRAME_END + ret + +.Lxorpart: + # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output + mov %rax,%r9 + and $0x0f,%r9 + jz .Ldone + and $~0x0f,%rax + + mov %rsi,%r11 + + lea 8(%rsp),%r10 + sub $0x10,%rsp + and $~31,%rsp + + lea (%rdx,%rax),%rsi + mov %rsp,%rdi + mov %r9,%rcx + rep movsb + + pxor 0x00(%rsp),%xmm0 + movdqa %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) + mov %rsp,%rsi + lea (%r11,%rax),%rdi + mov %r9,%rcx + rep movsb + + lea -8(%r10),%rsp + jmp .Ldone + +ENDPROC(chacha_block_xor_ssse3) + +ENTRY(hchacha_block_ssse3) + # %rdi: Input state matrix, s + # %rsi: output (8 32-bit words) + # %edx: nrounds + FRAME_BEGIN + + movdqa 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0 + movdqa 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1 + movdqa 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2 + movdqa 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3 + + mov %edx,%r8d + call chacha_permute + + movdqu %xmm0,0x00(%rsi) + movdqu %xmm3,0x10(%rsi) + + FRAME_END ret -ENDPROC(chacha20_block_xor_ssse3) +ENDPROC(hchacha_block_ssse3) -ENTRY(chacha20_4block_xor_ssse3) +ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_ssse3) # %rdi: Input state matrix, s - # %rsi: 4 data blocks output, o - # %rdx: 4 data blocks input, i + # %rsi: up to 4 data blocks output, o + # %rdx: up to 4 data blocks input, i + # %rcx: input/output length in bytes + # %r8d: nrounds - # This function encrypts four consecutive ChaCha20 blocks by loading the + # This function encrypts four consecutive ChaCha blocks by loading the # the state matrix in SSE registers four times. As we need some scratch # registers, we save the first four registers on the stack. The # algorithm performs each operation on the corresponding word of each @@ -163,6 +244,7 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_4block_xor_ssse3) lea 8(%rsp),%r10 sub $0x80,%rsp and $~63,%rsp + mov %rcx,%rax # x0..15[0-3] = s0..3[0..3] movq 0x00(%rdi),%xmm1 @@ -202,8 +284,6 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_4block_xor_ssse3) # x12 += counter values 0-3 paddd %xmm1,%xmm12 - mov $10,%ecx - .Ldoubleround4: # x0 += x4, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x0, 16) movdqa 0x00(%rsp),%xmm0 @@ -421,7 +501,7 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_4block_xor_ssse3) psrld $25,%xmm4 por %xmm0,%xmm4 - dec %ecx + sub $2,%r8d jnz .Ldoubleround4 # x0[0-3] += s0[0] @@ -573,58 +653,143 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_4block_xor_ssse3) # xor with corresponding input, write to output movdqa 0x00(%rsp),%xmm0 + cmp $0x10,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 movdqu 0x00(%rdx),%xmm1 pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 movdqu %xmm0,0x00(%rsi) - movdqa 0x10(%rsp),%xmm0 - movdqu 0x80(%rdx),%xmm1 + + movdqu %xmm4,%xmm0 + cmp $0x20,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + movdqu 0x10(%rdx),%xmm1 pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 - movdqu %xmm0,0x80(%rsi) + movdqu %xmm0,0x10(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm8,%xmm0 + cmp $0x30,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + movdqu 0x20(%rdx),%xmm1 + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0x20(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm12,%xmm0 + cmp $0x40,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + movdqu 0x30(%rdx),%xmm1 + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0x30(%rsi) + movdqa 0x20(%rsp),%xmm0 + cmp $0x50,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 movdqu 0x40(%rdx),%xmm1 pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 movdqu %xmm0,0x40(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm6,%xmm0 + cmp $0x60,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + movdqu 0x50(%rdx),%xmm1 + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0x50(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm10,%xmm0 + cmp $0x70,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + movdqu 0x60(%rdx),%xmm1 + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0x60(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm14,%xmm0 + cmp $0x80,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + movdqu 0x70(%rdx),%xmm1 + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0x70(%rsi) + + movdqa 0x10(%rsp),%xmm0 + cmp $0x90,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + movdqu 0x80(%rdx),%xmm1 + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0x80(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm5,%xmm0 + cmp $0xa0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + movdqu 0x90(%rdx),%xmm1 + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0x90(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm9,%xmm0 + cmp $0xb0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + movdqu 0xa0(%rdx),%xmm1 + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0xa0(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm13,%xmm0 + cmp $0xc0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 + movdqu 0xb0(%rdx),%xmm1 + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0xb0(%rsi) + movdqa 0x30(%rsp),%xmm0 + cmp $0xd0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 movdqu 0xc0(%rdx),%xmm1 pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 movdqu %xmm0,0xc0(%rsi) - movdqu 0x10(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm4 - movdqu %xmm4,0x10(%rsi) - movdqu 0x90(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm5 - movdqu %xmm5,0x90(%rsi) - movdqu 0x50(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm6 - movdqu %xmm6,0x50(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm7,%xmm0 + cmp $0xe0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 movdqu 0xd0(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm7 - movdqu %xmm7,0xd0(%rsi) - movdqu 0x20(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm8 - movdqu %xmm8,0x20(%rsi) - movdqu 0xa0(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm9 - movdqu %xmm9,0xa0(%rsi) - movdqu 0x60(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm10 - movdqu %xmm10,0x60(%rsi) + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0xd0(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm11,%xmm0 + cmp $0xf0,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 movdqu 0xe0(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm11 - movdqu %xmm11,0xe0(%rsi) - movdqu 0x30(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm12 - movdqu %xmm12,0x30(%rsi) - movdqu 0xb0(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm13 - movdqu %xmm13,0xb0(%rsi) - movdqu 0x70(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm14 - movdqu %xmm14,0x70(%rsi) + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0xe0(%rsi) + + movdqu %xmm15,%xmm0 + cmp $0x100,%rax + jl .Lxorpart4 movdqu 0xf0(%rdx),%xmm1 - pxor %xmm1,%xmm15 - movdqu %xmm15,0xf0(%rsi) + pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 + movdqu %xmm0,0xf0(%rsi) +.Ldone4: lea -8(%r10),%rsp ret -ENDPROC(chacha20_4block_xor_ssse3) + +.Lxorpart4: + # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output + mov %rax,%r9 + and $0x0f,%r9 + jz .Ldone4 + and $~0x0f,%rax + + mov %rsi,%r11 + + lea (%rdx,%rax),%rsi + mov %rsp,%rdi + mov %r9,%rcx + rep movsb + + pxor 0x00(%rsp),%xmm0 + movdqa %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) + + mov %rsp,%rsi + lea (%r11,%rax),%rdi + mov %r9,%rcx + rep movsb + + jmp .Ldone4 + +ENDPROC(chacha_4block_xor_ssse3) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20-avx2-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20-avx2-x86_64.S deleted file mode 100644 index f3cd26f48332..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20-avx2-x86_64.S +++ /dev/null @@ -1,448 +0,0 @@ -/* - * ChaCha20 256-bit cipher algorithm, RFC7539, x64 AVX2 functions - * - * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - */ - -#include <linux/linkage.h> - -.section .rodata.cst32.ROT8, "aM", @progbits, 32 -.align 32 -ROT8: .octa 0x0e0d0c0f0a09080b0605040702010003 - .octa 0x0e0d0c0f0a09080b0605040702010003 - -.section .rodata.cst32.ROT16, "aM", @progbits, 32 -.align 32 -ROT16: .octa 0x0d0c0f0e09080b0a0504070601000302 - .octa 0x0d0c0f0e09080b0a0504070601000302 - -.section .rodata.cst32.CTRINC, "aM", @progbits, 32 -.align 32 -CTRINC: .octa 0x00000003000000020000000100000000 - .octa 0x00000007000000060000000500000004 - -.text - -ENTRY(chacha20_8block_xor_avx2) - # %rdi: Input state matrix, s - # %rsi: 8 data blocks output, o - # %rdx: 8 data blocks input, i - - # This function encrypts eight consecutive ChaCha20 blocks by loading - # the state matrix in AVX registers eight times. As we need some - # scratch registers, we save the first four registers on the stack. The - # algorithm performs each operation on the corresponding word of each - # state matrix, hence requires no word shuffling. For final XORing step - # we transpose the matrix by interleaving 32-, 64- and then 128-bit - # words, which allows us to do XOR in AVX registers. 8/16-bit word - # rotation is done with the slightly better performing byte shuffling, - # 7/12-bit word rotation uses traditional shift+OR. - - vzeroupper - # 4 * 32 byte stack, 32-byte aligned - lea 8(%rsp),%r10 - and $~31, %rsp - sub $0x80, %rsp - - # x0..15[0-7] = s[0..15] - vpbroadcastd 0x00(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpbroadcastd 0x04(%rdi),%ymm1 - vpbroadcastd 0x08(%rdi),%ymm2 - vpbroadcastd 0x0c(%rdi),%ymm3 - vpbroadcastd 0x10(%rdi),%ymm4 - vpbroadcastd 0x14(%rdi),%ymm5 - vpbroadcastd 0x18(%rdi),%ymm6 - vpbroadcastd 0x1c(%rdi),%ymm7 - vpbroadcastd 0x20(%rdi),%ymm8 - vpbroadcastd 0x24(%rdi),%ymm9 - vpbroadcastd 0x28(%rdi),%ymm10 - vpbroadcastd 0x2c(%rdi),%ymm11 - vpbroadcastd 0x30(%rdi),%ymm12 - vpbroadcastd 0x34(%rdi),%ymm13 - vpbroadcastd 0x38(%rdi),%ymm14 - vpbroadcastd 0x3c(%rdi),%ymm15 - # x0..3 on stack - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) - vmovdqa %ymm1,0x20(%rsp) - vmovdqa %ymm2,0x40(%rsp) - vmovdqa %ymm3,0x60(%rsp) - - vmovdqa CTRINC(%rip),%ymm1 - vmovdqa ROT8(%rip),%ymm2 - vmovdqa ROT16(%rip),%ymm3 - - # x12 += counter values 0-3 - vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm12,%ymm12 - - mov $10,%ecx - -.Ldoubleround8: - # x0 += x4, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x0, 16) - vpaddd 0x00(%rsp),%ymm4,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 - vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm12,%ymm12 - # x1 += x5, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x1, 16) - vpaddd 0x20(%rsp),%ymm5,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x20(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm13,%ymm13 - vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm13,%ymm13 - # x2 += x6, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x2, 16) - vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),%ymm6,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x40(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm14,%ymm14 - vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm14,%ymm14 - # x3 += x7, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x3, 16) - vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),%ymm7,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x60(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 - vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm15,%ymm15 - - # x8 += x12, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x8, 12) - vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm8 - vpxor %ymm8,%ymm4,%ymm4 - vpslld $12,%ymm4,%ymm0 - vpsrld $20,%ymm4,%ymm4 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm4 - # x9 += x13, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x9, 12) - vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm9 - vpxor %ymm9,%ymm5,%ymm5 - vpslld $12,%ymm5,%ymm0 - vpsrld $20,%ymm5,%ymm5 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm5 - # x10 += x14, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x10, 12) - vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm10 - vpxor %ymm10,%ymm6,%ymm6 - vpslld $12,%ymm6,%ymm0 - vpsrld $20,%ymm6,%ymm6 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm6,%ymm6 - # x11 += x15, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x11, 12) - vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm11 - vpxor %ymm11,%ymm7,%ymm7 - vpslld $12,%ymm7,%ymm0 - vpsrld $20,%ymm7,%ymm7 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm7,%ymm7 - - # x0 += x4, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x0, 8) - vpaddd 0x00(%rsp),%ymm4,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 - vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm12,%ymm12 - # x1 += x5, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x1, 8) - vpaddd 0x20(%rsp),%ymm5,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x20(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm13,%ymm13 - vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm13,%ymm13 - # x2 += x6, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x2, 8) - vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),%ymm6,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x40(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm14,%ymm14 - vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm14,%ymm14 - # x3 += x7, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x3, 8) - vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),%ymm7,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x60(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 - vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm15,%ymm15 - - # x8 += x12, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x8, 7) - vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm8 - vpxor %ymm8,%ymm4,%ymm4 - vpslld $7,%ymm4,%ymm0 - vpsrld $25,%ymm4,%ymm4 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm4 - # x9 += x13, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x9, 7) - vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm9 - vpxor %ymm9,%ymm5,%ymm5 - vpslld $7,%ymm5,%ymm0 - vpsrld $25,%ymm5,%ymm5 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm5 - # x10 += x14, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x10, 7) - vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm10 - vpxor %ymm10,%ymm6,%ymm6 - vpslld $7,%ymm6,%ymm0 - vpsrld $25,%ymm6,%ymm6 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm6,%ymm6 - # x11 += x15, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x11, 7) - vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm11 - vpxor %ymm11,%ymm7,%ymm7 - vpslld $7,%ymm7,%ymm0 - vpsrld $25,%ymm7,%ymm7 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm7,%ymm7 - - # x0 += x5, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x0, 16) - vpaddd 0x00(%rsp),%ymm5,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 - vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm15,%ymm15 - # x1 += x6, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x1, 16)%ymm0 - vpaddd 0x20(%rsp),%ymm6,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x20(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 - vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm12,%ymm12 - # x2 += x7, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x2, 16) - vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),%ymm7,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x40(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm13,%ymm13 - vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm13,%ymm13 - # x3 += x4, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x3, 16) - vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),%ymm4,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x60(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm14,%ymm14 - vpshufb %ymm3,%ymm14,%ymm14 - - # x10 += x15, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x10, 12) - vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm10,%ymm10 - vpxor %ymm10,%ymm5,%ymm5 - vpslld $12,%ymm5,%ymm0 - vpsrld $20,%ymm5,%ymm5 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm5 - # x11 += x12, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x11, 12) - vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm11,%ymm11 - vpxor %ymm11,%ymm6,%ymm6 - vpslld $12,%ymm6,%ymm0 - vpsrld $20,%ymm6,%ymm6 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm6,%ymm6 - # x8 += x13, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x8, 12) - vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm8,%ymm8 - vpxor %ymm8,%ymm7,%ymm7 - vpslld $12,%ymm7,%ymm0 - vpsrld $20,%ymm7,%ymm7 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm7,%ymm7 - # x9 += x14, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x9, 12) - vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm9,%ymm9 - vpxor %ymm9,%ymm4,%ymm4 - vpslld $12,%ymm4,%ymm0 - vpsrld $20,%ymm4,%ymm4 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm4 - - # x0 += x5, x15 = rotl32(x15 ^ x0, 8) - vpaddd 0x00(%rsp),%ymm5,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 - vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm15,%ymm15 - # x1 += x6, x12 = rotl32(x12 ^ x1, 8) - vpaddd 0x20(%rsp),%ymm6,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x20(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 - vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm12,%ymm12 - # x2 += x7, x13 = rotl32(x13 ^ x2, 8) - vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),%ymm7,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x40(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm13,%ymm13 - vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm13,%ymm13 - # x3 += x4, x14 = rotl32(x14 ^ x3, 8) - vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),%ymm4,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x60(%rsp) - vpxor %ymm0,%ymm14,%ymm14 - vpshufb %ymm2,%ymm14,%ymm14 - - # x10 += x15, x5 = rotl32(x5 ^ x10, 7) - vpaddd %ymm15,%ymm10,%ymm10 - vpxor %ymm10,%ymm5,%ymm5 - vpslld $7,%ymm5,%ymm0 - vpsrld $25,%ymm5,%ymm5 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm5 - # x11 += x12, x6 = rotl32(x6 ^ x11, 7) - vpaddd %ymm12,%ymm11,%ymm11 - vpxor %ymm11,%ymm6,%ymm6 - vpslld $7,%ymm6,%ymm0 - vpsrld $25,%ymm6,%ymm6 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm6,%ymm6 - # x8 += x13, x7 = rotl32(x7 ^ x8, 7) - vpaddd %ymm13,%ymm8,%ymm8 - vpxor %ymm8,%ymm7,%ymm7 - vpslld $7,%ymm7,%ymm0 - vpsrld $25,%ymm7,%ymm7 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm7,%ymm7 - # x9 += x14, x4 = rotl32(x4 ^ x9, 7) - vpaddd %ymm14,%ymm9,%ymm9 - vpxor %ymm9,%ymm4,%ymm4 - vpslld $7,%ymm4,%ymm0 - vpsrld $25,%ymm4,%ymm4 - vpor %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm4 - - dec %ecx - jnz .Ldoubleround8 - - # x0..15[0-3] += s[0..15] - vpbroadcastd 0x00(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd 0x00(%rsp),%ymm0,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x00(%rsp) - vpbroadcastd 0x04(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd 0x20(%rsp),%ymm0,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x20(%rsp) - vpbroadcastd 0x08(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),%ymm0,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x40(%rsp) - vpbroadcastd 0x0c(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),%ymm0,%ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0,0x60(%rsp) - vpbroadcastd 0x10(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm4,%ymm4 - vpbroadcastd 0x14(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm5 - vpbroadcastd 0x18(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm6,%ymm6 - vpbroadcastd 0x1c(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm7,%ymm7 - vpbroadcastd 0x20(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm8,%ymm8 - vpbroadcastd 0x24(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm9,%ymm9 - vpbroadcastd 0x28(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm10,%ymm10 - vpbroadcastd 0x2c(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm11,%ymm11 - vpbroadcastd 0x30(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm12,%ymm12 - vpbroadcastd 0x34(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm13,%ymm13 - vpbroadcastd 0x38(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm14,%ymm14 - vpbroadcastd 0x3c(%rdi),%ymm0 - vpaddd %ymm0,%ymm15,%ymm15 - - # x12 += counter values 0-3 - vpaddd %ymm1,%ymm12,%ymm12 - - # interleave 32-bit words in state n, n+1 - vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),%ymm0 - vmovdqa 0x20(%rsp),%ymm1 - vpunpckldq %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm2 - vpunpckhdq %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm1 - vmovdqa %ymm2,0x00(%rsp) - vmovdqa %ymm1,0x20(%rsp) - vmovdqa 0x40(%rsp),%ymm0 - vmovdqa 0x60(%rsp),%ymm1 - vpunpckldq %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm2 - vpunpckhdq %ymm1,%ymm0,%ymm1 - vmovdqa %ymm2,0x40(%rsp) - vmovdqa %ymm1,0x60(%rsp) - vmovdqa %ymm4,%ymm0 - vpunpckldq %ymm5,%ymm0,%ymm4 - vpunpckhdq %ymm5,%ymm0,%ymm5 - vmovdqa %ymm6,%ymm0 - vpunpckldq %ymm7,%ymm0,%ymm6 - vpunpckhdq %ymm7,%ymm0,%ymm7 - vmovdqa %ymm8,%ymm0 - vpunpckldq %ymm9,%ymm0,%ymm8 - vpunpckhdq %ymm9,%ymm0,%ymm9 - vmovdqa %ymm10,%ymm0 - vpunpckldq %ymm11,%ymm0,%ymm10 - vpunpckhdq %ymm11,%ymm0,%ymm11 - vmovdqa %ymm12,%ymm0 - vpunpckldq %ymm13,%ymm0,%ymm12 - vpunpckhdq %ymm13,%ymm0,%ymm13 - vmovdqa %ymm14,%ymm0 - vpunpckldq %ymm15,%ymm0,%ymm14 - vpunpckhdq %ymm15,%ymm0,%ymm15 - - # interleave 64-bit words in state n, n+2 - vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),%ymm0 - vmovdqa 0x40(%rsp),%ymm2 - vpunpcklqdq %ymm2,%ymm0,%ymm1 - vpunpckhqdq %ymm2,%ymm0,%ymm2 - vmovdqa %ymm1,0x00(%rsp) - vmovdqa %ymm2,0x40(%rsp) - vmovdqa 0x20(%rsp),%ymm0 - vmovdqa 0x60(%rsp),%ymm2 - vpunpcklqdq %ymm2,%ymm0,%ymm1 - vpunpckhqdq %ymm2,%ymm0,%ymm2 - vmovdqa %ymm1,0x20(%rsp) - vmovdqa %ymm2,0x60(%rsp) - vmovdqa %ymm4,%ymm0 - vpunpcklqdq %ymm6,%ymm0,%ymm4 - vpunpckhqdq %ymm6,%ymm0,%ymm6 - vmovdqa %ymm5,%ymm0 - vpunpcklqdq %ymm7,%ymm0,%ymm5 - vpunpckhqdq %ymm7,%ymm0,%ymm7 - vmovdqa %ymm8,%ymm0 - vpunpcklqdq %ymm10,%ymm0,%ymm8 - vpunpckhqdq %ymm10,%ymm0,%ymm10 - vmovdqa %ymm9,%ymm0 - vpunpcklqdq %ymm11,%ymm0,%ymm9 - vpunpckhqdq %ymm11,%ymm0,%ymm11 - vmovdqa %ymm12,%ymm0 - vpunpcklqdq %ymm14,%ymm0,%ymm12 - vpunpckhqdq %ymm14,%ymm0,%ymm14 - vmovdqa %ymm13,%ymm0 - vpunpcklqdq %ymm15,%ymm0,%ymm13 - vpunpckhqdq %ymm15,%ymm0,%ymm15 - - # interleave 128-bit words in state n, n+4 - vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),%ymm0 - vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm4,%ymm0,%ymm1 - vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm4,%ymm0,%ymm4 - vmovdqa %ymm1,0x00(%rsp) - vmovdqa 0x20(%rsp),%ymm0 - vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm5,%ymm0,%ymm1 - vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm5,%ymm0,%ymm5 - vmovdqa %ymm1,0x20(%rsp) - vmovdqa 0x40(%rsp),%ymm0 - vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm6,%ymm0,%ymm1 - vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm6,%ymm0,%ymm6 - vmovdqa %ymm1,0x40(%rsp) - vmovdqa 0x60(%rsp),%ymm0 - vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm7,%ymm0,%ymm1 - vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm7,%ymm0,%ymm7 - vmovdqa %ymm1,0x60(%rsp) - vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm0 - vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm12,%ymm8,%ymm12 - vmovdqa %ymm0,%ymm8 - vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm0 - vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm13,%ymm9,%ymm13 - vmovdqa %ymm0,%ymm9 - vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm0 - vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm14,%ymm10,%ymm14 - vmovdqa %ymm0,%ymm10 - vperm2i128 $0x20,%ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm0 - vperm2i128 $0x31,%ymm15,%ymm11,%ymm15 - vmovdqa %ymm0,%ymm11 - - # xor with corresponding input, write to output - vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),%ymm0 - vpxor 0x0000(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 - vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0000(%rsi) - vmovdqa 0x20(%rsp),%ymm0 - vpxor 0x0080(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 - vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0080(%rsi) - vmovdqa 0x40(%rsp),%ymm0 - vpxor 0x0040(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 - vmovdqu %ymm0,0x0040(%rsi) - vmovdqa 0x60(%rsp),%ymm0 - vpxor 0x00c0(%rdx),%ymm0,%ymm0 - vmovdqu %ymm0,0x00c0(%rsi) - vpxor 0x0100(%rdx),%ymm4,%ymm4 - vmovdqu %ymm4,0x0100(%rsi) - vpxor 0x0180(%rdx),%ymm5,%ymm5 - vmovdqu %ymm5,0x00180(%rsi) - vpxor 0x0140(%rdx),%ymm6,%ymm6 - vmovdqu %ymm6,0x0140(%rsi) - vpxor 0x01c0(%rdx),%ymm7,%ymm7 - vmovdqu %ymm7,0x01c0(%rsi) - vpxor 0x0020(%rdx),%ymm8,%ymm8 - vmovdqu %ymm8,0x0020(%rsi) - vpxor 0x00a0(%rdx),%ymm9,%ymm9 - vmovdqu %ymm9,0x00a0(%rsi) - vpxor 0x0060(%rdx),%ymm10,%ymm10 - vmovdqu %ymm10,0x0060(%rsi) - vpxor 0x00e0(%rdx),%ymm11,%ymm11 - vmovdqu %ymm11,0x00e0(%rsi) - vpxor 0x0120(%rdx),%ymm12,%ymm12 - vmovdqu %ymm12,0x0120(%rsi) - vpxor 0x01a0(%rdx),%ymm13,%ymm13 - vmovdqu %ymm13,0x01a0(%rsi) - vpxor 0x0160(%rdx),%ymm14,%ymm14 - vmovdqu %ymm14,0x0160(%rsi) - vpxor 0x01e0(%rdx),%ymm15,%ymm15 - vmovdqu %ymm15,0x01e0(%rsi) - - vzeroupper - lea -8(%r10),%rsp - ret -ENDPROC(chacha20_8block_xor_avx2) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c deleted file mode 100644 index dce7c5d39c2f..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,146 +0,0 @@ -/* - * ChaCha20 256-bit cipher algorithm, RFC7539, SIMD glue code - * - * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - */ - -#include <crypto/algapi.h> -#include <crypto/chacha20.h> -#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> -#include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/module.h> -#include <asm/fpu/api.h> -#include <asm/simd.h> - -#define CHACHA20_STATE_ALIGN 16 - -asmlinkage void chacha20_block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src); -asmlinkage void chacha20_4block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src); -#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 -asmlinkage void chacha20_8block_xor_avx2(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src); -static bool chacha20_use_avx2; -#endif - -static void chacha20_dosimd(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, - unsigned int bytes) -{ - u8 buf[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; - -#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 - if (chacha20_use_avx2) { - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 8) { - chacha20_8block_xor_avx2(state, dst, src); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; - src += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; - state[12] += 8; - } - } -#endif - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { - chacha20_4block_xor_ssse3(state, dst, src); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; - src += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; - state[12] += 4; - } - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { - chacha20_block_xor_ssse3(state, dst, src); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - src += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - state[12]++; - } - if (bytes) { - memcpy(buf, src, bytes); - chacha20_block_xor_ssse3(state, buf, buf); - memcpy(dst, buf, bytes); - } -} - -static int chacha20_simd(struct skcipher_request *req) -{ - struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - struct chacha20_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8); - struct skcipher_walk walk; - int err; - - BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA20_STATE_ALIGN != 16); - state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA20_STATE_ALIGN); - - if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd()) - return crypto_chacha20_crypt(req); - - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); - - crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); - - kernel_fpu_begin(); - - while (walk.nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { - chacha20_dosimd(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, - rounddown(walk.nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE)); - err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, - walk.nbytes % CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); - } - - if (walk.nbytes) { - chacha20_dosimd(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, - walk.nbytes); - err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0); - } - - kernel_fpu_end(); - - return err; -} - -static struct skcipher_alg alg = { - .base.cra_name = "chacha20", - .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-simd", - .base.cra_priority = 300, - .base.cra_blocksize = 1, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), - .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - - .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = CHACHA20_IV_SIZE, - .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, - .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, - .encrypt = chacha20_simd, - .decrypt = chacha20_simd, -}; - -static int __init chacha20_simd_mod_init(void) -{ - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3)) - return -ENODEV; - -#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 - chacha20_use_avx2 = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) && - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) && - cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM, NULL); -#endif - return crypto_register_skcipher(&alg); -} - -static void __exit chacha20_simd_mod_fini(void) -{ - crypto_unregister_skcipher(&alg); -} - -module_init(chacha20_simd_mod_init); -module_exit(chacha20_simd_mod_fini); - -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -MODULE_AUTHOR("Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>"); -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("chacha20 cipher algorithm, SIMD accelerated"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-simd"); diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..45c1c4143176 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,304 @@ +/* + * x64 SIMD accelerated ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers, + * including ChaCha20 (RFC7539) + * + * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#include <crypto/algapi.h> +#include <crypto/chacha.h> +#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <asm/fpu/api.h> +#include <asm/simd.h> + +#define CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN 16 + +asmlinkage void chacha_block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int len, int nrounds); +asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int len, int nrounds); +asmlinkage void hchacha_block_ssse3(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds); +#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 +asmlinkage void chacha_2block_xor_avx2(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int len, int nrounds); +asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_avx2(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int len, int nrounds); +asmlinkage void chacha_8block_xor_avx2(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int len, int nrounds); +static bool chacha_use_avx2; +#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX512 +asmlinkage void chacha_2block_xor_avx512vl(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int len, int nrounds); +asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_avx512vl(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int len, int nrounds); +asmlinkage void chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int len, int nrounds); +static bool chacha_use_avx512vl; +#endif +#endif + +static unsigned int chacha_advance(unsigned int len, unsigned int maxblocks) +{ + len = min(len, maxblocks * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); + return round_up(len, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) / CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; +} + +static void chacha_dosimd(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int bytes, int nrounds) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 +#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX512 + if (chacha_use_avx512vl) { + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8) { + chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl(state, dst, src, bytes, + nrounds); + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + state[12] += 8; + } + if (bytes > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { + chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl(state, dst, src, bytes, + nrounds); + state[12] += chacha_advance(bytes, 8); + return; + } + if (bytes > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) { + chacha_4block_xor_avx512vl(state, dst, src, bytes, + nrounds); + state[12] += chacha_advance(bytes, 4); + return; + } + if (bytes) { + chacha_2block_xor_avx512vl(state, dst, src, bytes, + nrounds); + state[12] += chacha_advance(bytes, 2); + return; + } + } +#endif + if (chacha_use_avx2) { + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8) { + chacha_8block_xor_avx2(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds); + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + state[12] += 8; + } + if (bytes > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { + chacha_8block_xor_avx2(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds); + state[12] += chacha_advance(bytes, 8); + return; + } + if (bytes > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) { + chacha_4block_xor_avx2(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds); + state[12] += chacha_advance(bytes, 4); + return; + } + if (bytes > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { + chacha_2block_xor_avx2(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds); + state[12] += chacha_advance(bytes, 2); + return; + } + } +#endif + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { + chacha_4block_xor_ssse3(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds); + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + state[12] += 4; + } + if (bytes > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { + chacha_4block_xor_ssse3(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds); + state[12] += chacha_advance(bytes, 4); + return; + } + if (bytes) { + chacha_block_xor_ssse3(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds); + state[12]++; + } +} + +static int chacha_simd_stream_xor(struct skcipher_walk *walk, + struct chacha_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) +{ + u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8); + int next_yield = 4096; /* bytes until next FPU yield */ + int err = 0; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN != 16); + state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN); + + crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, iv); + + while (walk->nbytes > 0) { + unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes; + + if (nbytes < walk->total) { + nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk->stride); + next_yield -= nbytes; + } + + chacha_dosimd(state, walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, + nbytes, ctx->nrounds); + + if (next_yield <= 0) { + /* temporarily allow preemption */ + kernel_fpu_end(); + kernel_fpu_begin(); + next_yield = 4096; + } + + err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes - nbytes); + } + + return err; +} + +static int chacha_simd(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + int err; + + if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !irq_fpu_usable()) + return crypto_chacha_crypt(req); + + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); + if (err) + return err; + + kernel_fpu_begin(); + err = chacha_simd_stream_xor(&walk, ctx, req->iv); + kernel_fpu_end(); + return err; +} + +static int xchacha_simd(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + struct chacha_ctx subctx; + u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8); + u8 real_iv[16]; + int err; + + if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !irq_fpu_usable()) + return crypto_xchacha_crypt(req); + + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); + if (err) + return err; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN != 16); + state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN); + crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, req->iv); + + kernel_fpu_begin(); + + hchacha_block_ssse3(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds); + subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds; + + memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8); + memcpy(&real_iv[8], req->iv + 16, 8); + err = chacha_simd_stream_xor(&walk, &subctx, real_iv); + + kernel_fpu_end(); + + return err; +} + +static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = { + { + .base.cra_name = "chacha20", + .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-simd", + .base.cra_priority = 300, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, + .encrypt = chacha_simd, + .decrypt = chacha_simd, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "xchacha20", + .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha20-simd", + .base.cra_priority = 300, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, + .encrypt = xchacha_simd, + .decrypt = xchacha_simd, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "xchacha12", + .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha12-simd", + .base.cra_priority = 300, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha12_setkey, + .encrypt = xchacha_simd, + .decrypt = xchacha_simd, + }, +}; + +static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3)) + return -ENODEV; + +#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 + chacha_use_avx2 = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) && + cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM, NULL); +#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX512 + chacha_use_avx512vl = chacha_use_avx2 && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL) && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW); /* kmovq */ +#endif +#endif + return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)); +} + +static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)); +} + +module_init(chacha_simd_mod_init); +module_exit(chacha_simd_mod_fini); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers (x64 SIMD accelerated)"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-simd"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20-simd"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12-simd"); diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f7946ea1b704 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * NH - ε-almost-universal hash function, x86_64 AVX2 accelerated + * + * Copyright 2018 Google LLC + * + * Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +#define PASS0_SUMS %ymm0 +#define PASS1_SUMS %ymm1 +#define PASS2_SUMS %ymm2 +#define PASS3_SUMS %ymm3 +#define K0 %ymm4 +#define K0_XMM %xmm4 +#define K1 %ymm5 +#define K1_XMM %xmm5 +#define K2 %ymm6 +#define K2_XMM %xmm6 +#define K3 %ymm7 +#define K3_XMM %xmm7 +#define T0 %ymm8 +#define T1 %ymm9 +#define T2 %ymm10 +#define T2_XMM %xmm10 +#define T3 %ymm11 +#define T3_XMM %xmm11 +#define T4 %ymm12 +#define T5 %ymm13 +#define T6 %ymm14 +#define T7 %ymm15 +#define KEY %rdi +#define MESSAGE %rsi +#define MESSAGE_LEN %rdx +#define HASH %rcx + +.macro _nh_2xstride k0, k1, k2, k3 + + // Add message words to key words + vpaddd \k0, T3, T0 + vpaddd \k1, T3, T1 + vpaddd \k2, T3, T2 + vpaddd \k3, T3, T3 + + // Multiply 32x32 => 64 and accumulate + vpshufd $0x10, T0, T4 + vpshufd $0x32, T0, T0 + vpshufd $0x10, T1, T5 + vpshufd $0x32, T1, T1 + vpshufd $0x10, T2, T6 + vpshufd $0x32, T2, T2 + vpshufd $0x10, T3, T7 + vpshufd $0x32, T3, T3 + vpmuludq T4, T0, T0 + vpmuludq T5, T1, T1 + vpmuludq T6, T2, T2 + vpmuludq T7, T3, T3 + vpaddq T0, PASS0_SUMS, PASS0_SUMS + vpaddq T1, PASS1_SUMS, PASS1_SUMS + vpaddq T2, PASS2_SUMS, PASS2_SUMS + vpaddq T3, PASS3_SUMS, PASS3_SUMS +.endm + +/* + * void nh_avx2(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + * u8 hash[NH_HASH_BYTES]) + * + * It's guaranteed that message_len % 16 == 0. + */ +ENTRY(nh_avx2) + + vmovdqu 0x00(KEY), K0 + vmovdqu 0x10(KEY), K1 + add $0x20, KEY + vpxor PASS0_SUMS, PASS0_SUMS, PASS0_SUMS + vpxor PASS1_SUMS, PASS1_SUMS, PASS1_SUMS + vpxor PASS2_SUMS, PASS2_SUMS, PASS2_SUMS + vpxor PASS3_SUMS, PASS3_SUMS, PASS3_SUMS + + sub $0x40, MESSAGE_LEN + jl .Lloop4_done +.Lloop4: + vmovdqu (MESSAGE), T3 + vmovdqu 0x00(KEY), K2 + vmovdqu 0x10(KEY), K3 + _nh_2xstride K0, K1, K2, K3 + + vmovdqu 0x20(MESSAGE), T3 + vmovdqu 0x20(KEY), K0 + vmovdqu 0x30(KEY), K1 + _nh_2xstride K2, K3, K0, K1 + + add $0x40, MESSAGE + add $0x40, KEY + sub $0x40, MESSAGE_LEN + jge .Lloop4 + +.Lloop4_done: + and $0x3f, MESSAGE_LEN + jz .Ldone + + cmp $0x20, MESSAGE_LEN + jl .Llast + + // 2 or 3 strides remain; do 2 more. + vmovdqu (MESSAGE), T3 + vmovdqu 0x00(KEY), K2 + vmovdqu 0x10(KEY), K3 + _nh_2xstride K0, K1, K2, K3 + add $0x20, MESSAGE + add $0x20, KEY + sub $0x20, MESSAGE_LEN + jz .Ldone + vmovdqa K2, K0 + vmovdqa K3, K1 +.Llast: + // Last stride. Zero the high 128 bits of the message and keys so they + // don't affect the result when processing them like 2 strides. + vmovdqu (MESSAGE), T3_XMM + vmovdqa K0_XMM, K0_XMM + vmovdqa K1_XMM, K1_XMM + vmovdqu 0x00(KEY), K2_XMM + vmovdqu 0x10(KEY), K3_XMM + _nh_2xstride K0, K1, K2, K3 + +.Ldone: + // Sum the accumulators for each pass, then store the sums to 'hash' + + // PASS0_SUMS is (0A 0B 0C 0D) + // PASS1_SUMS is (1A 1B 1C 1D) + // PASS2_SUMS is (2A 2B 2C 2D) + // PASS3_SUMS is (3A 3B 3C 3D) + // We need the horizontal sums: + // (0A + 0B + 0C + 0D, + // 1A + 1B + 1C + 1D, + // 2A + 2B + 2C + 2D, + // 3A + 3B + 3C + 3D) + // + + vpunpcklqdq PASS1_SUMS, PASS0_SUMS, T0 // T0 = (0A 1A 0C 1C) + vpunpckhqdq PASS1_SUMS, PASS0_SUMS, T1 // T1 = (0B 1B 0D 1D) + vpunpcklqdq PASS3_SUMS, PASS2_SUMS, T2 // T2 = (2A 3A 2C 3C) + vpunpckhqdq PASS3_SUMS, PASS2_SUMS, T3 // T3 = (2B 3B 2D 3D) + + vinserti128 $0x1, T2_XMM, T0, T4 // T4 = (0A 1A 2A 3A) + vinserti128 $0x1, T3_XMM, T1, T5 // T5 = (0B 1B 2B 3B) + vperm2i128 $0x31, T2, T0, T0 // T0 = (0C 1C 2C 3C) + vperm2i128 $0x31, T3, T1, T1 // T1 = (0D 1D 2D 3D) + + vpaddq T5, T4, T4 + vpaddq T1, T0, T0 + vpaddq T4, T0, T0 + vmovdqu T0, (HASH) + ret +ENDPROC(nh_avx2) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/nh-sse2-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/nh-sse2-x86_64.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..51f52d4ab4bb --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/nh-sse2-x86_64.S @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * NH - ε-almost-universal hash function, x86_64 SSE2 accelerated + * + * Copyright 2018 Google LLC + * + * Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +#define PASS0_SUMS %xmm0 +#define PASS1_SUMS %xmm1 +#define PASS2_SUMS %xmm2 +#define PASS3_SUMS %xmm3 +#define K0 %xmm4 +#define K1 %xmm5 +#define K2 %xmm6 +#define K3 %xmm7 +#define T0 %xmm8 +#define T1 %xmm9 +#define T2 %xmm10 +#define T3 %xmm11 +#define T4 %xmm12 +#define T5 %xmm13 +#define T6 %xmm14 +#define T7 %xmm15 +#define KEY %rdi +#define MESSAGE %rsi +#define MESSAGE_LEN %rdx +#define HASH %rcx + +.macro _nh_stride k0, k1, k2, k3, offset + + // Load next message stride + movdqu \offset(MESSAGE), T1 + + // Load next key stride + movdqu \offset(KEY), \k3 + + // Add message words to key words + movdqa T1, T2 + movdqa T1, T3 + paddd T1, \k0 // reuse k0 to avoid a move + paddd \k1, T1 + paddd \k2, T2 + paddd \k3, T3 + + // Multiply 32x32 => 64 and accumulate + pshufd $0x10, \k0, T4 + pshufd $0x32, \k0, \k0 + pshufd $0x10, T1, T5 + pshufd $0x32, T1, T1 + pshufd $0x10, T2, T6 + pshufd $0x32, T2, T2 + pshufd $0x10, T3, T7 + pshufd $0x32, T3, T3 + pmuludq T4, \k0 + pmuludq T5, T1 + pmuludq T6, T2 + pmuludq T7, T3 + paddq \k0, PASS0_SUMS + paddq T1, PASS1_SUMS + paddq T2, PASS2_SUMS + paddq T3, PASS3_SUMS +.endm + +/* + * void nh_sse2(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + * u8 hash[NH_HASH_BYTES]) + * + * It's guaranteed that message_len % 16 == 0. + */ +ENTRY(nh_sse2) + + movdqu 0x00(KEY), K0 + movdqu 0x10(KEY), K1 + movdqu 0x20(KEY), K2 + add $0x30, KEY + pxor PASS0_SUMS, PASS0_SUMS + pxor PASS1_SUMS, PASS1_SUMS + pxor PASS2_SUMS, PASS2_SUMS + pxor PASS3_SUMS, PASS3_SUMS + + sub $0x40, MESSAGE_LEN + jl .Lloop4_done +.Lloop4: + _nh_stride K0, K1, K2, K3, 0x00 + _nh_stride K1, K2, K3, K0, 0x10 + _nh_stride K2, K3, K0, K1, 0x20 + _nh_stride K3, K0, K1, K2, 0x30 + add $0x40, KEY + add $0x40, MESSAGE + sub $0x40, MESSAGE_LEN + jge .Lloop4 + +.Lloop4_done: + and $0x3f, MESSAGE_LEN + jz .Ldone + _nh_stride K0, K1, K2, K3, 0x00 + + sub $0x10, MESSAGE_LEN + jz .Ldone + _nh_stride K1, K2, K3, K0, 0x10 + + sub $0x10, MESSAGE_LEN + jz .Ldone + _nh_stride K2, K3, K0, K1, 0x20 + +.Ldone: + // Sum the accumulators for each pass, then store the sums to 'hash' + movdqa PASS0_SUMS, T0 + movdqa PASS2_SUMS, T1 + punpcklqdq PASS1_SUMS, T0 // => (PASS0_SUM_A PASS1_SUM_A) + punpcklqdq PASS3_SUMS, T1 // => (PASS2_SUM_A PASS3_SUM_A) + punpckhqdq PASS1_SUMS, PASS0_SUMS // => (PASS0_SUM_B PASS1_SUM_B) + punpckhqdq PASS3_SUMS, PASS2_SUMS // => (PASS2_SUM_B PASS3_SUM_B) + paddq PASS0_SUMS, T0 + paddq PASS2_SUMS, T1 + movdqu T0, 0x00(HASH) + movdqu T1, 0x10(HASH) + ret +ENDPROC(nh_sse2) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/nhpoly1305-avx2-glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/nhpoly1305-avx2-glue.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..20d815ea4b6a --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/nhpoly1305-avx2-glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * NHPoly1305 - ε-almost-∆-universal hash function for Adiantum + * (AVX2 accelerated version) + * + * Copyright 2018 Google LLC + */ + +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <crypto/nhpoly1305.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <asm/fpu/api.h> + +asmlinkage void nh_avx2(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + u8 hash[NH_HASH_BYTES]); + +/* wrapper to avoid indirect call to assembly, which doesn't work with CFI */ +static void _nh_avx2(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + __le64 hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]) +{ + nh_avx2(key, message, message_len, (u8 *)hash); +} + +static int nhpoly1305_avx2_update(struct shash_desc *desc, + const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen) +{ + if (srclen < 64 || !irq_fpu_usable()) + return crypto_nhpoly1305_update(desc, src, srclen); + + do { + unsigned int n = min_t(unsigned int, srclen, PAGE_SIZE); + + kernel_fpu_begin(); + crypto_nhpoly1305_update_helper(desc, src, n, _nh_avx2); + kernel_fpu_end(); + src += n; + srclen -= n; + } while (srclen); + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg nhpoly1305_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "nhpoly1305", + .base.cra_driver_name = "nhpoly1305-avx2", + .base.cra_priority = 300, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct nhpoly1305_key), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .digestsize = POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = crypto_nhpoly1305_init, + .update = nhpoly1305_avx2_update, + .final = crypto_nhpoly1305_final, + .setkey = crypto_nhpoly1305_setkey, + .descsize = sizeof(struct nhpoly1305_state), +}; + +static int __init nhpoly1305_mod_init(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) || + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE)) + return -ENODEV; + + return crypto_register_shash(&nhpoly1305_alg); +} + +static void __exit nhpoly1305_mod_exit(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&nhpoly1305_alg); +} + +module_init(nhpoly1305_mod_init); +module_exit(nhpoly1305_mod_exit); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NHPoly1305 ε-almost-∆-universal hash function (AVX2-accelerated)"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("nhpoly1305"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("nhpoly1305-avx2"); diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/nhpoly1305-sse2-glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/nhpoly1305-sse2-glue.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ed68d164ce14 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/nhpoly1305-sse2-glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * NHPoly1305 - ε-almost-∆-universal hash function for Adiantum + * (SSE2 accelerated version) + * + * Copyright 2018 Google LLC + */ + +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <crypto/nhpoly1305.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <asm/fpu/api.h> + +asmlinkage void nh_sse2(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + u8 hash[NH_HASH_BYTES]); + +/* wrapper to avoid indirect call to assembly, which doesn't work with CFI */ +static void _nh_sse2(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + __le64 hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]) +{ + nh_sse2(key, message, message_len, (u8 *)hash); +} + +static int nhpoly1305_sse2_update(struct shash_desc *desc, + const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen) +{ + if (srclen < 64 || !irq_fpu_usable()) + return crypto_nhpoly1305_update(desc, src, srclen); + + do { + unsigned int n = min_t(unsigned int, srclen, PAGE_SIZE); + + kernel_fpu_begin(); + crypto_nhpoly1305_update_helper(desc, src, n, _nh_sse2); + kernel_fpu_end(); + src += n; + srclen -= n; + } while (srclen); + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg nhpoly1305_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "nhpoly1305", + .base.cra_driver_name = "nhpoly1305-sse2", + .base.cra_priority = 200, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct nhpoly1305_key), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .digestsize = POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = crypto_nhpoly1305_init, + .update = nhpoly1305_sse2_update, + .final = crypto_nhpoly1305_final, + .setkey = crypto_nhpoly1305_setkey, + .descsize = sizeof(struct nhpoly1305_state), +}; + +static int __init nhpoly1305_mod_init(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) + return -ENODEV; + + return crypto_register_shash(&nhpoly1305_alg); +} + +static void __exit nhpoly1305_mod_exit(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&nhpoly1305_alg); +} + +module_init(nhpoly1305_mod_init); +module_exit(nhpoly1305_mod_exit); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NHPoly1305 ε-almost-∆-universal hash function (SSE2-accelerated)"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("nhpoly1305"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("nhpoly1305-sse2"); diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c index f012b7e28ad1..88cc01506c84 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c @@ -83,35 +83,37 @@ static unsigned int poly1305_simd_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, if (poly1305_use_avx2 && srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { if (unlikely(!sctx->wset)) { if (!sctx->uset) { - memcpy(sctx->u, dctx->r, sizeof(sctx->u)); - poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u, dctx->r); + memcpy(sctx->u, dctx->r.r, sizeof(sctx->u)); + poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u, dctx->r.r); sctx->uset = true; } memcpy(sctx->u + 5, sctx->u, sizeof(sctx->u)); - poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u + 5, dctx->r); + poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u + 5, dctx->r.r); memcpy(sctx->u + 10, sctx->u + 5, sizeof(sctx->u)); - poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u + 10, dctx->r); + poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u + 10, dctx->r.r); sctx->wset = true; } blocks = srclen / (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4); - poly1305_4block_avx2(dctx->h, src, dctx->r, blocks, sctx->u); + poly1305_4block_avx2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r.r, blocks, + sctx->u); src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 * blocks; srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 * blocks; } #endif if (likely(srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2)) { if (unlikely(!sctx->uset)) { - memcpy(sctx->u, dctx->r, sizeof(sctx->u)); - poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u, dctx->r); + memcpy(sctx->u, dctx->r.r, sizeof(sctx->u)); + poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u, dctx->r.r); sctx->uset = true; } blocks = srclen / (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2); - poly1305_2block_sse2(dctx->h, src, dctx->r, blocks, sctx->u); + poly1305_2block_sse2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r.r, blocks, + sctx->u); src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2 * blocks; srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2 * blocks; } if (srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) { - poly1305_block_sse2(dctx->h, src, dctx->r, 1); + poly1305_block_sse2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r.r, 1); srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; } return srclen; diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c index d78bcc03e60e..d9d81ad7a400 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size) * sig_on_uaccess_err, this could go away. */ - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (void __user *)ptr, size)) { + if (!access_ok((void __user *)ptr, size)) { struct thread_struct *thread = ¤t->thread; thread->error_code = X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_WRITE; diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c index 8e02b30cf08e..f65b78d32f5e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c @@ -176,10 +176,10 @@ static int aout_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm) /* make sure we actually have a data and stack area to dump */ set_fs(USER_DS); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (void *) (unsigned long)START_DATA(dump), + if (!access_ok((void *) (unsigned long)START_DATA(dump), dump.u_dsize << PAGE_SHIFT)) dump.u_dsize = 0; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (void *) (unsigned long)START_STACK(dump), + if (!access_ok((void *) (unsigned long)START_STACK(dump), dump.u_ssize << PAGE_SHIFT)) dump.u_ssize = 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c index 86b1341cba9a..321fe5f5d0e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_sigreturn(void) struct sigframe_ia32 __user *frame = (struct sigframe_ia32 __user *)(regs->sp-8); sigset_t set; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) goto badframe; if (__get_user(set.sig[0], &frame->sc.oldmask) || (_COMPAT_NSIG_WORDS > 1 @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_rt_sigreturn(void) frame = (struct rt_sigframe_ia32 __user *)(regs->sp - 4); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) goto badframe; if (__copy_from_user(&set, &frame->uc.uc_sigmask, sizeof(set))) goto badframe; @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ int ia32_setup_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig, frame = get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sizeof(*frame), &fpstate); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) return -EFAULT; if (__put_user(sig, &frame->sig)) @@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig, frame = get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sizeof(*frame), &fpstate); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) return -EFAULT; put_user_try { diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c b/arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c index 11ef7b7c9cc8..a43212036257 100644 --- a/arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static int cp_stat64(struct stat64 __user *ubuf, struct kstat *stat) typeof(ubuf->st_gid) gid = 0; SET_UID(uid, from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), stat->uid)); SET_GID(gid, from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), stat->gid)); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ubuf, sizeof(struct stat64)) || + if (!access_ok(ubuf, sizeof(struct stat64)) || __put_user(huge_encode_dev(stat->dev), &ubuf->st_dev) || __put_user(stat->ino, &ubuf->__st_ino) || __put_user(stat->ino, &ubuf->st_ino) || diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/checksum_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/checksum_32.h index 7a659c74cd03..f57b94e02c57 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/checksum_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/checksum_32.h @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static inline __wsum csum_and_copy_to_user(const void *src, __wsum ret; might_sleep(); - if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dst, len)) { + if (access_ok(dst, len)) { stac(); ret = csum_partial_copy_generic(src, (__force void *)dst, len, sum, NULL, err_ptr); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h index b3ec519e3982..4fe9e7fc74d3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ void sync_initial_page_table(void); /* * Define this if things work differently on an i386 and an i486: * it will (on an i486) warn about kernel memory accesses that are - * done without a 'access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE,..)' + * done without a 'access_ok( ..)' */ #undef TEST_ACCESS_OK diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 071b2a6fff85..33051436c864 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ static inline uint32_t hypervisor_cpuid_base(const char *sig, uint32_t leaves) } extern unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp); -extern void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigned long begin, unsigned long end); +void free_init_pages(const char *what, unsigned long begin, unsigned long end); extern void free_kernel_image_pages(void *begin, void *end); void default_idle(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index b5e58cc0c5e7..3920f456db79 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -77,9 +77,6 @@ static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, un /** * access_ok: - Checks if a user space pointer is valid - * @type: Type of access: %VERIFY_READ or %VERIFY_WRITE. Note that - * %VERIFY_WRITE is a superset of %VERIFY_READ - if it is safe - * to write to a block, it is always safe to read from it. * @addr: User space pointer to start of block to check * @size: Size of block to check * @@ -95,7 +92,7 @@ static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, un * checks that the pointer is in the user space range - after calling * this function, memory access functions may still return -EFAULT. */ -#define access_ok(type, addr, size) \ +#define access_ok(addr, size) \ ({ \ WARN_ON_IN_IRQ(); \ likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, user_addr_max())); \ @@ -670,7 +667,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void) #define user_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(uval, ptr, old, new) \ ({ \ - access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr))) ? \ + access_ok((ptr), sizeof(*(ptr))) ? \ __user_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic((uval), (ptr), \ (old), (new), sizeof(*(ptr))) : \ -EFAULT; \ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 8824d01c0c35..eb51b0e1189c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -150,3 +150,7 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y) obj-$(CONFIG_MMCONF_FAM10H) += mmconf-fam10h_64.o obj-y += vsmp_64.o endif + +ifdef CONFIG_EFI +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima_arch.o +endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c index 3f9d1b4019bb..e0ff3ac8c127 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c @@ -50,8 +50,6 @@ static unsigned long iommu_pages; /* .. and in pages */ static u32 *iommu_gatt_base; /* Remapping table */ -static dma_addr_t bad_dma_addr; - /* * If this is disabled the IOMMU will use an optimized flushing strategy * of only flushing when an mapping is reused. With it true the GART is @@ -74,8 +72,6 @@ static u32 gart_unmapped_entry; (((x) & 0xfffff000) | (((x) >> 32) << 4) | GPTE_VALID | GPTE_COHERENT) #define GPTE_DECODE(x) (((x) & 0xfffff000) | (((u64)(x) & 0xff0) << 28)) -#define EMERGENCY_PAGES 32 /* = 128KB */ - #ifdef CONFIG_AGP #define AGPEXTERN extern #else @@ -155,9 +151,6 @@ static void flush_gart(void) #ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_LEAK /* Debugging aid for drivers that don't free their IOMMU tables */ -static int leak_trace; -static int iommu_leak_pages = 20; - static void dump_leak(void) { static int dump; @@ -184,14 +177,6 @@ static void iommu_full(struct device *dev, size_t size, int dir) */ dev_err(dev, "PCI-DMA: Out of IOMMU space for %lu bytes\n", size); - - if (size > PAGE_SIZE*EMERGENCY_PAGES) { - if (dir == PCI_DMA_FROMDEVICE || dir == PCI_DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL) - panic("PCI-DMA: Memory would be corrupted\n"); - if (dir == PCI_DMA_TODEVICE || dir == PCI_DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL) - panic(KERN_ERR - "PCI-DMA: Random memory would be DMAed\n"); - } #ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_LEAK dump_leak(); #endif @@ -220,7 +205,7 @@ static dma_addr_t dma_map_area(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t phys_mem, int i; if (unlikely(phys_mem + size > GART_MAX_PHYS_ADDR)) - return bad_dma_addr; + return DMA_MAPPING_ERROR; iommu_page = alloc_iommu(dev, npages, align_mask); if (iommu_page == -1) { @@ -229,7 +214,7 @@ static dma_addr_t dma_map_area(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t phys_mem, if (panic_on_overflow) panic("dma_map_area overflow %lu bytes\n", size); iommu_full(dev, size, dir); - return bad_dma_addr; + return DMA_MAPPING_ERROR; } for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) { @@ -271,7 +256,7 @@ static void gart_unmap_page(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t dma_addr, int npages; int i; - if (dma_addr < iommu_bus_base + EMERGENCY_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE || + if (dma_addr == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR || dma_addr >= iommu_bus_base + iommu_size) return; @@ -315,7 +300,7 @@ static int dma_map_sg_nonforce(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg, if (nonforced_iommu(dev, addr, s->length)) { addr = dma_map_area(dev, addr, s->length, dir, 0); - if (addr == bad_dma_addr) { + if (addr == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR) { if (i > 0) gart_unmap_sg(dev, sg, i, dir, 0); nents = 0; @@ -471,7 +456,7 @@ error: iommu_full(dev, pages << PAGE_SHIFT, dir); for_each_sg(sg, s, nents, i) - s->dma_address = bad_dma_addr; + s->dma_address = DMA_MAPPING_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -490,7 +475,7 @@ gart_alloc_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *dma_addr, *dma_addr = dma_map_area(dev, virt_to_phys(vaddr), size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL, (1UL << get_order(size)) - 1); flush_gart(); - if (unlikely(*dma_addr == bad_dma_addr)) + if (unlikely(*dma_addr == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR)) goto out_free; return vaddr; out_free: @@ -507,11 +492,6 @@ gart_free_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size, void *vaddr, dma_direct_free_pages(dev, size, vaddr, dma_addr, attrs); } -static int gart_mapping_error(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t dma_addr) -{ - return (dma_addr == bad_dma_addr); -} - static int no_agp; static __init unsigned long check_iommu_size(unsigned long aper, u64 aper_size) @@ -695,7 +675,6 @@ static const struct dma_map_ops gart_dma_ops = { .unmap_page = gart_unmap_page, .alloc = gart_alloc_coherent, .free = gart_free_coherent, - .mapping_error = gart_mapping_error, .dma_supported = dma_direct_supported, }; @@ -730,7 +709,6 @@ int __init gart_iommu_init(void) unsigned long aper_base, aper_size; unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn; unsigned long scratch; - long i; if (!amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_GART)) return 0; @@ -774,29 +752,12 @@ int __init gart_iommu_init(void) if (!iommu_gart_bitmap) panic("Cannot allocate iommu bitmap\n"); -#ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_LEAK - if (leak_trace) { - int ret; - - ret = dma_debug_resize_entries(iommu_pages); - if (ret) - pr_debug("PCI-DMA: Cannot trace all the entries\n"); - } -#endif - - /* - * Out of IOMMU space handling. - * Reserve some invalid pages at the beginning of the GART. - */ - bitmap_set(iommu_gart_bitmap, 0, EMERGENCY_PAGES); - pr_info("PCI-DMA: Reserving %luMB of IOMMU area in the AGP aperture\n", iommu_size >> 20); agp_memory_reserved = iommu_size; iommu_start = aper_size - iommu_size; iommu_bus_base = info.aper_base + iommu_start; - bad_dma_addr = iommu_bus_base; iommu_gatt_base = agp_gatt_table + (iommu_start>>PAGE_SHIFT); /* @@ -838,8 +799,6 @@ int __init gart_iommu_init(void) if (!scratch) panic("Cannot allocate iommu scratch page"); gart_unmapped_entry = GPTE_ENCODE(__pa(scratch)); - for (i = EMERGENCY_PAGES; i < iommu_pages; i++) - iommu_gatt_base[i] = gart_unmapped_entry; flush_gart(); dma_ops = &gart_dma_ops; @@ -853,16 +812,6 @@ void __init gart_parse_options(char *p) { int arg; -#ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_LEAK - if (!strncmp(p, "leak", 4)) { - leak_trace = 1; - p += 4; - if (*p == '=') - ++p; - if (isdigit(*p) && get_option(&p, &arg)) - iommu_leak_pages = arg; - } -#endif if (isdigit(*p) && get_option(&p, &arg)) iommu_size = arg; if (!strncmp(p, "fullflush", 9)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c index 2637ff09d6a0..97f9ada9ceda 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c @@ -434,9 +434,10 @@ static ssize_t microcode_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *ppos) { ssize_t ret = -EINVAL; + unsigned long nr_pages = totalram_pages(); - if ((len >> PAGE_SHIFT) > totalram_pages) { - pr_err("too much data (max %ld pages)\n", totalram_pages); + if ((len >> PAGE_SHIFT) > nr_pages) { + pr_err("too much data (max %ld pages)\n", nr_pages); return ret; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c index d99a8ee9e185..f6a1d299627c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size) ia32_fxstate &= (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, size)) + if (!access_ok(buf, size)) return -EACCES; if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU)) @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size) return 0; } - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, size)) + if (!access_ok(buf, size)) return -EACCES; fpu__initialize(fpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c index 7ee8067cbf45..8257a59704ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -733,18 +733,20 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union { } __attribute__((packed)); }; +#define RET_SIZE 1 + static unsigned long create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size) { - unsigned const char *jmp; unsigned long start_offset; unsigned long end_offset; unsigned long op_offset; unsigned long offset; unsigned long size; - unsigned long ip; + unsigned long retq; unsigned long *ptr; void *trampoline; + void *ip; /* 48 8b 15 <offset> is movq <offset>(%rip), %rdx */ unsigned const char op_ref[] = { 0x48, 0x8b, 0x15 }; union ftrace_op_code_union op_ptr; @@ -764,27 +766,27 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size) /* * Allocate enough size to store the ftrace_caller code, - * the jmp to ftrace_epilogue, as well as the address of - * the ftrace_ops this trampoline is used for. + * the iret , as well as the address of the ftrace_ops this + * trampoline is used for. */ - trampoline = alloc_tramp(size + MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE + sizeof(void *)); + trampoline = alloc_tramp(size + RET_SIZE + sizeof(void *)); if (!trampoline) return 0; - *tramp_size = size + MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE + sizeof(void *); + *tramp_size = size + RET_SIZE + sizeof(void *); /* Copy ftrace_caller onto the trampoline memory */ ret = probe_kernel_read(trampoline, (void *)start_offset, size); - if (WARN_ON(ret < 0)) { - tramp_free(trampoline, *tramp_size); - return 0; - } + if (WARN_ON(ret < 0)) + goto fail; - ip = (unsigned long)trampoline + size; + ip = trampoline + size; - /* The trampoline ends with a jmp to ftrace_epilogue */ - jmp = ftrace_jmp_replace(ip, (unsigned long)ftrace_epilogue); - memcpy(trampoline + size, jmp, MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE); + /* The trampoline ends with ret(q) */ + retq = (unsigned long)ftrace_stub; + ret = probe_kernel_read(ip, (void *)retq, RET_SIZE); + if (WARN_ON(ret < 0)) + goto fail; /* * The address of the ftrace_ops that is used for this trampoline @@ -794,17 +796,15 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size) * the global function_trace_op variable. */ - ptr = (unsigned long *)(trampoline + size + MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE); + ptr = (unsigned long *)(trampoline + size + RET_SIZE); *ptr = (unsigned long)ops; op_offset -= start_offset; memcpy(&op_ptr, trampoline + op_offset, OP_REF_SIZE); /* Are we pointing to the reference? */ - if (WARN_ON(memcmp(op_ptr.op, op_ref, 3) != 0)) { - tramp_free(trampoline, *tramp_size); - return 0; - } + if (WARN_ON(memcmp(op_ptr.op, op_ref, 3) != 0)) + goto fail; /* Load the contents of ptr into the callback parameter */ offset = (unsigned long)ptr; @@ -819,6 +819,9 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size) ops->flags |= FTRACE_OPS_FL_ALLOC_TRAMP; return (unsigned long)trampoline; +fail: + tramp_free(trampoline, *tramp_size); + return 0; } static unsigned long calc_trampoline_call_offset(bool save_regs) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S index 91b2cff4b79a..75f2b36b41a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S @@ -171,9 +171,6 @@ GLOBAL(ftrace_call) restore_mcount_regs /* - * The copied trampoline must call ftrace_epilogue as it - * still may need to call the function graph tracer. - * * The code up to this label is copied into trampolines so * think twice before adding any new code or changing the * layout here. @@ -185,7 +182,10 @@ GLOBAL(ftrace_graph_call) jmp ftrace_stub #endif -/* This is weak to keep gas from relaxing the jumps */ +/* + * This is weak to keep gas from relaxing the jumps. + * It is also used to copy the retq for trampolines. + */ WEAK(ftrace_stub) retq ENDPROC(ftrace_caller) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e47cd9390ab4 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation + */ +#include <linux/efi.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> + +extern struct boot_params boot_params; + +static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void) +{ + efi_char16_t efi_SecureBoot_name[] = L"SecureBoot"; + efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; + efi_status_t status; + unsigned long size; + u8 secboot; + + size = sizeof(secboot); + + /* Get variable contents into buffer */ + status = efi.get_variable(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid, + NULL, &size, &secboot); + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) { + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n"); + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + } + + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n"); + return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown; + } + + if (secboot == 0) { + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n"); + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + } + + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n"); + return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled; +} + +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) +{ + static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode; + static bool initialized; + + if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { + sb_mode = boot_params.secure_boot; + + if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset) + sb_mode = get_sb_mode(); + initialized = true; + } + + if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled) + return true; + else + return false; +} + +/* secureboot arch rules */ +static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = { +#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig", +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */ + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK", + NULL +}; + +const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) +{ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) + return sb_arch_rules; + return NULL; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c index 8e36f249646e..5db08425063e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c @@ -422,21 +422,16 @@ static void kgdb_disable_hw_debug(struct pt_regs *regs) #ifdef CONFIG_SMP /** * kgdb_roundup_cpus - Get other CPUs into a holding pattern - * @flags: Current IRQ state * * On SMP systems, we need to get the attention of the other CPUs * and get them be in a known state. This should do what is needed * to get the other CPUs to call kgdb_wait(). Note that on some arches, * the NMI approach is not used for rounding up all the CPUs. For example, - * in case of MIPS, smp_call_function() is used to roundup CPUs. In - * this case, we have to make sure that interrupts are enabled before - * calling smp_call_function(). The argument to this function is - * the flags that will be used when restoring the interrupts. There is - * local_irq_save() call before kgdb_roundup_cpus(). + * in case of MIPS, smp_call_function() is used to roundup CPUs. * * On non-SMP systems, this is not called. */ -void kgdb_roundup_cpus(unsigned long flags) +void kgdb_roundup_cpus(void) { apic->send_IPI_allbutself(APIC_DM_NMI); } @@ -804,7 +799,7 @@ knl_write: (char *)bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); } -struct kgdb_arch arch_kgdb_ops = { +const struct kgdb_arch arch_kgdb_ops = { /* Breakpoint instruction: */ .gdb_bpt_instr = { 0xcc }, .flags = KGDB_HW_BREAKPOINT, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-calgary_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-calgary_64.c index bbfc8b1e9104..c70720f61a34 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-calgary_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-calgary_64.c @@ -51,8 +51,6 @@ #include <asm/x86_init.h> #include <asm/iommu_table.h> -#define CALGARY_MAPPING_ERROR 0 - #ifdef CONFIG_CALGARY_IOMMU_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT int use_calgary __read_mostly = 1; #else @@ -157,8 +155,6 @@ static const unsigned long phb_debug_offsets[] = { #define PHB_DEBUG_STUFF_OFFSET 0x0020 -#define EMERGENCY_PAGES 32 /* = 128KB */ - unsigned int specified_table_size = TCE_TABLE_SIZE_UNSPECIFIED; static int translate_empty_slots __read_mostly = 0; static int calgary_detected __read_mostly = 0; @@ -255,7 +251,7 @@ static unsigned long iommu_range_alloc(struct device *dev, if (panic_on_overflow) panic("Calgary: fix the allocator.\n"); else - return CALGARY_MAPPING_ERROR; + return DMA_MAPPING_ERROR; } } @@ -274,11 +270,10 @@ static dma_addr_t iommu_alloc(struct device *dev, struct iommu_table *tbl, dma_addr_t ret; entry = iommu_range_alloc(dev, tbl, npages); - - if (unlikely(entry == CALGARY_MAPPING_ERROR)) { + if (unlikely(entry == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR)) { pr_warn("failed to allocate %u pages in iommu %p\n", npages, tbl); - return CALGARY_MAPPING_ERROR; + return DMA_MAPPING_ERROR; } /* set the return dma address */ @@ -294,12 +289,10 @@ static void iommu_free(struct iommu_table *tbl, dma_addr_t dma_addr, unsigned int npages) { unsigned long entry; - unsigned long badend; unsigned long flags; /* were we called with bad_dma_address? */ - badend = CALGARY_MAPPING_ERROR + (EMERGENCY_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE); - if (unlikely(dma_addr < badend)) { + if (unlikely(dma_addr == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR)) { WARN(1, KERN_ERR "Calgary: driver tried unmapping bad DMA " "address 0x%Lx\n", dma_addr); return; @@ -383,7 +376,7 @@ static int calgary_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg, npages = iommu_num_pages(vaddr, s->length, PAGE_SIZE); entry = iommu_range_alloc(dev, tbl, npages); - if (entry == CALGARY_MAPPING_ERROR) { + if (entry == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR) { /* makes sure unmap knows to stop */ s->dma_length = 0; goto error; @@ -401,7 +394,7 @@ static int calgary_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg, error: calgary_unmap_sg(dev, sg, nelems, dir, 0); for_each_sg(sg, s, nelems, i) { - sg->dma_address = CALGARY_MAPPING_ERROR; + sg->dma_address = DMA_MAPPING_ERROR; sg->dma_length = 0; } return 0; @@ -454,7 +447,7 @@ static void* calgary_alloc_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size, /* set up tces to cover the allocated range */ mapping = iommu_alloc(dev, tbl, ret, npages, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - if (mapping == CALGARY_MAPPING_ERROR) + if (mapping == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR) goto free; *dma_handle = mapping; return ret; @@ -479,11 +472,6 @@ static void calgary_free_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size, free_pages((unsigned long)vaddr, get_order(size)); } -static int calgary_mapping_error(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t dma_addr) -{ - return dma_addr == CALGARY_MAPPING_ERROR; -} - static const struct dma_map_ops calgary_dma_ops = { .alloc = calgary_alloc_coherent, .free = calgary_free_coherent, @@ -491,7 +479,6 @@ static const struct dma_map_ops calgary_dma_ops = { .unmap_sg = calgary_unmap_sg, .map_page = calgary_map_page, .unmap_page = calgary_unmap_page, - .mapping_error = calgary_mapping_error, .dma_supported = dma_direct_supported, }; @@ -739,9 +726,6 @@ static void __init calgary_reserve_regions(struct pci_dev *dev) u64 start; struct iommu_table *tbl = pci_iommu(dev->bus); - /* reserve EMERGENCY_PAGES from bad_dma_address and up */ - iommu_range_reserve(tbl, CALGARY_MAPPING_ERROR, EMERGENCY_PAGES); - /* avoid the BIOS/VGA first 640KB-1MB region */ /* for CalIOC2 - avoid the entire first MB */ if (is_calgary(dev->device)) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c index f4562fcec681..d460998ae828 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static bool disable_dac_quirk __read_mostly; -const struct dma_map_ops *dma_ops = &dma_direct_ops; +const struct dma_map_ops *dma_ops; EXPORT_SYMBOL(dma_ops); #ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_DEBUG diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c index bd08b9e1c9e2..5f5302028a9a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c @@ -62,10 +62,8 @@ IOMMU_INIT(pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb, void __init pci_swiotlb_init(void) { - if (swiotlb) { + if (swiotlb) swiotlb_init(0); - dma_ops = &swiotlb_dma_ops; - } } void __init pci_swiotlb_late_init(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c index 92a3b312a53c..08dfd4c1a4f9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ __setup_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set, frame = get_sigframe(&ksig->ka, regs, sizeof(*frame), &fpstate); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) return -EFAULT; if (__put_user(sig, &frame->sig)) @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig, frame = get_sigframe(&ksig->ka, regs, sizeof(*frame), &fpstate); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) return -EFAULT; put_user_try { @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig, frame = get_sigframe(&ksig->ka, regs, sizeof(struct rt_sigframe), &fp); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) return -EFAULT; if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO) { @@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ static int x32_setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, frame = get_sigframe(&ksig->ka, regs, sizeof(*frame), &fpstate); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) return -EFAULT; if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO) { @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sigreturn) frame = (struct sigframe __user *)(regs->sp - 8); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) goto badframe; if (__get_user(set.sig[0], &frame->sc.oldmask) || (_NSIG_WORDS > 1 && __copy_from_user(&set.sig[1], &frame->extramask, @@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn) unsigned long uc_flags; frame = (struct rt_sigframe __user *)(regs->sp - sizeof(long)); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) goto badframe; if (__copy_from_user(&set, &frame->uc.uc_sigmask, sizeof(set))) goto badframe; @@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_x32_rt_sigreturn(void) frame = (struct rt_sigframe_x32 __user *)(regs->sp - 8); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) goto badframe; if (__copy_from_user(&set, &frame->uc.uc_sigmask, sizeof(set))) goto badframe; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c index 7627455047c2..5c2d71a1dc06 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ copy_stack_frame(const void __user *fp, struct stack_frame_user *frame) { int ret; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, fp, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(fp, sizeof(*frame))) return 0; ret = 1; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c index a2486f444073..6e5ef8fb8a02 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ * */ -#include <linux/dma_remapping.h> +#include <linux/intel-iommu.h> #include <linux/init_task.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/export.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c index c2fd39752da8..a092b6b40c6b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval) set_flags(regs->pt.flags, VEFLAGS, X86_EFLAGS_VIF | vm86->veflags_mask); user = vm86->user_vm86; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, user, vm86->vm86plus.is_vm86pus ? + if (!access_ok(user, vm86->vm86plus.is_vm86pus ? sizeof(struct vm86plus_struct) : sizeof(struct vm86_struct))) { pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86 info\n"); @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86, bool plus) if (vm86->saved_sp0) return -EPERM; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, user_vm86, plus ? + if (!access_ok(user_vm86, plus ? sizeof(struct vm86_struct) : sizeof(struct vm86plus_struct))) return -EFAULT; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig index 1bbec387d289..72fa955f4a15 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig @@ -98,6 +98,6 @@ config KVM_MMU_AUDIT # OK, it's a little counter-intuitive to do this, but it puts it neatly under # the virtualization menu. -source drivers/vhost/Kconfig +source "drivers/vhost/Kconfig" endif # VIRTUALIZATION diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/csum-wrappers_64.c b/arch/x86/lib/csum-wrappers_64.c index 8bd53589ecfb..a6a2b7dccbff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/csum-wrappers_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/csum-wrappers_64.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ csum_partial_copy_from_user(const void __user *src, void *dst, might_sleep(); *errp = 0; - if (!likely(access_ok(VERIFY_READ, src, len))) + if (!likely(access_ok(src, len))) goto out_err; /* @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ csum_partial_copy_to_user(const void *src, void __user *dst, might_sleep(); - if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dst, len))) { + if (unlikely(!access_ok(dst, len))) { *errp = -EFAULT; return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c index 71fb58d44d58..bfd94e7812fc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ unsigned long clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n) { might_fault(); - if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) + if (access_ok(to, n)) __do_clear_user(to, n); return n; } diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c index 1bd837cdc4b1..ee42bb0cbeb3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user); unsigned long clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n) { - if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) + if (access_ok(to, n)) return __clear_user(to, n); return n; } diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/fpu_system.h b/arch/x86/math-emu/fpu_system.h index c8b1b31ed7c4..f98a0c956764 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/fpu_system.h +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/fpu_system.h @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static inline bool seg_writable(struct desc_struct *d) #define instruction_address (*(struct address *)&I387->soft.fip) #define operand_address (*(struct address *)&I387->soft.foo) -#define FPU_access_ok(x,y,z) if ( !access_ok(x,y,z) ) \ +#define FPU_access_ok(y,z) if ( !access_ok(y,z) ) \ math_abort(FPU_info,SIGSEGV) #define FPU_abort math_abort(FPU_info, SIGSEGV) @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static inline bool seg_writable(struct desc_struct *d) /* A simpler test than access_ok() can probably be done for FPU_code_access_ok() because the only possible error is to step past the upper boundary of a legal code area. */ -#define FPU_code_access_ok(z) FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ,(void __user *)FPU_EIP,z) +#define FPU_code_access_ok(z) FPU_access_ok((void __user *)FPU_EIP,z) #endif #define FPU_get_user(x,y) get_user((x),(y)) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/load_store.c b/arch/x86/math-emu/load_store.c index f821a9cd7753..f15263e158e8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/load_store.c +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/load_store.c @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ int FPU_load_store(u_char type, fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, break; case 024: /* fldcw */ RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, data_address, 2); + FPU_access_ok(data_address, 2); FPU_get_user(control_word, (unsigned short __user *)data_address); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ int FPU_load_store(u_char type, fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, break; case 034: /* fstcw m16int */ RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, data_address, 2); + FPU_access_ok(data_address, 2); FPU_put_user(control_word, (unsigned short __user *)data_address); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ int FPU_load_store(u_char type, fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, break; case 036: /* fstsw m2byte */ RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, data_address, 2); + FPU_access_ok(data_address, 2); FPU_put_user(status_word(), (unsigned short __user *)data_address); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_ld_str.c b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_ld_str.c index d40ff45497b9..f3779743d15e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_ld_str.c +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_ld_str.c @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ int FPU_load_extended(long double __user *s, int stnr) FPU_REG *sti_ptr = &st(stnr); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, s, 10); + FPU_access_ok(s, 10); __copy_from_user(sti_ptr, s, 10); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int FPU_load_double(double __user *dfloat, FPU_REG *loaded_data) unsigned m64, l64; RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, dfloat, 8); + FPU_access_ok(dfloat, 8); FPU_get_user(m64, 1 + (unsigned long __user *)dfloat); FPU_get_user(l64, (unsigned long __user *)dfloat); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int FPU_load_single(float __user *single, FPU_REG *loaded_data) int exp, tag, negative; RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, single, 4); + FPU_access_ok(single, 4); FPU_get_user(m32, (unsigned long __user *)single); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ int FPU_load_int64(long long __user *_s) FPU_REG *st0_ptr = &st(0); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, _s, 8); + FPU_access_ok(_s, 8); if (copy_from_user(&s, _s, 8)) FPU_abort; RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ int FPU_load_int32(long __user *_s, FPU_REG *loaded_data) int negative; RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, _s, 4); + FPU_access_ok(_s, 4); FPU_get_user(s, _s); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ int FPU_load_int16(short __user *_s, FPU_REG *loaded_data) int s, negative; RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, _s, 2); + FPU_access_ok(_s, 2); /* Cast as short to get the sign extended. */ FPU_get_user(s, _s); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ int FPU_load_bcd(u_char __user *s) int sign; RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, s, 10); + FPU_access_ok(s, 10); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; for (pos = 8; pos >= 0; pos--) { l *= 10; @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ int FPU_store_extended(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, if (st0_tag != TAG_Empty) { RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d, 10); + FPU_access_ok(d, 10); FPU_put_user(st0_ptr->sigl, (unsigned long __user *)d); FPU_put_user(st0_ptr->sigh, @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ int FPU_store_extended(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, /* The masked response */ /* Put out the QNaN indefinite */ RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d, 10); + FPU_access_ok(d, 10); FPU_put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *)d); FPU_put_user(0xc0000000, 1 + (unsigned long __user *)d); FPU_put_user(0xffff, 4 + (short __user *)d); @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ denormal_arg: /* The masked response */ /* Put out the QNaN indefinite */ RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dfloat, 8); + FPU_access_ok(dfloat, 8); FPU_put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *)dfloat); FPU_put_user(0xfff80000, 1 + (unsigned long __user *)dfloat); @@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ denormal_arg: l[1] |= 0x80000000; RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dfloat, 8); + FPU_access_ok(dfloat, 8); FPU_put_user(l[0], (unsigned long __user *)dfloat); FPU_put_user(l[1], 1 + (unsigned long __user *)dfloat); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ int FPU_store_single(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, float __user *single) /* The masked response */ /* Put out the QNaN indefinite */ RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, single, 4); + FPU_access_ok(single, 4); FPU_put_user(0xffc00000, (unsigned long __user *)single); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ int FPU_store_single(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, float __user *single) templ |= 0x80000000; RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, single, 4); + FPU_access_ok(single, 4); FPU_put_user(templ, (unsigned long __user *)single); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ int FPU_store_int64(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, long long __user *d) } RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d, 8); + FPU_access_ok(d, 8); if (copy_to_user(d, &tll, 8)) FPU_abort; RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ int FPU_store_int32(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, long __user *d) } RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d, 4); + FPU_access_ok(d, 4); FPU_put_user(t.sigl, (unsigned long __user *)d); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ int FPU_store_int16(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, short __user *d) } RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d, 2); + FPU_access_ok(d, 2); FPU_put_user((short)t.sigl, d); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; @@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ int FPU_store_bcd(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, u_char __user *d) if (control_word & CW_Invalid) { /* Produce the QNaN "indefinite" */ RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d, 10); + FPU_access_ok(d, 10); for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) FPU_put_user(0, d + i); /* These bytes "undefined" */ FPU_put_user(0xc0, d + 7); /* This byte "undefined" */ @@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ int FPU_store_bcd(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, u_char __user *d) } RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d, 10); + FPU_access_ok(d, 10); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON; for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) { b = FPU_div_small(&ll, 10); @@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ u_char __user *fldenv(fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, u_char __user *s) ((addr_modes.default_mode == PM16) ^ (addr_modes.override.operand_size == OP_SIZE_PREFIX))) { RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, s, 0x0e); + FPU_access_ok(s, 0x0e); FPU_get_user(control_word, (unsigned short __user *)s); FPU_get_user(partial_status, (unsigned short __user *)(s + 2)); FPU_get_user(tag_word, (unsigned short __user *)(s + 4)); @@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ u_char __user *fldenv(fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, u_char __user *s) } } else { RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, s, 0x1c); + FPU_access_ok(s, 0x1c); FPU_get_user(control_word, (unsigned short __user *)s); FPU_get_user(partial_status, (unsigned short __user *)(s + 4)); FPU_get_user(tag_word, (unsigned short __user *)(s + 8)); @@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ void frstor(fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, u_char __user *data_address) /* Copy all registers in stack order. */ RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, s, 80); + FPU_access_ok(s, 80); __copy_from_user(register_base + offset, s, other); if (offset) __copy_from_user(register_base, s + other, offset); @@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ u_char __user *fstenv(fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, u_char __user *d) ((addr_modes.default_mode == PM16) ^ (addr_modes.override.operand_size == OP_SIZE_PREFIX))) { RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d, 14); + FPU_access_ok(d, 14); #ifdef PECULIAR_486 FPU_put_user(control_word & ~0xe080, (unsigned long __user *)d); #else @@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ u_char __user *fstenv(fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, u_char __user *d) d += 0x0e; } else { RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d, 7 * 4); + FPU_access_ok(d, 7 * 4); #ifdef PECULIAR_486 control_word &= ~0xe080; /* An 80486 sets nearly all of the reserved bits to 1. */ @@ -1204,7 +1204,7 @@ void fsave(fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, u_char __user *data_address) d = fstenv(addr_modes, data_address); RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF; - FPU_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d, 80); + FPU_access_ok(d, 80); /* Copy all registers in stack order. */ if (__copy_to_user(d, register_base + offset, other)) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c index abcb8d00b014..e3cdc85ce5b6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ static void walk_pte_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pmd_t addr, /* * This is an optimization for KASAN=y case. Since all kasan page tables - * eventually point to the kasan_zero_page we could call note_page() + * eventually point to the kasan_early_shadow_page we could call note_page() * right away without walking through lower level page tables. This saves * us dozens of seconds (minutes for 5-level config) while checking for * W+X mapping or reading kernel_page_tables debugfs file. @@ -385,10 +385,11 @@ static void walk_pte_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pmd_t addr, static inline bool kasan_page_table(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, void *pt) { - if (__pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_pmd) || - (pgtable_l5_enabled() && __pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_p4d)) || - __pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_pud)) { - pgprotval_t prot = pte_flags(kasan_zero_pte[0]); + if (__pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_early_shadow_pmd) || + (pgtable_l5_enabled() && + __pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_early_shadow_p4d)) || + __pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_early_shadow_pud)) { + pgprotval_t prot = pte_flags(kasan_early_shadow_pte[0]); note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 0, 5); return true; } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c index 427a955a2cf2..f905a2371080 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c @@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pagenr) return 1; } -void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigned long begin, unsigned long end) +void free_init_pages(const char *what, unsigned long begin, unsigned long end) { unsigned long begin_aligned, end_aligned; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c index 49ecf5ecf6d3..85c94f9a87f8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c @@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size, struct vmem_altmap *altmap, } #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE -int arch_remove_memory(u64 start, u64 size, struct vmem_altmap *altmap) +int arch_remove_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size, struct vmem_altmap *altmap) { unsigned long start_pfn = start >> PAGE_SHIFT; unsigned long nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c index 484c1b92f078..bccff68e3267 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c @@ -1141,7 +1141,8 @@ kernel_physical_mapping_remove(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) remove_pagetable(start, end, true, NULL); } -int __ref arch_remove_memory(u64 start, u64 size, struct vmem_altmap *altmap) +int __ref arch_remove_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size, + struct vmem_altmap *altmap) { unsigned long start_pfn = start >> PAGE_SHIFT; unsigned long nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c index 04a9cf6b034f..462fde83b515 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c @@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ static void __init kasan_early_p4d_populate(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long next; if (pgd_none(*pgd)) { - pgd_entry = __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_p4d)); + pgd_entry = __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | + __pa_nodebug(kasan_early_shadow_p4d)); set_pgd(pgd, pgd_entry); } @@ -222,7 +223,8 @@ static void __init kasan_early_p4d_populate(pgd_t *pgd, if (!p4d_none(*p4d)) continue; - p4d_entry = __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pud)); + p4d_entry = __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | + __pa_nodebug(kasan_early_shadow_pud)); set_p4d(p4d, p4d_entry); } while (p4d++, addr = next, addr != end && p4d_none(*p4d)); } @@ -261,10 +263,11 @@ static struct notifier_block kasan_die_notifier = { void __init kasan_early_init(void) { int i; - pteval_t pte_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC; - pmdval_t pmd_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE; - pudval_t pud_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE; - p4dval_t p4d_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE; + pteval_t pte_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_early_shadow_page) | + __PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC; + pmdval_t pmd_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_early_shadow_pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE; + pudval_t pud_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_early_shadow_pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE; + p4dval_t p4d_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_early_shadow_pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE; /* Mask out unsupported __PAGE_KERNEL bits: */ pte_val &= __default_kernel_pte_mask; @@ -273,16 +276,16 @@ void __init kasan_early_init(void) p4d_val &= __default_kernel_pte_mask; for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) - kasan_zero_pte[i] = __pte(pte_val); + kasan_early_shadow_pte[i] = __pte(pte_val); for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) - kasan_zero_pmd[i] = __pmd(pmd_val); + kasan_early_shadow_pmd[i] = __pmd(pmd_val); for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++) - kasan_zero_pud[i] = __pud(pud_val); + kasan_early_shadow_pud[i] = __pud(pud_val); for (i = 0; pgtable_l5_enabled() && i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) - kasan_zero_p4d[i] = __p4d(p4d_val); + kasan_early_shadow_p4d[i] = __p4d(p4d_val); kasan_map_early_shadow(early_top_pgt); kasan_map_early_shadow(init_top_pgt); @@ -326,7 +329,7 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) clear_pgds(KASAN_SHADOW_START & PGDIR_MASK, KASAN_SHADOW_END); - kasan_populate_zero_shadow((void *)(KASAN_SHADOW_START & PGDIR_MASK), + kasan_populate_early_shadow((void *)(KASAN_SHADOW_START & PGDIR_MASK), kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)PAGE_OFFSET)); for (i = 0; i < E820_MAX_ENTRIES; i++) { @@ -338,41 +341,41 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) shadow_cpu_entry_begin = (void *)CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE; shadow_cpu_entry_begin = kasan_mem_to_shadow(shadow_cpu_entry_begin); - shadow_cpu_entry_begin = (void *)round_down((unsigned long)shadow_cpu_entry_begin, - PAGE_SIZE); + shadow_cpu_entry_begin = (void *)round_down( + (unsigned long)shadow_cpu_entry_begin, PAGE_SIZE); shadow_cpu_entry_end = (void *)(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE + CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE); shadow_cpu_entry_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(shadow_cpu_entry_end); - shadow_cpu_entry_end = (void *)round_up((unsigned long)shadow_cpu_entry_end, - PAGE_SIZE); + shadow_cpu_entry_end = (void *)round_up( + (unsigned long)shadow_cpu_entry_end, PAGE_SIZE); - kasan_populate_zero_shadow( + kasan_populate_early_shadow( kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)PAGE_OFFSET + MAXMEM), shadow_cpu_entry_begin); kasan_populate_shadow((unsigned long)shadow_cpu_entry_begin, (unsigned long)shadow_cpu_entry_end, 0); - kasan_populate_zero_shadow(shadow_cpu_entry_end, - kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)__START_KERNEL_map)); + kasan_populate_early_shadow(shadow_cpu_entry_end, + kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)__START_KERNEL_map)); kasan_populate_shadow((unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(_stext), (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(_end), early_pfn_to_nid(__pa(_stext))); - kasan_populate_zero_shadow(kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)MODULES_END), - (void *)KASAN_SHADOW_END); + kasan_populate_early_shadow(kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)MODULES_END), + (void *)KASAN_SHADOW_END); load_cr3(init_top_pgt); __flush_tlb_all(); /* - * kasan_zero_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus it may - * contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, since - * after the TLB flush no one should write to it. + * kasan_early_shadow_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus + * it may contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, + * since after the TLB flush no one should write to it. */ - memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + memset(kasan_early_shadow_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE); for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) { pte_t pte; pgprot_t prot; @@ -380,8 +383,8 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) prot = __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_ENC); pgprot_val(prot) &= __default_kernel_pte_mask; - pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | pgprot_val(prot)); - set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte); + pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_early_shadow_page) | pgprot_val(prot)); + set_pte(&kasan_early_shadow_pte[i], pte); } /* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */ __flush_tlb_all(); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 006f373f54ab..385afa2b9e17 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -381,13 +381,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(); /* - * With SEV, DMA operations cannot use encryption, we need to use - * SWIOTLB to bounce buffer DMA operation. - */ - if (sev_active()) - dma_ops = &swiotlb_dma_ops; - - /* * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions. */ if (sev_active()) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c b/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c index 2385538e8065..de1851d15699 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int get_bt_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long bd_entry; unsigned long bt_addr; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (bd_entry_ptr), sizeof(*bd_entry_ptr))) + if (!access_ok((bd_entry_ptr), sizeof(*bd_entry_ptr))) return -EFAULT; while (1) { diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c index 59274e2c1ac4..b0284eab14dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c @@ -794,6 +794,14 @@ int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmd) return 0; } +/* + * Until we support 512GB pages, skip them in the vmap area. + */ +int p4d_free_pud_page(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr) +{ + return 0; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /** * pud_free_pmd_page - Clear pud entry and free pmd page. @@ -811,9 +819,6 @@ int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr) pte_t *pte; int i; - if (pud_none(*pud)) - return 1; - pmd = (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(*pud); pmd_sv = (pmd_t *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!pmd_sv) @@ -855,9 +860,6 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr) { pte_t *pte; - if (pmd_none(*pmd)) - return 1; - pte = (pte_t *)pmd_page_vaddr(*pmd); pmd_clear(pmd); diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 2580cd2e98b1..5542303c43d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -1181,6 +1181,8 @@ out_image: } if (!image || !prog->is_func || extra_pass) { + if (image) + bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo(prog, addrs); out_addrs: kfree(addrs); kfree(jit_data); diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/sta2x11-fixup.c b/arch/x86/pci/sta2x11-fixup.c index 7a5bafb76d77..3cdafea55ab6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/pci/sta2x11-fixup.c +++ b/arch/x86/pci/sta2x11-fixup.c @@ -168,7 +168,6 @@ static void sta2x11_setup_pdev(struct pci_dev *pdev) return; pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pdev, STA2X11_AMBA_SIZE - 1); pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, STA2X11_AMBA_SIZE - 1); - pdev->dev.dma_ops = &swiotlb_dma_ops; pdev->dev.archdata.is_sta2x11 = true; /* We must enable all devices as master, for audio DMA to work */ diff --git a/arch/x86/um/Makefile b/arch/x86/um/Makefile index c2d3d7c51e9e..2d686ae54681 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/um/Makefile @@ -36,9 +36,12 @@ subarch-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += ../kernel/module.o USER_OBJS := bugs_$(BITS).o ptrace_user.o fault.o -extra-y += user-offsets.s $(obj)/user-offsets.s: c_flags = -Wp,-MD,$(depfile) $(USER_CFLAGS) \ -Iarch/x86/include/generated +targets += user-offsets.s + +include/generated/user_constants.h: $(obj)/user-offsets.s + $(call filechk,offsets,__USER_CONSTANT_H__) UNPROFILE_OBJS := stub_segv.o CFLAGS_stub_segv.o := $(CFLAGS_NO_HARDENING) diff --git a/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum_32.h b/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum_32.h index 83a75f8a1233..b9ac7c9eb72c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum_32.h @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static __inline__ __wsum csum_and_copy_to_user(const void *src, void __user *dst, int len, __wsum sum, int *err_ptr) { - if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dst, len)) { + if (access_ok(dst, len)) { if (copy_to_user(dst, src, len)) { *err_ptr = -EFAULT; return (__force __wsum)-1; diff --git a/arch/x86/um/signal.c b/arch/x86/um/signal.c index 727ed442e0a5..8b4a71efe7ee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/um/signal.c @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ int setup_signal_stack_sc(unsigned long stack_top, struct ksignal *ksig, /* This is the same calculation as i386 - ((sp + 4) & 15) == 0 */ stack_top = ((stack_top + 4) & -16UL) - 4; frame = (struct sigframe __user *) stack_top - 1; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) return 1; restorer = frame->retcode; @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ int setup_signal_stack_si(unsigned long stack_top, struct ksignal *ksig, stack_top &= -8UL; frame = (struct rt_sigframe __user *) stack_top - 1; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) return 1; restorer = frame->retcode; @@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ int setup_signal_stack_si(unsigned long stack_top, struct ksignal *ksig, /* Subtract 128 for a red zone and 8 for proper alignment */ frame = (struct rt_sigframe __user *) ((unsigned long) frame - 128 - 8); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) goto out; if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO) { |