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-rw-r--r--net/sctp/associola.c30
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/inqueue.c2
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/ipv6.c75
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/protocol.c10
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c7
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c89
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/socket.c33
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/ulpevent.c1
8 files changed, 151 insertions, 96 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
index f10d3397f917..738c55e994c4 100644
--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
@@ -1006,9 +1006,10 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct work_struct *work)
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
struct sctp_inq *inqueue;
- int state;
sctp_subtype_t subtype;
+ int first_time = 1; /* is this the first time through the loop */
int error = 0;
+ int state;
/* The association should be held so we should be safe. */
ep = asoc->ep;
@@ -1019,6 +1020,30 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct work_struct *work)
state = asoc->state;
subtype = SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type);
+ /* If the first chunk in the packet is AUTH, do special
+ * processing specified in Section 6.3 of SCTP-AUTH spec
+ */
+ if (first_time && subtype.chunk == SCTP_CID_AUTH) {
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *next_hdr;
+
+ next_hdr = sctp_inq_peek(inqueue);
+ if (!next_hdr)
+ goto normal;
+
+ /* If the next chunk is COOKIE-ECHO, skip the AUTH
+ * chunk while saving a pointer to it so we can do
+ * Authentication later (during cookie-echo
+ * processing).
+ */
+ if (next_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO) {
+ chunk->auth_chunk = skb_clone(chunk->skb,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ chunk->auth = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+normal:
/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
* The receiver has a list of chunk types which it expects
* to be received only after an AUTH-chunk. This list has
@@ -1057,6 +1082,9 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct work_struct *work)
/* If there is an error on chunk, discard this packet. */
if (error && chunk)
chunk->pdiscard = 1;
+
+ if (first_time)
+ first_time = 0;
}
sctp_association_put(asoc);
}
diff --git a/net/sctp/inqueue.c b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
index f731de3e8428..e06083c53f57 100644
--- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ new_skb:
skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid. */
- if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) <
+ if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) <=
skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
/* This is not a singleton */
chunk->singleton = 0;
diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
index 5d015270e454..f4d5efb1d231 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -324,8 +324,10 @@ static void sctp_v6_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
bdst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
- if (!IS_ERR(bdst) &&
- ipv6_chk_addr(dev_net(bdst->dev),
+ if (IS_ERR(bdst))
+ continue;
+
+ if (ipv6_chk_addr(dev_net(bdst->dev),
&laddr->a.v6.sin6_addr, bdst->dev, 1)) {
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dst))
dst_release(dst);
@@ -334,8 +336,10 @@ static void sctp_v6_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
}
bmatchlen = sctp_v6_addr_match_len(daddr, &laddr->a);
- if (matchlen > bmatchlen)
+ if (matchlen > bmatchlen) {
+ dst_release(bdst);
continue;
+ }
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dst))
dst_release(dst);
@@ -517,46 +521,49 @@ static void sctp_v6_to_addr(union sctp_addr *addr, struct in6_addr *saddr,
addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = 0;
}
-/* Compare addresses exactly.
- * v4-mapped-v6 is also in consideration.
- */
-static int sctp_v6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1,
- const union sctp_addr *addr2)
+static int __sctp_v6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1,
+ const union sctp_addr *addr2)
{
if (addr1->sa.sa_family != addr2->sa.sa_family) {
if (addr1->sa.sa_family == AF_INET &&
addr2->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
- ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr2->v6.sin6_addr)) {
- if (addr2->v6.sin6_port == addr1->v4.sin_port &&
- addr2->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] ==
- addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)
- return 1;
- }
+ ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr2->v6.sin6_addr) &&
+ addr2->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] ==
+ addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)
+ return 1;
+
if (addr2->sa.sa_family == AF_INET &&
addr1->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
- ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr)) {
- if (addr1->v6.sin6_port == addr2->v4.sin_port &&
- addr1->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] ==
- addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)
- return 1;
- }
+ ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr) &&
+ addr1->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] ==
+ addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)
+ return 1;
+
return 0;
}
- if (addr1->v6.sin6_port != addr2->v6.sin6_port)
- return 0;
+
if (!ipv6_addr_equal(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr, &addr2->v6.sin6_addr))
return 0;
+
/* If this is a linklocal address, compare the scope_id. */
- if (ipv6_addr_type(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
- if (addr1->v6.sin6_scope_id && addr2->v6.sin6_scope_id &&
- (addr1->v6.sin6_scope_id != addr2->v6.sin6_scope_id)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
+ if ((ipv6_addr_type(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) &&
+ addr1->v6.sin6_scope_id && addr2->v6.sin6_scope_id &&
+ addr1->v6.sin6_scope_id != addr2->v6.sin6_scope_id)
+ return 0;
return 1;
}
+/* Compare addresses exactly.
+ * v4-mapped-v6 is also in consideration.
+ */
+static int sctp_v6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1,
+ const union sctp_addr *addr2)
+{
+ return __sctp_v6_cmp_addr(addr1, addr2) &&
+ addr1->v6.sin6_port == addr2->v6.sin6_port;
+}
+
/* Initialize addr struct to INADDR_ANY. */
static void sctp_v6_inaddr_any(union sctp_addr *addr, __be16 port)
{
@@ -723,8 +730,10 @@ static int sctp_v6_addr_to_user(struct sctp_sock *sp, union sctp_addr *addr)
sctp_v6_map_v4(addr);
}
- if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+ if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
+ memset(addr->v4.sin_zero, 0, sizeof(addr->v4.sin_zero));
return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ }
return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
}
@@ -838,8 +847,8 @@ static int sctp_inet6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1,
const union sctp_addr *addr2,
struct sctp_sock *opt)
{
- struct sctp_af *af1, *af2;
struct sock *sk = sctp_opt2sk(opt);
+ struct sctp_af *af1, *af2;
af1 = sctp_get_af_specific(addr1->sa.sa_family);
af2 = sctp_get_af_specific(addr2->sa.sa_family);
@@ -855,10 +864,10 @@ static int sctp_inet6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1,
if (sctp_is_any(sk, addr1) || sctp_is_any(sk, addr2))
return 1;
- if (addr1->sa.sa_family != addr2->sa.sa_family)
- return 0;
+ if (addr1->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && addr2->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+ return addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr == addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
- return af1->cmp_addr(addr1, addr2);
+ return __sctp_v6_cmp_addr(addr1, addr2);
}
/* Verify that the provided sockaddr looks bindable. Common verification,
diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c
index 7b523e3f551f..fb7b7632316a 100644
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -510,22 +510,20 @@ static void sctp_v4_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
if (IS_ERR(rt))
continue;
- if (!dst)
- dst = &rt->dst;
-
/* Ensure the src address belongs to the output
* interface.
*/
odev = __ip_dev_find(sock_net(sk), laddr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr,
false);
if (!odev || odev->ifindex != fl4->flowi4_oif) {
- if (&rt->dst != dst)
+ if (!dst)
+ dst = &rt->dst;
+ else
dst_release(&rt->dst);
continue;
}
- if (dst != &rt->dst)
- dst_release(dst);
+ dst_release(dst);
dst = &rt->dst;
break;
}
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 9e9690b7afe1..fc67d356b5fa 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1373,9 +1373,14 @@ static struct sctp_chunk *_sctp_make_chunk(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
sctp_chunkhdr_t *chunk_hdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk;
+ int chunklen;
+
+ chunklen = SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(*chunk_hdr) + paylen);
+ if (chunklen > SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN)
+ goto nodata;
/* No need to allocate LL here, as this is only a chunk. */
- skb = alloc_skb(SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) + paylen), gfp);
+ skb = alloc_skb(chunklen, gfp);
if (!skb)
goto nodata;
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 8ec20a64a3f8..bfd068679710 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -144,10 +144,8 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation_chunk(
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands);
-static sctp_ierror_t sctp_sf_authenticate(struct net *net,
- const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+static sctp_ierror_t sctp_sf_authenticate(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
- const sctp_subtype_t type,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk);
static sctp_disposition_t __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(struct net *net,
@@ -615,6 +613,38 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
+static bool sctp_auth_chunk_verify(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+ const struct sctp_association *asoc)
+{
+ struct sctp_chunk auth;
+
+ if (!chunk->auth_chunk)
+ return true;
+
+ /* SCTP-AUTH: auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
+ * is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
+ * authentication. We've just recreated the association using
+ * the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
+ * do the authentication.
+ */
+
+ /* Make sure that we and the peer are AUTH capable */
+ if (!net->sctp.auth_enable || !asoc->peer.auth_capable)
+ return false;
+
+ /* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
+ auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
+ auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
+ auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
+ auth.chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)
+ skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+ skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+ auth.transport = chunk->transport;
+
+ return sctp_sf_authenticate(asoc, &auth) == SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
+}
+
/*
* Respond to a normal COOKIE ECHO chunk.
* We are the side that is being asked for an association.
@@ -751,36 +781,9 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
if (error)
goto nomem_init;
- /* SCTP-AUTH: auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
- * is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
- * authentication. We've just recreated the association using
- * the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
- * do the authentication.
- */
- if (chunk->auth_chunk) {
- struct sctp_chunk auth;
- sctp_ierror_t ret;
-
- /* Make sure that we and the peer are AUTH capable */
- if (!net->sctp.auth_enable || !new_asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
- sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
- return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
- }
-
- /* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
- auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
- auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
- auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
- auth.chunk_hdr = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
- skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
- auth.transport = chunk->transport;
-
- ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, new_asoc, type, &auth);
- if (ret != SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR) {
- sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
- return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
- }
+ if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc)) {
+ sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
+ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
@@ -1717,13 +1720,15 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(struct net *net,
GFP_ATOMIC))
goto nomem;
+ if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc))
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+
/* Make sure no new addresses are being added during the
* restart. Though this is a pretty complicated attack
* since you'd have to get inside the cookie.
*/
- if (!sctp_sf_check_restart_addrs(new_asoc, asoc, chunk, commands)) {
+ if (!sctp_sf_check_restart_addrs(new_asoc, asoc, chunk, commands))
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
- }
/* If the endpoint is in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state and recognizes
* the peer has restarted (Action A), it MUST NOT setup a new
@@ -1828,6 +1833,9 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(struct net *net,
GFP_ATOMIC))
goto nomem;
+ if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc))
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+
/* Update the content of current association. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
@@ -1920,6 +1928,9 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_dupcook_d(struct net *net,
* a COOKIE ACK.
*/
+ if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, asoc))
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+
/* Don't accidentally move back into established state. */
if (asoc->state < SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
@@ -1959,7 +1970,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_dupcook_d(struct net *net,
}
}
- repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
+ repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(asoc, chunk);
if (!repl)
goto nomem;
@@ -3981,10 +3992,8 @@ gen_shutdown:
*
* The return value is the disposition of the chunk.
*/
-static sctp_ierror_t sctp_sf_authenticate(struct net *net,
- const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+static sctp_ierror_t sctp_sf_authenticate(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
- const sctp_subtype_t type,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_authhdr *auth_hdr;
@@ -4083,7 +4092,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_auth(struct net *net,
commands);
auth_hdr = (struct sctp_authhdr *)chunk->skb->data;
- error = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, asoc, type, chunk);
+ error = sctp_sf_authenticate(asoc, chunk);
switch (error) {
case SCTP_IERROR_AUTH_BAD_HMAC:
/* Generate the ERROR chunk and discard the rest
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index fd5b9d573b38..78f38056fca6 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -335,11 +335,14 @@ static struct sctp_af *sctp_sockaddr_af(struct sctp_sock *opt,
if (!opt->pf->af_supported(addr->sa.sa_family, opt))
return NULL;
- /* V4 mapped address are really of AF_INET family */
- if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
- ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr->v6.sin6_addr) &&
- !opt->pf->af_supported(AF_INET, opt))
- return NULL;
+ if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+ if (len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+ return NULL;
+ /* V4 mapped address are really of AF_INET family */
+ if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr->v6.sin6_addr) &&
+ !opt->pf->af_supported(AF_INET, opt))
+ return NULL;
+ }
/* If we get this far, af is valid. */
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa.sa_family);
@@ -1519,7 +1522,7 @@ static void sctp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, timeout:%ld\n", __func__, sk, timeout);
- lock_sock(sk);
+ lock_sock_nested(sk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSING;
@@ -1569,7 +1572,7 @@ static void sctp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
* held and that should be grabbed before socket lock.
*/
spin_lock_bh(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
- bh_lock_sock(sk);
+ bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
/* Hold the sock, since sk_common_release() will put sock_put()
* and we have just a little more cleanup.
@@ -4765,7 +4768,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_autoclose(struct sock *sk, int len, char __user *optv
len = sizeof(int);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
- if (copy_to_user(optval, &sctp_sk(sk)->autoclose, sizeof(int)))
+ if (copy_to_user(optval, &sctp_sk(sk)->autoclose, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
@@ -5342,6 +5345,9 @@ copy_getaddrs:
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
+ /* XXX: We should have accounted for sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs) too,
+ * but we can't change it anymore.
+ */
if (put_user(bytes_copied, optlen))
err = -EFAULT;
out:
@@ -5778,7 +5784,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_maxseg(struct sock *sk, int len,
params.assoc_id = 0;
} else if (len >= sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_value)) {
len = sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_value);
- if (copy_from_user(&params, optval, sizeof(params)))
+ if (copy_from_user(&params, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
} else
return -EINVAL;
@@ -5947,7 +5953,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk, int len,
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid))
return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)))
+
+ len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
+ if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, val.scact_assoc_id);
@@ -5959,7 +5967,6 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk, int len,
else
val.scact_keynumber = ep->active_key_id;
- len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
@@ -5985,7 +5992,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks))
return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks)))
+ if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
to = p->gauth_chunks;
@@ -6030,7 +6037,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks))
return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks)))
+ if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
to = p->gauth_chunks;
diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
index bea00058ce35..6825e05a68b2 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
@@ -723,7 +723,6 @@ struct sctp_ulpevent *sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg(struct sctp_association *asoc,
return event;
fail_mark:
- sctp_chunk_put(chunk);
kfree_skb(skb);
fail:
return NULL;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-04-30 18:28:34 +0000