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authorRussell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>2018-05-14 09:40:24 +0100
committerDavid A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>2018-10-11 22:38:33 -0400
commitd2fdf5abe82cbd6fe2de939b6810e6e5150df264 (patch)
tree8c83df5890a5da45be40468629cc507a261ac5e8
parent77285c628630f85660873ee79963a39fa431d656 (diff)
downloadlinux-linaro-stable-linux-linaro-lsk-v4.4-test.tar.gz
ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesseslinux-linaro-lsk-v4.4-test
Commit a3c0f84765bb429ba0fd23de1c57b5e1591c9389 upstream. Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code: index = load(user-manipulated pointer); access(base + index * stride); In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been loaded. On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory. The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data, and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory. Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access. This also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used by a subsequent access. Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer. This prevents get_user() being used as the load() step above. As a side effect, put_user() will also be affected even though it isn't implicated. Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds. Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S9
2 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
index 307901f88a1e..483481c6937e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -454,6 +454,10 @@ THUMB( orr \reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT )
adds \tmp, \addr, #\size - 1
sbcccs \tmp, \tmp, \limit
bcs \bad
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+ movcs \addr, #0
+ csdb
+#endif
#endif
.endm
diff --git a/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S b/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S
index 1512bebfbf1b..d36329cefedc 100644
--- a/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S
@@ -90,6 +90,15 @@
.text
ENTRY(arm_copy_from_user)
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+ get_thread_info r3
+ ldr r3, [r3, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
+ adds ip, r1, r2 @ ip=addr+size
+ sub r3, r3, #1 @ addr_limit - 1
+ cmpcc ip, r3 @ if (addr+size > addr_limit - 1)
+ movcs r1, #0 @ addr = NULL
+ csdb
+#endif
#include "copy_template.S"