nbd: Don't send oversize strings

Qemu as server currently won't accept export names larger than 256
bytes, nor create dirty bitmap names longer than 1023 bytes, so most
uses of qemu as client or server have no reason to get anywhere near
the NBD spec maximum of a 4k limit per string.

However, we weren't actually enforcing things, ignoring when the
remote side violates the protocol on input, and also having several
code paths where we send oversize strings on output (for example,
qemu-nbd --description could easily send more than 4k).  Tighten
things up as follows:

client:
- Perform bounds check on export name and dirty bitmap request prior
  to handing it to server
- Validate that copied server replies are not too long (ignoring
  NBD_INFO_* replies that are not copied is not too bad)
server:
- Perform bounds check on export name and description prior to
  advertising it to client
- Reject client name or metadata query that is too long
- Adjust things to allow full 4k name limit rather than previous
  256 byte limit

Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20191114024635.11363-4-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
index 6a8b206e1d..8c20baa4a4 100644
--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ void qmp_nbd_server_add(const char *device, bool has_name, const char *name,
         name = device;
     }
 
+    if (strlen(name) > NBD_MAX_STRING_SIZE) {
+        error_setg(errp, "export name '%s' too long", name);
+        return;
+    }
+
     if (nbd_export_find(name)) {
         error_setg(errp, "NBD server already has export named '%s'", name);
         return;