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2020-12-22TEMP: w/a issues for property names with comma s/ti,prus/ti-prus/ti-pruss-binding-issueGrzegorz Jaszczyk
Changing s/ti,prus/ti-prus/ results with only one expected (left for test) warning: serial@28000: ti-pruss-gp-mux-sel:0:0: 7 is not one of [0, 1, 2, 3, 4] From schema: ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml
2020-12-22TEMP: w/a issues for properties names with commaGrzegorz Jaszczyk
This patch temporary removes problematic ti,prus and ti,pruss-gp-mux-sel properties from ti,pruss-uart.yaml (they are restored in next patch where properties names don't contain commas). Fixes below: ============ make DT_SCHEMA_FILES=Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml dt_binding_check dtbs_check ... DTEX Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.example.dts ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml: ignoring, error in schema: properties: ti,prus warning: no schema found in file: ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml ... ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml: properties:ti,prus: 'description' is a required property ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml: properties:ti,prus: 'oneOf' conditional failed, one must be fixed: 'type' is a required property Additional properties are not allowed ('maxItems' was unexpected) ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml: properties:ti,prus: 'oneOf' conditional failed, one must be fixed: 'enum' is a required property 'const' is a required property ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml: properties:ti,prus: 'oneOf' conditional failed, one must be fixed: '$ref' is a required property 'allOf' is a required property ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml: properties:ti,pruss-gp-mux-sel: 'description' is a required property ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml: properties:ti,pruss-gp-mux-sel: 'oneOf' conditional failed, one must be fixed: 'type' is a required property Additional properties are not allowed ('maxItems' was unexpected) ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml: properties:ti,pruss-gp-mux-sel: 'oneOf' conditional failed, one must be fixed: 'enum' is a required property 'const' is a required property ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml: properties:ti,pruss-gp-mux-sel: 'oneOf' conditional failed, one must be fixed: '$ref' is a required property 'allOf' is a required property After this patch: ================= CHECK Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.example.dt.yaml ...arm64/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.example.dt.yaml: serial@28000: ti,pruss-gp-mux-sel:0:0: 7 is not one of [0, 1, 2, 3, 4] From schema: ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml ...arm64/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.example.dt.yaml: serial@28000: 'ti,prus', 'ti,pruss-gp-mux-sel' do not match any of the regexes: 'pinctrl-[0-9]+' From schema: ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml ...arm64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/ti/k3-am654-base-board.dt.yaml: serial@28000: ti,pruss-gp-mux-sel:0:0: 7 is not one of [0, 1, 2, 3, 4] From schema: ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml ...arm64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/ti/k3-am654-base-board.dt.yaml: serial@28000: 'ti,prus', 'ti,pruss-gp-mux-sel' do not match any of the regexes: 'pinctrl-[0-9]+' From schema: ...linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/ti,pruss-uart.yaml
2020-12-22TEMP: arm64: dts: k3-am65-main: add PRUSS related nodesGrzegorz Jaszczyk
PRUSS related nodes were introduced to test ti,pruss-uart.yaml binding.
2020-12-22TEMP: dt-bindings: serial: add pruss-uart bindingGrzegorz Jaszczyk
Add example PRU consumer driver binding which references remoteproc/ti,pru-consumer.yaml# Based on: https://git.ti.com/cgit/ti-linux-kernel/ti-linux-kernel/commit/?h=ti-linux-5.4.y&id=ea3785c68164a257da3efae50ffb984e697b17fa
2020-12-21soc: ti: pruss: Add helper functions to get/set PRUSS_CFG_GPMUXTero Kristo
Add two new helper functions pruss_cfg_get_gpmux() & pruss_cfg_set_gpmux() to get and set the GP MUX mode for programming the PRUSS internal wrapper mux functionality as needed by usecases. Co-developed-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Tero Kristo <t-kristo@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org>
2020-12-21soc: ti: pruss: Add helper function to enable OCP master portsSuman Anna
The PRU-ICSS subsystem on OMAP-architecture based SoCS (AM33xx, AM437x and AM57xx SoCs) has a control bit STANDBY_INIT in the PRUSS_CFG register to initiate a Standby sequence (when set) and trigger a MStandby request to the SoC's PRCM module. This same bit is also used to enable the OCP master ports (when cleared). The clearing of the STANDBY_INIT bit requires an acknowledgment from PRCM and is done through the monitoring of the PRUSS_SYSCFG.SUB_MWAIT bit. Add a helper function pruss_cfg_ocp_master_ports() to allow the PRU client drivers to control this bit and enable or disable the firmware running on PRU cores access to any peripherals or memory to achieve desired functionality. The access is disabled by default on power-up and on any suspend (context is not maintained). Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org>
2020-12-21soc: ti: pruss: Add helper functions to set GPI mode, MII_RT_event and XFRSuman Anna
The PRUSS CFG module is represented as a syscon node and is currently managed by the PRUSS platform driver. Add easy accessor functions to set GPI mode, MII_RT event enable/disable and XFR (XIN XOUT) enable/disable to enable the PRUSS Ethernet usecase. These functions reuse the generic pruss_cfg_update() API function. Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org>
2020-12-21soc: ti: pruss: Add pruss_cfg_read()/update() APISuman Anna
Add two new generic API pruss_cfg_read() and pruss_cfg_update() to the PRUSS platform driver to allow other drivers to read and program respectively a register within the PRUSS CFG sub-module represented by a syscon driver. This interface provides a simple way for client drivers without having them to include and parse the CFG syscon node within their respective device nodes. Various useful registers and macros for certain register bit-fields and their values have also been added. It is the responsibility of the client drivers to reconfigure or reset a particular register upon any failures. Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org>
2020-12-21soc: ti: pruss: Add pruss_{request,release}_mem_region() APIAndrew F. Davis
Add two new API - pruss_request_mem_region() & pruss_release_mem_region(), to the PRUSS platform driver to allow client drivers to acquire and release the common memory resources present within a PRU-ICSS subsystem. This allows the client drivers to directly manipulate the respective memories, as per their design contract with the associated firmware. Co-developed-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org>
2020-12-21soc: ti: pruss: Add pruss_get()/put() APITero Kristo
Add two new get and put API, pruss_get() and pruss_put() to the PRUSS platform driver to allow client drivers to request a handle to a PRUSS device. This handle will be used by client drivers to request various operations of the PRUSS platform driver through additional API that will be added in the following patches. The pruss_get() function returns the pruss handle corresponding to a PRUSS device referenced by a PRU remoteproc instance. The pruss_put() is the complimentary function to pruss_get(). Co-developed-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Tero Kristo <t-kristo@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org>
2020-12-21remoteproc: pru: Configure firmware based on client setupTero Kristo
Client device node property firmware-name is now used to configure firmware for the PRU instances. The default firmware is also restored once releasing the PRU resource. Co-developed-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Tero Kristo <t-kristo@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org>
2020-12-21remoteproc: pru: Add pru_rproc_set_ctable() functionRoger Quadros
Some firmwares expect the OS drivers to configure the CTABLE entries publishing dynamically allocated memory regions. For example, the PRU Ethernet firmwares use the C28 and C30 entries for retrieving the Shared RAM and System SRAM (OCMC) areas allocated by the PRU Ethernet client driver. Provide a way for users to do that through a new API, pru_rproc_set_ctable(). The API returns 0 on success and a negative value on error. NOTE: The programmable CTABLE entries are typically re-programmed by the PRU firmwares when dealing with a certain block of memory during block processing. This API provides an interface to the PRU client drivers to publish a dynamically allocated memory block with the PRU firmware using a CTABLE entry instead of a negotiated address in shared memory. Additional synchronization may be needed between the PRU client drivers and firmwares if different addresses needs to be published at run-time reusing the same CTABLE entry. Co-developed-by: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org>
2020-12-21remoteproc: pru: Deny rproc sysfs ops for PRU client driven bootsSuman Anna
The PRU remoteproc driver is not configured for 'auto-boot' by default, and allows to be booted either by in-kernel PRU client drivers or by userspace using the generic remoteproc sysfs interfaces. The sysfs interfaces should not be permitted to change the remoteproc firmwares or states when a PRU is being managed by an in-kernel client driver. Use the newly introduced remoteproc generic 'deny_sysfs_ops' flag to provide these restrictions by setting and clearing it appropriately during the PRU acquire and release steps. Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org>
2020-12-21remoteproc: pru: Add APIs to get and put the PRU coresTero Kristo
Add two new APIs, pru_rproc_get() and pru_rproc_put(), to the PRU driver to allow client drivers to acquire and release the remoteproc device associated with a PRU core. The PRU cores are treated as resources with only one client owning it at a time. The pru_rproc_get() function returns the rproc handle corresponding to a PRU core identified by the device tree "ti,prus" property under the client node. The pru_rproc_put() is the complementary function to pru_rproc_get(). Co-developed-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Tero Kristo <t-kristo@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> --- v1->v2: - Introduce relevant updates after changing the 'prus' property name to 'ti,prus' in patch #1 as suggested by Rob Herring.
2020-12-21dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add PRU consumer bindingsSuman Anna
Add a YAML binding document for PRU consumers. The binding includes all the common properties that can be used by different PRU consumer or application nodes and supported by the PRU remoteproc driver. These are used to configure the PRU hardware for specific user applications. The application nodes themselves should define their own bindings. Co-developed-by: Tero Kristo <t-kristo@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Tero Kristo <t-kristo@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org> --- v1->v2: - Change the 'prus' property name to 'ti,prus' as suggested by Rob Herring.
2020-12-21remoteproc: Introduce deny_sysfs_ops flagSuman Anna
The remoteproc framework provides sysfs interfaces for changing the firmware name and for starting/stopping a remote processor through the sysfs files 'state' and 'firmware'. These interfaces are currently allowed irrespective of how the remoteprocs were booted (like remoteproc self auto-boot, remoteproc client-driven boot etc). These interfaces can adversely affect a remoteproc and its clients especially when a remoteproc is being controlled by a remoteproc client driver(s). Also, not all remoteproc drivers may want to support the sysfs interfaces by default. Add support to deny the sysfs state/firmware change by introducing a state flag 'deny_sysfs_ops' that the individual remoteproc drivers can set based on their usage needs. The default behavior is to allow the sysfs operations as before. Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> [grzegorz: solve conflicts]
2020-12-16dt-bindings: soc: ti: Update TI PRUSS bindings about schemas to includeGrzegorz Jaszczyk
Now after ti,pruss-intc.yaml and ti,pru-rproc.yaml are merged, include them in proper property and extend the examples section. At the occasion extend the allowed property list about dma-ranges. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Jaszczyk <grzegorz.jaszczyk@linaro.org>
2020-12-16Add linux-next specific files for 20201216next-20201216Stephen Rothwell
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16Merge branch 'akpm/master'Stephen Rothwell
2020-12-16secretmem-test-add-basic-selftest-for-memfd_secret2-fixJohn Hubbard
fix build Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/248f928b-1383-48ea-8584-ec10146e60c9@nvidia.com Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)Mike Rapoport
The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-11-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16arch-mm-wire-up-memfd_secret-system-call-were-relevant-fixAndrew Morton
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>, Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevantMike Rapoport
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-10-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem usersMike Rapoport
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-9-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16secretmem: add memcg accountingMike Rapoport
Account memory consumed by secretmem to memcg. The accounting is updated when the memory is actually allocated and freed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-8-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentationMike Rapoport
Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings. Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with PMD-size pages. As pages allocated by secretmem become unmovable, use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages. The CMA area used by secretmem is controlled by the "secretmem=" kernel parameter. This allows explicit control over the memory available for secretmem and provides upper hard limit for secretmem consumption. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-7-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areasMike Rapoport
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the owning mm. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not accessible using direct/linear map addresses. Functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-6-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kfence: fix implicit function declarationAnders Roxell
When building kfence the following error shows up: In file included from mm/kfence/report.c:13: arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h: In function `kfence_protect_page': arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h:12:2: error: implicit declaration of function `set_memory_valid' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] 12 | set_memory_valid(addr, 1, !protect); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Use the correct include both f2b7c491916d ("set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled") and 4c4c75881536 ("arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64") went in the same day via different trees. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201204121804.1532849-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabledMike Rapoport
On arm64, set_direct_map_*() functions may return 0 without actually changing the linear map. This behaviour can be controlled using kernel parameters, so we need a way to determine at runtime whether calls to set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() have any effect. Extend set_memory API with can_set_direct_map() function that allows checking if calling set_direct_map_*() will actually change the page table, replace several occurrences of open coded checks in arm64 with the new function and provide a generic stub for architectures that always modify page tables upon calls to set_direct_map APIs. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16set_memory-allow-set_direct_map__noflush-for-multiple-pages-fixAndrew Morton
fix kernel/power/snapshot.c Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pagesMike Rapoport
The underlying implementations of set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() allow updating multiple contiguous pages at once. Add numpages parameter to set_direct_map_*_noflush() to expose this ability with these APIs. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-4-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64] Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16mmap: make mlock_future_check() globalMike Rapoport
It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-3-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDERMike Rapoport
Patch series "mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas", v14. This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm. Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings. Additionally, in the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host. For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification. Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future. To limit fragmentation of the direct map to splitting only PUD-size pages, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor that is used as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas. As the memory allocated by secretmem becomes unmovable, we use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages. This patch (of 10): The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well. Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203062949.5484-2-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16mm/gup: assert that the mmap lock is held in __get_user_pages()Jann Horn
After having cleaned up all GUP callers (except for the atomisp staging driver, which currently gets mmap locking completely wrong [1]) to always ensure that they hold the mmap lock when calling into GUP (unless the mm is not yet globally visible), add an assertion to make sure it stays that way going forward. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3tZAb9JVhw4T5e-i=h2_DUZxfNRTDsagSRCVazNXx5qA@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez1GM==OnHpS=ghqZNJPn02FCDUEHc7GQmGRMXUD_aKudg@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16mmap locking API: don't check locking if the mm isn't live yetJann Horn
In preparation for adding a mmap_assert_locked() check in __get_user_pages(), teach the mmap_assert_*locked() helpers that it's fine to operate on an mm without locking in the middle of execve() as long as it hasn't been installed on a process yet. Existing code paths that do this are (reverse callgraph): get_user_pages_remote get_arg_page copy_strings copy_string_kernel remove_arg_zero tomoyo_dump_page tomoyo_print_bprm tomoyo_scan_bprm tomoyo_environ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez03YJG9JU_6tGiMcaVjuTyRE_o4LEQ7901b5ZoCnNAjcg@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16selftests/filesystems: expand epoll with epoll_pwait2Willem de Bruijn
Code coverage for the epoll_pwait2 syscall. epoll62: Repeat basic test epoll1, but exercising the new syscall. epoll63: Pass a timespec and exercise the timeout wakeup path. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-5-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16epoll: wire up syscall epoll_pwait2Willem de Bruijn
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-4-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16epoll: add syscall epoll_pwait2Willem de Bruijn
Add syscall epoll_pwait2, an epoll_wait variant with nsec resolution that replaces int timeout with struct timespec. It is equivalent otherwise. int epoll_pwait2(int fd, struct epoll_event *events, int maxevents, const struct timespec *timeout, const sigset_t *sigset); The underlying hrtimer is already programmed with nsec resolution. pselect and ppoll also set nsec resolution timeout with timespec. The sigset_t in epoll_pwait has a compat variant. epoll_pwait2 needs the same. For timespec, only support this new interface on 2038 aware platforms that define __kernel_timespec_t. So no CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-3-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16epoll: convert internal api to timespec64Willem de Bruijn
Patch series "add epoll_pwait2 syscall", v4. Enable nanosecond timeouts for epoll. Analogous to pselect and ppoll, introduce an epoll_wait syscall variant that takes a struct timespec instead of int timeout. This patch (of 4): Make epoll more consistent with select/poll: pass along the timeout as timespec64 pointer. In anticipation of additional changes affecting all three polling mechanisms: - add epoll_pwait2 syscall with timespec semantics, and share poll_select_set_timeout implementation. - compute slack before conversion to absolute time, to save one ktime_get_ts64 call. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-2-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16mm: fix some spelling mistakes in commentsHaitao Shi
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments: udpate ==> update succesful ==> successful exmaple ==> example unneccessary ==> unnecessary stoping ==> stopping uknown ==> unknown Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201127011747.86005-1-shihaitao1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Haitao Shi <shihaitao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kasan: update documentationAndrey Konovalov
This change updates KASAN documentation to reflect the addition of boot parameters and also reworks and clarifies some of the existing sections, in particular: defines what a memory granule is, mentions quarantine, makes Kunit section more readable. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/748daf013e17d925b0fe00c1c3b5dce726dd2430.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ib1f83e91be273264b25f42b04448ac96b858849f Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kasan, mm: allow cache merging with no metadataAndrey Konovalov
The reason cache merging is disabled with KASAN is because KASAN puts its metadata right after the allocated object. When the merged caches have slightly different sizes, the metadata ends up in different places, which KASAN doesn't support. It might be possible to adjust the metadata allocation algorithm and make it friendly to the cache merging code. Instead this change takes a simpler approach and allows merging caches when no metadata is present. Which is the case for hardware tag-based KASAN with kasan.mode=prod. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/37497e940bfd4b32c0a93a702a9ae4cf061d5392.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ia114847dfb2244f297d2cb82d592bf6a07455dba Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fitAndrey Konovalov
KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_largeAndrey Konovalov
Currently it says that the memory gets poisoned by page_alloc code. Clarify this by mentioning the specific callback that poisons the memory. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1c8380fe0332a3bcc720fe29f1e0bef2e2974416.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I1334dffb69b87d7986fab88a1a039cc3ea764725 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag callsAndrey Konovalov
set_tag() already ignores the tag for the generic mode, so just call it as is. Add a check for the generic mode to assign_tag(), and simplify its call in ____kasan_kmalloc(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/121eeab245f98555862b289d2ba9269c868fbbcf.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I18905ca78fb4a3d60e1a34a4ca00247272480438 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kasan: don't round_up too muchAndrey Konovalov
For hardware tag-based mode kasan_poison_memory() already rounds up the size. Do the same for software modes and remove round_up() from the common code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/47b232474f1f89dc072aeda0fa58daa6efade377.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ib397128fac6eba874008662b4964d65352db4aa4 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kasan, mm: rename kasan_poison_kfreeAndrey Konovalov
Rename kasan_poison_kfree() to kasan_slab_free_mempool() as it better reflects what this annotation does. Also add a comment that explains the PageSlab() check. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/141675fb493555e984c5dca555e9d9f768c7bbaa.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I5026f87364e556b506ef1baee725144bb04b8810 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kasan, mm: check kasan_enabled in annotationsAndrey Konovalov
Declare the kasan_enabled static key in include/linux/kasan.h and in include/linux/mm.h and check it in all kasan annotations. This allows to avoid any slowdown caused by function calls when kasan_enabled is disabled. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9f90e3c0aa840dbb4833367c2335193299f69023.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I2589451d3c96c97abbcbf714baabe6161c6f153e Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kasan: don't use read-only static keysAndrey Konovalov
__ro_after_init static keys are incompatible with usage in loadable kernel modules and cause crashes. Don't use those, use normal static keys. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f2ded589eba1597f7360a972226083de9afd86e2.1607537948.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2020-12-16kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parametersAndrey Konovalov
Hardware tag-based KASAN mode is intended to eventually be used in production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch. This change adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features. The features that can be controlled are: 1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all. 2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks. 3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not. With this change a new boot parameter kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes: - kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed - kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled - kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned above. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing: - kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable alloc/free stack collection (default: on for mode=full, otherwise off) - kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic (default: report) If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise. It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative [1]. [1] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb093613879d8d8841173f090133eddeb4c35f1f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If7d37003875b2ed3e0935702c8015c223d6416a4 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>