// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * This is a maximally equidistributed combined Tausworthe generator * based on code from GNU Scientific Library 1.5 (30 Jun 2004) * * lfsr113 version: * * x_n = (s1_n ^ s2_n ^ s3_n ^ s4_n) * * s1_{n+1} = (((s1_n & 4294967294) << 18) ^ (((s1_n << 6) ^ s1_n) >> 13)) * s2_{n+1} = (((s2_n & 4294967288) << 2) ^ (((s2_n << 2) ^ s2_n) >> 27)) * s3_{n+1} = (((s3_n & 4294967280) << 7) ^ (((s3_n << 13) ^ s3_n) >> 21)) * s4_{n+1} = (((s4_n & 4294967168) << 13) ^ (((s4_n << 3) ^ s4_n) >> 12)) * * The period of this generator is about 2^113 (see erratum paper). * * From: P. L'Ecuyer, "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe * Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213: * http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps * ftp://ftp.iro.umontreal.ca/pub/simulation/lecuyer/papers/tausme.ps * * There is an erratum in the paper "Tables of Maximally Equidistributed * Combined LFSR Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 68, 225 (1999), * 261--269: http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps * * ... the k_j most significant bits of z_j must be non-zero, * for each j. (Note: this restriction also applies to the * computer code given in [4], but was mistakenly not mentioned * in that paper.) * * This affects the seeding procedure by imposing the requirement * s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /** * prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator. * @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state. * * This is used for pseudo-randomness with no outside seeding. * For more random results, use prandom_u32(). */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state) { #define TAUSWORTHE(s, a, b, c, d) ((s & c) << d) ^ (((s << a) ^ s) >> b) state->s1 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s1, 6U, 13U, 4294967294U, 18U); state->s2 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s2, 2U, 27U, 4294967288U, 2U); state->s3 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s3, 13U, 21U, 4294967280U, 7U); state->s4 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s4, 3U, 12U, 4294967168U, 13U); return (state->s1 ^ state->s2 ^ state->s3 ^ state->s4); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state); /** * prandom_bytes_state - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes * * @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state. * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to * @bytes: the requested number of bytes * * This is used for pseudo-randomness with no outside seeding. * For more random results, use prandom_bytes(). */ void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t bytes) { u8 *ptr = buf; while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) { put_unaligned(prandom_u32_state(state), (u32 *) ptr); ptr += sizeof(u32); bytes -= sizeof(u32); } if (bytes > 0) { u32 rem = prandom_u32_state(state); do { *ptr++ = (u8) rem; bytes--; rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE; } while (bytes > 0); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes_state); static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state) { /* Calling RNG ten times to satisfy recurrence condition */ prandom_u32_state(state); prandom_u32_state(state); prandom_u32_state(state); prandom_u32_state(state); prandom_u32_state(state); prandom_u32_state(state); prandom_u32_state(state); prandom_u32_state(state); prandom_u32_state(state); prandom_u32_state(state); } void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state) { int i; for_each_possible_cpu(i) { struct rnd_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(pcpu_state, i); u32 seeds[4]; get_random_bytes(&seeds, sizeof(seeds)); state->s1 = __seed(seeds[0], 2U); state->s2 = __seed(seeds[1], 8U); state->s3 = __seed(seeds[2], 16U); state->s4 = __seed(seeds[3], 128U); prandom_warmup(state); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed_full_state); #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST static struct prandom_test1 { u32 seed; u32 result; } test1[] = { { 1U, 3484351685U }, { 2U, 2623130059U }, { 3U, 3125133893U }, { 4U, 984847254U }, }; static struct prandom_test2 { u32 seed; u32 iteration; u32 result; } test2[] = { /* Test cases against taus113 from GSL library. */ { 931557656U, 959U, 2975593782U }, { 1339693295U, 876U, 3887776532U }, { 1545556285U, 961U, 1615538833U }, { 601730776U, 723U, 1776162651U }, { 1027516047U, 687U, 511983079U }, { 416526298U, 700U, 916156552U }, { 1395522032U, 652U, 2222063676U }, { 366221443U, 617U, 2992857763U }, { 1539836965U, 714U, 3783265725U }, { 556206671U, 994U, 799626459U }, { 684907218U, 799U, 367789491U }, { 2121230701U, 931U, 2115467001U }, { 1668516451U, 644U, 3620590685U }, { 768046066U, 883U, 2034077390U }, { 1989159136U, 833U, 1195767305U }, { 536585145U, 996U, 3577259204U }, { 1008129373U, 642U, 1478080776U }, { 1740775604U, 939U, 1264980372U }, { 1967883163U, 508U, 10734624U }, { 1923019697U, 730U, 3821419629U }, { 442079932U, 560U, 3440032343U }, { 1961302714U, 845U, 841962572U }, { 2030205964U, 962U, 1325144227U }, { 1160407529U, 507U, 240940858U }, { 635482502U, 779U, 4200489746U }, { 1252788931U, 699U, 867195434U }, { 1961817131U, 719U, 668237657U }, { 1071468216U, 983U, 917876630U }, { 1281848367U, 932U, 1003100039U }, { 582537119U, 780U, 1127273778U }, { 1973672777U, 853U, 1071368872U }, { 1896756996U, 762U, 1127851055U }, { 847917054U, 500U, 1717499075U }, { 1240520510U, 951U, 2849576657U }, { 1685071682U, 567U, 1961810396U }, { 1516232129U, 557U, 3173877U }, { 1208118903U, 612U, 1613145022U }, { 1817269927U, 693U, 4279122573U }, { 1510091701U, 717U, 638191229U }, { 365916850U, 807U, 600424314U }, { 399324359U, 702U, 1803598116U }, { 1318480274U, 779U, 2074237022U }, { 697758115U, 840U, 1483639402U }, { 1696507773U, 840U, 577415447U }, { 2081979121U, 981U, 3041486449U }, { 955646687U, 742U, 3846494357U }, { 1250683506U, 749U, 836419859U }, { 595003102U, 534U, 366794109U }, { 47485338U, 558U, 3521120834U }, { 619433479U, 610U, 3991783875U }, { 704096520U, 518U, 4139493852U }, { 1712224984U, 606U, 2393312003U }, { 1318233152U, 922U, 3880361134U }, { 855572992U, 761U, 1472974787U }, { 64721421U, 703U, 683860550U }, { 678931758U, 840U, 380616043U }, { 692711973U, 778U, 1382361947U }, { 677703619U, 530U, 2826914161U }, { 92393223U, 586U, 1522128471U }, { 1222592920U, 743U, 3466726667U }, { 358288986U, 695U, 1091956998U }, { 1935056945U, 958U, 514864477U }, { 735675993U, 990U, 1294239989U }, { 1560089402U, 897U, 2238551287U }, { 70616361U, 829U, 22483098U }, { 368234700U, 731U, 2913875084U }, { 20221190U, 879U, 1564152970U }, { 539444654U, 682U, 1835141259U }, { 1314987297U, 840U, 1801114136U }, { 2019295544U, 645U, 3286438930U }, { 469023838U, 716U, 1637918202U }, { 1843754496U, 653U, 2562092152U }, { 400672036U, 809U, 4264212785U }, { 404722249U, 965U, 2704116999U }, { 600702209U, 758U, 584979986U }, { 519953954U, 667U, 2574436237U }, { 1658071126U, 694U, 2214569490U }, { 420480037U, 749U, 3430010866U }, { 690103647U, 969U, 3700758083U }, { 1029424799U, 937U, 3787746841U }, { 2012608669U, 506U, 3362628973U }, { 1535432887U, 998U, 42610943U }, { 1330635533U, 857U, 3040806504U }, { 1223800550U, 539U, 3954229517U }, { 1322411537U, 680U, 3223250324U }, { 1877847898U, 945U, 2915147143U }, { 1646356099U, 874U, 965988280U }, { 805687536U, 744U, 4032277920U }, { 1948093210U, 633U, 1346597684U }, { 392609744U, 783U, 1636083295U }, { 690241304U, 770U, 1201031298U }, { 1360302965U, 696U, 1665394461U }, { 1220090946U, 780U, 1316922812U }, { 447092251U, 500U, 3438743375U }, { 1613868791U, 592U, 828546883U }, { 523430951U, 548U, 2552392304U }, { 726692899U, 810U, 1656872867U }, { 1364340021U, 836U, 3710513486U }, { 1986257729U, 931U, 935013962U }, { 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U }, }; static u32 __extract_hwseed(void) { unsigned int val = 0; (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) || arch_get_random_int(&val)); return val; } static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed, bool mix_with_hwseed) { #define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */ #define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0) state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U); state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U); state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U); state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U); } static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void) { int i, j, errors = 0, runs = 0; bool error = false; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test1); i++) { struct rnd_state state; prandom_seed_early(&state, test1[i].seed, false); prandom_warmup(&state); if (test1[i].result != prandom_u32_state(&state)) error = true; } if (error) pr_warn("prandom: seed boundary self test failed\n"); else pr_info("prandom: seed boundary self test passed\n"); for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test2); i++) { struct rnd_state state; prandom_seed_early(&state, test2[i].seed, false); prandom_warmup(&state); for (j = 0; j < test2[i].iteration - 1; j++) prandom_u32_state(&state); if (test2[i].result != prandom_u32_state(&state)) errors++; runs++; cond_resched(); } if (errors) pr_warn("prandom: %d/%d self tests failed\n", errors, runs); else pr_info("prandom: %d self tests passed\n", runs); return 0; } core_initcall(prandom_state_selftest); #endif /* * The prandom_u32() implementation is now completely separate from the * prandom_state() functions, which are retained (for now) for compatibility. * * Because of (ab)use in the networking code for choosing random TCP/UDP port * numbers, which open DoS possibilities if guessable, we want something * stronger than a standard PRNG. But the performance requirements of * the network code do not allow robust crypto for this application. * * So this is a homebrew Junior Spaceman implementation, based on the * lowest-latency trustworthy crypto primitive available, SipHash. * (The authors of SipHash have not been consulted about this abuse of * their work.) * * Standard SipHash-2-4 uses 2n+4 rounds to hash n words of input to * one word of output. This abbreviated version uses 2 rounds per word * of output. */ struct siprand_state { unsigned long v0; unsigned long v1; unsigned long v2; unsigned long v3; }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct siprand_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy; DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise); EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(net_rand_noise); /* * This is the core CPRNG function. As "pseudorandom", this is not used * for truly valuable things, just intended to be a PITA to guess. * For maximum speed, we do just two SipHash rounds per word. This is * the same rate as 4 rounds per 64 bits that SipHash normally uses, * so hopefully it's reasonably secure. * * There are two changes from the official SipHash finalization: * - We omit some constants XORed with v2 in the SipHash spec as irrelevant; * they are there only to make the output rounds distinct from the input * rounds, and this application has no input rounds. * - Rather than returning v0^v1^v2^v3, return v1+v3. * If you look at the SipHash round, the last operation on v3 is * "v3 ^= v0", so "v0 ^ v3" just undoes that, a waste of time. * Likewise "v1 ^= v2". (The rotate of v2 makes a difference, but * it still cancels out half of the bits in v2 for no benefit.) * Second, since the last combining operation was xor, continue the * pattern of alternating xor/add for a tiny bit of extra non-linearity. */ static inline u32 siprand_u32(struct siprand_state *s) { unsigned long v0 = s->v0, v1 = s->v1, v2 = s->v2, v3 = s->v3; unsigned long n = raw_cpu_read(net_rand_noise); v3 ^= n; PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); v0 ^= n; s->v0 = v0; s->v1 = v1; s->v2 = v2; s->v3 = v3; return v1 + v3; } /** * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator * * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT * considered safe for cryptographic use. */ u32 prandom_u32(void) { struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state); u32 res = siprand_u32(state); trace_prandom_u32(res); put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state); return res; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32); /** * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to * @bytes: the requested number of bytes */ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes) { struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state); u8 *ptr = buf; while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) { put_unaligned(siprand_u32(state), (u32 *)ptr); ptr += sizeof(u32); bytes -= sizeof(u32); } if (bytes > 0) { u32 rem = siprand_u32(state); do { *ptr++ = (u8)rem; rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE; } while (--bytes > 0); } put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes); /** * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator * @entropy: entropy value * * Add some additional seed material to the prandom pool. * The "entropy" is actually our IP address (the only caller is * the network code), not for unpredictability, but to ensure that * different machines are initialized differently. */ void prandom_seed(u32 entropy) { int i; add_device_randomness(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); for_each_possible_cpu(i) { struct siprand_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i); unsigned long v0 = state->v0, v1 = state->v1; unsigned long v2 = state->v2, v3 = state->v3; do { v3 ^= entropy; PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); v0 ^= entropy; } while (unlikely(!v0 || !v1 || !v2 || !v3)); WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0); WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1); WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2); WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed); /* * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow * the prandom_u32() engine to be started. */ static int __init prandom_init_early(void) { int i; unsigned long v0, v1, v2, v3; if (!arch_get_random_long(&v0)) v0 = jiffies; if (!arch_get_random_long(&v1)) v1 = random_get_entropy(); v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0; v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1; for_each_possible_cpu(i) { struct siprand_state *state; v3 ^= i; PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); v0 ^= i; state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i); state->v0 = v0; state->v1 = v1; state->v2 = v2; state->v3 = v3; } return 0; } core_initcall(prandom_init_early); /* Stronger reseeding when available, and periodically thereafter. */ static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused); static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, prandom_reseed); static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused) { unsigned long expires; int i; /* * Reinitialize each CPU's PRNG with 128 bits of key. * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are, * well, expected. */ for_each_possible_cpu(i) { struct siprand_state *state; unsigned long v0 = get_random_long(), v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0; unsigned long v1 = get_random_long(), v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1; #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 int j; /* * On 32-bit machines, hash in two extra words to * approximate 128-bit key length. Not that the hash * has that much security, but this prevents a trivial * 64-bit brute force. */ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { unsigned long m = get_random_long(); v3 ^= m; PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); v0 ^= m; } #endif /* * Probably impossible in practice, but there is a * theoretical risk that a race between this reseeding * and the target CPU writing its state back could * create the all-zero SipHash fixed point. * * To ensure that never happens, ensure the state * we write contains no zero words. */ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i); WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0 ? v0 : -1ul); WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1 ? v1 : -1ul); WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2 ? v2 : -1ul); WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3 ? v3 : -1ul); } /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */ expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + 40 * HZ + prandom_u32_max(40 * HZ)); mod_timer(&seed_timer, expires); } /* * The random ready callback can be called from almost any interrupt. * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event. */ static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused) { mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies); } #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST /* Principle: True 32-bit random numbers will all have 16 differing bits on * average. For each 32-bit number, there are 601M numbers differing by 16 * bits, and 89% of the numbers differ by at least 12 bits. Note that more * than 16 differing bits also implies a correlation with inverted bits. Thus * we take 1024 random numbers and compare each of them to the other ones, * counting the deviation of correlated bits to 16. Constants report 32, * counters 32-log2(TEST_SIZE), and pure randoms, around 6 or lower. With the * u32 total, TEST_SIZE may be as large as 4096 samples. */ #define TEST_SIZE 1024 static int __init prandom32_state_selftest(void) { unsigned int x, y, bits, samples; u32 xor, flip; u32 total; u32 *data; data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) * TEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) return 0; for (samples = 0; samples < TEST_SIZE; samples++) data[samples] = prandom_u32(); flip = total = 0; for (x = 0; x < samples; x++) { for (y = 0; y < samples; y++) { if (x == y) continue; xor = data[x] ^ data[y]; flip |= xor; bits = hweight32(xor); total += (bits - 16) * (bits - 16); } } /* We'll return the average deviation as 2*sqrt(corr/samples), which * is also sqrt(4*corr/samples) which provides a better resolution. */ bits = int_sqrt(total / (samples * (samples - 1)) * 4); if (bits > 6) pr_warn("prandom32: self test failed (at least %u bits" " correlated, fixed_mask=%#x fixed_value=%#x\n", bits, ~flip, data[0] & ~flip); else pr_info("prandom32: self test passed (less than %u bits" " correlated)\n", bits+1); kfree(data); return 0; } core_initcall(prandom32_state_selftest); #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST */ /* * Start periodic full reseeding as soon as strong * random numbers are available. */ static int __init prandom_init_late(void) { static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = { .func = prandom_timer_start }; int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready); if (ret == -EALREADY) { prandom_timer_start(&random_ready); ret = 0; } return ret; } late_initcall(prandom_init_late);