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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:
- Clean up the transmission flow
Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now
done in the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead
taking the chip lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside
tpm_transmit(), used with the resource manager, have been refactored
out.
Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel
patches by James Bottomley).
- PPI 1.3 support
TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that
may be needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command
requires such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.
The PPI request file will show output like this then:
# echo "23 16" > request
# cat request
23 16
# echo "5" > request
# cat request
5
- Extend all PCR banks in IMA
Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks
is now allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined
dynamically using a probe PCR read without relying crypto's static
list of hash algorithms.
This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and
secure.
- TPM 2.0 selftests
Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside
of the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
tpm/ppi: Enable submission of optional command parameter for PPI 1.3
tpm/ppi: Possibly show command parameter if TPM PPI 1.3 is used
tpm/ppi: Display up to 101 operations as define for version 1.3
tpm/ppi: rename TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID to TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID_1
tpm/ppi: pass function revision ID to tpm_eval_dsm()
tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()
KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()
tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h
tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read
tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms
tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array
tpm: remove @flags from tpm_transmit()
tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit()
tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop()
tpm: remove TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED flag
tpm: use tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm-sysfs.c.
tpm: remove @space from tpm_transmit()
tpm: move TPM space code out of tpm_transmit()
tpm: move tpm_validate_commmand() to tpm2-space.c
tpm: clean up tpm_try_transmit() error handling flow
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"Mimi Zohar says:
'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.
Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup'"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.
Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.
Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.
All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1"
* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: mark expected switch fall-through
audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
audit: join tty records to their syscall
audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
audit: ignore fcaps on umount
audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
audit: add support for fcaps v3
audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
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In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch fixes the following warnings:
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
Also, add a missing break statement to fix the following warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Currently, tpm_pcr_extend() accepts as an input only a SHA1 digest.
This patch replaces the hash parameter of tpm_pcr_extend() with an array of
tpm_digest structures, so that the caller can provide a digest for each PCR
bank currently allocated in the TPM.
tpm_pcr_extend() will not extend banks for which no digest was provided,
as it happened before this patch, but instead it requires that callers
provide the full set of digests. Since the number of digests will always be
chip->nr_allocated_banks, the count parameter has been removed.
Due to the API change, ima_pcr_extend() and pcrlock() have been modified.
Since the number of allocated banks is not known in advance, the memory for
the digests must be dynamically allocated. To avoid performance degradation
and to avoid that a PCR extend is not done due to lack of memory, the array
of tpm_digest structures is allocated by the users of the TPM driver at
initialization time.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (on x86 for TPM 1.2 & PTT TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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Currently, the TPM driver retrieves the digest size from a table mapping
TPM algorithms identifiers to identifiers defined by the crypto subsystem.
If the algorithm is not defined by the latter, the digest size can be
retrieved from the output of the PCR read command.
The patch modifies the definition of tpm_pcr_read() and tpm2_pcr_read() to
pass the desired hash algorithm and obtain the digest size at TPM startup.
Algorithms and corresponding digest sizes are stored in the new structure
tpm_bank_info, member of tpm_chip, so that the information can be used by
other kernel subsystems.
tpm_bank_info contains: the TPM algorithm identifier, necessary to generate
the event log as defined by Trusted Computing Group (TCG); the digest size,
to pad/truncate a digest calculated with a different algorithm; the crypto
subsystem identifier, to calculate the digest of event data.
This patch also protects against data corruption that could happen in the
bus, by checking that the digest size returned by the TPM during a PCR read
matches the size of the algorithm passed to tpm2_pcr_read().
For the initial PCR read, when digest sizes are not yet available, this
patch ensures that the amount of data copied from the output returned by
the TPM does not exceed the size of the array data are copied to.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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If tmpfiles can be made persistent, then newly created tmpfiles need to
be treated like any other new files in policy.
This patch indicates which newly created tmpfiles are in policy, causing
the file hash to be calculated on __fput().
Reported-by: Ignaz Forster <ignaz.forster@gmx.de>
[rgoldwyn@suse.com: Call ima_post_create_tmpfile() in vfs_tmpfile() as
opposed to do_tmpfile(). This will help the case for overlayfs where
copy_up is denied while overwriting a file.]
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).
The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.
It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.
Remove it.
Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull TPM updates from James Morris:
- Support for partial reads of /dev/tpm0.
- Clean up for TPM 1.x code: move the commands to tpm1-cmd.c and make
everything to use the same data structure for building TPM commands
i.e. struct tpm_buf.
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (25 commits)
tpm: add support for partial reads
tpm: tpm_ibmvtpm: fix kdoc warnings
tpm: fix kdoc for tpm2_flush_context_cmd()
tpm: tpm_try_transmit() refactor error flow.
tpm: use u32 instead of int for PCR index
tpm1: reimplement tpm1_continue_selftest() using tpm_buf
tpm1: reimplement SAVESTATE using tpm_buf
tpm1: rename tpm1_pcr_read_dev to tpm1_pcr_read()
tpm1: implement tpm1_pcr_read_dev() using tpm_buf structure
tpm: tpm1: rewrite tpm1_get_random() using tpm_buf structure
tpm: tpm-space.c remove unneeded semicolon
tpm: tpm-interface.c drop unused macros
tpm: add tpm_auto_startup() into tpm-interface.c
tpm: factor out tpm_startup function
tpm: factor out tpm 1.x pm suspend flow into tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: move tpm 1.x selftest code from tpm-interface.c tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: factor out tpm1_get_random into tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: move tpm_getcap to tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: move tpm1_pcr_extend to tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: factor out tpm_get_timeouts()
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.
Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the
kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent
loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall,
independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure
boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.
In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.
(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here)"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
integrity: Remove references to module keyring
ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write
ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
efi: Add EFI signature data types
integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring
integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring
selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test
ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs
x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
ima: add support for arch specific policies
ima: refactor ima_init_policy()
ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot
integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
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totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages are made static inline function.
Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating
things. It was discussed in length here,
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 So it seemes
better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic, with preventing
poteintial store-to-read tearing as a bonus.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-4-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"The main changes here are Paul Gortmaker's removal of unneccesary
module.h infrastructure"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: integrity: partial revert of make ima_main explicitly non-modular
security: fs: make inode explicitly non-modular
security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h
security: integrity: make evm_main explicitly non-modular
keys: remove needless modular infrastructure from ecryptfs_format
security: integrity: make ima_main explicitly non-modular
tomoyo: fix small typo
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"In the finest of holiday of traditions, I have a number of gifts to
share today. While most of them are re-gifts from others, unlike the
typical re-gift, these are things you will want in and around your
tree; I promise.
This pull request is perhaps a bit larger than our typical PR, but
most of it comes from Jan's rework of audit's fanotify code; a very
welcome improvement. We ran this through our normal regression tests,
as well as some newly created stress tests and everything looks good.
Richard added a few patches, mostly cleaning up a few things and and
shortening some of the audit records that we send to userspace; a
change the userspace folks are quite happy about.
Finally YueHaibing and I kick in a few patches to simplify things a
bit and make the code less prone to errors.
Lastly, I want to say thanks one more time to everyone who has
contributed patches, testing, and code reviews for the audit subsystem
over the past year. The project is what it is due to your help and
contributions - thank you"
* tag 'audit-pr-20181224' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: (22 commits)
audit: remove duplicated include from audit.c
audit: shorten PATH cap values when zero
audit: use current whenever possible
audit: minimize our use of audit_log_format()
audit: remove WATCH and TREE config options
audit: use session_info helper
audit: localize audit_log_session_info prototype
audit: Use 'mark' name for fsnotify_mark variables
audit: Replace chunk attached to mark instead of replacing mark
audit: Simplify locking around untag_chunk()
audit: Drop all unused chunk nodes during deletion
audit: Guarantee forward progress of chunk untagging
audit: Allocate fsnotify mark independently of chunk
audit: Provide helper for dropping mark's chunk reference
audit: Remove pointless check in insert_hash()
audit: Factor out chunk replacement code
audit: Make hash table insertion safe against concurrent lookups
audit: Embed key into chunk
audit: Fix possible tagging failures
audit: Fix possible spurious -ENOSPC error
...
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In commit 4f83d5ea643a ("security: integrity: make ima_main explicitly
non-modular") I'd removed <linux/module.h> after assuming that the
function is_module_sig_enforced() was an LSM function and not a core
kernel module function.
Unfortunately the typical .config selections used in build testing
provide an implicit <linux/module.h> presence, and so normal/typical
build testing did not immediately reveal my incorrect assumption.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Start the policy_tokens and the associated enumeration from zero,
simplifying the pt macro.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd into next-tpm
tpmdd updates for Linux v4.21
From Jarkko:
v4.21 updates:
* Support for partial reads of /dev/tpm0.
* Clean up for TPM 1.x code: move the commands to tpm1-cmd.c and make
everything to use the same data structure for building TPM commands
i.e. struct tpm_buf.
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next-integrity
From Mimi:
In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load
syscall. Different signature verification methods exist for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image. This pull request adds additional support
in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load
syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime
"secure boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.
In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.
(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here.)
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Use the aptly named function rather than open coding the check. No
functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel
image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A
soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and
initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the
signatures.
This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now
loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image
and initramfs signatures.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: only use platform keyring if it's enabled (Thiago)]
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.
The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.
Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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The Makefile/Kconfig entry controlling compilation of this code is:
obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig:config IMA
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig- bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag etc. since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Update the builtin IMA policies specified on the boot command line
(eg. ima_policy="tcb|appraise_tcb") to permit accessing efivar files.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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On x86, there are two methods of verifying a kexec'ed kernel image
signature being loaded via the kexec_file_load syscall - an architecture
specific implementaton or a IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraisal rule. Neither
of these methods verify the kexec'ed kernel image signature being loaded
via the kexec_load syscall.
Secure boot enabled systems require kexec images to be signed. Therefore,
this patch loads an IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK policy rule on secure boot
enabled systems not configured with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.
When IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM is configured, different IMA appraise modes
(eg. fix, log) can be specified on the boot command line, allowing unsigned
or invalidly signed kernel images to be kexec'ed. This patch permits
enabling IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM or IMA_ARCH_POLICY, but not both.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Builtin IMA policies can be enabled on the boot command line, and replaced
with a custom policy, normally during early boot in the initramfs. Build
time IMA policy rules were recently added. These rules are automatically
enabled on boot and persist after loading a custom policy.
There is a need for yet another type of policy, an architecture specific
policy, which is derived at runtime during kernel boot, based on the
runtime secure boot flags. Like the build time policy rules, these rules
persist after loading a custom policy.
This patch adds support for loading an architecture specific IMA policy.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Co-Developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This patch removes the code duplication in ima_init_policy() by defining
a new function named add_rules(). The new function adds the rules to the
initial IMA policy, the custom policy or both based on the policy mask
(IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY).
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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When CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, the kexec_file_load syscall
requires the kexec'd kernel image to be signed. Distros are concerned
about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall. As a compromise, the
kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
is configured and the system is booted with secureboot enabled.
This patch disables the kexec_load syscall only for systems booted with
secureboot enabled.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: add missing mesage on kexec_load failure]
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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There are many places, notably audit_log_task_info() and
audit_log_exit(), that take task_struct pointers but in reality they
are always working on the current task. This patch eliminates the
task_struct arguments and uses current directly which allows a number
of cleanups as well.
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The TPM specs defines PCR index as a positive number, and there is
no reason to use a signed number. It is also a possible security
issue as currently no functions check for a negative index,
which may become a large number when converted to u32.
Adjust the API to use u32 instead of int in all PCR related
functions.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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Open a new file instance as opposed to changing file->f_mode when
the file is not readable. This is done to accomodate overlayfs
stacked file operations change. The real struct file is hidden
behind the overlays struct file. So, any file->f_mode manipulations are
not reflected on the real struct file. Open the file again in read mode
if original file cannot be read, read and calculate the hash.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-4.19)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold
a 'long' value. Increase it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Constify some static data that is never modified,
so that it is placed in .rodata.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"This adds support for EVM signatures based on larger digests, contains
a new audit record AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to differentiate the
IMA policy rules from the IMA-audit messages, addresses two deadlocks
due to either loading or searching for crypto algorithms, and cleans
up the audit messages"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()
integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification.
evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures
evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable
integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled
ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set
ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string()
ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull TPM updates from James Morris:
- Migrate away from PM runtime as explicit cmdReady/goIdle transactions
for every command is a spec requirement. PM runtime adds only a layer
of complexity on our case.
- tpm_tis drivers can now specify the hwrng quality.
- TPM 2.0 code uses now tpm_buf for constructing messages. Jarkko
thinks Tomas Winkler has done the same for TPM 1.2, and will start
digging those changes from the patchwork in the near future.
- Bug fixes and clean ups
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: Get rid of ima_used_chip and use ima_tpm_chip != NULL instead
ima: Use tpm_default_chip() and call TPM functions with a tpm_chip
tpm: replace TPM_TRANSMIT_RAW with TPM_TRANSMIT_NESTED
tpm: Convert tpm_find_get_ops() to use tpm_default_chip()
tpm: Implement tpm_default_chip() to find a TPM chip
tpm: rename tpm_chip_find_get() to tpm_find_get_ops()
tpm: Allow tpm_tis drivers to set hwrng quality.
tpm: Return the actual size when receiving an unsupported command
tpm: separate cmd_ready/go_idle from runtime_pm
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: switch to i2c_lock_bus(..., I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT)
tpm_tis_spi: Pass the SPI IRQ down to the driver
tpm: migrate tpm2_get_random() to use struct tpm_buf
tpm: migrate tpm2_get_tpm_pt() to use struct tpm_buf
tpm: migrate tpm2_probe() to use struct tpm_buf
tpm: migrate tpm2_shutdown() to use struct tpm_buf
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers
- Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of
kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file
descriptor, from Mimi Zohar.
- Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than
just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from
Mimi.
- Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if
using signed firmware), from Mimi.
- Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be
measured by IMA, from Mimi.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()
security: export security_kernel_load_data function
ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)
module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
ima: add build time policy
ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback
ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
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Get rid of ima_used_chip and use ima_tpm_chip variable instead for
determining whether to use the TPM chip.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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Rather than accessing the TPM functions by passing a NULL pointer for
the tpm_chip, which causes a lookup for a suitable chip every time, get a
hold of a tpm_chip and access the TPM functions using it.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines
AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.
Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the
audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces
the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules:
type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1
type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \
success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \
items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \
fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \
exe="/usr/bin/echo" \
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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If Integrity is not auditing, IMA shouldn't audit, either.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Remove the usage of audit_log_string() and replace it with
audit_log_format().
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The parameters passed to this logging function are all provided by
a privileged user and therefore we can call audit_log_string()
rather than audit_log_untrustedstring().
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Some systems are memory constrained but they need to load very large
firmwares. The firmware subsystem allows drivers to request this
firmware be loaded from the filesystem, but this requires that the
entire firmware be loaded into kernel memory first before it's provided
to the driver. This can lead to a situation where we map the firmware
twice, once to load the firmware into kernel memory and once to copy the
firmware into the final resting place.
To resolve this problem, commit a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading
into a pre-allocated buffer") introduced request_firmware_into_buf() API
that allows drivers to request firmware be loaded directly into a
pre-allocated buffer.
Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the firmware being
accessible to the device prior to the completion of IMA's signature
verification any more than when using two buffers? (Refer to mailing list
discussion[1]).
Only on systems with an IOMMU can the access be prevented. As long as
the signature verification completes prior to the DMA map is performed,
the device can not access the buffer. This implies that the same buffer
can not be re-used. Can we ensure the buffer has not been DMA mapped
before using the pre-allocated buffer?
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/10/56
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly
or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch
replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new
security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes
in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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IMA by default does not measure, appraise or audit files, but can be
enabled at runtime by specifying a builtin policy on the boot command line
or by loading a custom policy.
This patch defines a build time policy, which verifies kernel modules,
firmware, kexec image, and/or the IMA policy signatures. This build time
policy is automatically enabled at runtime and persists after loading a
custom policy.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch prevents
the sysfs fallback method of loading firmware.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures, nor can
the kexec image be measured. Based on policy, deny the kexec_load
syscall.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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just check ->f_mode in ima_appraise_measurement()
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"From Mimi:
- add run time support for specifying additional security xattrs
included in the security.evm HMAC/signature
- some code clean up and bug fixes"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
EVM: unlock on error path in evm_read_xattrs()
EVM: prevent array underflow in evm_write_xattrs()
EVM: Fix null dereference on xattr when xattr fails to allocate
EVM: fix memory leak of temporary buffer 'temp'
IMA: use list_splice_tail_init_rcu() instead of its open coded variant
ima: use match_string() helper
ima: fix updating the ima_appraise flag
ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)
ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name
EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs
EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list
integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfs
ima: Remove unused variable ima_initialized
ima: Unify logging
ima: Reflect correct permissions for policy
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Use list_splice_tail_init_rcu() to extend the existing custom IMA policy
with additional IMA policy rules.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petko.manolov@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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match_string() returns the index of an array for a matching string,
which can be used intead of open coded variant.
Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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As IMA policy rules are added, a mask of the type of rule (eg. kernel
modules, firmware, IMA policy) is updated. Unlike custom IMA policy
rules, which replace the original builtin policy rules and update the
mask, the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules were loaded, but did not
update the mask.
This patch refactors the code to load custom policies, defining a new
function named ima_appraise_flag(). The new function is called either
when loading the builtin "secure_boot" or custom policies.
Fixes: 503ceaef8e2e ("ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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