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Fix undefined symbol issue in ecrdsa_generic module when ASN1
or OID_REGISTRY aren't enabled in the config by selecting these
options for CRYPTO_ECRDSA.
ERROR: "asn1_ber_decoder" [crypto/ecrdsa_generic.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "look_up_OID" [crypto/ecrdsa_generic.ko] undefined!
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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ecc.c have algorithms that could be used togeter by ecdh and ecrdsa.
Make it separate module. Add CRYPTO_ECC into Kconfig. EXPORT_SYMBOL and
document to what seems appropriate. Move structs ecc_point and ecc_curve
from ecc_curve_defs.h into ecc.h.
No code changes.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Group RSA, DH, and ECDH into Public-key cryptography config section.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Fixes: ccb778e1841ce04b ("crypto: api - Add fips_enable flag")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Spotted while reviewind patches from Eric Biggers.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Convert the x86 implementations of MORUS-1280 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Convert the x86 implementation of MORUS-640 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Convert the x86 implementation of AEGIS-256 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Convert the x86 implementation of AEGIS-128L to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Convert the x86 implementation of AEGIS-128 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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To achieve more comprehensive crypto test coverage, I'd like to add fuzz
tests that use random data layouts and request flags.
To be most effective these tests should be part of testmgr, so they
automatically run on every algorithm registered with the crypto API.
However, they will take much longer to run than the current tests and
therefore will only really be intended to be run by developers, whereas
the current tests have a wider audience.
Therefore, add a new kconfig option CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
that can be set by developers to enable these extra, expensive tests.
Similar to the regular tests, also add a module parameter
cryptomgr.noextratests to support disabling the tests.
Finally, another module parameter cryptomgr.fuzz_iterations is added to
control how many iterations the fuzz tests do. Note: for now setting
this to 0 will be equivalent to cryptomgr.noextratests=1. But I opted
for separate parameters to provide more flexibility to add other types
of tests under the "extra tests" category in the future.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Fix typo "plcmul" to "pclmul"
Signed-off-by: Huaxuan Mao <minhaco@msn.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kconfig updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- support -y option for merge_config.sh to avoid downgrading =y to =m
- remove S_OTHER symbol type, and touch include/config/*.h files correctly
- fix file name and line number in lexer warnings
- fix memory leak when EOF is encountered in quotation
- resolve all shift/reduce conflicts of the parser
- warn no new line at end of file
- make 'source' statement more strict to take only string literal
- rewrite the lexer and remove the keyword lookup table
- convert to SPDX License Identifier
- compile C files independently instead of including them from zconf.y
- fix various warnings of gconfig
- misc cleanups
* tag 'kconfig-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (39 commits)
kconfig: surround dbg_sym_flags with #ifdef DEBUG to fix gconf warning
kconfig: split images.c out of qconf.cc/gconf.c to fix gconf warnings
kconfig: add static qualifiers to fix gconf warnings
kconfig: split the lexer out of zconf.y
kconfig: split some C files out of zconf.y
kconfig: convert to SPDX License Identifier
kconfig: remove keyword lookup table entirely
kconfig: update current_pos in the second lexer
kconfig: switch to ASSIGN_VAL state in the second lexer
kconfig: stop associating kconf_id with yylval
kconfig: refactor end token rules
kconfig: stop supporting '.' and '/' in unquoted words
treewide: surround Kconfig file paths with double quotes
microblaze: surround string default in Kconfig with double quotes
kconfig: use T_WORD instead of T_VARIABLE for variables
kconfig: use specific tokens instead of T_ASSIGN for assignments
kconfig: refactor scanning and parsing "option" properties
kconfig: use distinct tokens for type and default properties
kconfig: remove redundant token defines
kconfig: rename depends_list to comment_option_list
...
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The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in
the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to
support bare file paths in the source statement.
I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of
ambiguity.
The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes,
and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals.
Make it treewide consistent now.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Now that the x86_64 SIMD implementations of ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 have
been refactored to support varying the number of rounds, add support for
XChaCha12. This is identical to XChaCha20 except for the number of
rounds, which is 12 instead of 20. This can be used by Adiantum.
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add an XChaCha20 implementation that is hooked up to the x86_64 SIMD
implementations of ChaCha20. This can be used by Adiantum.
An SSSE3 implementation of single-block HChaCha20 is also added so that
XChaCha20 can use it rather than the generic implementation. This
required refactoring the ChaCha permutation into its own function.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add a 64-bit AVX2 implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal
hash function used in the Adiantum encryption mode. For now, only the
NH portion is actually AVX2-accelerated; the Poly1305 part is less
performance-critical so is just implemented in C.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add a 64-bit SSE2 implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal
hash function used in the Adiantum encryption mode. For now, only the
NH portion is actually SSE2-accelerated; the Poly1305 part is less
performance-critical so is just implemented in C.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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CRYPTO_STATS is using CRYPTO_USER stuff, so it should depends on it.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add a generic implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash
function used in the Adiantum encryption mode.
CONFIG_NHPOLY1305 is not selectable by itself since there won't be any
real reason to enable it without also enabling Adiantum support.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the
application of the XSalsa20 construction
(https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the
ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe
it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
Supporting both variants is straightforward.
Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users
to seek to any position in the stream.
I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity of separate modules.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add GOST/IETF Streebog hash function (GOST R 34.11-2012, RFC 6986)
generic hash transformation.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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cts(cbc(aes)) as used in the kernel has been added to NIST
standard as CBC-CS3. Document it as such.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Suggested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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In the "aes-fixed-time" AES implementation, disable interrupts while
accessing the S-box, in order to make cache-timing attacks more
difficult. Previously it was possible for the CPU to be interrupted
while the S-box was loaded into L1 cache, potentially evicting the
cachelines and causing later table lookups to be time-variant.
In tests I did on x86 and ARM, this doesn't affect performance
significantly. Responsiveness is potentially a concern, but interrupts
are only disabled for a single AES block.
Note that even after this change, the implementation still isn't
necessarily guaranteed to be constant-time; see
https://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf for a discussion
of the many difficulties involved in writing truly constant-time AES
software. But it's valuable to make such attacks more difficult.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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For historical reasons, the AES-NI based implementation of the PCBC
chaining mode uses a special FPU chaining mode wrapper template to
amortize the FPU start/stop overhead over multiple blocks.
When this FPU wrapper was introduced, it supported widely used
chaining modes such as XTS and CTR (as well as LRW), but currently,
PCBC is the only remaining user.
Since there are no known users of pcbc(aes) in the kernel, let's remove
this special driver, and rely on the generic pcbc driver to encapsulate
the AES-NI core cipher.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add a generic version of output feedback mode. We already have support of
several hardware based transformations of this mode and the needed test
vectors but we somehow missed adding a generic software one. Fix this now.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch implement a generic way to get statistics about all crypto
usages.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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As it turns out, the AVX2 multibuffer SHA routines are currently
broken [0], in a way that would have likely been noticed if this
code were in wide use. Since the code is too complicated to be
maintained by anyone except the original authors, and since the
performance benefits for real-world use cases are debatable to
begin with, it is better to drop it entirely for the moment.
[0] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153476243825350&w=2
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by
anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about
its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end
devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before
that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck.
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153359499015659
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The x86 assembly implementations of Salsa20 use the frame base pointer
register (%ebp or %rbp), which breaks frame pointer convention and
breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code.
Recent (v4.10+) kernels will warn about this, e.g.
WARNING: kernel stack regs at 00000000a8291e69 in syzkaller047086:4677 has bad 'bp' value 000000001077994c
[...]
But after looking into it, I believe there's very little reason to still
retain the x86 Salsa20 code. First, these are *not* vectorized
(SSE2/SSSE3/AVX2) implementations, which would be needed to get anywhere
close to the best Salsa20 performance on any remotely modern x86
processor; they're just regular x86 assembly. Second, it's still
unclear that anyone is actually using the kernel's Salsa20 at all,
especially given that now ChaCha20 is supported too, and with much more
efficient SSSE3 and AVX2 implementations. Finally, in benchmarks I did
on both Intel and AMD processors with both gcc 8.1.0 and gcc 4.9.4, the
x86_64 salsa20-asm is actually slightly *slower* than salsa20-generic
(~3% slower on Skylake, ~10% slower on Zen), while the i686 salsa20-asm
is only slightly faster than salsa20-generic (~15% faster on Skylake,
~20% faster on Zen). The gcc version made little difference.
So, the x86_64 salsa20-asm is pretty clearly useless. That leaves just
the i686 salsa20-asm, which based on my tests provides a 15-20% speed
boost. But that's without updating the code to not use %ebp. And given
the maintenance cost, the small speed difference vs. salsa20-generic,
the fact that few people still use i686 kernels, the doubt that anyone
is even using the kernel's Salsa20 at all, and the fact that a SSE2
implementation would almost certainly be much faster on any remotely
modern x86 processor yet no one has cared enough to add one yet, I don't
think it's worthwhile to keep.
Thus, just remove both the x86_64 and i686 salsa20-asm implementations.
Reported-by: syzbot+ffa3a158337bbc01ff09@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Commit 56e8e57fc3a7 ("crypto: morus - Add common SIMD glue code for
MORUS") accidetally consiedered the glue code to be usable by different
architectures, but it seems to be only usable on x86.
This patch moves it under arch/x86/crypto and adds 'depends on X86' to
the Kconfig options and also removes the prompt to hide these internal
options from the user.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds optimized implementations of MORUS-640 and MORUS-1280,
utilizing the SSE2 and AVX2 x86 extensions.
For MORUS-1280 (which operates on 256-bit blocks) we provide both AVX2
and SSE2 implementation. Although SSE2 MORUS-1280 is slower than AVX2
MORUS-1280, it is comparable in speed to the SSE2 MORUS-640.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds a common glue code for optimized implementations of
MORUS AEAD algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds the generic implementation of the MORUS family of AEAD
algorithms (MORUS-640 and MORUS-1280). The original authors of MORUS
are Hongjun Wu and Tao Huang.
At the time of writing, MORUS is one of the finalists in CAESAR, an
open competition intended to select a portfolio of alternatives to
the problematic AES-GCM:
https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html
https://competitions.cr.yp.to/round3/morusv2.pdf
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds optimized implementations of AEGIS-128, AEGIS-128L,
and AEGIS-256, utilizing the AES-NI and SSE2 x86 extensions.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds the generic implementation of the AEGIS family of AEAD
algorithms (AEGIS-128, AEGIS-128L, and AEGIS-256). The original
authors of AEGIS are Hongjun Wu and Bart Preneel.
At the time of writing, AEGIS is one of the finalists in CAESAR, an
open competition intended to select a portfolio of alternatives to
the problematic AES-GCM:
https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html
https://competitions.cr.yp.to/round3/aegisv11.pdf
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Adds zstd support to crypto and scompress. Only supports the default
level.
Previously we held off on this patch, since there weren't any users.
Now zram is ready for zstd support, but depends on CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD,
which isn't defined until this patch is in. I also see a patch adding
zstd to pstore [0], which depends on crypto zstd.
[0] lkml.kernel.org/r/9c9416b2dff19f05fb4c35879aaa83d11ff72c92.1521626182.git.geliangtang@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jhogan/mips
Pull MIPS updates from James Hogan:
"These are the main MIPS changes for 4.17. Rough overview:
(1) generic platform: Add support for Microsemi Ocelot SoCs
(2) crypto: Add CRC32 and CRC32C HW acceleration module
(3) Various cleanups and misc improvements
More detailed summary:
Miscellaneous:
- hang more efficiently on halt/powerdown/restart
- pm-cps: Block system suspend when a JTAG probe is present
- expand make help text for generic defconfigs
- refactor handling of legacy defconfigs
- determine the entry point from the ELF file header to fix microMIPS
for certain toolchains
- introduce isa-rev.h for MIPS_ISA_REV and use to simplify other code
Minor cleanups:
- DTS: boston/ci20: Unit name cleanups and correction
- kdump: Make the default for PHYSICAL_START always 64-bit
- constify gpio_led in Alchemy, AR7, and TXX9
- silence a couple of W=1 warnings
- remove duplicate includes
Platform support:
Generic platform:
- add support for Microsemi Ocelot
- dt-bindings: Add vendor prefix for Microsemi Corporation
- dt-bindings: Add bindings for Microsemi SoCs
- add ocelot SoC & PCB123 board DTS files
- MAINTAINERS: Add entry for Microsemi MIPS SoCs
- enable crc32-mips on r6 configs
ath79:
- fix AR724X_PLL_REG_PCIE_CONFIG offset
BCM47xx:
- firmware: Use mac_pton() for MAC address parsing
- add Luxul XAP1500/XWR1750 WiFi LEDs
- use standard reset button for Luxul XWR-1750
BMIPS:
- enable CONFIG_BRCMSTB_PM in bmips_stb_defconfig for build coverage
- add STB PM, wake-up timer, watchdog DT nodes
Octeon:
- drop '.' after newlines in printk calls
ralink:
- pci-mt7621: Enable PCIe on MT7688"
* tag 'mips_4.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jhogan/mips: (37 commits)
MIPS: BCM47XX: Use standard reset button for Luxul XWR-1750
MIPS: BCM47XX: Add Luxul XAP1500/XWR1750 WiFi LEDs
MIPS: Make the default for PHYSICAL_START always 64-bit
MIPS: Use the entry point from the ELF file header
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for Microsemi MIPS SoCs
MIPS: generic: Add support for Microsemi Ocelot
MIPS: mscc: Add ocelot PCB123 device tree
MIPS: mscc: Add ocelot dtsi
dt-bindings: mips: Add bindings for Microsemi SoCs
dt-bindings: Add vendor prefix for Microsemi Corporation
MIPS: ath79: Fix AR724X_PLL_REG_PCIE_CONFIG offset
MIPS: pci-mt7620: Enable PCIe on MT7688
MIPS: pm-cps: Block system suspend when a JTAG probe is present
MIPS: VDSO: Replace __mips_isa_rev with MIPS_ISA_REV
MIPS: BPF: Replace __mips_isa_rev with MIPS_ISA_REV
MIPS: cpu-features.h: Replace __mips_isa_rev with MIPS_ISA_REV
MIPS: Introduce isa-rev.h to define MIPS_ISA_REV
MIPS: Hang more efficiently on halt/powerdown/restart
FIRMWARE: bcm47xx_nvram: Replace mac address parsing
MIPS: BMIPS: Add Broadcom STB watchdog nodes
...
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Introduce the SM4 cipher algorithms (OSCCA GB/T 32907-2016).
SM4 (GBT.32907-2016) is a cryptographic standard issued by the
Organization of State Commercial Administration of China (OSCCA)
as an authorized cryptographic algorithms for the use within China.
SMS4 was originally created for use in protecting wireless
networks, and is mandated in the Chinese National Standard for
Wireless LAN WAPI (Wired Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure)
(GB.15629.11-2003).
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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TPM security routines require encryption and decryption with AES in
CFB mode, so add it to the Linux Crypto schemes. CFB is basically a
one time pad where the pad is generated initially from the encrypted
IV and then subsequently from the encrypted previous block of
ciphertext. The pad is XOR'd into the plain text to get the final
ciphertext.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#CFB
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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All users of ablk_helper have been converted over to crypto_simd, so
remove ablk_helper.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Convert the AESNI AVX and AESNI AVX2 implementations of Camellia from
the (deprecated) ablkcipher and blkcipher interfaces over to the
skcipher interface. Note that this includes replacing the use of
ablk_helper with crypto_simd.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Convert the x86 asm implementation of Camellia from the (deprecated)
blkcipher interface over to the skcipher interface.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The XTS template now wraps an ECB mode algorithm rather than the block
cipher directly. Therefore it is now redundant for crypto modules to
wrap their ECB code with generic XTS code themselves via xts_crypt().
Remove the xts-camellia-asm algorithm which did this. Users who request
xts(camellia) and previously would have gotten xts-camellia-asm will now
get xts(ecb-camellia-asm) instead, which is just as fast.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The LRW template now wraps an ECB mode algorithm rather than the block
cipher directly. Therefore it is now redundant for crypto modules to
wrap their ECB code with generic LRW code themselves via lrw_crypt().
Remove the lrw-camellia-asm algorithm which did this. Users who request
lrw(camellia) and previously would have gotten lrw-camellia-asm will now
get lrw(ecb-camellia-asm) instead, which is just as fast.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The LRW template now wraps an ECB mode algorithm rather than the block
cipher directly. Therefore it is now redundant for crypto modules to
wrap their ECB code with generic LRW code themselves via lrw_crypt().
Remove the lrw-camellia-aesni-avx2 algorithm which did this. Users who
request lrw(camellia) and previously would have gotten
lrw-camellia-aesni-avx2 will now get lrw(ecb-camellia-aesni-avx2)
instead, which is just as fast.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The LRW template now wraps an ECB mode algorithm rather than the block
cipher directly. Therefore it is now redundant for crypto modules to
wrap their ECB code with generic LRW code themselves via lrw_crypt().
Remove the lrw-camellia-aesni algorithm which did this. Users who
request lrw(camellia) and previously would have gotten
lrw-camellia-aesni will now get lrw(ecb-camellia-aesni) instead, which
is just as fast.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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