diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 19 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h index ec2c0a094b5d..5948218f35c5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h @@ -86,28 +86,35 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page); extern int kernel_set_to_readonly; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn) +/* + * Prevent speculative access to the page by either unmapping + * it (if we do not require access to any part of the page) or + * marking it uncacheable (if we want to try to retrieve data + * from non-poisoned lines in the page). + */ +static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap) { unsigned long decoy_addr; int rc; /* - * Mark the linear address as UC to make sure we don't log more - * errors because of speculative access to the page. * We would like to just call: - * set_memory_uc((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1); + * set_memory_XX((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1); * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting * around in registers. * Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped. - * This relies on set_memory_uc() properly sanitizing any __pa() + * This relies on set_memory_XX() properly sanitizing any __pa() * results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK. */ decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63)); - rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1); + if (unmap) + rc = set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1); + else + rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1); if (rc) pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn); return rc; |