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-rw-r--r--drivers/tty/tty_audit.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/namespace.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/audit.h66
-rw-r--r--include/linux/capability.h5
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_hooks.h4
-rw-r--r--include/linux/namei.h3
-rw-r--r--include/linux/sched.h4
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h5
-rw-r--r--init/init_task.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.c267
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.h81
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit_fsnotify.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit_tree.c19
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit_watch.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c6
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c320
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/audit.c3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/audit.h3
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c6
-rw-r--r--security/security.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/audit.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c3
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c4
27 files changed, 440 insertions, 392 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c b/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
index 28f87fd6a28e..9f906a5b8e81 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,
uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current));
unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TTY);
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TTY);
if (ab) {
char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 914178cdbe94..87d7710a2e1d 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -2720,7 +2720,7 @@ filename_mountpoint(int dfd, struct filename *name, struct path *path,
if (unlikely(error == -ESTALE))
error = path_mountpoint(&nd, flags | LOOKUP_REVAL, path);
if (likely(!error))
- audit_inode(name, path->dentry, 0);
+ audit_inode(name, path->dentry, flags & LOOKUP_NO_EVAL);
restore_nameidata();
putname(name);
return error;
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index c4e83d94840c..98a8c182af4f 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1640,6 +1640,8 @@ int ksys_umount(char __user *name, int flags)
if (!(flags & UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_NO_EVAL;
+
retval = user_path_mountpoint_at(AT_FDCWD, name, lookup_flags, &path);
if (retval)
goto out;
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index fca9fa5f23d8..5ab1849971b4 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_oom_score_adj_operations = {
.llseek = default_llseek,
};
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
#define TMPBUFLEN 11
static ssize_t proc_loginuid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -3044,7 +3044,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
ONE("oom_score", S_IRUGO, proc_oom_score),
REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_adj_operations),
REG("oom_score_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_score_adj_operations),
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
#endif
@@ -3432,7 +3432,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
ONE("oom_score", S_IRUGO, proc_oom_score),
REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_adj_operations),
REG("oom_score_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_score_adj_operations),
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index a625c29a2ea2..1e69d9fe16da 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h> /* LOOKUP_* */
#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
@@ -159,6 +160,18 @@ extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
extern int audit_rule_change(int type, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz);
extern int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq);
+extern int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid);
+
+static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ return tsk->loginuid;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ return tsk->sessionid;
+}
+
extern u32 audit_enabled;
#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
static inline __printf(4, 5)
@@ -201,6 +214,17 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{ }
+
+static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ return INVALID_UID;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ return AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
+}
+
#define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
@@ -225,6 +249,7 @@ extern void __audit_getname(struct filename *name);
#define AUDIT_INODE_PARENT 1 /* dentry represents the parent */
#define AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN 2 /* audit record should be hidden */
+#define AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL 4 /* audit record incomplete */
extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int flags);
extern void __audit_file(const struct file *);
@@ -285,12 +310,15 @@ static inline void audit_getname(struct filename *name)
}
static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
- unsigned int parent) {
+ unsigned int flags) {
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context())) {
- unsigned int flags = 0;
- if (parent)
- flags |= AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
- __audit_inode(name, dentry, flags);
+ unsigned int aflags = 0;
+
+ if (flags & LOOKUP_PARENT)
+ aflags |= AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
+ if (flags & LOOKUP_NO_EVAL)
+ aflags |= AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL;
+ __audit_inode(name, dentry, aflags);
}
}
static inline void audit_file(struct file *file)
@@ -320,21 +348,6 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
}
/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
-extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
-extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
-extern int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid);
-
-static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- return tsk->loginuid;
-}
-
-static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- return tsk->sessionid;
-}
-
extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode);
extern void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -514,19 +527,6 @@ static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
static inline void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names,
const char *old_names, int res)
{ }
-static inline int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- return INVALID_UID;
-}
-static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- return AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
-}
static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{ }
static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index c3f9a4d558a0..ecce0f43c73a 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
-
+#include <linux/uidgid.h>
#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
@@ -25,11 +25,12 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
} kernel_cap_t;
-/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
+/* same as vfs_ns_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
__u32 magic_etc;
kernel_cap_t permitted;
kernel_cap_t inheritable;
+ kuid_t rootid;
};
#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 22fc786d723a..85a301632cf1 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1344,7 +1344,6 @@
* @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
* @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
* @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
- * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
* Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
*
* @audit_rule_free:
@@ -1766,8 +1765,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule);
int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
- int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h
index a78606e8e3df..9138b4471dbf 100644
--- a/include/linux/namei.h
+++ b/include/linux/namei.h
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
* - internal "there are more path components" flag
* - dentry cache is untrusted; force a real lookup
* - suppress terminal automount
+ * - skip revalidation
+ * - don't fetch xattrs on audit_inode
*/
#define LOOKUP_FOLLOW 0x0001
#define LOOKUP_DIRECTORY 0x0002
@@ -33,6 +35,7 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
#define LOOKUP_REVAL 0x0020
#define LOOKUP_RCU 0x0040
#define LOOKUP_NO_REVAL 0x0080
+#define LOOKUP_NO_EVAL 0x0100
/*
* Intent data
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index f073bd59df32..1549584a1538 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -872,8 +872,10 @@ struct task_struct {
struct callback_head *task_works;
- struct audit_context *audit_context;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+ struct audit_context *audit_context;
+#endif
kuid_t loginuid;
unsigned int sessionid;
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 13537a49ae97..2b35a43d11d6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1679,8 +1679,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1697,7 +1696,7 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
}
static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
+ void *lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/init/init_task.c b/init/init_task.c
index df0257c5928c..c70ef656d0f4 100644
--- a/init/init_task.c
+++ b/init/init_task.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ struct task_struct init_task
.thread_pid = &init_struct_pid,
.thread_group = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_task.thread_group),
.thread_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_signals.thread_head),
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
.loginuid = INVALID_UID,
.sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET,
#endif
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 632d36059556..c89ea48c70a6 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -396,10 +396,10 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old,
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int rc = 0;
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return rc;
- audit_log_format(ab, "%s=%u old=%u ", function_name, new, old);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=set %s=%u old=%u ", function_name, new, old);
audit_log_session_info(ab);
rc = audit_log_task_context(ab);
if (rc)
@@ -1053,7 +1053,8 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
return err;
}
-static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
+static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_context *context,
+ struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
{
uid_t uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid());
pid_t pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
@@ -1063,7 +1064,7 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
return;
}
- *ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
+ *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
if (unlikely(!*ab))
return;
audit_log_format(*ab, "pid=%d uid=%u ", pid, uid);
@@ -1071,6 +1072,12 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
audit_log_task_context(*ab);
}
+static inline void audit_log_user_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab,
+ u16 msg_type)
+{
+ audit_log_common_recv_msg(NULL, ab, msg_type);
+}
+
int is_audit_feature_set(int i)
{
return af.features & AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(i);
@@ -1338,7 +1345,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (err)
break;
}
- audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type);
+ audit_log_user_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type);
if (msg_type != AUDIT_USER_TTY)
audit_log_format(ab, " msg='%.*s'",
AUDIT_MESSAGE_TEXT_MAX,
@@ -1361,8 +1368,12 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule_data))
return -EINVAL;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_LOCKED) {
- audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
- audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0", audit_enabled);
+ audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s audit_enabled=%d res=0",
+ msg_type == AUDIT_ADD_RULE ?
+ "add_rule" : "remove_rule",
+ audit_enabled);
audit_log_end(ab);
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -1373,7 +1384,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
break;
case AUDIT_TRIM:
audit_trim_trees();
- audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
audit_log_format(ab, " op=trim res=1");
audit_log_end(ab);
break;
@@ -1403,8 +1415,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
/* OK, here comes... */
err = audit_tag_tree(old, new);
- audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
-
+ audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
audit_log_format(ab, " op=make_equiv old=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, old);
audit_log_format(ab, " new=");
@@ -1471,7 +1483,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
old.enabled = t & AUDIT_TTY_ENABLE;
old.log_passwd = !!(t & AUDIT_TTY_LOG_PASSWD);
- audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
audit_log_format(ab, " op=tty_set old-enabled=%d new-enabled=%d"
" old-log_passwd=%d new-log_passwd=%d res=%d",
old.enabled, s.enabled, old.log_passwd,
@@ -2054,153 +2067,6 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
}
-void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
- return;
- }
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
- CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
- audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
-}
-
-static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
-{
- audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
- audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
- audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x",
- name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
-}
-
-static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
- const struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
- int rc;
-
- if (!dentry)
- return 0;
-
- rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
- name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
- name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
- name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
- VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
-void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
- struct inode *inode)
-{
- name->ino = inode->i_ino;
- name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- name->mode = inode->i_mode;
- name->uid = inode->i_uid;
- name->gid = inode->i_gid;
- name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
- audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
- * @context: audit_context for the task
- * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
- * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
- * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
- * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
- */
-void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
- const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
-{
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
- ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
- if (!ab)
- return;
-
- audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
-
- if (path)
- audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
- else if (n->name) {
- switch (n->name_len) {
- case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
- /* log the full path */
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
- break;
- case 0:
- /* name was specified as a relative path and the
- * directory component is the cwd */
- audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
- break;
- default:
- /* log the name's directory component */
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
- n->name_len);
- }
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
-
- if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
- audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
- " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
- " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
- n->ino,
- MAJOR(n->dev),
- MINOR(n->dev),
- n->mode,
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
- from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
- MAJOR(n->rdev),
- MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
- if (call_panic)
- *call_panic = 2;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
- }
- }
-
- /* log the audit_names record type */
- switch(n->type) {
- case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
- audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
- break;
- case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
- audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
- break;
- case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
- audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
- break;
- case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
- audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
- break;
- default:
- audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
- break;
- }
-
- audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
- audit_log_end(ab);
-}
-
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
char *ctx = NULL;
@@ -2322,6 +2188,91 @@ void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation)
audit_log_end(ab);
}
+/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
+static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
+{
+ /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
+ if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
+ return 0;
+ /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
+ if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
+ return -EPERM;
+ /* it is set, you need permission */
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+ return -EPERM;
+ /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
+ if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID)
+ && uid_valid(loginuid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
+ unsigned int oldsessionid,
+ unsigned int sessionid, int rc)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
+ struct tty_struct *tty;
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
+ uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
+ oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
+ loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
+ tty = audit_get_tty();
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid);
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
+ oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
+ oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
+ audit_put_tty(tty);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's loginuid
+ * @loginuid: loginuid value
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ *
+ * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
+ */
+int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
+{
+ unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
+ kuid_t oldloginuid;
+ int rc;
+
+ oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+ oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+
+ rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* are we setting or clearing? */
+ if (uid_valid(loginuid)) {
+ sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
+ if (unlikely(sessionid == AUDIT_SID_UNSET))
+ sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
+ }
+
+ current->sessionid = sessionid;
+ current->loginuid = loginuid;
+out:
+ audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* audit_log_end - end one audit record
* @ab: the audit_buffer
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 91421679a168..958d5b8fc1b3 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ struct audit_cap_data {
kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of process */
};
kernel_cap_t ambient;
+ kuid_t rootid;
};
/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and bump
@@ -212,15 +213,6 @@ extern bool audit_ever_enabled;
extern void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
-extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
- const struct dentry *dentry,
- struct inode *inode);
-extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
- kernel_cap_t *cap);
-extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context,
- struct audit_names *n, const struct path *path,
- int record_num, int *call_panic);
-
extern int auditd_test_task(struct task_struct *task);
#define AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS 32
@@ -267,25 +259,52 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
extern struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(void);
extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty);
-/* audit watch functions */
+/* audit watch/mark/tree functions */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
+extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
+ struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
+
extern void audit_put_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
extern void audit_get_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
-extern int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len, u32 op);
+extern int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len,
+ u32 op);
extern int audit_add_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, struct list_head **list);
extern void audit_remove_watch_rule(struct audit_krule *krule);
extern char *audit_watch_path(struct audit_watch *watch);
-extern int audit_watch_compare(struct audit_watch *watch, unsigned long ino, dev_t dev);
+extern int audit_watch_compare(struct audit_watch *watch, unsigned long ino,
+ dev_t dev);
-extern struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule *krule, char *pathname, int len);
+extern struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule *krule,
+ char *pathname, int len);
extern char *audit_mark_path(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
extern void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark);
extern void audit_remove_mark_rule(struct audit_krule *krule);
-extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned long ino, dev_t dev);
+extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark,
+ unsigned long ino, dev_t dev);
extern int audit_dupe_exe(struct audit_krule *new, struct audit_krule *old);
-extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
+extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
+
+extern struct audit_chunk *audit_tree_lookup(const struct inode *inode);
+extern void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk);
+extern bool audit_tree_match(struct audit_chunk *chunk,
+ struct audit_tree *tree);
+extern int audit_make_tree(struct audit_krule *rule, char *pathname, u32 op);
+extern int audit_add_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule);
+extern int audit_remove_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule);
+extern void audit_trim_trees(void);
+extern int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new);
+extern const char *audit_tree_path(struct audit_tree *tree);
+extern void audit_put_tree(struct audit_tree *tree);
+extern void audit_kill_trees(struct audit_context *context);
-#else
+extern int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
+extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct audit_context *ctx);
+extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
+#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
+#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, t, s) 0
#define audit_put_watch(w) {}
#define audit_get_watch(w) {}
#define audit_to_watch(k, p, l, o) (-EINVAL)
@@ -301,21 +320,7 @@ extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark
#define audit_mark_compare(m, i, d) 0
#define audit_exe_compare(t, m) (-EINVAL)
#define audit_dupe_exe(n, o) (-EINVAL)
-#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-extern struct audit_chunk *audit_tree_lookup(const struct inode *inode);
-extern void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk);
-extern bool audit_tree_match(struct audit_chunk *chunk, struct audit_tree *tree);
-extern int audit_make_tree(struct audit_krule *rule, char *pathname, u32 op);
-extern int audit_add_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule);
-extern int audit_remove_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule);
-extern void audit_trim_trees(void);
-extern int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new);
-extern const char *audit_tree_path(struct audit_tree *tree);
-extern void audit_put_tree(struct audit_tree *tree);
-extern void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list);
-#else
#define audit_remove_tree_rule(rule) BUG()
#define audit_add_tree_rule(rule) -EINVAL
#define audit_make_tree(rule, str, op) -EINVAL
@@ -323,8 +328,11 @@ extern void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list);
#define audit_put_tree(tree) (void)0
#define audit_tag_tree(old, new) -EINVAL
#define audit_tree_path(rule) "" /* never called */
-#define audit_kill_trees(list) BUG()
-#endif
+#define audit_kill_trees(context) BUG()
+
+#define audit_signal_info(s, t) AUDIT_DISABLED
+#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_DISABLED
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
@@ -334,14 +342,5 @@ extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-extern int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
-extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx);
-extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
-#else
-#define audit_signal_info(s,t) AUDIT_DISABLED
-#define audit_filter_inodes(t,c) AUDIT_DISABLED
-#endif
-
extern void audit_ctl_lock(void);
extern void audit_ctl_unlock(void);
diff --git a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
index cf4512a33675..37ae95cfb7f4 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark, c
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_session_info(ab);
diff --git a/kernel/audit_tree.c b/kernel/audit_tree.c
index d4af4d97f847..abfb112f26aa 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
@@ -524,13 +524,14 @@ static int tag_chunk(struct inode *inode, struct audit_tree *tree)
return 0;
}
-static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule *rule)
+static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_context *context,
+ struct audit_krule *rule)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_format(ab, "op=remove_rule dir=");
@@ -540,7 +541,7 @@ static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule *rule)
audit_log_end(ab);
}
-static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
+static void kill_rules(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_tree *tree)
{
struct audit_krule *rule, *next;
struct audit_entry *entry;
@@ -551,7 +552,7 @@ static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
list_del_init(&rule->rlist);
if (rule->tree) {
/* not a half-baked one */
- audit_tree_log_remove_rule(rule);
+ audit_tree_log_remove_rule(context, rule);
if (entry->rule.exe)
audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
rule->tree = NULL;
@@ -633,7 +634,7 @@ static void trim_marked(struct audit_tree *tree)
tree->goner = 1;
spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
- kill_rules(tree);
+ kill_rules(audit_context(), tree);
list_del_init(&tree->list);
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
prune_one(tree);
@@ -973,8 +974,10 @@ static void audit_schedule_prune(void)
* ... and that one is done if evict_chunk() decides to delay until the end
* of syscall. Runs synchronously.
*/
-void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list)
+void audit_kill_trees(struct audit_context *context)
{
+ struct list_head *list = &context->killed_trees;
+
audit_ctl_lock();
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
@@ -982,7 +985,7 @@ void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list)
struct audit_tree *victim;
victim = list_entry(list->next, struct audit_tree, list);
- kill_rules(victim);
+ kill_rules(context, victim);
list_del_init(&victim->list);
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
@@ -1017,7 +1020,7 @@ static void evict_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
list_del_init(&owner->same_root);
spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
if (!postponed) {
- kill_rules(owner);
+ kill_rules(audit_context(), owner);
list_move(&owner->list, &prune_list);
need_prune = 1;
} else {
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 20ef9ba134b0..e8d1adeb2223 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void audit_watch_log_rule_change(struct audit_krule *r, struct audit_watc
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (!ab)
return;
audit_log_session_info(ab);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index bf309f2592c4..63f8b3f26fab 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
break;
}
- /* fallthrough if set */
+ /* fall through - if set */
default:
data->values[i] = f->val;
}
@@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int re
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (!ab)
return;
audit_log_session_info(ab);
@@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
if (f->lsm_rule) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL);
+ f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
}
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 6593a5207fb0..d1eab1d4a930 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -631,9 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op,
- f->lsm_rule,
- ctx);
+ f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -647,13 +646,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid, f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule, ctx);
+ name->osid,
+ f->type,
+ f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
- f->op, f->lsm_rule,
- ctx)) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(
+ n->osid,
+ f->type,
+ f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -664,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule, ctx))
+ f->lsm_rule))
++result;
}
break;
@@ -1136,6 +1139,32 @@ out:
kfree(buf_head);
}
+void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
+}
+
+static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
+{
+ if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
+ name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
+}
+
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1258,6 +1287,97 @@ static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
return len;
}
+/*
+ * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
+ * @context: audit_context for the task
+ * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
+ * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
+ * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
+ * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
+ */
+static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
+ const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
+
+ if (path)
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
+ else if (n->name) {
+ switch (n->name_len) {
+ case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
+ /* log the full path */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ /* name was specified as a relative path and the
+ * directory component is the cwd
+ */
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* log the name's directory component */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
+ n->name_len);
+ }
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
+
+ if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+ n->ino,
+ MAJOR(n->dev),
+ MINOR(n->dev),
+ n->mode,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
+ MAJOR(n->rdev),
+ MINOR(n->rdev));
+ if (n->osid != 0) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
+ n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ if (call_panic)
+ *call_panic = 2;
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* log the audit_names record type */
+ switch (n->type) {
+ case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
+ break;
+ default:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
{
int res;
@@ -1358,6 +1478,9 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
+ axs->fcap.rootid));
break; }
}
@@ -1444,6 +1567,9 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
if (!context)
return;
+ if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
+ audit_kill_trees(context);
+
/* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
* in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
* random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
@@ -1460,9 +1586,6 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
audit_log_exit();
}
- if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
- audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
-
audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
audit_free_context(context);
}
@@ -1537,6 +1660,9 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
if (!context)
return;
+ if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
+ audit_kill_trees(context);
+
if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
if (success)
context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
@@ -1571,9 +1697,6 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->in_syscall = 0;
context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
- if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
- audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
-
audit_free_names(context);
unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
audit_free_aux(context);
@@ -1750,6 +1873,47 @@ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
}
+static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
+ const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!dentry)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
+ name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
+ name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+ name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
+ name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
+ VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
+void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ name->ino = inode->i_ino;
+ name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ name->mode = inode->i_mode;
+ name->uid = inode->i_uid;
+ name->gid = inode->i_gid;
+ name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
+ name->fcap_ver = -1;
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
+}
+
/**
* __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
* @name: name being audited
@@ -1763,10 +1927,31 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct audit_names *n;
bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
+ int i;
if (!context->in_syscall)
return;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (!list_empty(list)) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+ for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+
+ if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
+ && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
+ f->op, f->val)
+ && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
if (!name)
goto out_alloc;
@@ -1832,7 +2017,7 @@ out:
n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
}
handle_path(dentry);
- audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
+ audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
}
void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
@@ -1875,14 +2060,12 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
- if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE) {
- if (audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
- f->op, f->val)) {
- if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return;
- }
- }
+ if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
+ && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
+ f->op, f->val)
+ && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
}
}
}
@@ -1933,7 +2116,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
if (!n)
return;
- audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
+ audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
}
if (!found_child) {
@@ -1952,7 +2135,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
}
if (inode)
- audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
+ audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
else
found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
}
@@ -1983,90 +2166,6 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
return 1;
}
-/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
-static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
-
-static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
-{
- /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
- if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
- return 0;
- /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
- if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
- return -EPERM;
- /* it is set, you need permission */
- if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
- return -EPERM;
- /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
- if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
- unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid,
- int rc)
-{
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
- uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
- struct tty_struct *tty;
-
- if (!audit_enabled)
- return;
-
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
- if (!ab)
- return;
-
- uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
- oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
- loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
- tty = audit_get_tty();
-
- audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid);
- audit_log_task_context(ab);
- audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
- oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
- oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
- audit_put_tty(tty);
- audit_log_end(ab);
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
- * @loginuid: loginuid value
- *
- * Returns 0.
- *
- * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
- */
-int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
-{
- unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
- kuid_t oldloginuid;
- int rc;
-
- oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
- oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-
- rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- /* are we setting or clearing? */
- if (uid_valid(loginuid)) {
- sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
- if (unlikely(sessionid == AUDIT_SID_UNSET))
- sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
- }
-
- current->sessionid = sessionid;
- current->loginuid = loginuid;
-out:
- audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
- return rc;
-}
-
/**
* __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
* @oflag: open flag
@@ -2355,6 +2454,7 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+ ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index eeaddfe0c0fb..5a8b9cded4f2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -225,8 +225,7 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
{
struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
struct aa_label *label;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index b8c8b1066b0a..ee559bc2acb8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -192,7 +192,6 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f1d117c3d8ae..c477fb673701 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -642,6 +642,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
+ cpu_caps->rootid = rootkuid;
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index cc12f3449a72..026163f37ba1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -307,8 +307,7 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
}
static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+ void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 122797023bdb..e0cc323f948f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -340,8 +340,7 @@ retry:
rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule,
- NULL);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
@@ -349,8 +348,7 @@ retry:
rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule,
- NULL);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule);
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ed9b8cbf21cf..301b141b9a32 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2302,11 +2302,9 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
- actx);
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 36e1d44c0209..682e2b5de2a4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -43,13 +43,11 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
* @field: the field this rule refers to
* @op: the operater the rule uses
* @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
- * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
*
* Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
* -errno on failure.
*/
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index a0a2aa964111..1269e2be3c2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3402,8 +3402,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
{
struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
struct context *ctxt;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2309c696c6c8..424bce4ef21d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4295,13 +4295,11 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
* @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
* @op: required testing operator
* @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
- * @actx: audit context associated with the check
*
* The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
* whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
*/
-static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
char *rule = vrule;