diff options
| author | Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> | 2022-02-18 11:49:08 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2022-02-21 10:21:47 +0100 |
| commit | 44a3918c8245ab10c6c9719dd12e7a8d291980d8 (patch) | |
| tree | 1dacbf59f0672a0cfeea601cf1b338d9ed74bc80 /kernel | |
| parent | 5ad3eb1132453b9795ce5fd4572b1c18b292cca9 (diff) | |
x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting
With unprivileged eBPF enabled, eIBRS (without retpoline) is vulnerable
to Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.
When both are enabled, print a warning message and report it in the
'spectre_v2' sysfs vulnerabilities file.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sysctl.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 5ae443b2882e..730ab56d9e92 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -180,6 +180,10 @@ static int bpf_stats_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return ret; } +void __weak unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state) +{ +} + static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -197,6 +201,9 @@ static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return -EPERM; *(int *)table->data = unpriv_enable; } + + unpriv_ebpf_notify(unpriv_enable); + return ret; } #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL && CONFIG_SYSCTL */ |