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2015-01-29KEYS: close race between key lookup and freeingSasha Levin
commit a3a8784454692dd72e5d5d34dcdab17b4420e74c upstream. When a key is being garbage collected, it's key->user would get put before the ->destroy() callback is called, where the key is removed from it's respective tracking structures. This leaves a key hanging in a semi-invalid state which leaves a window open for a different task to try an access key->user. An example is find_keyring_by_name() which would dereference key->user for a key that is in the process of being garbage collected (where key->user was freed but ->destroy() wasn't called yet - so it's still present in the linked list). This would cause either a panic, or corrupt memory. Fixes CVE-2014-9529. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-01-08KEYS: Fix stale key registration at error pathTakashi Iwai
commit b26bdde5bb27f3f900e25a95e33a0c476c8c2c48 upstream. When loading encrypted-keys module, if the last check of aes_get_sizes() in init_encrypted() fails, the driver just returns an error without unregistering its key type. This results in the stale entry in the list. In addition to memory leaks, this leads to a kernel crash when registering a new key type later. This patch fixes the problem by swapping the calls of aes_get_sizes() and register_key_type(), and releasing resources properly at the error paths. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=908163 Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-11-14selinux: fix inode security list corruptionStephen Smalley
commit 923190d32de4428afbea5e5773be86bea60a9925 upstream. sb_finish_set_opts() can race with inode_free_security() when initializing inode security structures for inodes created prior to initial policy load or by the filesystem during ->mount(). This appears to have always been a possible race, but commit 3dc91d4 ("SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()") made it more evident by immediately reusing the unioned list/rcu element of the inode security structure for call_rcu() upon an inode_free_security(). But the underlying issue was already present before that commit as a possible use-after-free of isec. Shivnandan Kumar reported the list corruption and proposed a patch to split the list and rcu elements out of the union as separate fields of the inode_security_struct so that setting the rcu element would not affect the list element. However, this would merely hide the issue and not truly fix the code. This patch instead moves up the deletion of the list entry prior to dropping the sbsec->isec_lock initially. Then, if the inode is dropped subsequently, there will be no further references to the isec. Reported-by: Shivnandan Kumar <shivnandan.k@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-11-14evm: check xattr value length and type in evm_inode_setxattr()Dmitry Kasatkin
commit 3b1deef6b1289a99505858a3b212c5b50adf0c2f upstream. evm_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. The function does not check the length so that following command can be used to produce the kernel oops: setfattr -n security.evm FOO. This patch fixes it. Changes in v3: * there is no reason to return different error codes for EVM_XATTR_HMAC and non EVM_XATTR_HMAC. Remove unnecessary test then. Changes in v2: * testing for validity of xattr type [ 1106.396921] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 1106.398192] IP: [<ffffffff812af7b8>] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48 [ 1106.399244] PGD 29048067 PUD 290d7067 PMD 0 [ 1106.399953] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 1106.400020] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse [ 1106.400020] CPU: 0 PID: 3635 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2936 [ 1106.400020] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 1106.400020] task: ffff8800291a0000 ti: ffff88002917c000 task.ti: ffff88002917c000 [ 1106.400020] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812af7b8>] [<ffffffff812af7b8>] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48 [ 1106.400020] RSP: 0018:ffff88002917fd50 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1106.400020] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88002917fdf8 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1106.400020] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff818136d3 RDI: ffff88002917fdf8 [ 1106.400020] RBP: ffff88002917fd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000003ec1df [ 1106.400020] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800438a0a00 [ 1106.400020] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 1106.400020] FS: 00007f7dfa7d7740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1106.400020] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003763e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 1106.400020] Stack: [ 1106.400020] ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000 ffff88002917fd98 [ 1106.400020] ffffffff812a1030 ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000 [ 1106.400020] 0000000000000000 ffff88002917fde0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff88002917fdc8 [ 1106.400020] Call Trace: [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff812a1030>] security_inode_setxattr+0x5d/0x6a [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff8116d08a>] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff8116d1e0>] setxattr+0x122/0x16c [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45 [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff8114d011>] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143 [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45 [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff811687c0>] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff8116d3e6>] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0 [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff81529da9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 1106.400020] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 89 f3 48 c7 c6 d3 36 81 81 48 89 df e8 18 22 04 00 85 c0 75 07 <41> 80 7d 00 02 74 0d 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 5a fe ff ff eb 03 83 [ 1106.400020] RIP [<ffffffff812af7b8>] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48 [ 1106.400020] RSP <ffff88002917fd50> [ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]--- Reported-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-09-17CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processesEric Paris
commit 7d8b6c63751cfbbe5eef81a48c22978b3407a3ad upstream. This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744 plus fixing it a different way... We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status. Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities. The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So the 'parent' will look something like: CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: ffffffc000000000 All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do... So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve() the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have. The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity. The solution here: 1) stop hiding capability bits in status This makes debugging easier! 2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either. This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other things) 3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use ~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility. This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run. 4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward compatibility. This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-26evm: prohibit userspace writing 'security.evm' HMAC valueMimi Zohar
commit 2fb1c9a4f2dbc2f0bd2431c7fa64d0b5483864e4 upstream. Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the EVM encrypted key. Only the kernel should have access to it. This patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr) from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-26ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()Dmitry Kasatkin
commit 0430e49b6e7c6b5e076be8fefdee089958c9adad upstream. Commit 8aac62706 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify" introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.750241] PGD 0 [ 106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci pps_core [ 106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15 [ 106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08 09/19/2012 [ 106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti: ffff880400fca000 [ 106.750704] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ec7da>] [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX: ffff8800d51523e7 [ 106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI: ffff880402d20020 [ 106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8800d5152300 [ 106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15: ffff8800d51523e7 [ 106.750871] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 106.750910] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 [ 106.750962] Stack: [ 106.750981] ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18 0000000000000000 [ 106.751037] ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000 0000000000000100 [ 106.751093] 0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e ffff8803eb8df500 [ 106.751149] Call Trace: [ 106.751172] [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430 [ 106.751199] [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10 [ 106.751225] [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170 [ 106.751250] [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80 [ 106.751276] [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40 [ 106.751301] [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0 [ 106.751327] [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20 [ 106.751355] [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0 [ 106.751382] [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0 [ 106.751407] [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170 [ 106.751432] [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60 [ 106.751457] [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280 [ 106.751483] [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280 [ 106.751509] [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160 [ 106.751536] [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 106.751562] [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0 [ 106.751587] [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60 [ 106.751612] [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0 [ 106.751637] [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300 [ 106.751662] [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [ 106.751687] [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0 [ 106.751712] [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90 [ 106.751738] [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b [ 106.751763] [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0 [ 106.751788] [<ffffffff81067894>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20 [ 106.751814] [<ffffffff8174522d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f [ 106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89 e5 5d <48> 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 [ 106.752185] RIP [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.752214] RSP <ffff880400fcba60> [ 106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]--- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls Apparmor handler, which uses current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. The 'guilty' commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy->mnt_ns was not already available for Apparmor. Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash. It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security and locking checks. This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security and mandatory locking checking. It prevents the kernel oops to happen. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-04-14selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loadedPaul Moore
commit f64410ec665479d7b4b77b7519e814253ed0f686 upstream. This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes the problem below: "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry() on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { if (opt_dentry) { isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...) rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); if (rc) goto out_unlock; isec->sid = sid; } } Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid() and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock. I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..." On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in /proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were accessed early in the boot), for example: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax However, with this patch in place we see the expected result: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-03-06SELinux: bigendian problems with filename trans rulesEric Paris
commit 9085a6422900092886da8c404e1c5340c4ff1cbf upstream. When writing policy via /sys/fs/selinux/policy I wrote the type and class of filename trans rules in CPU endian instead of little endian. On x86_64 this works just fine, but it means that on big endian arch's like ppc64 and s390 userspace reads the policy and converts it from le32_to_cpu. So the values are all screwed up. Write the values in le format like it should have been to start. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-02-20SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.Stephen Smalley
commit 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98 upstream. Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG. As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject all such security contexts whether coming from userspace via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr request by SELinux. Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process (CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts that are not defined in the build host policy. Reproducer: su setenforce 0 touch foo setfattr -n security.selinux foo Caveat: Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo after doing the above will also trigger the BUG. BUG output from Matthew Thode: [ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654! [ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP [ 474.027196] Modules linked in: [ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I 3.13.0-grsec #1 [ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti: ffff8805f50cd488 [ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX: 0000000000000100 [ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff8805e8aaa000 [ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000006 [ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15: 0000000000000000 [ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4: 00000000000207f0 [ 474.556058] Stack: [ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffff8805f1190a40 [ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990 ffff8805e8aac860 [ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060 ffff8805c0ac3d94 [ 474.690461] Call Trace: [ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a [ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b [ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179 [ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4 [ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31 [ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e [ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22 [ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d [ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91 [ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b [ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30 [ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3 [ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48 8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7 75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8 [ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38> [ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]--- Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-02-13SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policyTetsuo Handa
commit 8ed814602876bec9bad2649ca17f34b499357a1c upstream. Hello. I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 . [ 681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak) Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing ebitmap_set_bit() call. ---------- >>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900 Subject: SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks memory if hashtab_insert() returns error. unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8): comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5 W...kkk. backtrace: [<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360 [<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70 [<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500 [<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750 [<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0 [<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will show below message and the boot sequence freezes. systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-25SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()Steven Rostedt
commit 3dc91d4338d698ce77832985f9cb183d8eeaf6be upstream. While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit this bug: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000 RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54 R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0 Call Trace: security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30 __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0 inode_permission+0x18/0x50 link_path_walk+0x66/0x920 path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0 do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0 do_sys_open+0x146/0x240 SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 CR2: 0000000000000020 Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the dereference of it caused the oops. in selinux_inode_permission(): isec = inode->i_security; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder to hit. What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted. As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock(). The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the permission check). Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-09selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in ↵Paul Moore
selinux_ip_postroute() commit c0828e50485932b7e019df377a6b0a8d1ebd3080 upstream. Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-09selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packetsPaul Moore
commit 817eff718dca4e54d5721211ddde0914428fbb7c upstream. Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-09selinux: selinux_setprocattr()->ptrace_parent() needs rcu_read_lock()Oleg Nesterov
commit c0c1439541f5305b57a83d599af32b74182933fe upstream. selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p), but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace, this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage" warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check(). And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable() doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access the ->parent. Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-09selinux: fix broken peer recv checkChad Hanson
commit 46d01d63221c3508421dd72ff9c879f61053cffc upstream. Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is ignored. Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-12-20selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()Paul Moore
commit 446b802437f285de68ffb8d6fac3c44c3cab5b04 upstream. In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock, not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that originally labeled the associated request_sock. See the inline comments for more explanation. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-12-20selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()Paul Moore
commit 47180068276a04ed31d24fe04c673138208b07a9 upstream. In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval socket represented by the request_sock struct. Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet. It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about information leaks. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-12-04selinux: correct locking in selinux_netlbl_socket_connect)Paul Moore
commit 42d64e1add3a1ce8a787116036163b8724362145 upstream. The SELinux/NetLabel glue code has a locking bug that affects systems with NetLabel enabled, see the kernel error message below. This patch corrects this problem by converting the bottom half socket lock to a more conventional, and correct for this call-path, lock_sock() call. =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Not tainted ------------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1928 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by ping/731: #0: (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-...}, at: [...] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<...>] netlbl_conn_setattr stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 731 Comm: ping Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000001 ffff88006f659d28 ffffffff81726b6a ffff88003732c500 ffff88006f659d58 ffffffff810e4457 ffff88006b845a00 0000000000000000 000000000000000c ffff880075aa2f50 ffff88006f659d90 ffffffff8169bec7 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81726b6a>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74 [<ffffffff810e4457>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe7/0x120 [<ffffffff8169bec7>] cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x187/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8170f317>] netlbl_conn_setattr+0x187/0x190 [<ffffffff8170f195>] ? netlbl_conn_setattr+0x5/0x190 [<ffffffff8131ac9e>] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xae/0xc0 [<ffffffff81303025>] selinux_socket_connect+0x135/0x170 [<ffffffff8119d127>] ? might_fault+0x57/0xb0 [<ffffffff812fb146>] security_socket_connect+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff815d3ad3>] SYSC_connect+0x73/0x130 [<ffffffff81739a85>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [<ffffffff810e5e2d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 [<ffffffff81373d4e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff815d52be>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81739a59>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-11-29Revert "ima: policy for RAMFS"Mimi Zohar
commit 08de59eb144d7c41351a467442f898d720f0f15f upstream. This reverts commit 4c2c392763a682354fac65b6a569adec4e4b5387. Everything in the initramfs should be measured and appraised, but until the initramfs has extended attribute support, at least measured. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-31selinux: fix the labeled xfrm/IPsec reference count handlingPaul Moore
The SELinux labeled IPsec code was improperly handling its reference counting, dropping a reference on a delete operation instead of on a free/release operation. Reported-by: Ondrej Moris <omoris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-05-07aio: don't include aio.h in sched.hKent Overstreet
Faster kernel compiles by way of fewer unnecessary includes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fallout] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Zach Brown <zab@redhat.com> Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Asai Thambi S P <asamymuthupa@micron.com> Cc: Selvan Mani <smani@micron.com> Cc: Sam Bradshaw <sbradshaw@micron.com> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org> Reviewed-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-05-01Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull VFS updates from Al Viro, Misc cleanups all over the place, mainly wrt /proc interfaces (switch create_proc_entry to proc_create(), get rid of the deprecated create_proc_read_entry() in favor of using proc_create_data() and seq_file etc). 7kloc removed. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (204 commits) don't bother with deferred freeing of fdtables proc: Move non-public stuff from linux/proc_fs.h to fs/proc/internal.h proc: Make the PROC_I() and PDE() macros internal to procfs proc: Supply a function to remove a proc entry by PDE take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.c ppc: Clean up scanlog ppc: Clean up rtas_flash driver somewhat hostap: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree() drm: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree() drm: proc: Use minor->index to label things, not PDE->name drm: Constify drm_proc_list[] zoran: Don't print proc_dir_entry data in debug reiserfs: Don't access the proc_dir_entry in r_open(), r_start() r_show() proc: Supply an accessor for getting the data from a PDE's parent airo: Use remove_proc_subtree() rtl8192u: Don't need to save device proc dir PDE rtl8187se: Use a dir under /proc/net/r8180/ proc: Add proc_mkdir_data() proc: Move some bits from linux/proc_fs.h to linux/{of.h,signal.h,tty.h} proc: Move PDE_NET() to fs/proc/proc_net.c ...
2013-05-01Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds
Pull networking updates from David Miller: "Highlights (1721 non-merge commits, this has to be a record of some sort): 1) Add 'random' mode to team driver, from Jiri Pirko and Eric Dumazet. 2) Make it so that any driver that supports configuration of multiple MAC addresses can provide the forwarding database add and del calls by providing a default implementation and hooking that up if the driver doesn't have an explicit set of handlers. From Vlad Yasevich. 3) Support GSO segmentation over tunnels and other encapsulating devices such as VXLAN, from Pravin B Shelar. 4) Support L2 GRE tunnels in the flow dissector, from Michael Dalton. 5) Implement Tail Loss Probe (TLP) detection in TCP, from Nandita Dukkipati. 6) In the PHY layer, allow supporting wake-on-lan in situations where the PHY registers have to be written for it to be configured. Use it to support wake-on-lan in mv643xx_eth. From Michael Stapelberg. 7) Significantly improve firewire IPV6 support, from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki. 8) Allow multiple packets to be sent in a single transmission using network coding in batman-adv, from Martin Hundebøll. 9) Add support for T5 cxgb4 chips, from Santosh Rastapur. 10) Generalize the VXLAN forwarding tables so that there is more flexibility in configurating various aspects of the endpoints. From David Stevens. 11) Support RSS and TSO in hardware over GRE tunnels in bxn2x driver, from Dmitry Kravkov. 12) Zero copy support in nfnelink_queue, from Eric Dumazet and Pablo Neira Ayuso. 13) Start adding networking selftests. 14) In situations of overload on the same AF_PACKET fanout socket, or per-cpu packet receive queue, minimize drop by distributing the load to other cpus/fanouts. From Willem de Bruijn and Eric Dumazet. 15) Add support for new payload offset BPF instruction, from Daniel Borkmann. 16) Convert several drivers over to mdoule_platform_driver(), from Sachin Kamat. 17) Provide a minimal BPF JIT image disassembler userspace tool, from Daniel Borkmann. 18) Rewrite F-RTO implementation in TCP to match the final specification of it in RFC4138 and RFC5682. From Yuchung Cheng. 19) Provide netlink socket diag of netlink sockets ("Yo dawg, I hear you like netlink, so I implemented netlink dumping of netlink sockets.") From Andrey Vagin. 20) Remove ugly passing of rtnetlink attributes into rtnl_doit functions, from Thomas Graf. 21) Allow userspace to be able to see if a configuration change occurs in the middle of an address or device list dump, from Nicolas Dichtel. 22) Support RFC3168 ECN protection for ipv6 fragments, from Hannes Frederic Sowa. 23) Increase accuracy of packet length used by packet scheduler, from Jason Wang. 24) Beginning set of changes to make ipv4/ipv6 fragment handling more scalable and less susceptible to overload and locking contention, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer. 25) Get rid of using non-type-safe NLMSG_* macros and use nlmsg_*() instead. From Hong Zhiguo. 26) Optimize route usage in IPVS by avoiding reference counting where possible, from Julian Anastasov. 27) Convert IPVS schedulers to RCU, also from Julian Anastasov. 28) Support cpu fanouts in xt_NFQUEUE netfilter target, from Holger Eitzenberger. 29) Network namespace support for nf_log, ebt_log, xt_LOG, ipt_ULOG, nfnetlink_log, and nfnetlink_queue. From Gao feng. 30) Implement RFC3168 ECN protection, from Hannes Frederic Sowa. 31) Support several new r8169 chips, from Hayes Wang. 32) Support tokenized interface identifiers in ipv6, from Daniel Borkmann. 33) Use usbnet_link_change() helper in USB net driver, from Ming Lei. 34) Add 802.1ad vlan offload support, from Patrick McHardy. 35) Support mmap() based netlink communication, also from Patrick McHardy. 36) Support HW timestamping in mlx4 driver, from Amir Vadai. 37) Rationalize AF_PACKET packet timestamping when transmitting, from Willem de Bruijn and Daniel Borkmann. 38) Bring parity to what's provided by /proc/net/packet socket dumping and the info provided by netlink socket dumping of AF_PACKET sockets. From Nicolas Dichtel. 39) Fix peeking beyond zero sized SKBs in AF_UNIX, from Benjamin Poirier" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1722 commits) filter: fix va_list build error af_unix: fix a fatal race with bit fields bnx2x: Prevent memory leak when cnic is absent bnx2x: correct reading of speed capabilities net: sctp: attribute printl with __printf for gcc fmt checks netlink: kconfig: move mmap i/o into netlink kconfig netpoll: convert mutex into a semaphore netlink: Fix skb ref counting. net_sched: act_ipt forward compat with xtables mlx4_en: fix a build error on 32bit arches Revert "bnx2x: allow nvram test to run when device is down" bridge: avoid OOPS if root port not found drivers: net: cpsw: fix kernel warn on cpsw irq enable sh_eth: use random MAC address if no valid one supplied 3c509.c: call SET_NETDEV_DEV for all device types (ISA/ISAPnP/EISA) tg3: fix to append hardware time stamping flags unix/stream: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue unix/dgram: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue unix/dgram: peek beyond 0-sized skbs openvswitch: Remove unneeded ovs_netdev_get_ifindex() ...
2013-04-30Merge branch 'akpm' (incoming from Andrew)Linus Torvalds
Merge third batch of fixes from Andrew Morton: "Most of the rest. I still have two large patchsets against AIO and IPC, but they're a bit stuck behind other trees and I'm about to vanish for six days. - random fixlets - inotify - more of the MM queue - show_stack() cleanups - DMI update - kthread/workqueue things - compat cleanups - epoll udpates - binfmt updates - nilfs2 - hfs - hfsplus - ptrace - kmod - coredump - kexec - rbtree - pids - pidns - pps - semaphore tweaks - some w1 patches - relay updates - core Kconfig changes - sysrq tweaks" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (109 commits) Documentation/sysrq: fix inconstistent help message of sysrq key ethernet/emac/sysrq: fix inconstistent help message of sysrq key sparc/sysrq: fix inconstistent help message of sysrq key powerpc/xmon/sysrq: fix inconstistent help message of sysrq key ARM/etm/sysrq: fix inconstistent help message of sysrq key power/sysrq: fix inconstistent help message of sysrq key kgdb/sysrq: fix inconstistent help message of sysrq key lib/decompress.c: fix initconst notifier-error-inject: fix module names in Kconfig kernel/sys.c: make prctl(PR_SET_MM) generally available UAPI: remove empty Kbuild files menuconfig: print more info for symbol without prompts init/Kconfig: re-order CONFIG_EXPERT options to fix menuconfig display kconfig menu: move Virtualization drivers near other virtualization options Kconfig: consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS relay: use macro PAGE_ALIGN instead of FIX_SIZE kernel/relay.c: move FIX_SIZE macro into relay.c kernel/relay.c: remove unused function argument actor drivers/w1/slaves/w1_ds2760.c: fix the error handling in w1_ds2760_add_slave() drivers/w1/slaves/w1_ds2781.c: fix the error handling in w1_ds2781_add_slave() ...
2013-04-30KEYS: split call to call_usermodehelper_fns()Lucas De Marchi
Use call_usermodehelper_setup() + call_usermodehelper_exec() instead of calling call_usermodehelper_fns(). In case there's an OOM in this last function the cleanup function may not be called - in this case we would miss a call to key_put(). Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-04-30Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem update from James Morris: "Just some minor updates across the subsystem" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement() TPM: Retry SaveState command in suspend path tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Add small comment about return value of __i2c_transfer tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c: Add OF attributes type and name to the of_device_id table entries tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove duplicate inclusion of header files tpm: Add support for new Infineon I2C TPM (SLB 9645 TT 1.2 I2C) char/tpm: Convert struct i2c_msg initialization to C99 format drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi: use strlcpy instead of strncpy tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: formatting and white space changes Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.c selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch seccomp: allow BPF_XOR based ALU instructions. Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir() Smack: add support for modification of existing rules smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm() Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
2013-04-29Merge branch 'for-3.10' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo: - Fixes and a lot of cleanups. Locking cleanup is finally complete. cgroup_mutex is no longer exposed to individual controlelrs which used to cause nasty deadlock issues. Li fixed and cleaned up quite a bit including long standing ones like racy cgroup_path(). - device cgroup now supports proper hierarchy thanks to Aristeu. - perf_event cgroup now supports proper hierarchy. - A new mount option "__DEVEL__sane_behavior" is added. As indicated by the name, this option is to be used for development only at this point and generates a warning message when used. Unfortunately, cgroup interface currently has too many brekages and inconsistencies to implement a consistent and unified hierarchy on top. The new flag is used to collect the behavior changes which are necessary to implement consistent unified hierarchy. It's likely that this flag won't be used verbatim when it becomes ready but will be enabled implicitly along with unified hierarchy. The option currently disables some of broken behaviors in cgroup core and also .use_hierarchy switch in memcg (will be routed through -mm), which can be used to make very unusual hierarchy where nesting is partially honored. It will also be used to implement hierarchy support for blk-throttle which would be impossible otherwise without introducing a full separate set of control knobs. This is essentially versioning of interface which isn't very nice but at this point I can't see any other options which would allow keeping the interface the same while moving towards hierarchy behavior which is at least somewhat sane. The planned unified hierarchy is likely to require some level of adaptation from userland anyway, so I think it'd be best to take the chance and update the interface such that it's supportable in the long term. Maintaining the existing interface does complicate cgroup core but shouldn't put too much strain on individual controllers and I think it'd be manageable for the foreseeable future. Maybe we'll be able to drop it in a decade. Fix up conflicts (including a semantic one adding a new #include to ppc that was uncovered by header the file changes) as per Tejun. * 'for-3.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (45 commits) cpuset: fix compile warning when CONFIG_SMP=n cpuset: fix cpu hotplug vs rebuild_sched_domains() race cpuset: use rebuild_sched_domains() in cpuset_hotplug_workfn() cgroup: restore the call to eventfd->poll() cgroup: fix use-after-free when umounting cgroupfs cgroup: fix broken file xattrs devcg: remove parent_cgroup. memcg: force use_hierarchy if sane_behavior cgroup: remove cgrp->top_cgroup cgroup: introduce sane_behavior mount option move cgroupfs_root to include/linux/cgroup.h cgroup: convert cgroupfs_root flag bits to masks and add CGRP_ prefix cgroup: make cgroup_path() not print double slashes Revert "cgroup: remove bind() method from cgroup_subsys." perf: make perf_event cgroup hierarchical cgroup: implement cgroup_is_descendant() cgroup: make sure parent won't be destroyed before its children cgroup: remove bind() method from cgroup_subsys. devcg: remove broken_hierarchy tag cgroup: remove cgroup_lock_is_held() ...
2013-04-29tomoyo_close_control: don't bother with return valueAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-04-22Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller
Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmsmac/mac80211_if.c include/net/scm.h net/batman-adv/routing.c net/ipv4/tcp_input.c The e{uid,gid} --> {uid,gid} credentials fix conflicted with the cleanup in net-next to now pass cred structs around. The be2net driver had a bug fix in 'net' that overlapped with the VLAN interface changes by Patrick McHardy in net-next. An IGB conflict existed because in 'net' the build_skb() support was reverted, and in 'net-next' there was a comment style fix within that code. Several batman-adv conflicts were resolved by making sure that all calls to batadv_is_my_mac() are changed to have a new bat_priv first argument. Eric Dumazet's TS ECR fix in TCP in 'net' conflicted with the F-RTO rewrite in 'net-next', mostly overlapping changes. Thanks to Stephen Rothwell and Antonio Quartulli for help with several of these merge resolutions. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-04-18devcg: remove parent_cgroup.Rami Rosen
In devcgroup_css_alloc(), there is no longer need for parent_cgroup. bd2953ebbb("devcg: propagate local changes down the hierarchy") made the variable parent_cgroup redundant. This patch removes parent_cgroup from devcgroup_css_alloc(). Signed-off-by: Rami Rosen <ramirose@gmail.com> Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2013-04-17ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement()Mimi Zohar
Passing a pointer to the dentry name, as a parameter to process_measurement(), causes a race condition with rename() and is unnecessary, as the dentry name is already accessible via the file parameter. In the normal case, we use the full pathname as provided by brpm->filename, bprm->interp, or ima_d_path(). Only on ima_d_path() failure, do we fallback to using the d_name.name, which points either to external memory or d_iname. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-04-09selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hookEric Dumazet
Commit 90ba9b1986b5ac (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb()) broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet. Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big, and we would like it to happen only if really needed. This patch introduces a new security_ops->skb_owned_by() method, that is a void operation unless selinux is active. Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti <mvadkert@redhat.com> Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Tested-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-04-08devcg: remove broken_hierarchy tagTejun Heo
bd2953ebbb ("devcg: propagate local changes down the hierarchy") implemented proper hierarchy support. Remove the broken tag. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
2013-04-03Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.cCasey Schaufler
As reported for linux-next: Tree for Apr 2 (smack) Add the required include for smackfs.c Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-04-02selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatchJeff Layton
I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the second context= option is ignored. For instance: # mount server:/export /mnt/test1 # mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 # ls -dZ /mnt/test1 drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1 # ls -dZ /mnt/test2 drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2 When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock, it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this case cannot take effect. This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the admin why the second mount failed. Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts, then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways. For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the server: # mount server:/ /mnt/test1 # mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified ...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch. The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already present with the wrong context. OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work, because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons: # cd /mnt/test1/scratch/ -bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one. Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-04-01Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller
Conflicts: net/mac80211/sta_info.c net/wireless/core.h Two minor conflicts in wireless. Overlapping additions of extern declarations in net/wireless/core.h and a bug fix overlapping with the addition of a boolean parameter to __ieee80211_key_free(). Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-03-28Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull userns fixes from Eric W Biederman: "The bulk of the changes are fixing the worst consequences of the user namespace design oversight in not considering what happens when one namespace starts off as a clone of another namespace, as happens with the mount namespace. The rest of the changes are just plain bug fixes. Many thanks to Andy Lutomirski for pointing out many of these issues." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted ipc: Restrict mounting the mqueue filesystem vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted yama: Better permission check for ptraceme pid: Handle the exit of a multi-threaded init. scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
2013-03-28selinux: replace obsolete NLMSG_* with type safe nlmsg_*Hong zhi guo
Signed-off-by: Hong Zhiguo <honkiko@gmail.com> Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-03-26yama: Better permission check for ptracemeEric W. Biederman
Change the permission check for yama_ptrace_ptracee to the standard ptrace permission check, testing if the traceer has CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the tracees user namespace. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-03-20devcg: propagate local changes down the hierarchyAristeu Rozanski
This patch makes exception changes to propagate down in hierarchy respecting when possible local exceptions. New exceptions allowing additional access to devices won't be propagated, but it'll be possible to add an exception to access all of part of the newly allowed device(s). New exceptions disallowing access to devices will be propagated down and the local group's exceptions will be revalidated for the new situation. Example: A / \ B group behavior exceptions A allow "b 8:* rwm", "c 116:1 rw" B deny "c 1:3 rwm", "c 116:2 rwm", "b 3:* rwm" If a new exception is added to group A: # echo "c 116:* r" > A/devices.deny it'll propagate down and after revalidating B's local exceptions, the exception "c 116:2 rwm" will be removed. In case parent's exceptions change and local exceptions are not allowed anymore, they'll be deleted. v7: - do not allow behavior change when the cgroup has children - update documentation v6: fixed issues pointed by Serge Hallyn - only copy parent's exceptions while propagating behavior if the local behavior is different - while propagating exceptions, do not clear and copy parent's: it'd be against the premise we don't propagate access to more devices v5: fixed issues pointed by Serge Hallyn - updated documentation - not propagating when an exception is written to devices.allow - when propagating a new behavior, clean the local exceptions list if they're for a different behavior v4: fixed issues pointed by Tejun Heo - separated function to walk the tree and collect valid propagation targets v3: fixed issues pointed by Tejun Heo - update documentation - move css_online/css_offline changes to a new patch - use cgroup_for_each_descendant_pre() instead of own descendant walk - move exception_copy rework to a separared patch - move exception_clean rework to a separated patch v2: fixed issues pointed by Tejun Heo - instead of keeping the local settings that won't apply anymore, remove them Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2013-03-20devcg: use css_online and css_offlineAristeu Rozanski
Allocate resources and change behavior only when online. This is needed in order to determine if a node is suitable for hierarchy propagation or if it's being removed. Locking: Both functions take devcgroup_mutex to make changes to device_cgroup structure. Hierarchy propagation will also take devcgroup_mutex before walking the tree while walking the tree itself is protected by rcu lock. Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2013-03-20devcg: prepare may_access() for hierarchy supportAristeu Rozanski
Currently may_access() is only able to verify if an exception is valid for the current cgroup, which has the same behavior. With hierarchy, it'll be also used to verify if a cgroup local exception is valid towards its cgroup parent, which might have different behavior. v2: - updated patch description - rebased on top of a new patch to expand the may_access() logic to make it more clear - fixed argument description order in may_access() Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2013-03-20devcg: expand may_access() logicAristeu Rozanski
In order to make the next patch more clear, expand may_access() logic. v2: may_access() returns bool now Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2013-03-19Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir()Igor Zhbanov
This patch fixes kernel Oops because of wrong common_audit_data type in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir(). When SMACK security module is enabled and SMACK logging is on (/smack/logging is not zero) and you try to delete the file which 1) you cannot delete due to SMACK rules and logging of failures is on or 2) you can delete and logging of success is on, you will see following: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000002d7 [<...>] (strlen+0x0/0x28) [<...>] (audit_log_untrustedstring+0x14/0x28) [<...>] (common_lsm_audit+0x108/0x6ac) [<...>] (smack_log+0xc4/0xe4) [<...>] (smk_curacc+0x80/0x10c) [<...>] (smack_inode_unlink+0x74/0x80) [<...>] (security_inode_unlink+0x2c/0x30) [<...>] (vfs_unlink+0x7c/0x100) [<...>] (do_unlinkat+0x144/0x16c) The function smack_inode_unlink() (and smack_inode_rmdir()) need to log two structures of different types. First of all it does: smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry); This will set common audit data type to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY and store dentry for auditing (by function smk_curacc(), which in turn calls dump_common_audit_data(), which is actually uses provided data and logs it). /* * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking */ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad); if (rc == 0) { /* * You also need write access to the containing directory */ Then this function wants to log anoter data: smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir); The function sets inode field, but don't change common_audit_data type. rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad); } So the dump_common_audit() function incorrectly interprets inode structure as dentry, and Oops will happen. This patch reinitializes common_audit_data structures with correct type. Also I removed unneeded smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL); initialization, because both dentry and inode pointers are stored in the same union. Signed-off-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com>
2013-03-19Smack: add support for modification of existing rulesRafal Krypa
Rule modifications are enabled via /smack/change-rule. Format is as follows: "Subject Object rwaxt rwaxt" First two strings are subject and object labels up to 255 characters. Third string contains permissions to enable. Fourth string contains permissions to disable. All unmentioned permissions will be left unchanged. If no rule previously existed, it will be created. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
2013-03-19smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.hJarkko Sakkinen
SMACK_MAGIC moved to a proper place for easy user space access (i.e. libsmack). Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@iki.fi>
2013-03-19Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm()Rafal Krypa
This fixes audit logs for granting or denial of permissions to show information about transmute bit. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
2013-03-19Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to itRafal Krypa
Special file /smack/revoke-subject will silently accept labels that are not present on the subject label list. Nothing has to be done for such labels, as there are no rules for them to revoke. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
2013-03-19selinux: use GFP_ATOMIC under spin_lockDan Carpenter
The call tree here is: sk_clone_lock() <- takes bh_lock_sock(newsk); xfrm_sk_clone_policy() __xfrm_sk_clone_policy() clone_policy() <- uses GFP_ATOMIC for allocations security_xfrm_policy_clone() security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security() selinux_xfrm_policy_clone() Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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