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commit bd14b1b2e29bd6812597f896dde06eaf7c6d2f24 upstream.
It appears some networks play bad games with the two bits reserved for
ECN. This can trigger false congestion notifications and very slow
transferts.
Since RFC 3168 (6.1.1) forbids SYN packets to carry CT bits, we can
disable TCP ECN negociation if it happens we receive mangled CT bits in
the SYN packet.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Perry Lorier <perryl@google.com>
Cc: Matt Mathis <mattmathis@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Wilmer van der Gaast <wilmer@google.com>
Cc: Ankur Jain <jankur@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Dave Täht <dave.taht@bufferbloat.net>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
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commit 6d50e60cd2edb5a57154db5a6f64eef5aa59b751 upstream.
If an anonymous mapping is not allowed to fault thp memory and then
madvise(MADV_HUGEPAGE) is used after fault, khugepaged will never
collapse this memory into thp memory.
This occurs because the madvise(2) handler for thp, hugepage_madvise(),
clears VM_NOHUGEPAGE on the stack and it isn't stored in vma->vm_flags
until the final action of madvise_behavior(). This causes the
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge() to be a no-op in hugepage_madvise() when
the vma had previously had VM_NOHUGEPAGE set.
Fix this by passing the correct vma flags to the khugepaged mm slot
handler. There's no chance khugepaged can run on this vma until after
madvise_behavior() returns since we hold mm->mmap_sem.
It would be possible to clear VM_NOHUGEPAGE directly from vma->vm_flags
in hugepage_advise(), but I didn't want to introduce special case
behavior into madvise_behavior(). I think it's best to just let it
always set vma->vm_flags itself.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 8c3e434769b1707fd2d24de5a2eb25fedc634c4a upstream.
0x4c6e is a secondary device id so should not be used
by the driver.
Noticed-by: Mark Kettenis <mark.kettenis@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit d4c5efdb97773f59a2b711754ca0953f24516739 upstream.
zatimend has reported that in his environment (3.16/gcc4.8.3/corei7)
memset() calls which clear out sensitive data in extract_{buf,entropy,
entropy_user}() in random driver are being optimized away by gcc.
Add a helper memzero_explicit() (similarly as explicit_bzero() variants)
that can be used in such cases where a variable with sensitive data is
being cleared out in the end. Other use cases might also be in crypto
code. [ I have put this into lib/string.c though, as it's always built-in
and doesn't need any dependencies then. ]
Fixes kernel bugzilla: 82041
Reported-by: zatimend@hotmail.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- extract_buf() needs to use this for the 'extract' array as well
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Part of upstream commit fe8c8a126806 ('crypto: more robust
crypto_memneq'), needed by commit d4c5efdb9777 ('random: add and use
memzero_explicit() for clearing data').
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commit 71458cfc782eafe4b27656e078d379a34e472adf upstream.
We're missing include/linux/compiler-gcc5.h which is required now
because gcc branched off to v5 in trunk.
Just copy the relevant bits out of include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h,
no new code is added as of now.
This fixes a build error when using gcc 5.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit b8839b8c55f3fdd60dc36abcda7e0266aff7985c upstream.
The math in both blk_stack_limits() and queue_limit_alignment_offset()
assume that a block device's io_min (aka minimum_io_size) is always a
power-of-2. Fix the math such that it works for non-power-of-2 io_min.
This issue (of alignment_offset != 0) became apparent when testing
dm-thinp with a thinp blocksize that matches a RAID6 stripesize of
1280K. Commit fdfb4c8c1 ("dm thin: set minimum_io_size to pool's data
block size") unlocked the potential for alignment_offset != 0 due to
the dm-thin-pool's io_min possibly being a non-power-of-2.
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 90a8020278c1598fafd071736a0846b38510309c upstream.
->page_mkwrite() is used by filesystems to allocate blocks under a page
which is becoming writeably mmapped in some process' address space. This
allows a filesystem to return a page fault if there is not enough space
available, user exceeds quota or similar problem happens, rather than
silently discarding data later when writepage is called.
However VFS fails to call ->page_mkwrite() in all the cases where
filesystems need it when blocksize < pagesize. For example when
blocksize = 1024, pagesize = 4096 the following is problematic:
ftruncate(fd, 0);
pwrite(fd, buf, 1024, 0);
map = mmap(NULL, 1024, PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
map[0] = 'a'; ----> page_mkwrite() for index 0 is called
ftruncate(fd, 10000); /* or even pwrite(fd, buf, 1, 10000) */
mremap(map, 1024, 10000, 0);
map[4095] = 'a'; ----> no page_mkwrite() called
At the moment ->page_mkwrite() is called, filesystem can allocate only
one block for the page because i_size == 1024. Otherwise it would create
blocks beyond i_size which is generally undesirable. But later at
->writepage() time, we also need to store data at offset 4095 but we
don't have block allocated for it.
This patch introduces a helper function filesystems can use to have
->page_mkwrite() called at all the necessary moments.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Adjust context
- truncate_setsize() already has an oldsize variable]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit ddbe1fca0bcb87ca8c199ea873a456ca8a948567 upstream.
This full-speed USB device generates spurious remote wakeup event
as soon as USB_DEVICE_REMOTE_WAKEUP feature is set. As the result,
Linux can't enter system suspend and S0ix power saving modes once
this keyboard is used.
This patch tries to introduce USB_QUIRK_IGNORE_REMOTE_WAKEUP quirk.
With this quirk set, wakeup capability will be ignored during
device configure.
This patch could be back-ported to kernels as old as 2.6.39.
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit b69040d8e39f20d5215a03502a8e8b4c6ab78395 upstream.
When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.
Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 9de7922bc709eee2f609cd01d98aaedc4cf5ea74 upstream.
Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Adjust context
- sctp_sf_violation_paramlen() doesn't take a struct net * parameter]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit e86fea764991e00a03ff1e56409ec9cacdbda4c9 upstream.
Returns the time remaining for an alarm timer, rather than the time at
which it is scheduled to expire. If the timer has already expired or it
is not currently scheduled, the it_value's members are set to zero.
This new behavior matches that of the other posix-timers and the POSIX
specifications.
This is a change in user-visible behavior, and may break existing
applications. Hopefully, few users rely on the old incorrect behavior.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Sharvil Nanavati <sharvil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Larocque <rlarocque@google.com>
[jstultz: minor style tweak]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: Add definition of alarm_expires_remaining() from
commit 6cffe00f7d4e ('alarmtimer: Add functions for timerfd support')]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit d78c9300c51d6ceed9f6d078d4e9366f259de28c upstream.
timeval_to_jiffies tried to round a timeval up to an integral number
of jiffies, but the logic for doing so was incorrect: intervals
corresponding to exactly N jiffies would become N+1. This manifested
itself particularly repeatedly stopping/starting an itimer:
setitimer(ITIMER_PROF, &val, NULL);
setitimer(ITIMER_PROF, NULL, &val);
would add a full tick to val, _even if it was exactly representable in
terms of jiffies_ (say, the result of a previous rounding.) Doing
this repeatedly would cause unbounded growth in val. So fix the math.
Here's what was wrong with the conversion: we essentially computed
(eliding seconds)
jiffies = usec * (NSEC_PER_USEC/TICK_NSEC)
by using scaling arithmetic, which took the best approximation of
NSEC_PER_USEC/TICK_NSEC with denominator of 2^USEC_JIFFIE_SC =
x/(2^USEC_JIFFIE_SC), and computed:
jiffies = (usec * x) >> USEC_JIFFIE_SC
and rounded this calculation up in the intermediate form (since we
can't necessarily exactly represent TICK_NSEC in usec.) But the
scaling arithmetic is a (very slight) *over*approximation of the true
value; that is, instead of dividing by (1 usec/ 1 jiffie), we
effectively divided by (1 usec/1 jiffie)-epsilon (rounding
down). This would normally be fine, but we want to round timeouts up,
and we did so by adding 2^USEC_JIFFIE_SC - 1 before the shift; this
would be fine if our division was exact, but dividing this by the
slightly smaller factor was equivalent to adding just _over_ 1 to the
final result (instead of just _under_ 1, as desired.)
In particular, with HZ=1000, we consistently computed that 10000 usec
was 11 jiffies; the same was true for any exact multiple of
TICK_NSEC.
We could possibly still round in the intermediate form, adding
something less than 2^USEC_JIFFIE_SC - 1, but easier still is to
convert usec->nsec, round in nanoseconds, and then convert using
time*spec*_to_jiffies. This adds one constant multiplication, and is
not observably slower in microbenchmarks on recent x86 hardware.
Tested: the following program:
int main() {
struct itimerval zero = {{0, 0}, {0, 0}};
/* Initially set to 10 ms. */
struct itimerval initial = zero;
initial.it_interval.tv_usec = 10000;
setitimer(ITIMER_PROF, &initial, NULL);
/* Save and restore several times. */
for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
struct itimerval prev;
setitimer(ITIMER_PROF, &zero, &prev);
/* on old kernels, this goes up by TICK_USEC every iteration */
printf("previous value: %ld %ld %ld %ld\n",
prev.it_interval.tv_sec, prev.it_interval.tv_usec,
prev.it_value.tv_sec, prev.it_value.tv_usec);
setitimer(ITIMER_PROF, &prev, NULL);
}
return 0;
}
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Reported-by: Aaron Jacobs <jacobsa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com>
[jstultz: Tweaked to apply to 3.17-rc]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 3cea4c3071d4e55e9d7356efe9d0ebf92f0c2204 upstream.
Rename front_max field of struct ceph_msg to front_alloc_len to make
its purpose more clear.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit a5fe8e7695dc3f547e955ad2b662e3e72969e506 upstream.
alpha2 is defined as 2-chars array, but is used in multiple
places as string (e.g. with nla_put_string calls), which
might leak kernel data.
Solve it by simply adding an extra char for the NULL
terminator, making such operations safe.
Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit e7b691b085fda913830e5280ae6f724b2a63c824 upstream.
slab_node() could access current->mempolicy from interrupt context.
However there's a race condition during exit where the mempolicy
is first freed and then the pointer zeroed.
Using this from interrupts seems bogus anyways. The interrupt
will interrupt a random process and therefore get a random
mempolicy. Many times, this will be idle's, which noone can change.
Just disable this here and always use local for slab
from interrupts. I also cleaned up the callers of slab_node a bit
which always passed the same argument.
I believe the original mempolicy code did that in fact,
so it's likely a regression.
v2: send version with correct logic
v3: simplify. fix typo.
Reported-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com>
Cc: penberg@kernel.org
Cc: cl@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
[tdmackey@twitter.com: Rework control flow based on feedback from
cl@linux.com, fix logic, and cleanup current task_struct reference]
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com>
Signed-off-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 04ca6973f7c1a0d8537f2d9906a0cf8e69886d75 ]
In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and
Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to
infer whether two machines are exchanging packets.
With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we
changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this
side-channel technique.
This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers
for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after
an idle period.
Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most
once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not
increase collision probability.
This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can
rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine.
We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash
on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be
used to infer information for other protocols.
For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr.
If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict.
21:57:11.008086 IP (...)
A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64
21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...)
target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64
21:57:12.013133 IP (...)
A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64
21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...)
target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64
21:57:13.016580 IP (...)
A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64
21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...)
target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64
[1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu>
Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8c1074ac6327e0abd1169e95eb66463 ]
Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP
generator.
linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge
cost on servers disabling MTU discovery.
1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes
2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs,
with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load.
3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth
is about 20.
4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of
not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in
the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id())
5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively.
IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect'
Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time,
so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of
fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments
with a recycled ID.
We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP
as a key.
ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it
belongs (it is only used from this file)
secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed.
Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid
unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 41c3bd2039e0d7b3dc32313141773f20716ec524 upstream.
The NetLabel category (catmap) functions have a problem in that they
assume categories will be set in an increasing manner, e.g. the next
category set will always be larger than the last. Unfortunately, this
is not a valid assumption and could result in problems when attempting
to set categories less than the startbit in the lowest catmap node.
In some cases kernel panics and other nasties can result.
This patch corrects the problem by checking for this and allocating a
new catmap node instance and placing it at the front of the list.
Reported-by: Christian Evans <frodox@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename for SMACK]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit ffbc6f0ead47fa5a1dc9642b0331cb75c20a640e upstream.
Since March 2009 the kernel has treated the state that if no
MS_..ATIME flags are passed then the kernel defaults to relatime.
Defaulting to relatime instead of the existing atime state during a
remount is silly, and causes problems in practice for people who don't
specify any MS_...ATIME flags and to get the default filesystem atime
setting. Those users may encounter a permission error because the
default atime setting does not work.
A default that does not work and causes permission problems is
ridiculous, so preserve the existing value to have a default
atime setting that is always guaranteed to work.
Using the default atime setting in this way is particularly
interesting for applications built to run in restricted userspace
environments without /proc mounted, as the existing atime mount
options of a filesystem can not be read from /proc/mounts.
In practice this fixes user space that uses the default atime
setting on remount that are broken by the permission checks
keeping less privileged users from changing more privileged users
atime settings.
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: add definition of MNT_ATIME_MASK, as we don't
need the fix that introduced that definition upstream]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 1a112d10f03e83fb3a2fdc4c9165865dec8a3ca6 upstream.
1871ee134b73 ("libata: support the ata host which implements a queue
depth less than 32") directly used ata_port->scsi_host->can_queue from
ata_qc_new() to determine the number of tags supported by the host;
unfortunately, SAS controllers doing SATA don't initialize ->scsi_host
leading to the following oops.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058
IP: [<ffffffff814e0618>] ata_qc_new_init+0x188/0x1b0
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: isci libsas scsi_transport_sas mgag200 drm_kms_helper ttm
CPU: 1 PID: 518 Comm: udevd Not tainted 3.16.0-rc6+ #62
Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CO/S2600CO, BIOS SE5C600.86B.02.02.0002.122320131210 12/23/2013
task: ffff880c1a00b280 ti: ffff88061a000000 task.ti: ffff88061a000000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814e0618>] [<ffffffff814e0618>] ata_qc_new_init+0x188/0x1b0
RSP: 0018:ffff88061a003ae8 EFLAGS: 00010012
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88000241ca80 RCX: 00000000000000fa
RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000000000000020 RDI: ffff8806194aa298
RBP: ffff88061a003ae8 R08: ffff8806194a8000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88000241ca80 R12: ffff88061ad58200
R13: ffff8806194aa298 R14: ffffffff814e67a0 R15: ffff8806194a8000
FS: 00007f3ad7fe3840(0000) GS:ffff880627620000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 000000061a118000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
Stack:
ffff88061a003b20 ffffffff814e96e1 ffff88000241ca80 ffff88061ad58200
ffff8800b6bf6000 ffff880c1c988000 ffff880619903850 ffff88061a003b68
ffffffffa0056ce1 ffff88061a003b48 0000000013d6e6f8 ffff88000241ca80
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff814e96e1>] ata_sas_queuecmd+0xa1/0x430
[<ffffffffa0056ce1>] sas_queuecommand+0x191/0x220 [libsas]
[<ffffffff8149afee>] scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x10e/0x300
[<ffffffff814a3bc5>] scsi_request_fn+0x2f5/0x550
[<ffffffff81317613>] __blk_run_queue+0x33/0x40
[<ffffffff8131781a>] queue_unplugged+0x2a/0x90
[<ffffffff8131ceb4>] blk_flush_plug_list+0x1b4/0x210
[<ffffffff8131d274>] blk_finish_plug+0x14/0x50
[<ffffffff8117eaa8>] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x198/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8117ee21>] force_page_cache_readahead+0x31/0x50
[<ffffffff8117ee7e>] page_cache_sync_readahead+0x3e/0x50
[<ffffffff81172ac6>] generic_file_read_iter+0x496/0x5a0
[<ffffffff81219897>] blkdev_read_iter+0x37/0x40
[<ffffffff811e307e>] new_sync_read+0x7e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811e3734>] vfs_read+0x94/0x170
[<ffffffff811e43c6>] SyS_read+0x46/0xb0
[<ffffffff811e33d1>] ? SyS_lseek+0x91/0xb0
[<ffffffff8171ee29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 00 00 00 88 50 29 83 7f 08 01 19 d2 83 e2 f0 83 ea 50 88 50 34 c6 81 1d 02 00 00 40 c6 81 17 02 00 00 00 5d c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 <89> 14 25 58 00 00 00
Fix it by introducing ata_host->n_tags which is initialized to
ATA_MAX_QUEUE - 1 in ata_host_init() for SAS controllers and set to
scsi_host_template->can_queue in ata_host_register() for !SAS ones.
As SAS hosts are never registered, this will give them the same
ATA_MAX_QUEUE - 1 as before. Note that we can't use
scsi_host->can_queue directly for SAS hosts anyway as they can go
higher than the libata maximum.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Mike Qiu <qiudayu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Fixes: 1871ee134b73 ("libata: support the ata host which implements a queue depth less than 32")
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit a3860c1c5dd1137db23d7786d284939c5761d517 upstream.
ULONG_MAX is often used to check for integer overflow when calculating
allocation size. While ULONG_MAX happens to work on most systems, there
is no guarantee that `size_t' must be the same size as `long'.
This patch introduces SIZE_MAX, the maximum value of `size_t', to improve
portability and readability for allocation size validation.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Elder <elder@dreamhost.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit c2853c8df57f49620d26f317d7d43347c29bfc2e upstream.
There is div64_long() to handle the s64/long division, but no mocro do
u64/ul division. It is necessary in some scenarios, so add this
function.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit b14bf2d0c0358140041d1c1805a674376964d0e0 upstream.
Some buggy JMicron USB-ATA bridges don't know how to translate the FUA
bit in READs or WRITEs. This patch adds an entry in unusual_devs.h
and a blacklist flag to tell the sd driver not to use FUA.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Michael Büsch <m@bues.ch>
Tested-by: Michael Büsch <m@bues.ch>
Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
CC: Matthew Dharm <mdharm-usb@one-eyed-alien.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Adjust context
- Use sd_printk() not sd_first_printk()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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This reverts commit caa5344994778a2b4725b2d75c74430f76925e4a, which
was commit fe6cc55f3a9a053482a76f5a6b2257cee51b4663 upstream. In 3.2,
the transport header length is not calculated in the forwarding path,
so skb_gso_network_seglen() returns an incorrect result. We also have
problems due to the local_df flag not being set correctly.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit a353e0ce0fd42d8859260666d1e9b10f2abd4698 upstream.
Many places do
if ((skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_DEV_ZEROCOPY))
skb_copy_ubufs(skb, gfp_mask);
to copy and invoke frag destructors if necessary.
Add an inline helper for this.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit b9cd18de4db3c9ffa7e17b0dc0ca99ed5aa4d43a upstream.
The 'sysret' fastpath does not correctly restore even all regular
registers, much less any segment registers or reflags values. That is
very much part of why it's faster than 'iret'.
Normally that isn't a problem, because the normal ptrace() interface
catches the process using the signal handler infrastructure, which
always returns with an iret.
However, some paths can get caught using ptrace_event() instead of the
signal path, and for those we need to make sure that we aren't going to
return to user space using 'sysret'. Otherwise the modifications that
may have been done to the register set by the tracer wouldn't
necessarily take effect.
Fix it by forcing IRET path by setting TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME from
arch_ptrace_stop_needed() which is invoked from ptrace_stop().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 39c36094d78c39e038c1e499b2364e13bce36f54 ]
I noticed we were sending wrong IPv4 ID in TCP flows when MTU discovery
is disabled.
Note how GSO/TSO packets do not have monotonically incrementing ID.
06:37:41.575531 IP (id 14227, proto: TCP (6), length: 4396)
06:37:41.575534 IP (id 14272, proto: TCP (6), length: 65212)
06:37:41.575544 IP (id 14312, proto: TCP (6), length: 57972)
06:37:41.575678 IP (id 14317, proto: TCP (6), length: 7292)
06:37:41.575683 IP (id 14361, proto: TCP (6), length: 63764)
It appears I introduced this bug in linux-3.1.
inet_getid() must return the old value of peer->ip_id_count,
not the new one.
Lets revert this part, and remove the prevention of
a null identification field in IPv6 Fragment Extension Header,
which is dubious and not even done properly.
Fixes: 87c48fa3b463 ("ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit e63ed0d7a98014fdfc2cfeb3f6dada313dcabb59 upstream.
This patch eliminates the reap_ref and replaces it with a proper kref.
On last put of this kref, the target is removed from visibility in
sysfs. The final call to scsi_target_reap() for the device is done from
__scsi_remove_device() and only if the device was made visible. This
ensures that the target disappears as soon as the last device is gone
rather than waiting until final release of the device (which is often
too long).
Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Tested-by: Sarah Sharp <sarah.a.sharp@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 8b975bd3f9089f8ee5d7bbfd798537b992bbc7e7 upstream.
This commit updates the kernel LZO code to the current upsteam version
which features a significant speed improvement - benchmarking the Calgary
and Silesia test corpora typically shows a doubled performance in
both compression and decompression on modern i386/x86_64/powerpc machines.
Signed-off-by: Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer <markus@oberhumer.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 4af4206be2bd1933cae20c2b6fb2058dbc887f7c upstream.
syscall_regfunc() and syscall_unregfunc() should set/clear
TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT system-wide, but do_each_thread() can race
with copy_process() and miss the new child which was not added to
the process/thread lists yet.
Change copy_process() to update the child's TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT
under tasklist.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/20140413185854.GB20668@redhat.com
Fixes: a871bd33a6c0 "tracing: Add syscall tracepoints"
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92 upstream.
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 4e52365f279564cef0ddd41db5237f0471381093 upstream.
When tracing a process in another pid namespace, it's important for fork
event messages to contain the child's pid as seen from the tracer's pid
namespace, not the parent's. Otherwise, the tracer won't be able to
correlate the fork event with later SIGTRAP signals it receives from the
child.
We still risk a race condition if a ptracer from a different pid
namespace attaches after we compute the pid_t value. However, sending a
bogus fork event message in this unlikely scenario is still a vast
improvement over the status quo where we always send bogus fork event
messages to debuggers in a different pid namespace than the forking
process.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <mcgrathr@chromium.org>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit cfac4b47c664e207740880d6492938761c53d74b upstream.
Removed vmtruncate
Signed-off-by: Marco Stornelli <marco.stornelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 1e77d0a1ed7417d2a5a52a7b8d32aea1833faa6c upstream.
Till reported that the spurious interrupt detection of threaded
interrupts is broken in two ways:
- note_interrupt() is called for each action thread of a shared
interrupt line. That's wrong as we are only interested whether none
of the device drivers felt responsible for the interrupt, but by
calling multiple times for a single interrupt line we account
IRQ_NONE even if one of the drivers felt responsible.
- note_interrupt() when called from the thread handler is not
serialized. That leaves the members of irq_desc which are used for
the spurious detection unprotected.
To solve this we need to defer the spurious detection of a threaded
interrupt to the next hardware interrupt context where we have
implicit serialization.
If note_interrupt is called with action_ret == IRQ_WAKE_THREAD, we
check whether the previous interrupt requested a deferred check. If
not, we request a deferred check for the next hardware interrupt and
return.
If set, we check whether one of the interrupt threads signaled
success. Depending on this information we feed the result into the
spurious detector.
If one primary handler of a shared interrupt returns IRQ_HANDLED we
disable the deferred check of irq threads on the same line, as we have
found at least one device driver who cared.
Reported-by: Till Straumann <strauman@slac.stanford.edu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Austin Schuh <austin@peloton-tech.com>
Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1303071450130.22263@ionos
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 098507ae3ec2331476fb52e85d4040c1cc6d0ef4 upstream.
The replacement of the 'count' variable by two variables 'incs' and
'decs' to resolve some race conditions during module unloading was done
in parallel with some cleanup in the trace subsystem, and was integrated
as a merge.
Unfortunately, the formula for this replacement was wrong in the tracing
code, and the refcount in the traces was not usable as a result.
Use 'count = incs - decs' to compute the user count.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1393924179-9147-1-git-send-email-romain.izard.pro@gmail.com
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Fixes: c1ab9cab7509 "merge conflict resolution"
Signed-off-by: Romain Izard <romain.izard.pro@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit a949ae560a511fe4e3adf48fa44fefded93e5c2b upstream.
A race exists between module loading and enabling of function tracer.
CPU 1 CPU 2
----- -----
load_module()
module->state = MODULE_STATE_COMING
register_ftrace_function()
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
ftrace_startup()
update_ftrace_function();
ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()
set_all_module_text_rw();
<enables-ftrace>
ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process()
set_all_module_text_ro();
[ here all module text is set to RO,
including the module that is
loading!! ]
blocking_notifier_call_chain(MODULE_STATE_COMING);
ftrace_init_module()
[ tries to modify code, but it's RO, and fails!
ftrace_bug() is called]
When this race happens, ftrace_bug() will produces a nasty warning and
all of the function tracing features will be disabled until reboot.
The simple solution is to treate module load the same way the core
kernel is treated at boot. To hardcode the ftrace function modification
of converting calls to mcount into nops. This is done in init/main.c
there's no reason it could not be done in load_module(). This gives
a better control of the changes and doesn't tie the state of the
module to its notifiers as much. Ftrace is special, it needs to be
treated as such.
The reason this would work, is that the ftrace_module_init() would be
called while the module is in MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED, which is ignored
by the set_all_module_text_ro() call.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1395637826-3312-1-git-send-email-indou.takao@jp.fujitsu.com
Reported-by: Takao Indoh <indou.takao@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 98fda169290b3b28c0f2db2b8f02290c13da50ef upstream.
'.done' is used to mark the completion of 'async_pf_execute()', but
'cancel_work_sync()' returns true when the work was canceled, so we
use it instead.
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit ec47ea82477404631d49b8e568c71826c9b663ac ]
With the recent changes for how we compute the skb truesize it occurs to me
we are probably going to have a lot of calls to skb_end_pointer -
skb->head. Instead of running all over the place doing that it would make
more sense to just make it a separate inline skb_end_offset(skb) that way
we can return the correct value without having gcc having to do all the
optimization to cancel out skb->head - skb->head.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 30f78d8ebf7f514801e71b88a10c948275168518 ]
Francois reported that setting big mtu on loopback device could prevent
tcp sessions making progress.
We do not support (yet ?) IPv6 Jumbograms and cook corrupted packets.
We must limit the IPv6 MTU to (65535 + 40) bytes in theory.
Tested:
ifconfig lo mtu 70000
netperf -H ::1
Before patch : Throughput : 0.05 Mbits
After patch : Throughput : 35484 Mbits
Reported-by: Francois WELLENREITER <f.wellenreiter@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 5017b2851373ee15c7035151853bb1448800cae2 upstream.
dmi_match() considers a substring match to be a successful match. This is
not always sufficient to distinguish between DMI data for different
systems. Add support for exact string matching using strcmp() in addition
to the substring matching using strstr().
The specific use case in the i915 driver is to allow us to use an exact
match for D510MO, without also incorrectly matching D510MOV:
{
.ident = "Intel D510MO",
.matches = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "Intel"),
DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "D510MO"),
},
}
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: <annndddrr@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Cornel Panceac <cpanceac@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 8a4aeec8d2d6a3edeffbdfae451cdf05cbf0fefd upstream.
The AHCI spec allows implementations to issue commands in tag order
rather than FIFO order:
5.3.2.12 P:SelectCmd
HBA sets pSlotLoc = (pSlotLoc + 1) mod (CAP.NCS + 1)
or HBA selects the command to issue that has had the
PxCI bit set to '1' longer than any other command
pending to be issued.
The result is that commands posted sequentially (time-wise) may play out
of sequence when issued by hardware.
This behavior has likely been hidden by drives that arrange for commands
to complete in issue order. However, it appears recent drives (two from
different vendors that we have found so far) inflict out-of-order
completions as a matter of course. So, we need to take care to maintain
ordered submission, otherwise we risk triggering a drive to fall out of
sequential-io automation and back to random-io processing, which incurs
large latency and degrades throughput.
This issue was found in simple benchmarks where QD=2 seq-write
performance was 30-50% *greater* than QD=32 seq-write performance.
Tagging for -stable and making the change globally since it has a low
risk-to-reward ratio. Also, word is that recent versions of an unnamed
OS also does it this way now. So, drives in the field are already
experienced with this tag ordering scheme.
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Ed Ciechanowski <ed.ciechanowski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit ad36d28293936b03d6b7996e9d6aadfd73c0eb08 upstream.
Added the functions task_ppid_nr_ns() and task_ppid_nr() to abstract the lookup
of the PPID (real_parent's pid_t) of a process, including rcu locking, in the
arbitrary and init_pid_ns.
This provides an alternative to sys_getppid(), which is relative to the child
process' pid namespace.
(informed by ebiederman's 6c621b7e)
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit af5040da01ef980670b3741b3e10733ee3e33566 upstream.
trace_block_rq_complete does not take into account that request can
be partially completed, so we can get the following incorrect output
of blkparser:
C R 232 + 240 [0]
C R 240 + 232 [0]
C R 248 + 224 [0]
C R 256 + 216 [0]
but should be:
C R 232 + 8 [0]
C R 240 + 8 [0]
C R 248 + 8 [0]
C R 256 + 8 [0]
Also, the whole output summary statistics of completed requests and
final throughput will be incorrect.
This patch takes into account real completion size of the request and
fixes wrong completion accounting.
Signed-off-by: Roman Pen <r.peniaev@gmail.com>
CC: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CC: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: drop change in blk-mq.c]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit fe6cc55f3a9a053482a76f5a6b2257cee51b4663 upstream.
[ use zero netdev_feature mask to avoid backport of
netif_skb_dev_features function ]
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner reported problems when the forwarding link path
has a lower mtu than the incoming one if the inbound interface supports GRO.
Given:
Host <mtu1500> R1 <mtu1200> R2
Host sends tcp stream which is routed via R1 and R2. R1 performs GRO.
In this case, the kernel will fail to send ICMP fragmentation needed
messages (or pkt too big for ipv6), as GSO packets currently bypass dstmtu
checks in forward path. Instead, Linux tries to send out packets exceeding
the mtu.
When locking route MTU on Host (i.e., no ipv4 DF bit set), R1 does
not fragment the packets when forwarding, and again tries to send out
packets exceeding R1-R2 link mtu.
This alters the forwarding dstmtu checks to take the individual gso
segment lengths into account.
For ipv6, we send out pkt too big error for gso if the individual
segments are too big.
For ipv4, we either send icmp fragmentation needed, or, if the DF bit
is not set, perform software segmentation and let the output path
create fragments when the packet is leaving the machine.
It is not 100% correct as the error message will contain the headers of
the GRO skb instead of the original/segmented one, but it seems to
work fine in my (limited) tests.
Eric Dumazet suggested to simply shrink mss via ->gso_size to avoid
sofware segmentation.
However it turns out that skb_segment() assumes skb nr_frags is related
to mss size so we would BUG there. I don't want to mess with it considering
Herbert and Eric disagree on what the correct behavior should be.
Hannes Frederic Sowa notes that when we would shrink gso_size
skb_segment would then also need to deal with the case where
SKB_MAX_FRAGS would be exceeded.
This uses sofware segmentation in the forward path when we hit ipv4
non-DF packets and the outgoing link mtu is too small. Its not perfect,
but given the lack of bug reports wrt. GRO fwd being broken this is a
rare case anyway. Also its not like this could not be improved later
once the dust settles.
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit de960aa9ab4decc3304959f69533eef64d05d8e8 upstream.
[ no skb_gso_seglen helper in 3.4, leave tbf alone ]
This moves part of Eric Dumazets skb_gso_seglen helper from tbf sched to
skbuff core so it may be reused by upcoming ip forwarding path patch.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 00a1a053ebe5febcfc2ec498bd894f035ad2aa06 upstream.
Use cmpxchg() to atomically set i_flags instead of clearing out the
S_IMMUTABLE, S_APPEND, etc. flags and then setting them from the
EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL, EXT4_APPEND_FL flags, since this opens up a race
where an immutable file has the immutable flag cleared for a brief
window of time.
Reported-by: John Sullivan <jsrhbz@kanargh.force9.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 5a581b367b5df0531265311fc681c2abd377e5e6 upstream.
According to the C standard 3.4.3p3, overflow of a signed integer results
in undefined behavior. This commit therefore changes the definitions
of time_after(), time_after_eq(), time_after64(), and time_after_eq64()
to avoid this undefined behavior. The trick is that the subtraction
is done using unsigned arithmetic, which according to 6.2.5p9 cannot
overflow because it is defined as modulo arithmetic. This has the added
(though admittedly quite small) benefit of shortening four lines of code
by four characters each.
Note that the C standard considers the cast from unsigned to
signed to be implementation-defined, see 6.3.1.3p3. However, on a
two's-complement system, an implementation that defines anything other
than a reinterpretation of the bits is free to come to me, and I will be
happy to act as a witness for its being committed to an insane asylum.
(Although I have nothing against saturating arithmetic or signals in some
cases, these things really should not be the default when compiling an
operating-system kernel.)
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org>
[ paulmck: Included time_after64() and time_after_eq64(), as suggested
by Eric Dumazet, also fixed commit message.]
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 45ab2813d40d88fc575e753c38478de242d03f88 upstream.
If a module fails to add its tracepoints due to module tainting, do not
create the module event infrastructure in the debugfs directory. As the events
will not work and worse yet, they will silently fail, making the user wonder
why the events they enable do not display anything.
Having a warning on module load and the events not visible to the users
will make the cause of the problem much clearer.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140227154923.265882695@goodmis.org
Fixes: 6d723736e472 "tracing/events: add support for modules to TRACE_EVENT"
Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit a9f180345f5378ac87d80ed0bea55ba421d83859 upstream.
I started noticing problems with KVM guest destruction on Linux
3.12+, where guest memory wasn't being cleaned up. I bisected it
down to the commit introducing the new 'asm goto'-based atomics,
and found this quirk was later applied to those.
Unfortunately, even with GCC 4.8.2 (which ostensibly fixed the
known 'asm goto' bug) I am still getting some kind of
miscompilation. If I enable the asm_volatile_goto quirk for my
compiler, KVM guests are destroyed correctly and the memory is
cleaned up.
So make the quirk unconditional for now, until bug is found
and fixed.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Noonan <steven@uplinklabs.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392274867-15236-1-git-send-email-steven@uplinklabs.net
Link: http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58670
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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