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path: root/fs/namei.c
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2012-09-26namei.c: fix BS commentAl Viro
get_write_access() is needed for nfsd, not binfmt_aout (the latter has no business doing anything of that kind, of course) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-08-22fs: fix fs/namei.c kernel-doc warningsRandy Dunlap
Fix kernel-doc warnings in fs/namei.c: Warning(fs/namei.c:360): No description found for parameter 'inode' Warning(fs/namei.c:672): No description found for parameter 'nd' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-08-16vfs: fix propagation of atomic_open create error on negative dentrySage Weil
If ->atomic_open() returns -ENOENT, we take care to return the create error (e.g., EACCES), if any. Do the same when ->atomic_open() returns 1 and provides a negative dentry. This fixes a regression where an unprivileged open O_CREAT fails with ENOENT instead of EACCES, introduced with the new atomic_open code. It is tested by the open/08.t test in the pjd posix test suite, and was observed on top of fuse (backed by ceph-fuse). Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2012-08-15vfs: pass right create mode to may_o_create()Miklos Szeredi
Pass the umask-ed create mode to may_o_create() instead of the original one. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
2012-08-15vfs: atomic_open(): fix create mode usageMiklos Szeredi
Don't mask S_ISREG off the create mode before passing to ->atomic_open(). Other methods (->create, ->mknod) also get the complete file mode and filesystems expect it. Reported-by: Steve <steveamigauk@yahoo.co.uk> Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
2012-07-31fs: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutexJan Kara
Currently, mnt_want_write() is sometimes called with i_mutex held and sometimes without it. This isn't really a problem because mnt_want_write() is a non-blocking operation (essentially has a trylock semantics) but when the function starts to handle also frozen filesystems, it will get a full lock semantics and thus proper lock ordering has to be established. So move all mnt_want_write() calls outside of i_mutex. One non-trivial case needing conversion is kern_path_create() / user_path_create() which didn't include mnt_want_write() but now needs to because it acquires i_mutex. Because there are virtual file systems which don't bother with freeze / remount-ro protection we actually provide both versions of the function - one which calls mnt_want_write() and one which does not. [AV: scratch the previous, mnt_want_write() has been moved to kern_path_create() by now] Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-31simplify lookup_open()/atomic_open() - do the temporary mnt_want_write() earlyAl Viro
The write ref to vfsmount taken in lookup_open()/atomic_open() is going to be dropped; we take the one to stay in dentry_open(). Just grab the temporary in caller if it looks like we are going to need it (create/truncate/writable open) and pass (by value) "has it succeeded" flag. Instead of doing mnt_want_write() inside, check that flag and treat "false" as "mnt_want_write() has just failed". mnt_want_write() is cheap and the things get considerably simpler and more robust that way - we get it and drop it in the same function, to start with, rather than passing a "has something in the guts of really scary functions taken it" back to caller. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-30fix O_EXCL handling for devicesAl Viro
O_EXCL without O_CREAT has different semantics; it's "fail if already opened", not "fail if already exists". commit 71574865 broke that... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29fs: add link restriction audit reportingKees Cook
Adds audit messages for unexpected link restriction violations so that system owners will have some sort of potentially actionable information about misbehaving processes. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29fs: add link restrictionsKees Cook
This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to the Linux VFS. Symlinks: A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp The solution is to permit symlinks to only be followed when outside a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. Some pointers to the history of earlier discussion that I could find: 1996 Aug, Zygo Blaxell http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=87602167419830&w=2 1996 Oct, Andrew Tridgell http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9610.2/0086.html 1997 Dec, Albert D Cahalan http://lkml.org/lkml/1997/12/16/4 2005 Feb, Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0502.0/1896.html 2010 May, Kees Cook https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/30/144 Past objections and rebuttals could be summarized as: - Violates POSIX. - POSIX didn't consider this situation and it's not useful to follow a broken specification at the cost of security. - Might break unknown applications that use this feature. - Applications that break because of the change are easy to spot and fix. Applications that are vulnerable to symlink ToCToU by not having the change aren't. Additionally, no applications have yet been found that rely on this behavior. - Applications should just use mkstemp() or O_CREATE|O_EXCL. - True, but applications are not perfect, and new software is written all the time that makes these mistakes; blocking this flaw at the kernel is a single solution to the entire class of vulnerability. - This should live in the core VFS. - This should live in an LSM. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/31/135) - This should live in an LSM. - This should live in the core VFS. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/2/188) Hardlinks: On systems that have user-writable directories on the same partition as system files, a long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally, an issue exists where users can "pin" a potentially vulnerable setuid/setgid file so that an administrator will not actually upgrade a system fully. The solution is to permit hardlinks to only be created when the user is already the existing file's owner, or if they already have read/write access to the existing file. Many Linux users are surprised when they learn they can link to files they have no access to, so this change appears to follow the doctrine of "least surprise". Additionally, this change does not violate POSIX, which states "the implementation may require that the calling process has permission to access the existing file"[1]. This change is known to break some implementations of the "at" daemon, though the version used by Fedora and Ubuntu has been fixed[2] for a while. Otherwise, the change has been undisruptive while in use in Ubuntu for the last 1.5 years. [1] http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/linkat.html [2] http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=collab-maint/at.git;a=commitdiff;h=f4114656c3a6c6f6070e315ffdf940a49eda3279 This patch is based on the patches in Openwall and grsecurity, along with suggestions from Al Viro. I have added a sysctl to enable the protected behavior, and documentation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29vfs: don't let do_last pass negative dentry to audit_inodeJeff Layton
I can reliably reproduce the following panic by simply setting an audit rule on a recent 3.5.0+ kernel: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000040 IP: [<ffffffff810d1250>] audit_copy_inode+0x10/0x90 PGD 7acd9067 PUD 7b8fb067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#86] SMP Modules linked in: nfs nfs_acl auth_rpcgss fscache lockd sunrpc tpm_bios btrfs zlib_deflate libcrc32c kvm_amd kvm joydev virtio_net pcspkr i2c_piix4 floppy virtio_balloon microcode virtio_blk cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] CPU 0 Pid: 1286, comm: abrt-dump-oops Tainted: G D 3.5.0+ #1 Bochs Bochs RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810d1250>] [<ffffffff810d1250>] audit_copy_inode+0x10/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff88007aebfc38 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003692d860 RCX: 00000000000038c4 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88006baf5d80 RDI: ffff88003692d860 RBP: ffff88007aebfc68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff880036d30f00 R14: ffff88006baf5d80 R15: ffff88003692d800 FS: 00007f7562634740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 000000003643d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process abrt-dump-oops (pid: 1286, threadinfo ffff88007aebe000, task ffff880079614530) Stack: ffff88007aebfdf8 ffff88007aebff28 ffff88007aebfc98 ffffffff81211358 ffff88003692d860 0000000000000000 ffff88007aebfcc8 ffffffff810d4968 ffff88007aebfcc8 ffff8800000038c4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81211358>] ? ext4_lookup+0xe8/0x160 [<ffffffff810d4968>] __audit_inode+0x118/0x2d0 [<ffffffff811955a9>] do_last+0x999/0xe80 [<ffffffff81191fe8>] ? inode_permission+0x18/0x50 [<ffffffff81171efa>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11a/0x130 [<ffffffff81195b4a>] path_openat+0xba/0x420 [<ffffffff81196111>] do_filp_open+0x41/0xa0 [<ffffffff811a24bd>] ? alloc_fd+0x4d/0x120 [<ffffffff811855cd>] do_sys_open+0xed/0x1c0 [<ffffffff810d40cc>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xcc/0x300 [<ffffffff811856c1>] sys_open+0x21/0x30 [<ffffffff81611ca9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b RSP <ffff88007aebfc38> CR2: 0000000000000040 The problem is that do_last is passing a negative dentry to audit_inode. The comments on lookup_open note that it can pass back a negative dentry if O_CREAT is not set. This patch fixes the oops, but I'm not clear on whether there's a better approach. Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29pull mnt_want_write()/mnt_drop_write() into ↵Al Viro
kern_path_create()/done_path_create() resp. One side effect - attempt to create a cross-device link on a read-only fs fails with EROFS instead of EXDEV now. Makes more sense, POSIX allows, etc. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29mknod: take sanity checks on mode into the very beginningAl Viro
Note that applying umask can't affect their results. While that affects errno in cases like mknod("/no_such_directory/a", 030000) yielding -EINVAL (due to impossible mode_t) instead of -ENOENT (due to inexistent directory), IMO that makes a lot more sense, POSIX allows to return either and any software that relies on getting -ENOENT instead of -EINVAL in that case deserves everything it gets. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29new helper: done_path_create()Al Viro
releases what needs to be released after {kern,user}_path_create() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-23tidy up namei.c a bitAl Viro
locking/unlocking for rcu walk taken to a couple of inline helpers Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-23unobfuscate follow_up() a bitAl Viro
really convoluted test in there has grown up during struct mount introduction; what it checks is that we'd reached the root of mount tree.
2012-07-22use __lookup_hash() in kern_path_parent()Al Viro
No need to bother with lookup_one_len() here - it's an overkill Signed-off-by Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14VFS: Split inode_permission()David Howells
Split inode_permission() into inode- and superblock-dependent parts. This is aimed at unionmounts where the superblock from the upper layer has to be checked rather than the superblock from the lower layer as the upper layer may be writable, thus allowing an unwritable file from the lower layer to be copied up and modified. Original-author: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> (Further development) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14VFS: Comment mount following codeDavid Howells
Add comments describing what the directions "up" and "down" mean and ref count handling to the VFS mount following family of functions. Signed-off-by: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com> (Original author) Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14fs: add nd_jump_linkChristoph Hellwig
Add a helper that abstracts out the jump to an already parsed struct path from ->follow_link operation from procfs. Not only does this clean up the code by moving the two sides of this game into a single helper, but it also prepares for making struct nameidata private to namei.c Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14fs: move path_put on failure out of ->follow_linkChristoph Hellwig
Currently the non-nd_set_link based versions of ->follow_link are expected to do a path_put(&nd->path) on failure. This calling convention is unexpected, undocumented and doesn't match what the nd_set_link-based instances do. Move the path_put out of the only non-nd_set_link based ->follow_link instance into the caller. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14get rid of kern_path_parent()Al Viro
all callers want the same thing, actually - a kinda-sorta analog of kern_path_create(). I.e. they want parent vfsmount/dentry (with ->i_mutex held, to make sure the child dentry is still their child) + the child dentry. Signed-off-by Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14VFS: Fix the banner comment on lookup_open()David Howells
Since commit 197e37d9, the banner comment on lookup_open() no longer matches what the function returns. It used to return a struct file pointer or NULL and now it returns an integer and is passed the struct file pointer it is to use amongst its arguments. Update the comment to reflect this. Also add a banner comment to atomic_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14don't pass nameidata * to vfs_create()Al Viro
all we want is a boolean flag, same as the method gets now Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14don't pass nameidata to ->create()Al Viro
boolean "does it have to be exclusive?" flag is passed instead; Local filesystem should just ignore it - the object is guaranteed not to be there yet. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14fs/namei.c: don't pass nameidata to __lookup_hash() and lookup_real()Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14stop passing nameidata to ->lookup()Al Viro
Just the flags; only NFS cares even about that, but there are legitimate uses for such argument. And getting rid of that completely would require splitting ->lookup() into a couple of methods (at least), so let's leave that alone for now... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14fs/namei.c: don't pass namedata to lookup_dcache()Al Viro
just the flags... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14fs/namei.c: don't pass nameidata to d_revalidate()Al Viro
since the method wrapped by it doesn't need that anymore... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14stop passing nameidata * to ->d_revalidate()Al Viro
Just the lookup flags. Die, bastard, die... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14fs/namei.c: get do_last() and friends return intAl Viro
Same conventions as for ->atomic_open(). Trimmed the forest of labels a bit, while we are at it... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14kill struct opendataAl Viro
Just pass struct file *. Methods are happier that way... There's no need to return struct file * from finish_open() now, so let it return int. Next: saner prototypes for parts in namei.c Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14kill opendata->{mnt,dentry}Al Viro
->filp->f_path is there for purpose... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14make ->atomic_open() return intAl Viro
Change of calling conventions: old new NULL 1 file 0 ERR_PTR(-ve) -ve Caller *knows* that struct file *; no need to return it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14don't modify od->filp at allAl Viro
make put_filp() conditional on flag set by finish_open() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14->atomic_open() prototype change - pass int * instead of bool *Al Viro
... and let finish_open() report having opened the file via that sucker. Next step: don't modify od->filp at all. [AV: FILE_CREATE was already used by cifs; Miklos' fix folded] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: move O_DIRECT check to common codeMiklos Szeredi
Perform open_check_o_direct() in a common place in do_last after opening the file. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: do_last(): clean up retryMiklos Szeredi
Move the lookup retry logic to the bottom of the function to make the normal case simpler to read. Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: do_last(): clean up boolMiklos Szeredi
Consistently use bool for boolean values in do_last(). Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: do_last(): clean up labelsMiklos Szeredi
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: do_last(): clean up error handlingMiklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: remove open intents from nameidataMiklos Szeredi
All users of open intents have been converted to use ->atomic_{open,create}. This patch gets rid of nd->intent.open and related infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: add i_op->atomic_open()Miklos Szeredi
Add a new inode operation which is called on the last component of an open. Using this the filesystem can look up, possibly create and open the file in one atomic operation. If it cannot perform this (e.g. the file type turned out to be wrong) it may signal this by returning NULL instead of an open struct file pointer. i_op->atomic_open() is only called if the last component is negative or needs lookup. Handling cached positive dentries here doesn't add much value: these can be opened using f_op->open(). If the cached file turns out to be invalid, the open can be retried, this time using ->atomic_open() with a fresh dentry. For now leave the old way of using open intents in lookup and revalidate in place. This will be removed once all the users are converted. David Howells noticed that if ->atomic_open() opens the file but does not create it, handle_truncate() will be called on it even if it is not a regular file. Fix this by checking the file type in this case too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: lookup_open(): expand lookup_hash()Miklos Szeredi
Copy __lookup_hash() into lookup_open(). The next patch will insert the atomic open call just before the real lookup. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: add lookup_open()Miklos Szeredi
Split out lookup + maybe create from do_last(). This is the part under i_mutex protection. The function is called lookup_open() and returns a filp even though the open part is not used yet. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: do_last(): common slow lookupMiklos Szeredi
Make the slow lookup part of O_CREAT and non-O_CREAT opens common. This allows atomic_open to be hooked into the slow lookup part. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: do_last(): separate O_CREAT specific codeMiklos Szeredi
Check O_CREAT on the slow lookup paths where necessary. This allows the rest to be shared with plain open. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14vfs: do_last(): inline lookup_slow()Miklos Szeredi
Copy lookup_slow() into do_last(). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14namei.c: let follow_link() do put_link() on failureAl Viro
no need for kludgy "set cookie to ERR_PTR(...) because we failed before we did actual ->follow_link() and want to suppress put_link()", no pointless check in put_link() itself. Callers checked if follow_link() has failed anyway; might as well break out of their loops if that happened, without bothering to call put_link() first. [AV: folded fixes from hch] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-06-01vfs: retry last component if opening stale dentryMiklos Szeredi
NFS optimizes away d_revalidates for last component of open. This means that open itself can find the dentry stale. This patch allows the filesystem to return EOPENSTALE and the VFS will retry the lookup on just the last component if possible. If the lookup was done using RCU mode, including the last component, then this is not possible since the parent dentry is lost. In this case fall back to non-RCU lookup. Currently this is not used since NFS will always leave RCU mode. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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