path: root/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2018-10-30ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesseslinux-linaro-lsk-v4.4-testRussell King
Commit a3c0f84765bb429ba0fd23de1c57b5e1591c9389 upstream. Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code: index = load(user-manipulated pointer); access(base + index * stride); In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been loaded. On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory. The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data, and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory. Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access. This also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used by a subsequent access. Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer. This prevents get_user() being used as the load() step above. As a side effect, put_user() will also be affected even though it isn't implicated. Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds. Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
2015-08-25ARM: uaccess: provide uaccess_save_and_enable() and uaccess_restore()Russell King
Provide uaccess_save_and_enable() and uaccess_restore() to permit control of userspace visibility to the kernel, and hook these into the appropriate places in the kernel where we need to access userspace. Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-27ARM: 8225/1: Add unwinding support for memory copy functionsLin Yongting
The memory copy functions(memcpy, __copy_from_user, __copy_to_user) never had unwinding annotations added. Currently, when accessing invalid pointer by these functions occurs the backtrace shown will stop at these functions or some completely unrelated function. Add unwinding annotations in hopes of getting a more useful backtrace in following cases: 1. die on accessing invalid pointer by these functions 2. kprobe trapped at any instruction within these functions 3. interrupted at any instruction within these functions Signed-off-by: Lin Yongting <linyongting@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
2010-04-21ARM: fix build error in arch/arm/kernel/process.cRussell King
/tmp/ccJ3ssZW.s: Assembler messages: /tmp/ccJ3ssZW.s:1952: Error: can't resolve `.text' {.text section} - `.LFB1077' This is caused because: .section .data .section .text .section .text .previous does not return us to the .text section, but the .data section; this makes use of .previous dangerous if the ordering of previous sections is not known. Fix up the other users of .previous; .pushsection and .popsection are a safer pairing to use than .section and .previous. Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
2009-07-24Thumb-2: Implement the unified arch/arm/lib functionsCatalin Marinas
This patch adds the ARM/Thumb-2 unified support for the arch/arm/lib/* files. Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2008-09-01[ARM] 5227/1: Add the ENDPROC declarations to the .S filesCatalin Marinas
This declaration specifies the "function" type and size for various assembly functions, mainly needed for generating the correct branch instructions in Thumb-2. Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
2006-06-28[ARM] Remove the __arch_* layer from uaccess.hRussell King
Back in the days when we had armo (26-bit) and armv (32-bit) combined, we had an additional layer to the uaccess macros to ensure correct typing. Since we no longer have 26-bit in this tree, we no longer need this layer, so eliminate it. Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
2005-11-01[ARM] 2948/1: new preemption safe copy_{to|from}_user implementationNicolas Pitre
Patch from Nicolas Pitre This patch provides a preemption safe implementation of copy_to_user and copy_from_user based on the copy template also used for memcpy. It is enabled unconditionally when CONFIG_PREEMPT=y. Otherwise if the configured architecture is not ARMv3 then it is enabled as well as it gives better performances at least on StrongARM and XScale cores. If ARMv3 is not too affected or if it doesn't matter too much then uaccess.S could be removed altogether. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>