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2011-04-22x86, AMD: Set ARAT feature on AMD processorsBoris Ostrovsky
commit b87cf80af3ba4b4c008b4face3c68d604e1715c6 upstream. Support for Always Running APIC timer (ARAT) was introduced in commit db954b5898dd3ef3ef93f4144158ea8f97deb058. This feature allows us to avoid switching timers from LAPIC to something else (e.g. HPET) and go into timer broadcasts when entering deep C-states. AMD processors don't provide a CPUID bit for that feature but they also keep APIC timers running in deep C-states (except for cases when the processor is affected by erratum 400). Therefore we should set ARAT feature bit on AMD CPUs. Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Acked-by: Andreas Herrmann <andreas.herrmann3@amd.com> Acked-by: Mark Langsdorf <mark.langsdorf@amd.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@amd.com> LKML-Reference: <1300205624-4813-1-git-send-email-ostr@amd64.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22x86, cpu: Clean up AMD erratum 400 workaroundHans Rosenfeld
commit 9d8888c2a214aece2494a49e699a097c2ba9498b upstream. Remove check_c1e_idle() and use the new AMD errata checking framework instead. Signed-off-by: Hans Rosenfeld <hans.rosenfeld@amd.com> LKML-Reference: <1280336972-865982-2-git-send-email-hans.rosenfeld@amd.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22x86, cpu: AMD errata checking frameworkHans Rosenfeld
commit d78d671db478eb8b14c78501c0cee1cc7baf6967 upstream. Errata are defined using the AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM() or AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM() macros. The latter is intended for newer errata that have an OSVW id assigned, which it takes as first argument. Both take a variable number of family-specific model-stepping ranges created by AMD_MODEL_RANGE(). Iff an erratum has an OSVW id, OSVW is available on the CPU, and the OSVW id is known to the hardware, it is used to determine whether an erratum is present. Otherwise, the model-stepping ranges are matched against the current CPU to find out whether the erratum applies. For certain special errata, the code using this framework might have to conduct further checks to make sure an erratum is really (not) present. Signed-off-by: Hans Rosenfeld <hans.rosenfeld@amd.com> LKML-Reference: <1280336972-865982-1-git-send-email-hans.rosenfeld@amd.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22UBIFS: fix oops when R/O file-system is fsync'edArtem Bityutskiy
commit 78530bf7f2559b317c04991b52217c1608d5a58d upstream. This patch fixes severe UBIFS bug: UBIFS oopses when we 'fsync()' an file on R/O-mounter file-system. We (the UBIFS authors) incorrectly thought that VFS would not propagate 'fsync()' down to the file-system if it is read-only, but this is not the case. It is easy to exploit this bug using the following simple perl script: use strict; use File::Sync qw(fsync sync); die "File path is not specified" if not defined $ARGV[0]; my $path = $ARGV[0]; open FILE, "<", "$path" or die "Cannot open $path: $!"; fsync(\*FILE) or die "cannot fsync $path: $!"; close FILE or die "Cannot close $path: $!"; Thanks to Reuben Dowle <Reuben.Dowle@navico.com> for reporting about this issue. Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com> Reported-by: Reuben Dowle <Reuben.Dowle@navico.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22MAINTAINERS: update STABLE BRANCH infoRandy Dunlap
commit d00ebeac5f24f290636f7a895dafc124b2930a08 upstream. Drop Chris Wright from STABLE maintainers. He hasn't done STABLE release work for quite some time. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22ramfs: fix memleak on no-mmu archBob Liu
commit b836aec53e2bce71de1d5415313380688c851477 upstream. On no-mmu arch, there is a memleak during shmem test. The cause of this memleak is ramfs_nommu_expand_for_mapping() added page refcount to 2 which makes iput() can't free that pages. The simple test file is like this: int main(void) { int i; key_t k = ftok("/etc", 42); for ( i=0; i<100; ++i) { int id = shmget(k, 10000, 0644|IPC_CREAT); if (id == -1) { printf("shmget error\n"); } if(shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL ) == -1) { printf("shm rm error\n"); return -1; } } printf("run ok...\n"); return 0; } And the result: root:/> free total used free shared buffers Mem: 60320 17912 42408 0 0 -/+ buffers: 17912 42408 root:/> shmem run ok... root:/> free total used free shared buffers Mem: 60320 19096 41224 0 0 -/+ buffers: 19096 41224 root:/> shmem run ok... root:/> free total used free shared buffers Mem: 60320 20296 40024 0 0 -/+ buffers: 20296 40024 ... After this patch the test result is:(no memleak anymore) root:/> free total used free shared buffers Mem: 60320 16668 43652 0 0 -/+ buffers: 16668 43652 root:/> shmem run ok... root:/> free total used free shared buffers Mem: 60320 16668 43652 0 0 -/+ buffers: 16668 43652 Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <lliubbo@gmail.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22mca.c: Fix cast from integer to pointer warningJeff Mahoney
commit c1d036c4d1cb00b7e8473a2ad0a78f13e13a8183 upstream. ia64_mca_cpu_init has a void *data local variable that is assigned the value from either __get_free_pages() or mca_bootmem(). The problem is that __get_free_pages returns an unsigned long and mca_bootmem, via alloc_bootmem(), returns a void *. format_mca_init_stack takes the void *, and it's also used with __pa(), but that casts it to long anyway. This results in the following build warning: arch/ia64/kernel/mca.c:1898: warning: assignment makes pointer from integer without a cast Cast the return of __get_free_pages to a void * to avoid the warning. Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22tioca: Fix assignment from incompatible pointer warningsJeff Mahoney
commit b4a6b3436531f6c5256e6d60d388c3c28ff1a0e9 upstream. The prototype for sn_pci_provider->{dma_map,dma_map_consistent} expects an unsigned long instead of a u64. Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22x86: Fix a bogus unwind annotation in lib/semaphore_32.SJan Beulich
commit e938c287ea8d977e079f07464ac69923412663ce upstream. 'simple' would have required specifying current frame address and return address location manually, but that's obviously not the case (and not necessary) here. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> LKML-Reference: <4D6D1082020000780003454C@vpn.id2.novell.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22NET: cdc-phonet, handle empty phonet headerJiri Slaby
commit 468c3f924f043cad7a04f4f4d5224a2c9bc886c1 upstream. Currently, for N 5800 XM I get: cdc_phonet: probe of 1-6:1.10 failed with error -22 It's because phonet_header is empty. Extra altsetting looks like there: E 05 24 00 01 10 03 24 ab 05 24 06 0a 0b 04 24 fd .$....$..$....$. E 00 . I don't see the header used anywhere so just check if the phonet descriptor is there, not the structure itself. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi.denis-courmont@nokia.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi.denis-courmont@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22UBIFS: restrict world-writable debugfs filesVasiliy Kulikov
commit 8c559d30b4e59cf6994215ada1fe744928f494bf upstream. Don't allow everybody to dump sensitive information about filesystems. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22video: sn9c102: world-wirtable sysfs filesVasiliy Kulikov
commit 14ddc3188d50855ae2a419a6aced995e2834e5d4 upstream. Don't allow everybody to change video settings. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com> Acked-by: Luca Risolia <luca.risolia@studio.unibo.it> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-22cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mountJeff Layton
commit 70945643722ffeac779d2529a348f99567fa5c33 upstream. Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath, so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for the mount. This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at mount time instead. Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-15Linux 2.6.32.38v2.6.32.38Greg Kroah-Hartman
2011-04-15Revert "net: fix rds_iovec page count overflow"Greg Kroah-Hartman
This reverts commit bd378dd6df5ca43021a49f72441a6c14d9784bed (originally commit 1b1f693d7ad6d193862dcb1118540a030c5e761f upstream). I messed it up in backporting it to the .32-stable kernel, so revert it for now and try it again the next review cycle. Cc: Thomas Pollet <thomas.pollet@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Grover <andy.grover@oracle.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14Linux 2.6.32.37v2.6.32.37Greg Kroah-Hartman
2011-04-14xfs: zero proper structure size for geometry callsAlex Elder
commit af24ee9ea8d532e16883251a6684dfa1be8eec29 upstream. Commit 493f3358cb289ccf716c5a14fa5bb52ab75943e5 added this call to xfs_fs_geometry() in order to avoid passing kernel stack data back to user space: + memset(geo, 0, sizeof(*geo)); Unfortunately, one of the callers of that function passes the address of a smaller data type, cast to fit the type that xfs_fs_geometry() requires. As a result, this can happen: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: f87aca93 Pid: 262, comm: xfs_fsr Not tainted 2.6.38-rc6-493f3358cb2+ #1 Call Trace: [<c12991ac>] ? panic+0x50/0x150 [<c102ed71>] ? __stack_chk_fail+0x10/0x18 [<f87aca93>] ? xfs_ioc_fsgeometry_v1+0x56/0x5d [xfs] Fix this by fixing that one caller to pass the right type and then copy out the subset it is interested in. Note: This patch is an alternative to one originally proposed by Eric Sandeen. Reported-by: Jeffrey Hundstad <jeffrey.hundstad@mnsu.edu> Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeffrey Hundstad <jeffrey.hundstad@mnsu.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14net: fix rds_iovec page count overflowLinus Torvalds
commit 1b1f693d7ad6d193862dcb1118540a030c5e761f upstream. As reported by Thomas Pollet, the rdma page counting can overflow. We get the rdma sizes in 64-bit unsigned entities, but then limit it to UINT_MAX bytes and shift them down to pages (so with a possible "+1" for an unaligned address). So each individual page count fits comfortably in an 'unsigned int' (not even close to overflowing into signed), but as they are added up, they might end up resulting in a signed return value. Which would be wrong. Catch the case of tot_pages turning negative, and return the appropriate error code. Reported-by: Thomas Pollet <thomas.pollet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Grover <andy.grover@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14exec: copy-and-paste the fixes into compat_do_execve() pathsOleg Nesterov
commit 114279be2120a916e8a04feeb2ac976a10016f2f upstream. Note: this patch targets 2.6.37 and tries to be as simple as possible. That is why it adds more copy-and-paste horror into fs/compat.c and uglifies fs/exec.c, this will be cleanuped later. compat_copy_strings() plays with bprm->vma/mm directly and thus has two problems: it lacks the RLIMIT_STACK check and argv/envp memory is not visible to oom killer. Export acct_arg_size() and get_arg_page(), change compat_copy_strings() to use get_arg_page(), change compat_do_execve() to do acct_arg_size(0) as do_execve() does. Add the fatal_signal_pending/cond_resched checks into compat_count() and compat_copy_strings(), this matches the code in fs/exec.c and certainly makes sense. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14exec: make argv/envp memory visible to oom-killerOleg Nesterov
commit 3c77f845722158206a7209c45ccddc264d19319c upstream. Brad Spengler published a local memory-allocation DoS that evades the OOM-killer (though not the virtual memory RLIMIT): http://www.grsecurity.net/~spender/64bit_dos.c execve()->copy_strings() can allocate a lot of memory, but this is not visible to oom-killer, nobody can see the nascent bprm->mm and take it into account. With this patch get_arg_page() increments current's MM_ANONPAGES counter every time we allocate the new page for argv/envp. When do_execve() succeds or fails, we change this counter back. Technically this is not 100% correct, we can't know if the new page is swapped out and turn MM_ANONPAGES into MM_SWAPENTS, but I don't think this really matters and everything becomes correct once exec changes ->mm or fails. Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Reviewed-and-discussed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14CAN: Use inode instead of kernel address for /proc fileDan Rosenberg
commit 9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83 upstream. Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive information. CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14irda: prevent integer underflow in IRLMP_ENUMDEVICESDan Rosenberg
commit fdac1e0697356ac212259f2147aa60c72e334861 upstream. If the user-provided len is less than the expected offset, the IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES getsockopt will do a copy_to_user() with a very large size value. While this isn't be a security issue on x86 because it will get caught by the access_ok() check, it may leak large amounts of kernel heap on other architectures. In any event, this patch fixes it. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14econet: Fix crash in aun_incoming().David S. Miller
commit 4e085e76cbe558b79b54cbab772f61185879bc64 upstream. Unconditional use of skb->dev won't work here, try to fetch the econet device via skb_dst()->dev instead. Suggested by Eric Dumazet. Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> [jmm: Slightly adapted for 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14inet_diag: Make sure we actually run the same bytecode we audited.Nelson Elhage
commit 22e76c849d505d87c5ecf3d3e6742a65f0ff4860 upstream. We were using nlmsg_find_attr() to look up the bytecode by attribute when auditing, but then just using the first attribute when actually running bytecode. So, if we received a message with two attribute elements, where only the second had type INET_DIAG_REQ_BYTECODE, we would validate and run different bytecode strings. Fix this by consistently using nlmsg_find_attr everywhere. Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [jmm: Slightly adapted to apply against 2.6.32] Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14net: tipc: fix information leak to userlandKulikov Vasiliy
commit 88f8a5e3e7defccd3925cabb1ee4d3994e5cdb52 upstream. Structure sockaddr_tipc is copied to userland with padding bytes after "id" field in union field "name" unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14nfsd: fix auth_domain reference leak on nlm operationsJ. Bruce Fields
commit 954032d2527f2fce7355ba70709b5e143d6b686f upstream. This was noticed by users who performed more than 2^32 lock operations and hence made this counter overflow (eventually leading to use-after-free's). Setting rq_client to NULL here means that it won't later get auth_domain_put() when it should be. Appears to have been introduced in 2.5.42 by "[PATCH] kNFSd: Move auth domain lookup into svcauth" which moved most of the rq_client handling to common svcauth code, but left behind this one line. Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14ext4: fix credits computing for indirect mapped filesYongqiang Yang
commit 5b41395fcc0265fc9f193aef9df39ce49d64677c upstream. When writing a contiguous set of blocks, two indirect blocks could be needed depending on how the blocks are aligned, so we need to increase the number of credits needed by one. [ Also fixed a another bug which could further underestimate the number of journal credits needed by 1; the code was using integer division instead of DIV_ROUND_UP() -- tytso] Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14net: packet: fix information leak to userlandVasiliy Kulikov
commit 67286640f638f5ad41a946b9a3dc75327950248f upstream. packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of strlcpy(). The same with packet_getname(): it doesn't initialize sll_pkttype field of sockaddr_ll. Set it to zero. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> [jmm: Backported to 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14net: ax25: fix information leak to userlandVasiliy Kulikov
commit fe10ae53384e48c51996941b7720ee16995cbcb7 upstream. Sometimes ax25_getname() doesn't initialize all members of fsa_digipeater field of fsa struct, also the struct has padding bytes between sax25_call and sax25_ndigis fields. This structure is then copied to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14atm/solos-pci: Don't include frame pseudo-header on transmit hex-dumpPhilip A. Prindeville
commit 18b429e74eeafe42e947b1b0f9a760c7153a0b5c upstream. Omit pkt_hdr preamble when dumping transmitted packet as hex-dump; we can pull this up because the frame has already been sent, and dumping it is the last thing we do with it before freeing it. Also include the size, vpi, and vci in the debug as is done on receive. Use "port" consistently instead of "device" intermittently. Signed-off-by: Philip Prindeville <philipp@redfish-solutions.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14sctp: fix to calc the INIT/INIT-ACK chunk length correctly is setWei Yongjun
commit a8170c35e738d62e9919ce5b109cf4ed66e95bde upstream. When calculating the INIT/INIT-ACK chunk length, we should not only account the length of parameters, but also the parameters zero padding length, such as AUTH HMACS parameter and CHUNKS parameter. Without the parameters zero padding length we may get following oops. skb_over_panic: text:ce2068d2 len:130 put:6 head:cac3fe00 data:cac3fe00 tail:0xcac3fe82 end:0xcac3fe80 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:127! invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/module/aes_generic/initstate Modules linked in: authenc ...... Pid: 4102, comm: sctp_darn Tainted: G D 2.6.34-rc2 #6 EIP: 0060:[<c0607630>] EFLAGS: 00010282 CPU: 0 EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x37/0x3e EAX: 00000078 EBX: c07c024b ECX: c07c02b9 EDX: cb607b78 ESI: 00000000 EDI: cac3fe7a EBP: 00000002 ESP: cb607b74 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process sctp_darn (pid: 4102, ti=cb607000 task=cabdc990 task.ti=cb607000) Stack: c07c02b9 ce2068d2 00000082 00000006 cac3fe00 cac3fe00 cac3fe82 cac3fe80 <0> c07c024b cac3fe7c cac3fe7a c0608dec ca986e80 ce2068d2 00000006 0000007a <0> cb8120ca ca986e80 cb812000 00000003 cb8120c4 ce208a25 cb8120ca cadd9400 Call Trace: [<ce2068d2>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x45/0x85 [sctp] [<c0608dec>] ? skb_put+0x2e/0x32 [<ce2068d2>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x45/0x85 [sctp] [<ce208a25>] ? sctp_make_init+0x279/0x28c [sctp] [<c0686a92>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x2a/0x30 [<ce1fdc0b>] ? sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc+0x2b/0x7b [sctp] [<ce202823>] ? sctp_do_sm+0xa0/0x14a [sctp] [<ce2133b9>] ? sctp_pname+0x0/0x14 [sctp] [<ce211d72>] ? sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x2b/0x31 [sctp] [<ce20f3cf>] ? sctp_sendmsg+0x7a0/0x9eb [sctp] [<c064eb1e>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x3b/0x43 [<c04244b7>] ? task_tick_fair+0x2d/0xd9 [<c06031e1>] ? sock_sendmsg+0xa7/0xc1 [<c0416afe>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x75 [<c0425123>] ? dequeue_task_fair+0x34/0x19b [<c0446abb>] ? sched_clock_local+0x17/0x11e [<c052ea87>] ? _copy_from_user+0x2b/0x10c [<c060ab3a>] ? verify_iovec+0x3c/0x6a [<c06035ca>] ? sys_sendmsg+0x186/0x1e2 [<c042176b>] ? __wake_up_common+0x34/0x5b [<c04240c2>] ? __wake_up+0x2c/0x3b [<c057e35c>] ? tty_wakeup+0x43/0x47 [<c04430f2>] ? remove_wait_queue+0x16/0x24 [<c0580c94>] ? n_tty_read+0x5b8/0x65e [<c042be02>] ? default_wake_function+0x0/0x8 [<c0604e0e>] ? sys_socketcall+0x17f/0x1cd [<c040264c>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x22 Code: 0f 45 de 53 ff b0 98 00 00 00 ff b0 94 ...... EIP: [<c0607630>] skb_over_panic+0x37/0x3e SS:ESP 0068:cb607b74 To reproduce: # modprobe sctp # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_enable # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable # sctp_test -H 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e -P 800 -l # sctp_darn -H 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e -P 900 -h 192.168.0.21 -p 800 -I -s -t sctp_darn ready to send... 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> bindx-add=192.168.0.21 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> bindx-add=192.168.1.21 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> snd=10 ------------------------------------------------------------------ eth0 has addresses: 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e and 192.168.0.21 eth1 has addresses: 192.168.1.21 ------------------------------------------------------------------ Reported-by: George Cheimonidis <gchimon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14Squashfs: handle corruption of directory structurePhillip Lougher
commit 44cff8a9ee8a974f9e931df910688e7fc1f0b0f9 upstream. Handle the rare case where a directory metadata block is uncompressed and corrupted, leading to a kernel oops in directory scanning (memcpy). Normally corruption is detected at the decompression stage and dealt with then, however, this will not happen if: - metadata isn't compressed (users can optionally request no metadata compression), or - the compressed metadata block was larger than the original, in which case the uncompressed version was used, or - the data was corrupt after decompression This patch fixes this by adding some sanity checks against known maximum values. Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@lougher.demon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14Revert "x86: Cleanup highmap after brk is concluded"Greg Kroah-Hartman
This reverts upstream commit e5f15b45ddf3afa2bbbb10c7ea34fb32b6de0a0e It caused problems in the stable tree and should not have been there. Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14powerpc: Fix default_machine_crash_shutdown #ifdef botchKamalesh Babulal
powerpc: Fix default_machine_crash_shutdown #ifdef botch Commit: c2be05481f6125254c45b78f334d4dd09c701c82 upstream crash_kexec_wait_realmode() is defined only if CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 and CONFIG_SMP, but is called if CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 even if !CONFIG_SMP. Fix the conditional compilation around the invocation. Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com> cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14powerpc/kexec: Add ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 to PPC64 codeKamalesh Babulal
powerpc/kexec: Add ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 to PPC64 code This patch introduces PPC64 specific #ifdef bits from the upstream commit: b3df895aebe091b1657a42a8c859bd49fc96646b. Reported-and-tested-by: dann frazier <dannf@dannf.org> Signed-off-by: Kumar Gala <galak@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com> cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14x86, microcode, AMD: Extend ucode size verificationBorislav Petkov
Upstream commit: 44d60c0f5c58c2168f31df9a481761451840eb54 The different families have a different max size for the ucode patch, adjust size checking to the family we're running on. Also, do not vzalloc the max size of the ucode but only the actual size that is passed on from the firmware loader. Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14x86, amd-ucode: Remove needless log messagesAndreas Herrmann
Upstream commit: 6e18da75c28b592594fd632cf3e6eb09d3d078de Signed-off-by: Andreas Herrmann <andreas.herrmann3@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> LKML-Reference: <20091029134742.GD30802@alberich.amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14gro: reset skb_iif on reuseAndy Gospodarek
commit 6d152e23ad1a7a5b40fef1f42e017d66e6115159 upstream. Like Herbert's change from a few days ago: 66c46d741e2e60f0e8b625b80edb0ab820c46d7a gro: Reset dev pointer on reuse this may not be necessary at this point, but we should still clean up the skb->skb_iif. If not we may end up with an invalid valid for skb->skb_iif when the skb is reused and the check is done in __netif_receive_skb. Signed-off-by: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14gro: Reset dev pointer on reuseHerbert Xu
commit 66c46d741e2e60f0e8b625b80edb0ab820c46d7a upstream. On older kernels the VLAN code may zero skb->dev before dropping it and causing it to be reused by GRO. Unfortunately we didn't reset skb->dev in that case which causes the next GRO user to get a bogus skb->dev pointer. This particular problem no longer happens with the current upstream kernel due to changes in VLAN processing. However, for correctness we should still reset the skb->dev pointer in the GRO reuse function in case a future user does the same thing. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14repair gdbstub to match the gdbserial protocol specificationJason Wessel
commit fb82c0ff27b2c40c6f7a3d1a94cafb154591fa80 upstream. The gdbserial protocol handler should return an empty packet instead of an error string when ever it responds to a command it does not implement. The problem cases come from a debugger client sending qTBuffer, qTStatus, qSearch, qSupported. The incorrect response from the gdbstub leads the debugger clients to not function correctly. Recent versions of gdb will not detach correctly as a result of this behavior. Backport-request-by: Frank Pan <frankpzh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Dongdong Deng <dongdong.deng@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14sound: oss: midi_synth: check get_user() return valueKulikov Vasiliy
commit b3390ceab95601afc12213c3ec5551d3bc7b638f upstream. get_user() may fail, if so return -EFAULT. Signed-off-by: Kulikov Vasiliy <segooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacksDan Rosenberg
commit b769f49463711205d57286e64cf535ed4daf59e9 upstream. Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of uninitialized value, and signedness issue The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return -EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption. Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result in an unintentionally large loop. On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar issues in opl3. Compile tested only. v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14econet: 4 byte infoleak to the networkVasiliy Kulikov
commit 67c5c6cb8129c595f21e88254a3fc6b3b841ae8e upstream. struct aunhdr has 4 padding bytes between 'pad' and 'handle' fields on x86_64. These bytes are not initialized in the variable 'ah' before sending 'ah' to the network. This leads to 4 bytes kernel stack infoleak. This bug was introduced before the git epoch. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14drivers/misc/ep93xx_pwm.c: world-writable sysfs filesVasiliy Kulikov
commit deb187e72470b0382d4f0cb859e76e1ebc3a1082 upstream. Don't allow everybody to change device settings. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: Hartley Sweeten <hartleys@visionengravers.com> Cc: Matthieu Crapet <mcrapet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1511.c: world-writable sysfs nvram fileVasiliy Kulikov
commit 49d50fb1c28738ef6bad0c2b87d5355a1653fed5 upstream. Don't allow everybogy to write to NVRAM. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Andy Sharp <andy.sharp@onstor.com> Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14mfd: ab3100: world-writable debugfs *_priv filesVasiliy Kulikov
commit f8a0697722d12a201588225999cfc8bfcbc82781 upstream. Don't allow everybody to change device hardware registers. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@stericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspaceVasiliy Kulikov
commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream. Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14netfilter: ipt_CLUSTERIP: fix buffer overflowVasiliy Kulikov
commit 961ed183a9fd080cf306c659b8736007e44065a5 upstream. 'buffer' string is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether it is zero terminated. This may lead to overflow inside of simple_strtoul(). Changli Gao suggested to copy not more than user supplied 'size' bytes. It was introduced before the git epoch. Files "ipt_CLUSTERIP/*" are root writable only by default, however, on some setups permissions might be relaxed to e.g. network admin user. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14netfilter: arp_tables: fix infoleak to userspaceVasiliy Kulikov
commit 42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143 upstream. Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14netfilter: ip_tables: fix infoleak to userspaceVasiliy Kulikov
commit 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a upstream. Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-05-27 02:16:27 +0000