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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c5
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/match.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c2
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c2
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c78
-rw-r--r--security/security.c22
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c36
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c39
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h18
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c6
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c12
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c6
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/load_policy.c2
15 files changed, 163 insertions, 71 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index d21a427a35ae..ae3a698415e6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
@@ -136,11 +137,11 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
}
static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
- int cap, int audit)
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
- int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit);
+ int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (!error) {
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(profile))
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 5cb4dc1f6992..06d764ccbbe5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
*
* Unpack a dfa that has been serialized. To find information on the dfa
* format look in Documentation/apparmor.txt
- * Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundry
+ * Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundary
*
* Returns: an unpacked dfa ready for matching or ERR_PTR on failure
*/
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index eb3700e9fd37..e33aaf7e5744 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ fail:
* @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
* @profile: profile to add the accept table to (NOT NULL)
*
- * Returns: 1 if table succesfully unpacked
+ * Returns: 1 if table successfully unpacked
*/
static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
{
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 2984ea4f776f..bbb51156261b 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
return 0;
}
-static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 49c57fd60aea..f20e984ccfb4 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
/*
* If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
* @tsk: The task to query
* @cred: The credentials to use
+ * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
*
@@ -78,10 +80,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
- int audit)
+int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
{
- return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
+ if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
+ if (targ_ns == cred->user->user_ns)
+ return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+
+ /* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
+ if (targ_ns == &init_user_ns)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /*
+ *If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
+ * it over all children user namespaces as well.
+ */
+ targ_ns = targ_ns->creator->user_ns;
+ }
+
+ /* We never get here */
}
/**
@@ -105,18 +127,30 @@ int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
* @child: The process to be accessed
* @mode: The mode of attachment.
*
+ * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target
+ * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
+ * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace
+ * access is allowed.
+ * Else denied.
+ *
* Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
* granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
+ const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
rcu_read_lock();
- if (!cap_issubset(__task_cred(child)->cap_permitted,
- current_cred()->cap_permitted) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- ret = -EPERM;
+ cred = current_cred();
+ child_cred = __task_cred(child);
+ if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
+ cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+ goto out;
+ if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ goto out;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
@@ -125,18 +159,30 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
* cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current
* @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
*
+ * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's
+ * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
+ * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace
+ * access is allowed.
+ * Else denied.
+ *
* Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
* process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
int ret = 0;
+ const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
rcu_read_lock();
- if (!cap_issubset(current_cred()->cap_permitted,
- __task_cred(parent)->cap_permitted) &&
- !has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- ret = -EPERM;
+ cred = __task_cred(parent);
+ child_cred = current_cred();
+ if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
+ cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+ goto out;
+ if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ goto out;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
@@ -176,7 +222,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
+ if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
@@ -828,7 +875,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
+ || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
@@ -893,7 +941,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -920,7 +968,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
int ret = 0;
if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
- ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+ ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9187665a3fdd..4ba6d4cc061f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -154,29 +154,33 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, int cap)
+int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
+ int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(current, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
-int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap)
{
const struct cred *cred;
int ret;
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
const struct cred *cred;
int ret;
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
@@ -514,16 +518,14 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
+ return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, 0);
}
int security_inode_exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- if (flags)
- return -ECHILD;
- return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+ return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, flags);
}
int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 9da6420e2056..1d027e29ce8d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
* @avd: access vector decisions
* @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
* @a: auxiliary audit data
+ * @flags: VFS walk flags
*
* Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
* with the policy. This function is typically called by
@@ -481,9 +482,10 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
* be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
* before calling the auditing code.
*/
-void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
+ struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
+ unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data stack_data;
u32 denied, audited;
@@ -515,11 +517,24 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
else
audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
if (!audited)
- return;
+ return 0;
+
if (!a) {
a = &stack_data;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
}
+
+ /*
+ * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry. This is because
+ * the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU
+ * safe. Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes
+ * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
+ * happened a little later.
+ */
+ if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS) &&
+ (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU))
+ return -ECHILD;
+
a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
@@ -529,6 +544,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
common_lsm_audit(a);
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -793,6 +809,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
* @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
+ * @flags: VFS walk flags
*
* Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
* for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
@@ -802,14 +819,19 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
* permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
* another -errno upon other errors.
*/
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+ unsigned flags)
{
struct av_decision avd;
- int rc;
+ int rc, rc2;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
- avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
+
+ rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata,
+ flags);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6475e1f0223e..f7cf0ea6faea 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
#include <linux/syslog.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -1445,8 +1446,11 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
}
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
- if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
- avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
+ if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
+ int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
+ }
return rc;
}
@@ -1466,7 +1470,8 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct inode *inode,
u32 perms,
- struct common_audit_data *adp)
+ struct common_audit_data *adp,
+ unsigned flags)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1486,7 +1491,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
}
- return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+ return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
}
/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
@@ -1503,7 +1508,7 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
- return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
}
/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
@@ -1539,7 +1544,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
rc = 0;
if (av)
- rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+ rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
out:
return rc;
@@ -1846,11 +1851,11 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- int cap, int audit)
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+ rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1931,7 +1936,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2101,7 +2107,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
file = file_priv->file;
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
- FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
+ FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL, 0)) {
drop_tty = 1;
}
}
@@ -2633,7 +2639,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
}
-static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -2655,7 +2661,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
- return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
}
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
@@ -2723,7 +2729,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
+ if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
@@ -2834,7 +2840,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+ error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
@@ -2968,7 +2975,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case KDSKBENT:
case KDSKBSENT:
error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
break;
/* default case assumes that the command will go
@@ -3202,7 +3209,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
* new inode label or new policy.
* This check is not redundant - do not remove.
*/
- return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL, 0);
}
/* task security operations */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 5615081b73ec..e77b2ac2908b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ struct avc_cache_stats {
void __init avc_init(void);
-void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd,
int result,
- struct common_audit_data *a);
+ struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags);
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -66,9 +66,17 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
unsigned flags,
struct av_decision *avd);
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
+int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+ unsigned);
+
+static inline int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm_flags(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, auditdata, 0);
+}
u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 1c2fc46544bf..c3bf3ed07b06 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
*
* Description:
* Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
- * The caller is responsibile for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
+ * The caller is responsible for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
*
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 3e7544d2a07b..6ef4af47dac4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
return i;
}
- return pol_value;
+ return SECCLASS_NULL;
}
static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
@@ -2806,7 +2806,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
+ /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
return -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -3075,7 +3075,7 @@ static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
* Description:
* Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
* SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
- * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
* 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
* allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
* conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 86453db4333d..9637e107f7ea 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ char *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
* smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
* @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
*
- * Returns a pointer to the appropraite Smack label if there is one,
+ * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label if there is one,
* otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
*/
char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 23c7a6d0c80c..400a5d5cde61 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -696,6 +696,10 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
*/
if (mask == 0)
return 0;
+
+ /* May be droppable after audit */
+ if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
+ return -ECHILD;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
@@ -1794,7 +1798,7 @@ static void smack_set_catset(char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap)
* Casey says that CIPSO is good enough for now.
* It can be used to effect.
* It can also be abused to effect when necessary.
- * Appologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
+ * Apologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
*/
static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
{
@@ -2530,7 +2534,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
switch (sbp->s_magic) {
case SMACK_MAGIC:
/*
- * Casey says that it's a little embarassing
+ * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
* that the smack file system doesn't do
* extended attributes.
*/
@@ -3084,7 +3088,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
/*
* We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
* if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
- * propogate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
+ * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
*/
hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 90d1bbaaa6f3..f93460156dce 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
/*
- * Minor hack for backward compatability
+ * Minor hack for backward compatibility
*/
if (count < (SMK_OLOADLEN) || count > SMK_LOADLEN)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
}
/*
- * More on the minor hack for backward compatability
+ * More on the minor hack for backward compatibility
*/
if (count == (SMK_OLOADLEN))
data[SMK_OLOADLEN] = '-';
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
}
} else {
/* we delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
- * wasnt the special CIPSO option */
+ * wasn't the special CIPSO option */
if (skp->smk_label != smack_cipso_option)
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
index bbada7ca1b91..3312e5624f24 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_policy_loader_exists(void)
* If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not
* mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since
* policies are not loaded yet.
- * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime.
+ * Thus, let do_execve() call this function every time.
*/
struct path path;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-04-26 18:13:43 +0000