diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 16 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h index 968b50063431..ecd159b45f12 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -314,6 +314,15 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) #define user_addr_max() \ (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS) ? ~0UL : get_fs()) +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE +/* + * When mitigating Spectre variant 1, it is not worth fixing the non- + * verifying accessors, because we need to add verification of the + * address space there. Force these to use the standard get_user() + * version instead. + */ +#define __get_user(x, ptr) get_user(x, ptr) +#else /* * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the * address space - it must have been done previously with a separate @@ -330,12 +339,6 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) __gu_err; \ }) -#define __get_user_error(x, ptr, err) \ -({ \ - __get_user_err((x), (ptr), err); \ - (void) 0; \ -}) - #define __get_user_err(x, ptr, err) \ do { \ unsigned long __gu_addr = (unsigned long)(ptr); \ @@ -395,6 +398,7 @@ do { \ #define __get_user_asm_word(x, addr, err) \ __get_user_asm(x, addr, err, ldr) +#endif #define __put_user(x, ptr) \ ({ \ |