path: root/include/linux/capability.h
diff options
authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2008-11-11 22:02:50 +1100
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2008-11-11 22:02:50 +1100
commit06112163f5fd9e491a7f810443d81efa9d88e247 (patch)
tree48039f7488abbec36c0982a57405b57d47311dd6 /include/linux/capability.h
parent637d32dc720897616e8a1a4f9e9609e29d431800 (diff)
Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to
make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex indirection. This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/capability.h')
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 0f1950181102..b313ba1dd5d1 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -521,6 +521,8 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
kernel_cap_t cap_set_effective(const kernel_cap_t pE_new);
+extern int security_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+extern int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
* has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
* @t: The task in question
@@ -532,6 +534,7 @@ kernel_cap_t cap_set_effective(const kernel_cap_t pE_new);
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
+#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) (security_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
extern int capable(int cap);