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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-03-21 13:25:04 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-03-21 13:25:04 -0700
commit3556485f1595e3964ba539e39ea682acbb835cee (patch)
tree7f5ee254f425b1427ac0059b5f347a307f8538a1 /drivers/char
parentb8716614a7cc2fc15ea2a518edd04755fb08d922 (diff)
parent09f61cdbb32a9d812c618d3922db533542736bb0 (diff)
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates for 3.4 from James Morris: "The main addition here is the new Yama security module from Kees Cook, which was discussed at the Linux Security Summit last year. Its purpose is to collect miscellaneous DAC security enhancements in one place. This also marks a departure in policy for LSM modules, which were previously limited to being standalone access control systems. Chromium OS is using Yama, and I believe there are plans for Ubuntu, at least. This patchset also includes maintenance updates for AppArmor, TOMOYO and others." Fix trivial conflict in <net/sock.h> due to the jumo_label->static_key rename. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits) AppArmor: Fix location of const qualifier on generated string tables TOMOYO: Return error if fails to delete a domain AppArmor: add const qualifiers to string arrays AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy TOMOYO: Return appropriate value to poll(). AppArmor: Move path failure information into aa_get_name and rename AppArmor: Update dfa matching routines. AppArmor: Minor cleanup of d_namespace_path to consolidate error handling AppArmor: Retrieve the dentry_path for error reporting when path lookup fails AppArmor: Add const qualifiers to generated string tables AppArmor: Fix oops in policy unpack auditing AppArmor: Fix error returned when a path lookup is disconnected KEYS: testing wrong bit for KEY_FLAG_REVOKED TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order. security: fix ima kconfig warning AppArmor: Fix the error case for chroot relative path name lookup AppArmor: fix mapping of META_READ to audit and quiet flags AppArmor: Fix underflow in xindex calculation AppArmor: Fix dropping of allowed operations that are force audited AppArmor: Add mising end of structure test to caps unpacking ...
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c3
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h2
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c17
4 files changed, 14 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index 7fc75e47e6d0..a048199ce866 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
menuconfig TCG_TPM
tristate "TPM Hardware Support"
depends on HAS_IOMEM
- depends on EXPERIMENTAL
select SECURITYFS
---help---
If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 32362cf35b8d..ad7c7320dd1b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -1221,12 +1221,13 @@ ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
ret_size = atomic_read(&chip->data_pending);
atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
if (ret_size > 0) { /* relay data */
+ ssize_t orig_ret_size = ret_size;
if (size < ret_size)
ret_size = size;
mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
rc = copy_to_user(buf, chip->data_buffer, ret_size);
- memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, ret_size);
+ memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size);
if (rc)
ret_size = -EFAULT;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 010547138281..b1c5280ac159 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ struct tpm_vendor_specific {
wait_queue_head_t int_queue;
};
+#define TPM_VID_INTEL 0x8086
+
struct tpm_chip {
struct device *dev; /* Device stuff */
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index 70fac9abb0e2..d2a70cae76df 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -367,7 +367,12 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf1
};
size_t len = sizeof(cmd_getticks);
- int rem_itpm = itpm;
+ bool rem_itpm = itpm;
+ u16 vendor = ioread16(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_DID_VID(0));
+
+ /* probe only iTPMS */
+ if (vendor != TPM_VID_INTEL)
+ return 0;
itpm = 0;
@@ -390,9 +395,6 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
out:
itpm = rem_itpm;
tpm_tis_ready(chip);
- /* some TPMs need a break here otherwise they will not work
- * correctly on the immediately subsequent command */
- msleep(chip->vendor.timeout_b);
release_locality(chip, chip->vendor.locality, 0);
return rc;
@@ -508,7 +510,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, resource_size_t start,
resource_size_t len, unsigned int irq)
{
u32 vendor, intfcaps, intmask;
- int rc, i, irq_s, irq_e;
+ int rc, i, irq_s, irq_e, probe;
struct tpm_chip *chip;
if (!(chip = tpm_register_hardware(dev, &tpm_tis)))
@@ -538,11 +540,12 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, resource_size_t start,
vendor >> 16, ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_RID(0)));
if (!itpm) {
- itpm = probe_itpm(chip);
- if (itpm < 0) {
+ probe = probe_itpm(chip);
+ if (probe < 0) {
rc = -ENODEV;
goto out_err;
}
+ itpm = (probe == 0) ? 0 : 1;
}
if (itpm)