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authorOleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>2008-04-30 00:52:42 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-04-30 08:29:34 -0700
commit3b5e9e53c6f31b5a5a0f5c43707503c62bdefa46 (patch)
tree1244b7cf2755c06a8a793149ce4717e4a1311218 /security
parent9e3bd6c3fb2334be171e69b432039cd18bce4458 (diff)
downloadconfigs-3b5e9e53c6f31b5a5a0f5c43707503c62bdefa46.tar.gz
signals: cleanup security_task_kill() usage/implementation
Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from the kernel. This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the same check from ->task_kill() implementations. (sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal->session/__session but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here). NOTE: Eric W. Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think he is very right. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c3
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c9
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 85a220465a8..1b50a6ebc55 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3286,9 +3286,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
if (rc)
return rc;
- if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
- return 0;
-
if (!sig)
perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
else
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fe0ae1bf165..b5c8f923700 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1131,15 +1131,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid)
{
/*
- * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
- * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
- * make sense to change the caller so that it doesn't
- * bother with the LSM hook in these cases.
- */
- if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO &&
- (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
- return 0;
- /*
* Sending a signal requires that the sender
* can write the receiver.
*/