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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-08-01 10:26:23 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-08-01 10:26:23 -0700
commita0e881b7c189fa2bd76c024dbff91e79511c971d (patch)
tree0c801918565b08921d21aceee5b326f64d998f5f /Documentation
parenteff0d13f3823f35d70228cd151d2a2c89288ff32 (diff)
parentdbc6e0222d79e78925fe20733844a796a4b72cf9 (diff)
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull second vfs pile from Al Viro: "The stuff in there: fsfreeze deadlock fixes by Jan (essentially, the deadlock reproduced by xfstests 068), symlink and hardlink restriction patches, plus assorted cleanups and fixes. Note that another fsfreeze deadlock (emergency thaw one) is *not* dealt with - the series by Fernando conflicts a lot with Jan's, breaks userland ABI (FIFREEZE semantics gets changed) and trades the deadlock for massive vfsmount leak; this is going to be handled next cycle. There probably will be another pull request, but that stuff won't be in it." Fix up trivial conflicts due to unrelated changes next to each other in drivers/{staging/gdm72xx/usb_boot.c, usb/gadget/storage_common.c} * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (54 commits) delousing target_core_file a bit Documentation: Correct s_umount state for freeze_fs/unfreeze_fs fs: Remove old freezing mechanism ext2: Implement freezing btrfs: Convert to new freezing mechanism nilfs2: Convert to new freezing mechanism ntfs: Convert to new freezing mechanism fuse: Convert to new freezing mechanism gfs2: Convert to new freezing mechanism ocfs2: Convert to new freezing mechanism xfs: Convert to new freezing code ext4: Convert to new freezing mechanism fs: Protect write paths by sb_start_write - sb_end_write fs: Skip atime update on frozen filesystem fs: Add freezing handling to mnt_want_write() / mnt_drop_write() fs: Improve filesystem freezing handling switch the protection of percpu_counter list to spinlock nfsd: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutex btrfs: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutex fat: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutex ...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/filesystems/Locking4
-rw-r--r--Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt42
2 files changed, 44 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/Locking b/Documentation/filesystems/Locking
index 7f647e17830..0f103e39b4f 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/Locking
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/Locking
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ evict_inode:
put_super: write
write_super: read
sync_fs: read
-freeze_fs: read
-unfreeze_fs: read
+freeze_fs: write
+unfreeze_fs: write
statfs: maybe(read) (see below)
remount_fs: write
umount_begin: no
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
index 8c235b6e424..88152f214f4 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs:
- nr_open
- overflowuid
- overflowgid
+- protected_hardlinks
+- protected_symlinks
- suid_dumpable
- super-max
- super-nr
@@ -157,6 +159,46 @@ The default is 65534.
==============================================================
+protected_hardlinks:
+
+A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based
+time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable
+directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw
+is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a
+root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally,
+on systems without separated partitions, this stops unauthorized users
+from "pinning" vulnerable setuid/setgid files against being upgraded by
+the administrator, or linking to special files.
+
+When set to "0", hardlink creation behavior is unrestricted.
+
+When set to "1" hardlinks cannot be created by users if they do not
+already own the source file, or do not have read/write access to it.
+
+This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity.
+
+==============================================================
+
+protected_symlinks:
+
+A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based
+time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable
+directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw
+is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a
+root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely
+incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see:
+http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp
+
+When set to "0", symlink following behavior is unrestricted.
+
+When set to "1" symlinks are permitted to be followed only when outside
+a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and
+follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner.
+
+This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity.
+
+==============================================================
+
suid_dumpable:
This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid