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-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/auth.c10
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/array.c21
-rw-r--r--include/linux/capability.h221
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c113
-rw-r--r--mm/oom_kill.c5
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c87
-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c17
7 files changed, 349 insertions, 125 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
index 21928056e35..d13403e3362 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
#include <linux/nfsd/nfsd.h>
#include <linux/nfsd/export.h>
-#define CAP_NFSD_MASK (CAP_FS_MASK|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
-
int nfsexp_flags(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
{
struct exp_flavor_info *f;
@@ -69,10 +67,12 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
ret = set_current_groups(cred.cr_group_info);
put_group_info(cred.cr_group_info);
if ((cred.cr_uid)) {
- cap_t(current->cap_effective) &= ~CAP_NFSD_MASK;
+ current->cap_effective =
+ cap_drop_nfsd_set(current->cap_effective);
} else {
- cap_t(current->cap_effective) |= (CAP_NFSD_MASK &
- current->cap_permitted);
+ current->cap_effective =
+ cap_raise_nfsd_set(current->cap_effective,
+ current->cap_permitted);
}
return ret;
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index b380313092b..6ba2746e451 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -281,14 +281,23 @@ static inline char *task_sig(struct task_struct *p, char *buffer)
return buffer;
}
+static char *render_cap_t(const char *header, kernel_cap_t *a, char *buffer)
+{
+ unsigned __capi;
+
+ buffer += sprintf(buffer, "%s", header);
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
+ buffer += sprintf(buffer, "%08x",
+ a->cap[(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - __capi]);
+ }
+ return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "\n");
+}
+
static inline char *task_cap(struct task_struct *p, char *buffer)
{
- return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "CapInh:\t%016x\n"
- "CapPrm:\t%016x\n"
- "CapEff:\t%016x\n",
- cap_t(p->cap_inheritable),
- cap_t(p->cap_permitted),
- cap_t(p->cap_effective));
+ buffer = render_cap_t("CapInh:\t", &p->cap_inheritable, buffer);
+ buffer = render_cap_t("CapPrm:\t", &p->cap_permitted, buffer);
+ return render_cap_t("CapEff:\t", &p->cap_effective, buffer);
}
static inline char *task_context_switch_counts(struct task_struct *p,
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 7a8d7ade28a..a934dac672d 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -23,13 +23,20 @@ struct task_struct;
kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
it. */
-/* XXX - Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX to be an "opaque" pointer to
+/* Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX (draft) to be an "opaque" pointer to
a set of three capability sets. The transposition of 3*the
following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
etc.. */
-#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION 0x19980330
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 0x19980330
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 1
+
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 0x20071026
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 2
+
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2
typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
__u32 version;
@@ -42,43 +49,42 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
__u32 inheritable;
} __user *cap_user_data_t;
+
#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
-#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ (3*sizeof(__le32))
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000
+#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
+#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE 0x000001
+
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1 0x01000000
+#define VFS_CAP_U32_1 1
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_1))
-#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_1
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 0x02000000
+#define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
+
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
+#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
-#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
-#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE 0x000001
struct vfs_cap_data {
- __u32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
+ __le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
struct {
- __u32 permitted; /* Little endian */
- __u32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
- } data[1];
+ __le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
+ __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
+ } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
};
#ifdef __KERNEL__
-/* #define STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS */
-
-#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
-
typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
- __u32 cap;
+ __u32 cap[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
} kernel_cap_t;
-#else
-
-typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
-
-#endif
-
-#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (2*sizeof(__u32))
+#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
#endif
@@ -121,10 +127,6 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
#define CAP_FSETID 4
-/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
-
-#define CAP_FS_MASK 0x1f
-
/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
of the process receiving the signal. */
@@ -147,8 +149,12 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
** Linux-specific capabilities
**/
-/* Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
- remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid */
+/* Without VFS support for capabilities:
+ * Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
+ * remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
+ * With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
+ * Add any capability to the current process' inheritable set
+ */
#define CAP_SETPCAP 8
@@ -309,70 +315,153 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
+/*
+ * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
+ */
+
+#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) ((x) >> 5) /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
+#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
+
#ifdef __KERNEL__
/*
* Internal kernel functions only
*/
-#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
+#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
+ for (__capi = 0; __capi < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
+
+# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
+
+#if _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
+# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
+#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
+
+# define CAP_EMPTY_SET {{ 0, 0 }}
+# define CAP_FULL_SET {{ ~0, ~0 }}
+# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET {{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }}
+# define CAP_FS_SET {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, 0 }}
+# define CAP_NFSD_SET {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), 0 }}
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
+
+#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET CAP_EMPTY_SET
+
+# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
+# define cap_set_full(c) do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0)
+# define cap_set_init_eff(c) do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0)
+
+#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+
+#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
+do { \
+ unsigned __capi; \
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
+ c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
+do { \
+ unsigned __capi; \
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
+ c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
+ const kernel_cap_t b)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t dest;
+ CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
+ return dest;
+}
-#define to_cap_t(x) { x }
-#define cap_t(x) (x).cap
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
+ const kernel_cap_t b)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t dest;
+ CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
+ return dest;
+}
-#else
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
+ const kernel_cap_t drop)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t dest;
+ CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
+ return dest;
+}
-#define to_cap_t(x) (x)
-#define cap_t(x) (x)
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t dest;
+ CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
+ return dest;
+}
-#endif
+static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
+{
+ unsigned __capi;
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
+ if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
-#define CAP_EMPTY_SET to_cap_t(0)
-#define CAP_FULL_SET to_cap_t(~0)
-#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP))
-#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(0)
+static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t dest;
+ dest = cap_drop(a, set);
+ return cap_isclear(dest);
+}
-#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << (x))
-#define cap_raise(c, flag) (cap_t(c) |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-#define cap_lower(c, flag) (cap_t(c) &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-#define cap_raised(c, flag) (cap_t(c) & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t b)
+static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) | cap_t(b);
- return dest;
+ const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+ return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
}
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t b)
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) & cap_t(b);
- return dest;
+ const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+ return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
}
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t drop)
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
+ const kernel_cap_t permitted)
{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) & ~cap_t(drop);
- return dest;
+ const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+ return cap_combine(a,
+ cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
}
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(kernel_cap_t c)
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- cap_t(dest) = ~cap_t(c);
- return dest;
+ const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
+ return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
}
-#define cap_isclear(c) (!cap_t(c))
-#define cap_issubset(a,set) (!(cap_t(a) & ~cap_t(set)))
-
-#define cap_clear(c) do { cap_t(c) = 0; } while(0)
-#define cap_set_full(c) do { cap_t(c) = ~0; } while(0)
-#define cap_mask(c,mask) do { cap_t(c) &= cap_t(mask); } while(0)
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
+ const kernel_cap_t permitted)
+{
+ const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
+ return cap_combine(a,
+ cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
+}
-#define cap_is_fs_cap(c) (CAP_TO_MASK(c) & CAP_FS_MASK)
+extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
+extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
+extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
int capable(int cap);
int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index efbd9cdce13..39e8193b41e 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -22,6 +22,37 @@
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock);
/*
+ * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
+ */
+
+const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
+const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set = CAP_FULL_SET;
+const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
+
+/*
+ * More recent versions of libcap are available from:
+ *
+ * http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
+ */
+
+static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void)
+{
+ static int warned;
+ if (!warned) {
+ char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities"
+ " (legacy support in use)\n",
+ get_task_comm(name, current));
+ warned = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* For sys_getproccap() and sys_setproccap(), any of the three
* capability set pointers may be NULL -- indicating that that set is
* uninteresting and/or not to be changed.
@@ -42,12 +73,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
pid_t pid;
__u32 version;
struct task_struct *target;
- struct __user_cap_data_struct data;
+ unsigned tocopy;
+ kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
if (get_user(version, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
- if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) {
+ switch (version) {
+ case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
+ warn_legacy_capability_use();
+ tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
+ break;
+ case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
+ tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2;
+ break;
+ default:
if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
return -EINVAL;
@@ -71,14 +111,47 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
} else
target = current;
- ret = security_capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted);
+ ret = security_capget(target, &pE, &pI, &pP);
out:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
- if (!ret && copy_to_user(dataptr, &data, sizeof data))
- return -EFAULT;
+ if (!ret) {
+ struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
+ kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i];
+ kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i];
+ kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note, in the case, tocopy < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S,
+ * we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This
+ * has the effect of making older libcap
+ * implementations implicitly drop upper capability
+ * bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset
+ * sequence.
+ *
+ * This behavior is considered fail-safe
+ * behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer
+ * version of libcap will enable access to the newer
+ * capabilities.
+ *
+ * An alternative would be to return an error here
+ * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to
+ * unexpectidly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts
+ * before modification is attempted and the application
+ * fails.
+ */
+
+ if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy
+ * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -167,6 +240,8 @@ static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective,
*/
asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
{
+ struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
+ unsigned i, tocopy;
kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
__u32 version;
struct task_struct *target;
@@ -176,7 +251,15 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
if (get_user(version, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
- if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) {
+ switch (version) {
+ case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
+ warn_legacy_capability_use();
+ tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
+ break;
+ case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
+ tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2;
+ break;
+ default:
if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
return -EINVAL;
@@ -188,10 +271,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current) && !capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
- if (copy_from_user(&effective, &data->effective, sizeof(effective)) ||
- copy_from_user(&inheritable, &data->inheritable, sizeof(inheritable)) ||
- copy_from_user(&permitted, &data->permitted, sizeof(permitted)))
+ if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy
+ * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
+ effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
+ permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted;
+ inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable;
+ }
+ while (i < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S) {
+ effective.cap[i] = 0;
+ permitted.cap[i] = 0;
+ inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
+ i++;
+ }
spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
diff --git a/mm/oom_kill.c b/mm/oom_kill.c
index 96473b48209..320d74e707a 100644
--- a/mm/oom_kill.c
+++ b/mm/oom_kill.c
@@ -125,8 +125,7 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long uptime)
* Superuser processes are usually more important, so we make it
* less likely that we kill those.
*/
- if (cap_t(p->cap_effective) & CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- p->uid == 0 || p->euid == 0)
+ if (__capable(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || p->uid == 0 || p->euid == 0)
points /= 4;
/*
@@ -135,7 +134,7 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long uptime)
* tend to only have this flag set on applications they think
* of as important.
*/
- if (cap_t(p->cap_effective) & CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ if (__capable(p, CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
points /= 4;
/*
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index b06617b35b9..01ab47845dc 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
+/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
- *effective = cap_t (target->cap_effective);
- *inheritable = cap_t (target->cap_inheritable);
- *permitted = cap_t (target->cap_permitted);
+ *effective = target->cap_effective;
+ *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
+ *permitted = target->cap_permitted;
return 0;
}
@@ -197,28 +197,51 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
}
-static inline int cap_from_disk(__le32 *caps, struct linux_binprm *bprm,
- int size)
+static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps,
+ struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned size)
{
__u32 magic_etc;
+ unsigned tocopy, i;
- if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ)
+ if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
return -EINVAL;
- magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps[0]);
+ magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) {
- case VFS_CAP_REVISION:
- if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
- bprm->cap_effective = true;
- else
- bprm->cap_effective = false;
- bprm->cap_permitted = to_cap_t(le32_to_cpu(caps[1]));
- bprm->cap_inheritable = to_cap_t(le32_to_cpu(caps[2]));
- return 0;
+ case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
+ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
+ break;
+ case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
+ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
+ break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
+
+ if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) {
+ bprm->cap_effective = true;
+ } else {
+ bprm->cap_effective = false;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tocopy; ++i) {
+ bprm->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
+ le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
+ bprm->cap_inheritable.cap[i] =
+ le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
+ }
+ while (i < VFS_CAP_U32) {
+ bprm->cap_permitted.cap[i] = 0;
+ bprm->cap_inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
@@ -226,7 +249,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
int rc = 0;
- __le32 v1caps[XATTR_CAPS_SZ];
+ struct vfs_cap_data vcaps;
struct inode *inode;
if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) {
@@ -239,8 +262,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
goto out;
- rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &v1caps,
- XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
+ rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &vcaps,
+ XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
/* no data, that's ok */
rc = 0;
@@ -249,7 +272,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
- rc = cap_from_disk(v1caps, bprm, rc);
+ rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
if (rc)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -344,8 +367,10 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
* capability rules */
if (!is_global_init(current)) {
current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
- current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_effective ?
- new_permitted : 0;
+ if (bprm->cap_effective)
+ current->cap_effective = new_permitted;
+ else
+ cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
}
/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
@@ -467,13 +492,15 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
- cap_t (current->cap_effective) &=
- ~CAP_FS_MASK;
+ current->cap_effective =
+ cap_drop_fs_set(
+ current->cap_effective);
}
if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
- cap_t (current->cap_effective) |=
- (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) &
- CAP_FS_MASK);
+ current->cap_effective =
+ cap_raise_fs_set(
+ current->cap_effective,
+ current->cap_permitted);
}
}
break;
@@ -577,9 +604,9 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
{
- p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
- p->cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET;
- p->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET;
+ cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
+ cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
p->keep_capabilities = 0;
return;
}
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index c505122e22d..649326bf64e 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -36,14 +36,19 @@ static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * effective,
kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted)
{
- *effective = *inheritable = *permitted = 0;
if (target->euid == 0) {
- *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
- *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+ cap_set_full(*permitted);
+ cap_set_init_eff(*effective);
+ } else {
+ cap_clear(*permitted);
+ cap_clear(*effective);
}
- if (target->fsuid == 0) {
- *permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
- *effective |= CAP_FS_MASK;
+
+ cap_clear(*inheritable);
+
+ if (target->fsuid != 0) {
+ *permitted = cap_drop_fs_set(*permitted);
+ *effective = cap_drop_fs_set(*effective);
}
return 0;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-04-24 01:29:01 +0000