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-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/Makefile9
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c399
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.h85
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c489
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.h77
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/constraint.h61
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/context.h107
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c293
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h48
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c167
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h87
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c527
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.h42
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h56
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c1843
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h275
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c1777
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.h15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c305
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h59
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/symtab.c44
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/symtab.h23
22 files changed, 6788 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/Makefile b/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..bad78779b9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the SELinux security server as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
+obj-y := ss.o
+
+ss-y := ebitmap.o hashtab.o symtab.o sidtab.o avtab.o policydb.o services.o conditional.o mls.o
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f238c034c44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the access vector table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+#define AVTAB_HASH(keyp) \
+((keyp->target_class + \
+ (keyp->target_type << 2) + \
+ (keyp->source_type << 9)) & \
+ AVTAB_HASH_MASK)
+
+static kmem_cache_t *avtab_node_cachep;
+
+static struct avtab_node*
+avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
+ struct avtab_node * prev, struct avtab_node * cur,
+ struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+ struct avtab_node * newnode;
+ newnode = kmem_cache_alloc(avtab_node_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
+ if (newnode == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ memset(newnode, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_node));
+ newnode->key = *key;
+ newnode->datum = *datum;
+ if (prev) {
+ newnode->next = prev->next;
+ prev->next = newnode;
+ } else {
+ newnode->next = h->htable[hvalue];
+ h->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+ }
+
+ h->nel++;
+ return newnode;
+}
+
+static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+ int hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+ if (!h)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ cur;
+ prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (datum->specified & cur->datum.specified))
+ return -EEXIST;
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
+ if(!newnode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Unlike avtab_insert(), this function allow multiple insertions of the same
+ * key/specified mask into the table, as needed by the conditional avtab.
+ * It also returns a pointer to the node inserted.
+ */
+struct avtab_node *
+avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab * h, struct avtab_key * key, struct avtab_datum * datum)
+{
+ int hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+ if (!h)
+ return NULL;
+ hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ cur;
+ prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (datum->specified & cur->datum.specified))
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+ newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
+
+ return newnode;
+}
+
+struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, int specified)
+{
+ int hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!h)
+ return NULL;
+
+ hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->datum.specified))
+ return &cur->datum;
+
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
+ * conjunction with avtab_search_next_node()
+ */
+struct avtab_node*
+avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, int specified)
+{
+ int hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!h)
+ return NULL;
+
+ hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->datum.specified))
+ return cur;
+
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+struct avtab_node*
+avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!node)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (cur = node->next; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ node->key.target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->datum.specified))
+ return cur;
+
+ if (node->key.source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ node->key.target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ node->key.target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct avtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+ if (!h || !h->htable)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ temp = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
+ }
+ h->htable[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ vfree(h->htable);
+ h->htable = NULL;
+}
+
+
+int avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ h->htable = vmalloc(sizeof(*(h->htable)) * AVTAB_SIZE);
+ if (!h->htable)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++)
+ h->htable[i] = NULL;
+ h->nel = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
+{
+ int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+ slots_used = 0;
+ max_chain_len = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ if (cur) {
+ slots_used++;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ while (cur) {
+ chain_len++;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
+ "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, AVTAB_SIZE,
+ max_chain_len);
+}
+
+int avtab_read_item(void *fp, struct avtab_datum *avdatum, struct avtab_key *avkey)
+{
+ u32 buf[7];
+ u32 items, items2;
+ int rc;
+
+ memset(avkey, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
+ memset(avdatum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ items = 0;
+ avkey->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+ avkey->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+ avkey->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+ avdatum->specified = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+ if (!(avdatum->specified & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: null entry\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if ((avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AV) &&
+ (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AV) {
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+ avtab_allowed(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+ avtab_auditdeny(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+ avtab_auditallow(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+ } else {
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION)
+ avtab_transition(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_CHANGE)
+ avtab_change(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_MEMBER)
+ avtab_member(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+ }
+ if (items != items2) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n",
+ items2, items);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, u32 config)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_datum avdatum;
+ u32 buf[1];
+ u32 nel, i;
+
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated table\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (!nel) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: table is empty\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ if (avtab_read_item(fp, &avdatum, &avkey)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = avtab_insert(a, &avkey, &avdatum);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (rc == -ENOMEM)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: out of memory\n");
+ if (rc == -EEXIST)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+bad:
+ avtab_destroy(a);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+void avtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+ avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
+ sizeof(struct avtab_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
+{
+ kmem_cache_destroy (avtab_node_cachep);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..519d4f6dc65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * An access vector table (avtab) is a hash table
+ * of access vectors and transition types indexed
+ * by a type pair and a class. An access vector
+ * table is used to represent the type enforcement
+ * tables.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
+#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
+
+struct avtab_key {
+ u32 source_type; /* source type */
+ u32 target_type; /* target type */
+ u32 target_class; /* target object class */
+};
+
+struct avtab_datum {
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED 1
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW 2
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY 4
+#define AVTAB_AV (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 16
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER 32
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE 64
+#define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+ u32 specified; /* what fields are specified */
+ u32 data[3]; /* access vectors or types */
+#define avtab_allowed(x) (x)->data[0]
+#define avtab_auditdeny(x) (x)->data[1]
+#define avtab_auditallow(x) (x)->data[2]
+#define avtab_transition(x) (x)->data[0]
+#define avtab_change(x) (x)->data[1]
+#define avtab_member(x) (x)->data[2]
+};
+
+struct avtab_node {
+ struct avtab_key key;
+ struct avtab_datum datum;
+ struct avtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct avtab {
+ struct avtab_node **htable;
+ u32 nel; /* number of elements */
+};
+
+int avtab_init(struct avtab *);
+struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *k, int specified);
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
+
+int avtab_read_item(void *fp, struct avtab_datum *avdatum, struct avtab_key *avkey);
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, u32 config);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct avtab_datum *datum);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, int specified);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified);
+
+void avtab_cache_init(void);
+void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
+
+#define AVTAB_HASH_BITS 15
+#define AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
+#define AVTAB_HASH_MASK (AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
+
+#define AVTAB_SIZE AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
+
+#endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b53441184ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ * Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+
+/*
+ * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
+ * in reverse polish notation. It returns true (1), false (0),
+ * or undefined (-1). Undefined occurs when the expression
+ * exceeds the stack depth of COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH.
+ */
+static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+
+ struct cond_expr *cur;
+ int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+ int sp = -1;
+
+ for (cur = expr; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+ switch (cur->expr_type) {
+ case COND_BOOL:
+ if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return -1;
+ sp++;
+ s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[cur->bool - 1]->state;
+ break;
+ case COND_NOT:
+ if (sp < 0)
+ return -1;
+ s[sp] = !s[sp];
+ break;
+ case COND_OR:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case COND_AND:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case COND_XOR:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] ^= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case COND_EQ:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] = (s[sp] == s[sp + 1]);
+ break;
+ case COND_NEQ:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] = (s[sp] != s[sp + 1]);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * evaluate_cond_node evaluates the conditional stored in
+ * a struct cond_node and if the result is different than the
+ * current state of the node it sets the rules in the true/false
+ * list appropriately. If the result of the expression is undefined
+ * all of the rules are disabled for safety.
+ */
+int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
+{
+ int new_state;
+ struct cond_av_list* cur;
+
+ new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, node->expr);
+ if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
+ node->cur_state = new_state;
+ if (new_state == -1)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
+ /* turn the rules on or off */
+ for (cur = node->true_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+ if (new_state <= 0) {
+ cur->node->datum.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ } else {
+ cur->node->datum.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (cur = node->false_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+ /* -1 or 1 */
+ if (new_state) {
+ cur->node->datum.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ } else {
+ cur->node->datum.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
+ p->cond_list = NULL;
+ if (avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void cond_av_list_destroy(struct cond_av_list *list)
+{
+ struct cond_av_list *cur, *next;
+ for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = next) {
+ next = cur->next;
+ /* the avtab_ptr_t node is destroy by the avtab */
+ kfree(cur);
+ }
+}
+
+static void cond_node_destroy(struct cond_node *node)
+{
+ struct cond_expr *cur_expr, *next_expr;
+
+ for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = next_expr) {
+ next_expr = cur_expr->next;
+ kfree(cur_expr);
+ }
+ cond_av_list_destroy(node->true_list);
+ cond_av_list_destroy(node->false_list);
+ kfree(node);
+}
+
+static void cond_list_destroy(struct cond_node *list)
+{
+ struct cond_node *next, *cur;
+
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = next) {
+ next = cur->next;
+ cond_node_destroy(cur);
+ }
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ if (p->bool_val_to_struct != NULL)
+ kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+ avtab_destroy(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+ cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
+}
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ if (p->bool_val_to_struct)
+ kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+ p->bool_val_to_struct = (struct cond_bool_datum**)
+ kmalloc(p->p_bools.nprim * sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum*), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ if (key)
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+
+ booldatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->p_bool_val_to_name[booldatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value -1] = booldatum;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
+{
+ if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+ u32 buf[3], len;
+ int rc;
+
+ booldatum = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!booldatum)
+ return -1;
+ memset(booldatum, 0, sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
+ goto err;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
+ goto err;
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err;
+ key[len] = 0;
+ if (hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum))
+ goto err;
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list **ret_list,
+ struct cond_av_list *other)
+{
+ struct cond_av_list *list, *last = NULL, *cur;
+ struct avtab_key key;
+ struct avtab_datum datum;
+ struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
+ int rc;
+ u32 buf[1], i, len;
+ u8 found;
+
+ *ret_list = NULL;
+
+ len = 0;
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (avtab_read_item(fp, &datum, &key))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
+ * conflicting rules by searching the te_avtab and the
+ * cond_te_avtab.
+ */
+ if (datum.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
+ if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, &key, AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+ printk("security: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we are reading the false list other will be a pointer to
+ * the true list. We can have duplicate entries if there is only
+ * 1 other entry and it is in our true list.
+ *
+ * If we are reading the true list (other == NULL) there shouldn't
+ * be any other entries.
+ */
+ if (other) {
+ node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, &key, AVTAB_TYPE);
+ if (node_ptr) {
+ if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+ printk("security: too many conflicting type rules.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ found = 0;
+ for (cur = other; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+ if (cur->node == node_ptr) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ printk("security: conflicting type rules.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, &key, AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+ printk("security: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, &key, &datum);
+ if (!node_ptr) {
+ printk("security: could not insert rule.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ list = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_av_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!list)
+ goto err;
+ memset(list, 0, sizeof(struct cond_av_list));
+
+ list->node = node_ptr;
+ if (i == 0)
+ *ret_list = list;
+ else
+ last->next = list;
+ last = list;
+
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ cond_av_list_destroy(*ret_list);
+ *ret_list = NULL;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+ if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
+ printk("security: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+ printk("security: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
+{
+ u32 buf[2], len, i;
+ int rc;
+ struct cond_expr *expr = NULL, *last = NULL;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ len = 0;
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* expr */
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ expr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_expr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!expr) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memset(expr, 0, sizeof(struct cond_expr));
+
+ expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ if (!expr_isvalid(p, expr)) {
+ kfree(expr);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ node->expr = expr;
+ } else {
+ last->next = expr;
+ }
+ last = expr;
+ }
+
+ if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL) != 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list) != 0)
+ goto err;
+ return 0;
+err:
+ cond_node_destroy(node);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct cond_node *node, *last = NULL;
+ u32 buf[1], i, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ node = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_node), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!node)
+ goto err;
+ memset(node, 0, sizeof(struct cond_node));
+
+ if (cond_read_node(p, node, fp) != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ p->cond_list = node;
+ } else {
+ last->next = node;
+ }
+ last = node;
+ }
+ return 0;
+err:
+ cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
+ * av table, and if so, add them to the result
+ */
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+
+ if(!ctab || !key || !avd)
+ return;
+
+ for(node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key, AVTAB_AV); node != NULL;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, AVTAB_AV)) {
+ if ( (__u32) (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->datum.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ avd->allowed |= avtab_allowed(&node->datum);
+ if ( (__u32) (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->datum.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ /* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
+ * permission we do NOT want to audit (dontaudit), we use
+ * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
+ * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
+ */
+ avd->auditdeny &= avtab_auditdeny(&node->datum);
+ if ( (__u32) (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->datum.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ avd->auditallow |= avtab_auditallow(&node->datum);
+ }
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f3a1fc6e5d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ * Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+#define COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH 10
+
+/*
+ * A conditional expression is a list of operators and operands
+ * in reverse polish notation.
+ */
+struct cond_expr {
+#define COND_BOOL 1 /* plain bool */
+#define COND_NOT 2 /* !bool */
+#define COND_OR 3 /* bool || bool */
+#define COND_AND 4 /* bool && bool */
+#define COND_XOR 5 /* bool ^ bool */
+#define COND_EQ 6 /* bool == bool */
+#define COND_NEQ 7 /* bool != bool */
+#define COND_LAST 8
+ __u32 expr_type;
+ __u32 bool;
+ struct cond_expr *next;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Each cond_node contains a list of rules to be enabled/disabled
+ * depending on the current value of the conditional expression. This
+ * struct is for that list.
+ */
+struct cond_av_list {
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ struct cond_av_list *next;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A cond node represents a conditional block in a policy. It
+ * contains a conditional expression, the current state of the expression,
+ * two lists of rules to enable/disable depending on the value of the
+ * expression (the true list corresponds to if and the false list corresponds
+ * to else)..
+ */
+struct cond_node {
+ int cur_state;
+ struct cond_expr *expr;
+ struct cond_av_list *true_list;
+ struct cond_av_list *false_list;
+ struct cond_node *next;
+};
+
+int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb* p);
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb* p);
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb* p);
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p);
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp);
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
+
+#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..149dda731fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in
+ * order for one or more permissions to be granted.
+ * Constraints are used to impose additional restrictions
+ * beyond the type-based rules in `te' or the role-based
+ * transition rules in `rbac'. Constraints are typically
+ * used to prevent a process from transitioning to a new user
+ * identity or role unless it is in a privileged type.
+ * Constraints are likewise typically used to prevent a
+ * process from labeling an object with a different user
+ * identity.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+#define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+#define CEXPR_MAXDEPTH 5
+
+struct constraint_expr {
+#define CEXPR_NOT 1 /* not expr */
+#define CEXPR_AND 2 /* expr and expr */
+#define CEXPR_OR 3 /* expr or expr */
+#define CEXPR_ATTR 4 /* attr op attr */
+#define CEXPR_NAMES 5 /* attr op names */
+ u32 expr_type; /* expression type */
+
+#define CEXPR_USER 1 /* user */
+#define CEXPR_ROLE 2 /* role */
+#define CEXPR_TYPE 4 /* type */
+#define CEXPR_TARGET 8 /* target if set, source otherwise */
+#define CEXPR_XTARGET 16 /* special 3rd target for validatetrans rule */
+#define CEXPR_L1L2 32 /* low level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H2 64 /* low level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1L2 128 /* high level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1H2 256 /* high level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H1 512 /* low level 1 vs. high level 1 */
+#define CEXPR_L2H2 1024 /* low level 2 vs. high level 2 */
+ u32 attr; /* attribute */
+
+#define CEXPR_EQ 1 /* == or eq */
+#define CEXPR_NEQ 2 /* != */
+#define CEXPR_DOM 3 /* dom */
+#define CEXPR_DOMBY 4 /* domby */
+#define CEXPR_INCOMP 5 /* incomp */
+ u32 op; /* operator */
+
+ struct ebitmap names; /* names */
+
+ struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */
+};
+
+struct constraint_node {
+ u32 permissions; /* constrained permissions */
+ struct constraint_expr *expr; /* constraint on permissions */
+ struct constraint_node *next; /* next constraint */
+};
+
+#endif /* _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0562bacb7b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/*
+ * A security context is a set of security attributes
+ * associated with each subject and object controlled
+ * by the security policy. Security contexts are
+ * externally represented as variable-length strings
+ * that can be interpreted by a user or application
+ * with an understanding of the security policy.
+ * Internally, the security server uses a simple
+ * structure. This structure is private to the
+ * security server and can be changed without affecting
+ * clients of the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+#define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * A security context consists of an authenticated user
+ * identity, a role, a type and a MLS range.
+ */
+struct context {
+ u32 user;
+ u32 role;
+ u32 type;
+ struct mls_range range;
+};
+
+static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+ memset(&c->range, 0, sizeof(c->range));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
+{
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return 1;
+
+ return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
+ ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[0].cat,&c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
+ (c1->range.level[1].sens == c2->range.level[1].sens) &&
+ ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[1].cat,&c2->range.level[1].cat));
+}
+
+static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[1].cat);
+ mls_context_init(c);
+}
+
+static inline void context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+}
+
+static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+ dst->user = src->user;
+ dst->role = src->role;
+ dst->type = src->type;
+ return mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
+}
+
+static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+ c->user = c->role = c->type = 0;
+ mls_context_destroy(c);
+}
+
+static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
+{
+ return ((c1->user == c2->user) &&
+ (c1->role == c2->role) &&
+ (c1->type == c2->type) &&
+ mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
+}
+
+#endif /* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d8ce9cc0b9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+
+ if (e1->highbit != e2->highbit)
+ return 0;
+
+ n1 = e1->node;
+ n2 = e2->node;
+ while (n1 && n2 &&
+ (n1->startbit == n2->startbit) &&
+ (n1->map == n2->map)) {
+ n1 = n1->next;
+ n2 = n2->next;
+ }
+
+ if (n1 || n2)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n, *new, *prev;
+
+ ebitmap_init(dst);
+ n = src->node;
+ prev = NULL;
+ while (n) {
+ new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(dst);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+ new->startbit = n->startbit;
+ new->map = n->map;
+ new->next = NULL;
+ if (prev)
+ prev->next = new;
+ else
+ dst->node = new;
+ prev = new;
+ n = n->next;
+ }
+
+ dst->highbit = src->highbit;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+
+ if (e1->highbit < e2->highbit)
+ return 0;
+
+ n1 = e1->node;
+ n2 = e2->node;
+ while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) {
+ if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) {
+ n1 = n1->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((n1->map & n2->map) != n2->map)
+ return 0;
+
+ n1 = n1->next;
+ n2 = n2->next;
+ }
+
+ if (n2)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n;
+
+ if (e->highbit < bit)
+ return 0;
+
+ n = e->node;
+ while (n && (n->startbit <= bit)) {
+ if ((n->startbit + MAPSIZE) > bit) {
+ if (n->map & (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit)))
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n = n->next;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n, *prev, *new;
+
+ prev = NULL;
+ n = e->node;
+ while (n && n->startbit <= bit) {
+ if ((n->startbit + MAPSIZE) > bit) {
+ if (value) {
+ n->map |= (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit));
+ } else {
+ n->map &= ~(MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit));
+ if (!n->map) {
+ /* drop this node from the bitmap */
+
+ if (!n->next) {
+ /*
+ * this was the highest map
+ * within the bitmap
+ */
+ if (prev)
+ e->highbit = prev->startbit + MAPSIZE;
+ else
+ e->highbit = 0;
+ }
+ if (prev)
+ prev->next = n->next;
+ else
+ e->node = n->next;
+
+ kfree(n);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ prev = n;
+ n = n->next;
+ }
+
+ if (!value)
+ return 0;
+
+ new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+
+ new->startbit = bit & ~(MAPSIZE - 1);
+ new->map = (MAPBIT << (bit - new->startbit));
+
+ if (!n)
+ /* this node will be the highest map within the bitmap */
+ e->highbit = new->startbit + MAPSIZE;
+
+ if (prev) {
+ new->next = prev->next;
+ prev->next = new;
+ } else {
+ new->next = e->node;
+ e->node = new;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n, *temp;
+
+ if (!e)
+ return;
+
+ n = e->node;
+ while (n) {
+ temp = n;
+ n = n->next;
+ kfree(temp);
+ }
+
+ e->highbit = 0;
+ e->node = NULL;
+ return;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct ebitmap_node *n, *l;
+ u32 buf[3], mapsize, count, i;
+ u64 map;
+
+ ebitmap_init(e);
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ mapsize = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ if (mapsize != MAPSIZE) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
+ "match my size %Zd (high bit was %d)\n", mapsize,
+ MAPSIZE, e->highbit);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (!e->highbit) {
+ e->node = NULL;
+ goto ok;
+ }
+ if (e->highbit & (MAPSIZE - 1)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: high bit (%d) is not a "
+ "multiple of the map size (%Zd)\n", e->highbit, MAPSIZE);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ l = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ n = kmalloc(sizeof(*n), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!n) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ memset(n, 0, sizeof(*n));
+
+ n->startbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ if (n->startbit & (MAPSIZE - 1)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+ "not a multiple of the map size (%Zd)\n",
+ n->startbit, MAPSIZE);
+ goto bad_free;
+ }
+ if (n->startbit > (e->highbit - MAPSIZE)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+ "beyond the end of the bitmap (%Zd)\n",
+ n->startbit, (e->highbit - MAPSIZE));
+ goto bad_free;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(&map, fp, sizeof(u64));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+ goto bad_free;
+ }
+ n->map = le64_to_cpu(map);
+
+ if (!n->map) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: null map in "
+ "ebitmap (startbit %d)\n", n->startbit);
+ goto bad_free;
+ }
+ if (l) {
+ if (n->startbit <= l->startbit) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: start "
+ "bit %d comes after start bit %d\n",
+ n->startbit, l->startbit);
+ goto bad_free;
+ }
+ l->next = n;
+ } else
+ e->node = n;
+
+ l = n;
+ }
+
+ok:
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad_free:
+ kfree(n);
+bad:
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ebitmap_destroy(e);
+ goto out;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..471370233fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * An extensible bitmap is a bitmap that supports an
+ * arbitrary number of bits. Extensible bitmaps are
+ * used to represent sets of values, such as types,
+ * roles, categories, and classes.
+ *
+ * Each extensible bitmap is implemented as a linked
+ * list of bitmap nodes, where each bitmap node has
+ * an explicitly specified starting bit position within
+ * the total bitmap.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+#define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+
+#define MAPTYPE u64 /* portion of bitmap in each node */
+#define MAPSIZE (sizeof(MAPTYPE) * 8) /* number of bits in node bitmap */
+#define MAPBIT 1ULL /* a bit in the node bitmap */
+
+struct ebitmap_node {
+ u32 startbit; /* starting position in the total bitmap */
+ MAPTYPE map; /* this node's portion of the bitmap */
+ struct ebitmap_node *next;
+};
+
+struct ebitmap {
+ struct ebitmap_node *node; /* first node in the bitmap */
+ u32 highbit; /* highest position in the total bitmap */
+};
+
+#define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
+#define ebitmap_startbit(e) ((e)->node ? (e)->node->startbit : 0)
+
+static inline void ebitmap_init(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+ memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+}
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+
+#endif /* _SS_EBITMAP_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..26661fcc00c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the hash table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key),
+ int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2),
+ u32 size)
+{
+ struct hashtab *p;
+ u32 i;
+
+ p = kmalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return p;
+
+ memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+ p->size = size;
+ p->nel = 0;
+ p->hash_value = hash_value;
+ p->keycmp = keycmp;
+ p->htable = kmalloc(sizeof(*(p->htable)) * size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (p->htable == NULL) {
+ kfree(p);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ p->htable[i] = NULL;
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
+{
+ u32 hvalue;
+ struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+ if (!h || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
+ prev = NULL;
+ cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ while (cur && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0) {
+ prev = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ if (cur && (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) == 0))
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (newnode == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memset(newnode, 0, sizeof(*newnode));
+ newnode->key = key;
+ newnode->datum = datum;
+ if (prev) {
+ newnode->next = prev->next;
+ prev->next = newnode;
+ } else {
+ newnode->next = h->htable[hvalue];
+ h->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+ }
+
+ h->nel++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
+{
+ u32 hvalue;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!h)
+ return NULL;
+
+ hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
+ cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ while (cur != NULL && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0)
+ cur = cur->next;
+
+ if (cur == NULL || (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) != 0))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return cur->datum;
+}
+
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+ if (!h)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ temp = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ kfree(temp);
+ }
+ h->htable[i] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ kfree(h->htable);
+ h->htable = NULL;
+
+ kfree(h);
+}
+
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+ int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+ void *args)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ int ret;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!h)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ ret = apply(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
+{
+ u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+ slots_used = 0;
+ max_chain_len = 0;
+ for (slots_used = max_chain_len = i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ if (cur) {
+ slots_used++;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ while (cur) {
+ chain_len++;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ info->slots_used = slots_used;
+ info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4cc85816a71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+ * A hash table (hashtab) maintains associations between
+ * key values and datum values. The type of the key values
+ * and the type of the datum values is arbitrary. The
+ * functions for hash computation and key comparison are
+ * provided by the creator of the table.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+#define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+
+#define HASHTAB_MAX_NODES 0xffffffff
+
+struct hashtab_node {
+ void *key;
+ void *datum;
+ struct hashtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct hashtab {
+ struct hashtab_node **htable; /* hash table */
+ u32 size; /* number of slots in hash table */
+ u32 nel; /* number of elements in hash table */
+ u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key);
+ /* hash function */
+ int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2);
+ /* key comparison function */
+};
+
+struct hashtab_info {
+ u32 slots_used;
+ u32 max_chain_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new hash table with the specified characteristics.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if insufficent space is available or
+ * the new hash table otherwise.
+ */
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key),
+ int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2),
+ u32 size);
+
+/*
+ * Inserts the specified (key, datum) pair into the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENOMEM on memory allocation error,
+ * -EEXIST if there is already an entry with the same key,
+ * -EINVAL for general errors or
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *k, void *d);
+
+/*
+ * Searches for the entry with the specified key in the hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if no entry has the specified key or
+ * the datum of the entry otherwise.
+ */
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, void *k);
+
+/*
+ * Destroys the specified hash table.
+ */
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h);
+
+/*
+ * Applies the specified apply function to (key,datum,args)
+ * for each entry in the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * The order in which the function is applied to the entries
+ * is dependent upon the internal structure of the hash table.
+ *
+ * If apply returns a non-zero status, then hashtab_map will cease
+ * iterating through the hash table and will propagate the error
+ * return to its caller.
+ */
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+ int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+ void *args);
+
+/* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
+
+#endif /* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..756036bcc24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
+ * security context string representation of `context'.
+ */
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct context * context)
+{
+ int i, l, len, range;
+
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ range = 0;
+ len += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&context->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+ if (range) {
+ range++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]) + 1;
+ range++;
+ } else {
+ if (range > 1)
+ len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]) + 1;
+ range = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Handle case where last category is the end of range */
+ if (range > 1)
+ len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]) + 1;
+
+ if (l == 0) {
+ if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+ &context->range.level[1]))
+ break;
+ else
+ len++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
+ * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
+ */
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
+ char **scontext)
+{
+ char *scontextp;
+ int i, l, range, wrote_sep;
+
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ scontextp = *scontext;
+
+ *scontextp = ':';
+ scontextp++;
+
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ range = 0;
+ wrote_sep = 0;
+ strcpy(scontextp,
+ policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+ scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+
+ /* categories */
+ for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&context->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+ if (range) {
+ range++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!wrote_sep) {
+ *scontextp++ = ':';
+ wrote_sep = 1;
+ } else
+ *scontextp++ = ',';
+ strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+ scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+ range++;
+ } else {
+ if (range > 1) {
+ if (range > 2)
+ *scontextp++ = '.';
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = ',';
+
+ strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+ scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+ }
+ range = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Handle case where last category is the end of range */
+ if (range > 1) {
+ if (range > 2)
+ *scontextp++ = '.';
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = ',';
+
+ strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+ scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+ }
+
+ if (l == 0) {
+ if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+ &context->range.level[1]))
+ break;
+ else {
+ *scontextp = '-';
+ scontextp++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ int i, l;
+
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * MLS range validity checks: high must dominate low, low level must
+ * be valid (category set <-> sensitivity check), and high level must
+ * be valid (category set <-> sensitivity check)
+ */
+ if (!mls_level_dom(&c->range.level[1], &c->range.level[0]))
+ /* High does not dominate low. */
+ return 0;
+
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ if (!c->range.level[l].sens || c->range.level[l].sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ levdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_levels.table,
+ p->p_sens_val_to_name[c->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&c->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+ if (i > p->p_cats.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i - 1))
+ /*
+ * Category may not be associated with
+ * sensitivity in low level.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (c->role == OBJECT_R_VAL)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * User must be authorized for the MLS range.
+ */
+ if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+ if (!mls_range_contains(usrdatum->range, c->range))
+ return 0; /* user may not be associated with range */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `*scontext'. Update `*scontext' to
+ * point to the end of the string representation of
+ * the MLS fields.
+ *
+ * This function modifies the string in place, inserting
+ * NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
+ */
+int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
+ char **scontext,
+ struct context *context)
+{
+
+ char delim;
+ char *scontextp, *p, *rngptr;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
+ int l, rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* No MLS component to the security context. */
+ if (!oldc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Extract low sensitivity. */
+ scontextp = p = *scontext;
+ while (*p && *p != ':' && *p != '-')
+ p++;
+
+ delim = *p;
+ if (delim != 0)
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ levdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_levels.table, scontextp);
+ if (!levdatum) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+ if (delim == ':') {
+ /* Extract category set. */
+ while (1) {
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ',' && *p != '-')
+ p++;
+ delim = *p;
+ if (delim != 0)
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ /* Separate into range if exists */
+ if ((rngptr = strchr(scontextp, '.')) != NULL) {
+ /* Remove '.' */
+ *rngptr++ = 0;
+ }
+
+ catdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table,
+ scontextp);
+ if (!catdatum) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+ catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* If range, set all categories in range */
+ if (rngptr) {
+ int i;
+
+ rngdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table, rngptr);
+ if (!rngdatum) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (delim != ',')
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (delim == '-') {
+ /* Extract high sensitivity. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ delim = *p;
+ if (delim != 0)
+ *p++ = 0;
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (l == 0) {
+ context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
+ &context->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *scontext = ++p;
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_copy_context(struct context *dst,
+ struct context *src)
+{
+ int l, rc = 0;
+
+ /* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[l].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
+ &src->range.level[l].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the effective MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_scopy_context(struct context *dst,
+ struct context *src)
+{
+ int l, rc = 0;
+
+ /* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
+ &src->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
+ struct mls_range *range)
+{
+ int l, rc = 0;
+
+ /* Copy the MLS range into the context */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ context->range.level[l].sens = range->level[l].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+ &range->level[l].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+ struct context *usercon)
+{
+ if (selinux_mls_enabled) {
+ struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
+ struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
+ struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
+ struct mls_level *user_clr = &(user->range.level[1]);
+ struct mls_level *user_def = &(user->dfltlevel);
+ struct mls_level *usercon_sen = &(usercon->range.level[0]);
+ struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]);
+
+ /* Honor the user's default level if we can */
+ if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr)) {
+ *usercon_sen = *user_def;
+ } else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr)) {
+ *usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen;
+ } else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def)) {
+ *usercon_sen = *user_low;
+ } else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Lower the clearance of available contexts
+ if the clearance of "fromcon" is lower than
+ that of the user's default clearance (but
+ only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates
+ the user's computed sensitivity level) */
+ if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr)) {
+ *usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr;
+ } else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr)) {
+ *usercon_clr = *user_clr;
+ } else
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified in the
+ * policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp'.
+ */
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+ struct policydb *newp,
+ struct context *c)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+ struct ebitmap bitmap;
+ int l, i;
+
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ levdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_levels.table,
+ oldp->p_sens_val_to_name[c->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ c->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+ ebitmap_init(&bitmap);
+ for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&c->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+ int rc;
+
+ catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
+ oldp->p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+ if (!catdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
+ c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 specified,
+ struct context *newcontext)
+{
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS) {
+ struct range_trans *rangetr;
+ /* Look for a range transition rule. */
+ for (rangetr = policydb.range_tr; rangetr;
+ rangetr = rangetr->next) {
+ if (rangetr->dom == scontext->type &&
+ rangetr->type == tcontext->type) {
+ /* Set the range from the rule */
+ return mls_range_set(newcontext,
+ &rangetr->range);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Fallthrough */
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
+ /* Use the process MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_copy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+ else
+ /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_scopy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ /* Only polyinstantiate the MLS attributes if
+ the type is being polyinstantiated */
+ if (newcontext->type != tcontext->type) {
+ /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_scopy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+ } else {
+ /* Use the related object MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_copy_context(newcontext, tcontext);
+ }
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0d37beaa85e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_H_
+
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context);
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext);
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+
+int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
+ char **scontext,
+ struct context *context);
+
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+ struct policydb *newp,
+ struct context *context);
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 specified,
+ struct context *newcontext);
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+ struct context *usercon);
+
+#endif /* _SS_MLS_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0c692d58d48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+struct mls_level {
+ u32 sens; /* sensitivity */
+ struct ebitmap cat; /* category set */
+};
+
+struct mls_range {
+ struct mls_level level[2]; /* low == level[0], high == level[1] */
+};
+
+static inline int mls_level_eq(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return 1;
+
+ return ((l1->sens == l2->sens) &&
+ ebitmap_cmp(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_level_dom(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return 1;
+
+ return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
+ ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+}
+
+#define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \
+(!mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && !mls_level_dom((l2), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_level_between(l1, l2, l3) \
+(mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && mls_level_dom((l3), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_range_contains(r1, r2) \
+(mls_level_dom(&(r2).level[0], &(r1).level[0]) && \
+ mls_level_dom(&(r1).level[1], &(r2).level[1]))
+
+#endif /* _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..14190efbf33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1843 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the policy database.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "security.h"
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+
+#define _DEBUG_HASHES
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+static char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
+ "common prefixes",
+ "classes",
+ "roles",
+ "types",
+ "users",
+ "bools",
+ "levels",
+ "categories",
+};
+#endif
+
+int selinux_mls_enabled = 0;
+
+static unsigned int symtab_sizes[SYM_NUM] = {
+ 2,
+ 32,
+ 16,
+ 512,
+ 128,
+ 16,
+ 16,
+ 16,
+};
+
+struct policydb_compat_info {
+ int version;
+ int sym_num;
+ int ocon_num;
+};
+
+/* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */
+static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 3,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 1,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 1,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+};
+
+static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct policydb_compat_info *info = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(policydb_compat)/sizeof(*info); i++) {
+ if (policydb_compat[i].version == version) {
+ info = &policydb_compat[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return info;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the role table.
+ */
+static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ int rc;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+
+ role = kmalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!role) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(role, 0, sizeof(*role));
+ role->value = ++p->p_roles.nprim;
+ if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free_role;
+ }
+ key = kmalloc(strlen(OBJECT_R)+1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_role;
+ }
+ strcpy(key, OBJECT_R);
+ rc = hashtab_insert(p->p_roles.table, key, role);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free_key;
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+out_free_key:
+ kfree(key);
+out_free_role:
+ kfree(role);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a policy database structure.
+ */
+static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ int i, rc;
+
+ memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ rc = symtab_init(&p->symtab[i], symtab_sizes[i]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free_symtab;
+ }
+
+ rc = avtab_init(&p->te_avtab);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free_symtab;
+
+ rc = roles_init(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free_avtab;
+
+ rc = cond_policydb_init(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free_avtab;
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+out_free_avtab:
+ avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
+
+out_free_symtab:
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+ hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_index functions are used to
+ * define the val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure. The val_to_name
+ * arrays are used when converting security context
+ * structures into string representations. The
+ * val_to_struct arrays are used when the attributes
+ * of a class, role, or user are needed.
+ */
+
+static int common_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+ comdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!comdatum->value || comdatum->value > p->p_commons.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->p_common_val_to_name[comdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+
+ cladatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!cladatum->value || cladatum->value > p->p_classes.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->p_class_val_to_name[cladatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->class_val_to_struct[cladatum->value - 1] = cladatum;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+
+ role = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!role->value || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->p_role_val_to_name[role->value - 1] = key;
+ p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+
+ typdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (typdatum->primary) {
+ if (!typdatum->value || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->p_type_val_to_name[typdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ usrdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!usrdatum->value || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->p_user_val_to_name[usrdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+ levdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (!levdatum->isalias) {
+ if (!levdatum->level->sens ||
+ levdatum->level->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->p_sens_val_to_name[levdatum->level->sens - 1] = key;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+
+ catdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (!catdatum->isalias) {
+ if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->p_cat_val_to_name[catdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
+{
+ common_index,
+ class_index,
+ role_index,
+ type_index,
+ user_index,
+ cond_index_bool,
+ sens_index,
+ cat_index,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Define the common val_to_name array and the class
+ * val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays in a policy
+ * database structure.
+ *
+ * Caller must clean up upon failure.
+ */
+static int policydb_index_classes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ p->p_common_val_to_name =
+ kmalloc(p->p_commons.nprim * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->p_common_val_to_name) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(p->p_commons.table, common_index, p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ p->class_val_to_struct =
+ kmalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->class_val_to_struct) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ p->p_class_val_to_name =
+ kmalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->p_class_val_to_name) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(p->p_classes.table, class_index, p);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ struct hashtab *h = s[i].table;
+ struct hashtab_info info;
+
+ hashtab_stat(h, &info);
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+ "longest chain length %d\n", symtab_name[i], h->nel,
+ info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define the other val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure.
+ *
+ * Caller must clean up on failure.
+ */
+static int policydb_index_others(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ int i, rc = 0;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "security: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools",
+ p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim, p->p_bools.nprim);
+ if (selinux_mls_enabled)
+ printk(", %d sens, %d cats", p->p_levels.nprim,
+ p->p_cats.nprim);
+ printk("\n");
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "security: %d classes, %d rules\n",
+ p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+ avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
+ symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
+#endif
+
+ p->role_val_to_struct =
+ kmalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->role_val_to_struct) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ p->user_val_to_struct =
+ kmalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->user_val_to_struct) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (cond_init_bool_indexes(p)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = SYM_ROLES; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ p->sym_val_to_name[i] =
+ kmalloc(p->symtab[i].nprim * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i]) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, index_f[i], p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_destroy functions are used to
+ * free any memory allocated for each kind of
+ * symbol data in the policy database.
+ */
+
+static int perm_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ comdatum = datum;
+ hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(comdatum->permissions.table);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct constraint_node *constraint, *ctemp;
+ struct constraint_expr *e, *etmp;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ cladatum = datum;
+ hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(cladatum->permissions.table);
+ constraint = cladatum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ e = constraint->expr;
+ while (e) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&e->names);
+ etmp = e;
+ e = e->next;
+ kfree(etmp);
+ }
+ ctemp = constraint;
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ kfree(ctemp);
+ }
+
+ constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ e = constraint->expr;
+ while (e) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&e->names);
+ etmp = e;
+ e = e->next;
+ kfree(etmp);
+ }
+ ctemp = constraint;
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ kfree(ctemp);
+ }
+
+ kfree(cladatum->comkey);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct role_datum *role;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ role = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ usrdatum = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ levdatum = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+ kfree(levdatum->level);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
+{
+ common_destroy,
+ class_destroy,
+ role_destroy,
+ type_destroy,
+ user_destroy,
+ cond_destroy_bool,
+ sens_destroy,
+ cat_destroy,
+};
+
+static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
+{
+ context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
+ context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
+ if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
+ i == OCON_NETIF || i == OCON_FSUSE)
+ kfree(c->u.name);
+ kfree(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free any memory allocated by a policy database structure.
+ */
+void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ struct ocontext *c, *ctmp;
+ struct genfs *g, *gtmp;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ if (p->sym_val_to_name[i])
+ kfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
+ }
+
+ if (p->class_val_to_struct)
+ kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
+ if (p->role_val_to_struct)
+ kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
+ if (p->user_val_to_struct)
+ kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
+
+ avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < OCON_NUM; i++) {
+ c = p->ocontexts[i];
+ while (c) {
+ ctmp = c;
+ c = c->next;
+ ocontext_destroy(ctmp,i);
+ }
+ }
+
+ g = p->genfs;
+ while (g) {
+ kfree(g->fstype);
+ c = g->head;
+ while (c) {
+ ctmp = c;
+ c = c->next;
+ ocontext_destroy(ctmp,OCON_FSUSE);
+ }
+ gtmp = g;
+ g = g->next;
+ kfree(gtmp);
+ }
+
+ cond_policydb_destroy(p);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the initial SIDs specified in a policy database
+ * structure into a SID table.
+ */
+int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ struct ocontext *head, *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = sidtab_init(s);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: out of memory on SID table init\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+ for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
+ if (!c->context[0].user) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: SID %s was never "
+ "defined.\n", c->u.name);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0])) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: unable to load initial "
+ "SID %s.\n", c->u.name);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ if (!c->role || c->role > p->p_roles.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!c->type || c->type > p->p_types.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (c->role != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+ /*
+ * Role must be authorized for the type.
+ */
+ role = p->role_val_to_struct[c->role - 1];
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types,
+ c->type - 1))
+ /* role may not be associated with type */
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * User must be authorized for the role.
+ */
+ usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&usrdatum->roles,
+ c->role - 1))
+ /* user may not be associated with role */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!mls_context_isvalid(p, c))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS range structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+{
+ u32 buf[2], items;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: range overflow\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: truncated range\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r->level[0].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (items > 1)
+ r->level[1].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ else
+ r->level[1].sens = r->level[0].sens;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: error reading low "
+ "categories\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (items > 1) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: error reading high "
+ "categories\n");
+ goto bad_high;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: out of memory\n");
+ goto bad_high;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad_high:
+ ebitmap_destroy(&r->level[0].cat);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and validate a security context structure
+ * from a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
+ struct policydb *p,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ u32 buf[3];
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: context truncated\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ c->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ c->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+ if (mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: error reading MLS range of "
+ "context\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: invalid security context\n");
+ context_destroy(c);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_read functions are used to
+ * read the symbol data from a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum;
+ int rc;
+ u32 buf[2], len;
+
+ perdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*perdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!perdatum) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(perdatum, 0, sizeof(*perdatum));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ key[len] = 0;
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, perdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ perm_destroy(key, perdatum, NULL);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+ u32 buf[4], len, nel;
+ int i, rc;
+
+ comdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!comdatum) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(comdatum, 0, sizeof(*comdatum));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ key[len] = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = perm_read(p, comdatum->permissions.table, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, comdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ common_destroy(key, comdatum, NULL);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons,
+ int allowxtarget, void *fp)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
+ struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
+ u32 buf[3], nexpr;
+ int rc, i, j, depth;
+
+ lc = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < ncons; i++) {
+ c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+
+ if (lc) {
+ lc->next = c;
+ } else {
+ *nodep = c;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ c->permissions = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ nexpr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ le = NULL;
+ depth = -1;
+ for (j = 0; j < nexpr; j++) {
+ e = kmalloc(sizeof(*e), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!e)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+
+ if (le) {
+ le->next = e;
+ } else {
+ c->expr = e;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 3));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ e->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ e->attr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ e->op = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NOT:
+ if (depth < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_AND:
+ case CEXPR_OR:
+ if (depth < 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ depth--;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ATTR:
+ if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ depth++;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ if (!allowxtarget && (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ depth++;
+ if (ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ le = e;
+ }
+ if (depth != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ lc = c;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ u32 buf[6], len, len2, ncons, nel;
+ int i, rc;
+
+ cladatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cladatum) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(cladatum, 0, sizeof(*cladatum));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*6);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+
+ ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
+
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ key[len] = 0;
+
+ if (len2) {
+ cladatum->comkey = kmalloc(len2 + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cladatum->comkey) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(cladatum->comkey, fp, len2);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ cladatum->comkey[len2] = 0;
+
+ cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table,
+ cladatum->comkey);
+ if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: unknown common %s\n",
+ cladatum->comkey);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = perm_read(p, cladatum->permissions.table, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS) {
+ /* grab the validatetrans rules */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->validatetrans, ncons, 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, cladatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ class_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ int rc;
+ u32 buf[2], len;
+
+ role = kmalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!role) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(role, 0, sizeof(*role));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ key[len] = 0;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&role->dominates, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&role->types, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) {
+ if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
+ OBJECT_R, role->value);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, role);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ role_destroy(key, role, NULL);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ int rc;
+ u32 buf[3], len;
+
+ typdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*typdatum),GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!typdatum) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ memset(typdatum, 0, sizeof(*typdatum));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ key[len] = 0;
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, typdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ type_destroy(key, typdatum, NULL);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS level structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp)
+{
+ u32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ memset(lp, 0, sizeof(*lp));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: truncated level\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ if (ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: error reading level "
+ "categories\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+bad:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ int rc;
+ u32 buf[2], len;
+
+ usrdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!usrdatum) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(usrdatum, 0, sizeof(*usrdatum));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ key[len] = 0;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ rc = mls_read_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, usrdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ user_destroy(key, usrdatum, NULL);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ int rc;
+ u32 buf[2], len;
+
+ levdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!levdatum) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(levdatum, 0, sizeof(*levdatum));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!key) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ key[len] = 0;
+
+ levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mls_level), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!levdatum->level) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (mls_read_level(levdatum->level, fp)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, levdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+ int rc;
+ u32 buf[3], len;
+
+ catdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!catdatum) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(catdatum, 0, sizeof(*catdatum));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!key) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ key[len] = 0;
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, catdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+bad:
+ cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int (*read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) =
+{
+ common_read,
+ class_read,
+ role_read,
+ type_read,
+ user_read,
+ cond_read_bool,
+ sens_read,
+ cat_read,
+};
+
+extern int ss_initialized;
+
+/*
+ * Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
+ * representation file into a policy database structure.
+ */
+int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
+ struct role_trans *tr, *ltr;
+ struct ocontext *l, *c, *newc;
+ struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs, *newgenfs;
+ int i, j, rc;
+ u32 buf[8], len, len2, config, nprim, nel, nel2;
+ char *policydb_str;
+ struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+ struct range_trans *rt, *lrt;
+
+ config = 0;
+
+ rc = policydb_init(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Read the magic number and string length. */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)* 2);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+ buf[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf[i]);
+
+ if (buf[0] != POLICYDB_MAGIC) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: policydb magic number 0x%x does "
+ "not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
+ buf[0], POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ len = buf[1];
+ if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: policydb string length %d does not "
+ "match expected length %Zu\n",
+ len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!policydb_str) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: unable to allocate memory for policydb "
+ "string of length %d\n", len);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: truncated policydb string identifier\n");
+ kfree(policydb_str);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ policydb_str[len] = 0;
+ if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: policydb string %s does not match "
+ "my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
+ kfree(policydb_str);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ /* Done with policydb_str. */
+ kfree(policydb_str);
+ policydb_str = NULL;
+
+ /* Read the version, config, and table sizes. */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*4);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ buf[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf[i]);
+
+ p->policyvers = buf[0];
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
+ p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: policydb version %d does not match "
+ "my version range %d-%d\n",
+ buf[0], POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if ((buf[1] & POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS)) {
+ if (ss_initialized && !selinux_mls_enabled) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot switch between non-MLS and MLS "
+ "policies\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ selinux_mls_enabled = 1;
+ config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security policydb version %d (MLS) "
+ "not backwards compatible\n", p->policyvers);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ss_initialized && selinux_mls_enabled) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot switch between MLS and non-MLS "
+ "policies\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+
+ info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+ if (!info) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: unable to find policy compat info "
+ "for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (buf[2] != info->sym_num || buf[3] != info->ocon_num) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
+ "not match mine (%d,%d)\n", buf[2], buf[3],
+ info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < info->sym_num; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+ rc = read_f[i](p, p->symtab[i].table, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ p->symtab[i].nprim = nprim;
+ }
+
+ rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, config);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL) {
+ rc = cond_read_list(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ ltr = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ tr = kmalloc(sizeof(*tr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tr) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ memset(tr, 0, sizeof(*tr));
+ if (ltr) {
+ ltr->next = tr;
+ } else {
+ p->role_tr = tr;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ tr->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ tr->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ tr->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ ltr = tr;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ lra = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ ra = kmalloc(sizeof(*ra), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ra) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ memset(ra, 0, sizeof(*ra));
+ if (lra) {
+ lra->next = ra;
+ } else {
+ p->role_allow = ra;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ ra->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ ra->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ lra = ra;
+ }
+
+ rc = policydb_index_classes(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = policydb_index_others(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ l = NULL;
+ for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+ c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+ if (l) {
+ l->next = c;
+ } else {
+ p->ocontexts[i] = c;
+ }
+ l = c;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ switch (i) {
+ case OCON_ISID:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FS:
+ case OCON_NETIF:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c->u.name) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ c->u.name[len] = 0;
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ break;
+ case OCON_PORT:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)* 2);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ c->u.node.addr = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ c->u.node.mask = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FSUSE:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE)
+ goto bad;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c->u.name) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ c->u.name[len] = 0;
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE6: {
+ int k;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+ c->u.node6.addr[k] = le32_to_cpu(buf[k]);
+ for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+ c->u.node6.mask[k] = le32_to_cpu(buf[k+4]);
+ if (context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp))
+ goto bad;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ genfs_p = NULL;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ newgenfs = kmalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newgenfs) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ memset(newgenfs, 0, sizeof(*newgenfs));
+
+ newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newgenfs->fstype) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ kfree(newgenfs);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(newgenfs->fstype, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
+ kfree(newgenfs);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ newgenfs->fstype[len] = 0;
+ for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
+ genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
+ if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: dup genfs "
+ "fstype %s\n", newgenfs->fstype);
+ kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
+ kfree(newgenfs);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ newgenfs->next = genfs;
+ if (genfs_p)
+ genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
+ else
+ p->genfs = newgenfs;
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ newc = kmalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newc) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ memset(newc, 0, sizeof(*newc));
+
+ newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newc->u.name) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad_newc;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(newc->u.name, fp, len);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad_newc;
+ newc->u.name[len] = 0;
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad_newc;
+ newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp))
+ goto bad_newc;
+ for (l = NULL, c = newgenfs->head; c;
+ l = c, c = c->next) {
+ if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
+ (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
+ newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: dup genfs "
+ "entry (%s,%s)\n",
+ newgenfs->fstype, c->u.name);
+ goto bad_newc;
+ }
+ len = strlen(newc->u.name);
+ len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
+ if (len > len2)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ newc->next = c;
+ if (l)
+ l->next = newc;
+ else
+ newgenfs->head = newc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ lrt = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rt = kmalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rt) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ memset(rt, 0, sizeof(*rt));
+ if (lrt)
+ lrt->next = rt;
+ else
+ p->range_tr = rt;
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ rt->dom = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rt->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(&rt->range, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ lrt = rt;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad_newc:
+ ocontext_destroy(newc,OCON_FSUSE);
+bad:
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ policydb_destroy(p);
+ goto out;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2470e2a1a1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+/*
+ * A policy database (policydb) specifies the
+ * configuration data for the security policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+#define _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "constraint.h"
+
+/*
+ * A datum type is defined for each kind of symbol
+ * in the configuration data: individual permissions,
+ * common prefixes for access vectors, classes,
+ * users, roles, types, sensitivities, categories, etc.
+ */
+
+/* Permission attributes */
+struct perm_datum {
+ u32 value; /* permission bit + 1 */
+};
+
+/* Attributes of a common prefix for access vectors */
+struct common_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal common value */
+ struct symtab permissions; /* common permissions */
+};
+
+/* Class attributes */
+struct class_datum {
+ u32 value; /* class value */
+ char *comkey; /* common name */
+ struct common_datum *comdatum; /* common datum */
+ struct symtab permissions; /* class-specific permission symbol table */
+ struct constraint_node *constraints; /* constraints on class permissions */
+ struct constraint_node *validatetrans; /* special transition rules */
+};
+
+/* Role attributes */
+struct role_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal role value */
+ struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
+ struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
+};
+
+struct role_trans {
+ u32 role; /* current role */
+ u32 type; /* program executable type */
+ u32 new_role; /* new role */
+ struct role_trans *next;
+};
+
+struct role_allow {
+ u32 role; /* current role */
+ u32 new_role; /* new role */
+ struct role_allow *next;
+};
+
+/* Type attributes */
+struct type_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal type value */
+ unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
+};
+
+/* User attributes */
+struct user_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal user value */
+ struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
+ struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
+ struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
+};
+
+
+/* Sensitivity attributes */
+struct level_datum {
+ struct mls_level *level; /* sensitivity and associated categories */
+ unsigned char isalias; /* is this sensitivity an alias for another? */
+};
+
+/* Category attributes */
+struct cat_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal category bit + 1 */
+ unsigned char isalias; /* is this category an alias for another? */
+};
+
+struct range_trans {
+ u32 dom; /* current process domain */
+ u32 type; /* program executable type */
+ struct mls_range range; /* new range */
+ struct range_trans *next;
+};
+
+/* Boolean data type */
+struct cond_bool_datum {
+ __u32 value; /* internal type value */
+ int state;
+};
+
+struct cond_node;
+
+/*
+ * The configuration data includes security contexts for
+ * initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems, TCP and UDP port numbers,
+ * network interfaces, and nodes. This structure stores the
+ * relevant data for one such entry. Entries of the same kind
+ * (e.g. all initial SIDs) are linked together into a list.
+ */
+struct ocontext {
+ union {
+ char *name; /* name of initial SID, fs, netif, fstype, path */
+ struct {
+ u8 protocol;
+ u16 low_port;
+ u16 high_port;
+ } port; /* TCP or UDP port information */
+ struct {
+ u32 addr;
+ u32 mask;
+ } node; /* node information */
+ struct {
+ u32 addr[4];
+ u32 mask[4];
+ } node6; /* IPv6 node information */
+ } u;
+ union {
+ u32 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
+ u32 behavior; /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
+ } v;
+ struct context context[2]; /* security context(s) */
+ u32 sid[2]; /* SID(s) */
+ struct ocontext *next;
+};
+
+struct genfs {
+ char *fstype;
+ struct ocontext *head;
+ struct genfs *next;
+};
+
+/* symbol table array indices */
+#define SYM_COMMONS 0
+#define SYM_CLASSES 1
+#define SYM_ROLES 2
+#define SYM_TYPES 3
+#define SYM_USERS 4
+#define SYM_BOOLS 5
+#define SYM_LEVELS 6
+#define SYM_CATS 7
+#define SYM_NUM 8
+
+/* object context array indices */
+#define OCON_ISID 0 /* initial SIDs */
+#define OCON_FS 1 /* unlabeled file systems */
+#define OCON_PORT 2 /* TCP and UDP port numbers */
+#define OCON_NETIF 3 /* network interfaces */
+#define OCON_NODE 4 /* nodes */
+#define OCON_FSUSE 5 /* fs_use */
+#define OCON_NODE6 6 /* IPv6 nodes */
+#define OCON_NUM 7
+
+/* The policy database */
+struct policydb {
+ /* symbol tables */
+ struct symtab symtab[SYM_NUM];
+#define p_commons symtab[SYM_COMMONS]
+#define p_classes symtab[SYM_CLASSES]
+#define p_roles symtab[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_types symtab[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_users symtab[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bools symtab[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_levels symtab[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cats symtab[SYM_CATS]
+
+ /* symbol names indexed by (value - 1) */
+ char **sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
+#define p_common_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS]
+#define p_class_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES]
+#define p_role_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_type_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_user_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bool_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_sens_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cat_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS]
+
+ /* class, role, and user attributes indexed by (value - 1) */
+ struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
+ struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
+ struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
+
+ /* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
+ struct avtab te_avtab;
+
+ /* role transitions */
+ struct role_trans *role_tr;
+
+ /* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
+ struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
+ /* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
+ struct avtab te_cond_avtab;
+ /* linked list indexing te_cond_avtab by conditional */
+ struct cond_node* cond_list;
+
+ /* role allows */
+ struct role_allow *role_allow;
+
+ /* security contexts of initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems,
+ TCP or UDP port numbers, network interfaces and nodes */
+ struct ocontext *ocontexts[OCON_NUM];
+
+ /* security contexts for files in filesystems that cannot support
+ a persistent label mapping or use another
+ fixed labeling behavior. */
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+
+ /* range transitions */
+ struct range_trans *range_tr;
+
+ unsigned int policyvers;
+};
+
+extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
+extern int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+#define PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE 32
+
+#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS 1
+
+#define OBJECT_R "object_r"
+#define OBJECT_R_VAL 1
+
+#define POLICYDB_MAGIC SELINUX_MAGIC
+#define POLICYDB_STRING "SE Linux"
+
+struct policy_file {
+ char *data;
+ size_t len;
+};
+
+static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
+{
+ if (bytes > fp->len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memcpy(buf, fp->data, bytes);
+ fp->data += bytes;
+ fp->len -= bytes;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5a820cf88c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1777 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+
+extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
+unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
+
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
+#define POLICY_RDLOCK read_lock(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
+
+static DECLARE_MUTEX(load_sem);
+#define LOAD_LOCK down(&load_sem)
+#define LOAD_UNLOCK up(&load_sem)
+
+static struct sidtab sidtab;
+struct policydb policydb;
+int ss_initialized = 0;
+
+/*
+ * The largest sequence number that has been used when
+ * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
+ * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
+ * occurs.
+ */
+static u32 latest_granting = 0;
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len);
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ struct context *xcontext,
+ struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
+{
+ u32 val1, val2;
+ struct context *c;
+ struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
+ struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
+ struct constraint_expr *e;
+ int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+ int sp = -1;
+
+ for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NOT:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+ s[sp] = !s[sp];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_AND:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] &= s[sp+1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_OR:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] |= s[sp+1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ATTR:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+ return 0;
+ switch (e->attr) {
+ case CEXPR_USER:
+ val1 = scontext->user;
+ val2 = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_TYPE:
+ val1 = scontext->type;
+ val2 = tcontext->type;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ROLE:
+ val1 = scontext->role;
+ val2 = tcontext->role;
+ r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+ r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = ( !ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1) &&
+ !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1) );
+ continue;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_L1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H1:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L2H2:
+ l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+mls_ops:
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+ return 0;
+ c = scontext;
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+ c = tcontext;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+ c = xcontext;
+ if (!c) {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+ val1 = c->user;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+ val1 = c->role;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+ val1 = c->type;
+ else {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+ return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
+ * the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ struct role_allow *ra;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+
+ /*
+ * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
+ * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
+ * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
+ * to remain in the correct class.
+ */
+ if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+ if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
+ tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
+ tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized class %d\n",
+ tclass);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
+ */
+ avd->allowed = 0;
+ avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+
+ /*
+ * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+ * this permission check, then use it.
+ */
+ avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+ avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey, AVTAB_AV);
+ if (avdatum) {
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+ avd->allowed = avtab_allowed(avdatum);
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+ avd->auditdeny = avtab_auditdeny(avdatum);
+ if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+ avd->auditallow = avtab_auditallow(avdatum);
+ }
+
+ /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+ cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
+
+ /*
+ * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+ * the MLS policy).
+ */
+ constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+ !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If checking process transition permission and the
+ * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+ * pair.
+ */
+ if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS &&
+ (avd->allowed & (PROCESS__TRANSITION | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION)) &&
+ scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+ for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+ tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ra)
+ avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
+ PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
+ struct context *ncontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
+ u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
+
+ if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context,
+ "security_validate_transition: denied for"
+ " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+out:
+ kfree(o);
+ kfree(n);
+ kfree(t);
+
+ if (!selinux_enforcing)
+ return 0;
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ struct context *ocontext;
+ struct context *ncontext;
+ struct context *tcontext;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+ struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ /*
+ * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
+ * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
+ * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
+ * to remain in the correct class.
+ */
+ if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+ if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
+ tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
+ tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+ "unrecognized class %d\n", tclass);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
+ if (!ocontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+ " unrecognized SID %d\n", oldsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
+ if (!ncontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+ " unrecognized SID %d\n", newsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+ " unrecognized SID %d\n", tasksid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
+ tcontext, tclass);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ *
+ * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
+ * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid or %0
+ * if the access vector decisions were computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ avd->allowed = requested;
+ avd->decided = requested;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ ssid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ tsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
+ requested, avd);
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ char *scontextp;
+
+ *scontext = NULL;
+ *scontext_len = 0;
+
+ /* Compute the size of the context. */
+ *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
+
+ /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
+ scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!scontextp) {
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
+ */
+ sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
+ policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
+ policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
+ policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+ scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
+ 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
+ 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+
+ mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
+
+ *scontextp = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ struct context *context;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
+ char *scontextp;
+
+ *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
+ scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len,GFP_ATOMIC);
+ strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context: called before initial "
+ "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+ if (!context) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context: unrecognized SID "
+ "%d\n", sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
+out_unlock:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
+{
+ char *scontext2;
+ struct context context;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+ if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
+ *sid = i;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it.
+ The string should already by null terminated, but we append a
+ null suffix to the copy to avoid problems with the existing
+ attr package, which doesn't view the null terminator as part
+ of the attribute value. */
+ scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scontext2) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
+ scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
+
+ context_init(&context);
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ /* Parse the security context. */
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ scontextp = (char *) scontext2;
+
+ /* Extract the user. */
+ p = scontextp;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ usrdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, scontextp);
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ context.user = usrdatum->value;
+
+ /* Extract role. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ role = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, scontextp);
+ if (!role)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ context.role = role->value;
+
+ /* Extract type. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+ oldc = *p;
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ typdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, scontextp);
+ if (!typdatum)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ context.type = typdatum->value;
+
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(oldc, &p, &context);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ if ((p - scontext2) < scontext_len) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &context)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ /* Obtain the new sid. */
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
+out_unlock:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ context_destroy(&context);
+ kfree(scontext2);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct context *newcontext)
+{
+ char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+ u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
+
+ if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context,
+ "security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
+ " for scontext=%s"
+ " tcontext=%s"
+ " tclass=%s",
+ n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+out:
+ kfree(s);
+ kfree(t);
+ kfree(n);
+ if (!selinux_enforcing)
+ return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 specified,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
+ struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ unsigned int type_change = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ switch (tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ *out_sid = ssid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *out_sid = tsid;
+ break;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ ssid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ tsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ context_init(&newcontext);
+
+ /* Set the user identity. */
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ /* Use the process user identity. */
+ newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+ break;
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ /* Use the related object owner. */
+ newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the role and type to default values. */
+ switch (tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ /* Use the current role and type of process. */
+ newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+ newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Use the well-defined object role. */
+ newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+ /* Use the type of the related object. */
+ newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+ }
+
+ /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
+ avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+ avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey, AVTAB_TYPE);
+
+ /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+ if(!avdatum) {
+ node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, specified);
+ for (; node != NULL; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+ if (node->datum.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+ avdatum = &node->datum;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ type_change = (avdatum && (avdatum->specified & specified));
+ if (type_change) {
+ /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ newcontext.type = avtab_transition(avdatum);
+ break;
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ newcontext.type = avtab_member(avdatum);
+ break;
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ newcontext.type = avtab_change(avdatum);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check for class-specific changes. */
+ switch (tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+ /* Look for a role transition rule. */
+ for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
+ roletr = roletr->next) {
+ if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
+ roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
+ /* Use the role transition rule. */
+ newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the MLS attributes.
+ This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+ rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
+ rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
+ tcontext,
+ tclass,
+ &newcontext);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+out_unlock:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ context_destroy(&newcontext);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
+ * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, out_sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
+ * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
+ * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that each permission that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same value
+ * in the new policy.
+ */
+static int validate_perm(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct hashtab *h;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum, *perdatum2;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+
+ h = p;
+ perdatum = datum;
+
+ perdatum2 = hashtab_search(h, key);
+ if (!perdatum2) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: permission %s disappeared",
+ (char *)key);
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (perdatum->value != perdatum2->value) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: the value of permission %s changed",
+ (char *)key);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that each class that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same
+ * attributes in the new policy.
+ */
+static int validate_class(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct policydb *newp;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum, *cladatum2;
+ int rc;
+
+ newp = p;
+ cladatum = datum;
+
+ cladatum2 = hashtab_search(newp->p_classes.table, key);
+ if (!cladatum2) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: class %s disappeared\n",
+ (char *)key);
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (cladatum->value != cladatum2->value) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: the value of class %s changed\n",
+ (char *)key);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((cladatum->comdatum && !cladatum2->comdatum) ||
+ (!cladatum->comdatum && cladatum2->comdatum)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: the inherits clause for the access "
+ "vector definition for class %s changed\n", (char *)key);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (cladatum->comdatum) {
+ rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->comdatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
+ cladatum2->comdatum->permissions.table);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(" in the access vector definition for class "
+ "%s\n", (char *)key);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
+ cladatum2->permissions.table);
+ if (rc)
+ printk(" in access vector definition for class %s\n",
+ (char *)key);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
+static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
+ struct context *context,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ struct sidtab *s = arg;
+
+ return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (selinux_enforcing) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+
+ context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: context %s is invalid\n", s);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct convert_context_args {
+ struct policydb *oldp;
+ struct policydb *newp;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Convert the values in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
+ * context is valid under the new policy.
+ */
+static int convert_context(u32 key,
+ struct context *c,
+ void *p)
+{
+ struct convert_context_args *args;
+ struct context oldc;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ args = p;
+
+ rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Convert the user. */
+ usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
+ args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
+ if (!usrdatum) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ c->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+ /* Convert the role. */
+ role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
+ args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
+ if (!role) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ c->role = role->value;
+
+ /* Convert the type. */
+ typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
+ args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
+ if (!typdatum) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ c->type = typdatum->value;
+
+ rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
+ rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ context_destroy(&oldc);
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+ context_destroy(&oldc);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: invalidating context %s\n", s);
+ kfree(s);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
+
+/**
+ * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
+ * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
+ * This function will flush the access vector cache after
+ * loading the new policy.
+ */
+int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
+ struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
+ struct convert_context_args args;
+ u32 seqno;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+
+ LOAD_LOCK;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ avtab_cache_init();
+ if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ avtab_cache_destroy();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ policydb_destroy(&policydb);
+ avtab_cache_destroy();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
+ ss_initialized = 1;
+
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ selinux_complete_init();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
+#endif
+
+ if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) {
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ sidtab_init(&newsidtab);
+
+ /* Verify that the existing classes did not change. */
+ if (hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, validate_class, &newpolicydb)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: the definition of an existing "
+ "class changed\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Clone the SID table. */
+ sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
+ if (sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Convert the internal representations of contexts
+ in the new SID table and remove invalid SIDs. */
+ args.oldp = &policydb;
+ args.newp = &newpolicydb;
+ sidtab_map_remove_on_error(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+
+ /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
+ memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
+ sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
+
+ /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
+ POLICY_WRLOCK;
+ memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
+ sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
+ seqno = ++latest_granting;
+ policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
+ POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+
+ /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
+ policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
+ sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
+
+ avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+ selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
+ policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
+ return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @type: socket type
+ * @protocol: protocol number
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_port_sid(u16 domain,
+ u16 type,
+ u8 protocol,
+ u16 port,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+ c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
+ c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
+ * @name: interface name
+ * @if_sid: interface SID
+ * @msg_sid: default SID for received packets
+ */
+int security_netif_sid(char *name,
+ u32 *if_sid,
+ u32 *msg_sid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[1],
+ &c->sid[1]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *if_sid = c->sid[0];
+ *msg_sid = c->sid[1];
+ } else {
+ *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+ *msg_sid = SECINITSID_NETMSG;
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
+{
+ int i, fail = 0;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ if(addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+ fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return !fail;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @addrp: address
+ * @addrlen: address length in bytes
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
+ void *addrp,
+ u32 addrlen,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ switch (domain) {
+ case AF_INET: {
+ u32 addr;
+
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+ while (c) {
+ if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+ c->u.node6.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#define SIDS_NEL 25
+
+/**
+ * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
+ * @fromsid: starting SID
+ * @username: username
+ * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
+ * @nel: number of elements in @sids
+ *
+ * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
+ * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
+ * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
+ * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
+ * number of elements in the array.
+ */
+
+int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
+ char *username,
+ u32 **sids,
+ u32 *nel)
+{
+ struct context *fromcon, usercon;
+ u32 *mysids, *mysids2, sid;
+ u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
+ struct user_datum *user;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ int rc = 0, i, j;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ *sids = NULL;
+ *nel = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
+ if (!fromcon) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
+ if (!user) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ usercon.user = user->value;
+
+ mysids = kmalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!mysids) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ memset(mysids, 0, maxnel*sizeof(*mysids));
+
+ for (i = ebitmap_startbit(&user->roles); i < ebitmap_length(&user->roles); i++) {
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&user->roles, i))
+ continue;
+ role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
+ usercon.role = i+1;
+ for (j = ebitmap_startbit(&role->types); j < ebitmap_length(&role->types); j++) {
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, j))
+ continue;
+ usercon.type = j+1;
+
+ if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
+ continue;
+
+ rc = context_struct_compute_av(fromcon, &usercon,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__TRANSITION,
+ &avd);
+ if (rc || !(avd.allowed & PROCESS__TRANSITION))
+ continue;
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(mysids);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ if (mynel < maxnel) {
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ } else {
+ maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
+ mysids2 = kmalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!mysids2) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ kfree(mysids);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ memset(mysids2, 0, maxnel*sizeof(*mysids2));
+ memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
+ kfree(mysids);
+ mysids = mysids2;
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *sids = mysids;
+ *nel = mynel;
+
+out_unlock:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
+ * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
+ * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+ char *path,
+ u16 sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ int len;
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+ cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+ if (cmp <= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!genfs || cmp) {
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
+ (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!c) {
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *sid = c->sid[0];
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @behavior: labeling behavior
+ * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
+ */
+int security_fs_use(
+ const char *fstype,
+ unsigned int *behavior,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ *behavior = c->v.behavior;
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else {
+ rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+{
+ int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ *names = NULL;
+ *values = NULL;
+
+ *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+ if (!*len) {
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *names = (char**)kmalloc(sizeof(char*) * *len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*names)
+ goto err;
+ memset(*names, 0, sizeof(char*) * *len);
+
+ *values = (int*)kmalloc(sizeof(int) * *len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*values)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
+ size_t name_len;
+ (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+ name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
+ (*names)[i] = (char*)kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!(*names)[i])
+ goto err;
+ strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
+ (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+err:
+ if (*names) {
+ for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
+ if ((*names)[i])
+ kfree((*names)[i]);
+ }
+ if (*values)
+ kfree(*values);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+
+int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
+{
+ int i, rc = 0;
+ int lenp, seqno = 0;
+ struct cond_node *cur;
+
+ POLICY_WRLOCK;
+
+ lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+ if (len != lenp) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { ");
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (values[i]) {
+ policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
+ } else {
+ policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
+ }
+ if (i != 0)
+ printk(", ");
+ printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
+ policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state);
+ }
+ printk(" }\n");
+
+ for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+ rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ seqno = ++latest_granting;
+
+out:
+ POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+ if (!rc) {
+ avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+ selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ int len;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+ if (bool >= len) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e8d907e903c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
+#define _SS_SERVICES_H_
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+
+extern struct policydb policydb;
+
+#endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..871c33bd074
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the SID table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH(sid) \
+(sid & SIDTAB_HASH_MASK)
+
+#define INIT_SIDTAB_LOCK(s) spin_lock_init(&s->lock)
+#define SIDTAB_LOCK(s, x) spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, x)
+#define SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, x) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, x)
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ s->htable = kmalloc(sizeof(*(s->htable)) * SIDTAB_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!s->htable)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++)
+ s->htable[i] = NULL;
+ s->nel = 0;
+ s->next_sid = 1;
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ INIT_SIDTAB_LOCK(s);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
+{
+ int hvalue, rc = 0;
+ struct sidtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+ if (!s) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+ prev = NULL;
+ cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+ while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid) {
+ prev = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ if (cur && sid == cur->sid) {
+ rc = -EEXIST;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (newnode == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ newnode->sid = sid;
+ if (context_cpy(&newnode->context, context)) {
+ kfree(newnode);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (prev) {
+ newnode->next = prev->next;
+ wmb();
+ prev->next = newnode;
+ } else {
+ newnode->next = s->htable[hvalue];
+ wmb();
+ s->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+ }
+
+ s->nel++;
+ if (sid >= s->next_sid)
+ s->next_sid = sid + 1;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ int hvalue;
+ struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!s)
+ return NULL;
+
+ hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+ cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+ while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid)
+ cur = cur->next;
+
+ if (cur == NULL || sid != cur->sid) {
+ /* Remap invalid SIDs to the unlabeled SID. */
+ sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+ cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+ while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid)
+ cur = cur->next;
+ if (!cur || sid != cur->sid)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return &cur->context;
+}
+
+int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
+ int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+ struct context *context,
+ void *args),
+ void *args)
+{
+ int i, rc = 0;
+ struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!s)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+ cur = s->htable[i];
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ rc = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s,
+ int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+ struct context *context,
+ void *args),
+ void *args)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+ struct sidtab_node *last, *cur, *temp;
+
+ if (!s)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+ last = NULL;
+ cur = s->htable[i];
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ ret = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (last) {
+ last->next = cur->next;
+ } else {
+ s->htable[i] = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ temp = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ context_destroy(&temp->context);
+ kfree(temp);
+ s->nel--;
+ } else {
+ last = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s,
+ struct context *context)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+ cur = s->htable[i];
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context))
+ return cur->sid;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
+ struct context *context,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ u32 sid;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ *out_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
+ if (!sid) {
+ SIDTAB_LOCK(s, flags);
+ /* Rescan now that we hold the lock. */
+ sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
+ if (sid)
+ goto unlock_out;
+ /* No SID exists for the context. Allocate a new one. */
+ if (s->next_sid == UINT_MAX || s->shutdown) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto unlock_out;
+ }
+ sid = s->next_sid++;
+ ret = sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+ if (ret)
+ s->next_sid--;
+unlock_out:
+ SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, flags);
+ }
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ *out_sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag)
+{
+ int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+ struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+ slots_used = 0;
+ max_chain_len = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ if (cur) {
+ slots_used++;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ while (cur) {
+ chain_len++;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
+ "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, SIDTAB_SIZE,
+ max_chain_len);
+}
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct sidtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+ if (!s)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+ cur = s->htable[i];
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ temp = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ context_destroy(&temp->context);
+ kfree(temp);
+ }
+ s->htable[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ kfree(s->htable);
+ s->htable = NULL;
+ s->nel = 0;
+ s->next_sid = 1;
+}
+
+void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ SIDTAB_LOCK(src, flags);
+ dst->htable = src->htable;
+ dst->nel = src->nel;
+ dst->next_sid = src->next_sid;
+ dst->shutdown = 0;
+ SIDTAB_UNLOCK(src, flags);
+}
+
+void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ SIDTAB_LOCK(s, flags);
+ s->shutdown = 1;
+ SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, flags);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2fe9dfa3eb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table
+ * of security context structures indexed by SID value.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+
+#include "context.h"
+
+struct sidtab_node {
+ u32 sid; /* security identifier */
+ struct context context; /* security context structure */
+ struct sidtab_node *next;
+};
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS 7
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_MASK (SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
+
+#define SIDTAB_SIZE SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
+
+struct sidtab {
+ struct sidtab_node **htable;
+ unsigned int nel; /* number of elements */
+ unsigned int next_sid; /* next SID to allocate */
+ unsigned char shutdown;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
+int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context);
+struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+
+int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
+ int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+ struct context *context,
+ void *args),
+ void *args);
+
+void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s,
+ int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+ struct context *context,
+ void *args),
+ void *args);
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
+ struct context *context,
+ u32 *sid);
+
+void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag);
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);
+void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src);
+void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s);
+
+#endif /* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
+
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..24a10d36d3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the symbol table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "symtab.h"
+
+static unsigned int symhash(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
+{
+ char *p, *keyp;
+ unsigned int size;
+ unsigned int val;
+
+ val = 0;
+ keyp = key;
+ size = strlen(keyp);
+ for (p = keyp; (p - keyp) < size; p++)
+ val = (val << 4 | (val >> (8*sizeof(unsigned int)-4))) ^ (*p);
+ return val & (h->size - 1);
+}
+
+static int symcmp(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2)
+{
+ char *keyp1, *keyp2;
+
+ keyp1 = key1;
+ keyp2 = key2;
+ return strcmp(keyp1, keyp2);
+}
+
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size)
+{
+ s->table = hashtab_create(symhash, symcmp, size);
+ if (!s->table)
+ return -1;
+ s->nprim = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ca422b42fbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/*
+ * A symbol table (symtab) maintains associations between symbol
+ * strings and datum values. The type of the datum values
+ * is arbitrary. The symbol table type is implemented
+ * using the hash table type (hashtab).
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+struct symtab {
+ struct hashtab *table; /* hash table (keyed on a string) */
+ u32 nprim; /* number of primary names in table */
+};
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size);
+
+#endif /* _SS_SYMTAB_H_ */
+
+
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-04-23 13:32:34 +0000