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2 daysAdd linux-next specific files for 20200925linaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/llvm-release-arm-next-defconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/llvm-release-arm-next-allyesconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/llvm-release-arm-next-allnoconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/llvm-release-arm-next-allmodconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/llvm-release-aarch64-next-defconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/llvm-release-aarch64-next-allyesconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/llvm-release-aarch64-next-allnoconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/llvm-release-aarch64-next-allmodconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-release-arm-next-defconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-release-arm-next-allyesconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-release-arm-next-allnoconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-release-arm-next-allmodconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-release-aarch64-next-defconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-release-aarch64-next-allyesconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-release-aarch64-next-allnoconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-release-aarch64-next-allmodconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-master-arm-next-defconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-master-arm-next-allyesconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-master-arm-next-allnoconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-master-arm-next-allmodconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-master-aarch64-next-defconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-master-aarch64-next-allyesconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-master-aarch64-next-allnoconfiglinaro-local/ci/tcwg_kernel/gnu-master-aarch64-next-allmodconfigStephen Rothwell
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysMerge branch 'akpm/master' into masterStephen Rothwell
2 dayssecretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)Mike Rapoport
The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200924132904.1391-7-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentationMike Rapoport
Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings. Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with PMD-size pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200924132904.1391-6-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysarch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevantMike Rapoport
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200924132904.1391-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areasMike Rapoport
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call where flags supplied as a parameter to this system call will define the desired protection mode for the memory associated with that file descriptor. Currently there are two protection modes: * exclusive - the memory area is unmapped from the kernel direct map and it is present only in the page tables of the owning mm. * uncached - the memory area is present only in the page tables of the owning mm and it is mapped there as uncached. The "exclusive" mode is enabled implicitly and it is the default mode for memfd_secret(). The "uncached" mode requires architecture support and an architecture should opt-in for this mode using HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED configuration option. For instance, the following example will create an uncached mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(SECRETMEM_UNCACHED); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200924132904.1391-4-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmmap: make mlock_future_check() globalMike Rapoport
It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200924132904.1391-3-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDERMike Rapoport
Patch series "mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas", v6. This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. I've dropped the boot time reservation patch for now as it is not strictly required for the basic usage and can be easily added later either with or without CMA. The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings. Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host. For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library [1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification. I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing. Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future. As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor that is used as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas. This patch (of 6): The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well. Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200924132904.1391-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200924132904.1391-2-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm: remove duplicate include statement in mmu.cTian Tao
asm/sections.h is included more than once, Remove the one that isn't necessary. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1600088607-17327-1-git-send-email-tiantao6@hisilicon.com Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6@hisilicon.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm-madvise-introduce-process_madvise-syscall-an-external-memory-hinting-api- ↵Andrew Morton
fix-fix-fix-fix-fix-fix-fix-fix pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm: do not use helper functions for process_madviseMinchan Kim
This patch removes helper functions process_madvise_vec, do_process_madvise and madv_import_iovec and use them inline. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm/madvise: remove duplicate includeYueHaibing
Remove duplicate header which is included twice. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm-madvise-introduce-process_madvise-syscall-an-external-memory-hinting-api- ↵Minchan Kim
fix-fix-fix-fix-fix fix mips build warning: #warning syscall process_madvise not implemented [-Wcpp] warning: #warning syscall process_madvise not implemented [-Wcpp] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysfix for "mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory ↵Stephen Rothwell
hinting API" Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm-madvise-introduce-process_madvise-syscall-an-external-memory-hinting-api- ↵Stephen Rothwell
fix-fix-fix Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm-madvise-introduce-process_madvise-syscall-an-external-memory-hinting-api- ↵Andrew Morton
fix-fix fix i386 build mm/madvise.c: In function process_madvise_vec: mm/madvise.c:1168:15: error: storage size of iovec isnt known struct iovec iovec; Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm-madvise-introduce-process_madvise-syscall-an-external-memory-hinting-api-fixMinchan Kim
make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting APIMinchan Kim
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService. The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate reclaim on its own without any app involvement. To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very cache friendly environment). Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2) with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support feature. ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully. The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API. I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus, I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch. If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a buggy syscall but hard to fix it later. So finally, the API is as follows, ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec, unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags); DESCRIPTION The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve system or application performance. The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information) The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in <sys/uio.h> as: struct iovec { void *iov_base; /* starting address */ size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */ }; The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base) and with size length of bytes(iov_len). The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec. The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is external. MADV_COLD MADV_PAGEOUT Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2). The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target process is in same thread group with calling process so user could use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support vector address ranges. RETURN VALUE On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised. This return value may be less than the total number of requested bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value to determine whether a partial advice occurred. FAQ: Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge? Quote from Sandeep "For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer) are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the preloading during boot. After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the application. In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides which process is "important" to the user for interactivity. So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know* which address range of the application is not used / useful. Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory, please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1]. They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do. So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant memory in these applications will be useful. - ssp Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target process? process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space target process can run between the time the process_madvise process inspects the target process address space and the time that process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write. The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level, there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more fine-grained optimization model. To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument so we could support it in future if someone really needs it. Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work? Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at most one ptracer. [1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory" [2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224 [3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range) validation - Michal Hocko - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/ [minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com [minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com> Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com> Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 dayspid: move pidfd_get_pid() to pid.cMinchan Kim
process_madvise syscall needs pidfd_get_pid function to translate pidfd to pid so this patch move the function to kernel/pid.c. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-5-minchan@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-3-minchan@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-3-minchan@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Suggested-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com> Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm/madvise: pass mm to do_madviseMinchan Kim
Patch series "introduce memory hinting API for external process", v9. Now, we have MADV_PAGEOUT and MADV_COLD as madvise hinting API. With that, application could give hints to kernel what memory range are preferred to be reclaimed. However, in some platform(e.g., Android), the information required to make the hinting decision is not known to the app. Instead, it is known to a centralized userspace daemon(e.g., ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate reclaim on its own without any app involvement. To solve the concern, this patch introduces new syscall - process_madvise(2). Bascially, it's same with madvise(2) syscall but it has some differences. 1. It needs pidfd of target process to provide the hint 2. It supports only MADV_{COLD|PAGEOUT|MERGEABLE|UNMEREABLE} at this moment. Other hints in madvise will be opened when there are explicit requests from community to prevent unexpected bugs we couldn't support. 3. Only privileged processes can do something for other process's address space. For more detail of the new API, please see "mm: introduce external memory hinting API" description in this patchset. This patch (of 3): In upcoming patches, do_madvise will be called from external process context so we shouldn't asssume "current" is always hinted process's task_struct. Furthermore, we must not access mm_struct via task->mm, but obtain it via access_mm() once (in the following patch) and only use that pointer [1], so pass it to do_madvise() as well. Note the vma->vm_mm pointers are safe, so we can use them further down the call stack. And let's pass current->mm as arguments of do_madvise so it shouldn't change existing behavior but prepare next patch to make review easy. [vbabka@suse.cz: changelog tweak] [minchan@kernel.org: use current->mm for io_uring] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200423145215.72666-1-minchan@kernel.org [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix it for upstream changes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: whoops] [rdunlap@infradead.org: add missing includes] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-1-minchan@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-1-minchan@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-2-minchan@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-2-minchan@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-2-minchan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com> Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm/mmap: add inline munmap_vma_range() for code readabilityLiam R. Howlett
There are two locations that have a block of code for munmapping a vma range. Change those two locations to use a function and add meaningful comments about what happens to the arguments, which was unclear in the previous code. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200818154707.2515169-2-Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com Signed-off-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm/mmap: add inline vma_next() for readability of mmap codeLiam R. Howlett
There are three places that the next vma is required which uses the same block of code. Replace the block with a function and add comments on what happens in the case where NULL is encountered. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200818154707.2515169-1-Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com Signed-off-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm/migrate: avoid possible unnecessary process right check in ↵Miaohe Lin
kernel_move_pages() There is no need to check if this process has the right to modify the specified process when they are same. And we could also skip the security hook call if a process is modifying its own pages. Add helper function to handle these. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200819083331.19012-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Hongxiang Lou <louhongxiang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm/memory_hotplug: remove a wrapper for alloc_migration_target()Joonsoo Kim
To calculate the correct node to migrate the page for hotplug, we need to check node id of the page. Wrapper for alloc_migration_target() exists for this purpose. However, Vlastimil informs that all migration source pages come from a single node. In this case, we don't need to check the node id for each page and we don't need to re-set the target nodemask for each page by using the wrapper. Set up the migration_target_control once and use it for all pages. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1594622517-20681-10-git-send-email-iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm/memory-failure: remove a wrapper for alloc_migration_target()Joonsoo Kim
There is a well-defined standard migration target callback. Use it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1594622517-20681-9-git-send-email-iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm: kmem: enable kernel memcg accounting from interrupt contextsRoman Gushchin
If a memcg to charge can be determined (using remote charging API), there are no reasons to exclude allocations made from an interrupt context from the accounting. Such allocations will pass even if the resulting memcg size will exceed the hard limit, but it will affect the application of the memory pressure and an inability to put the workload under the limit will eventually trigger the OOM. To use active_memcg() helper, memcg_kmem_bypass() is moved back to memcontrol.c. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827225843.1270629-5-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm: kmem: prepare remote memcg charging infra for interrupt contextsRoman Gushchin
Remote memcg charging API uses current->active_memcg to store the currently active memory cgroup, which overwrites the memory cgroup of the current process. It works well for normal contexts, but doesn't work for interrupt contexts: indeed, if an interrupt occurs during the execution of a section with an active memcg set, all allocations inside the interrupt will be charged to the active memcg set (given that we'll enable accounting for allocations from an interrupt context). But because the interrupt might have no relation to the active memcg set outside, it's obviously wrong from the accounting prospective. To resolve this problem, let's add a global percpu int_active_memcg variable, which will be used to store an active memory cgroup which will be used from interrupt contexts. set_active_memcg() will transparently use current->active_memcg or int_active_memcg depending on the context. To make the read part simple and transparent for the caller, let's introduce two new functions: - struct mem_cgroup *active_memcg(void), - struct mem_cgroup *get_active_memcg(void). They are returning the active memcg if it's set, hiding all implementation details: where to get it depending on the current context. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827225843.1270629-4-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm: kmem: remove redundant checks from get_obj_cgroup_from_current()Roman Gushchin
There are checks for current->mm and current->active_memcg in get_obj_cgroup_from_current(), but these checks are redundant: memcg_kmem_bypass() called just above performs same checks. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827225843.1270629-3-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm: kmem: move memcg_kmem_bypass() calls to get_mem/obj_cgroup_from_current()Roman Gushchin
Patch series "mm: kmem: kernel memory accounting in an interrupt context". This patchset implements memcg-based memory accounting of allocations made from an interrupt context. Historically, such allocations were passed unaccounted mostly because charging the memory cgroup of the current process wasn't an option. Also performance reasons were likely a reason too. The remote charging API allows to temporarily overwrite the currently active memory cgroup, so that all memory allocations are accounted towards some specified memory cgroup instead of the memory cgroup of the current process. This patchset extends the remote charging API so that it can be used from an interrupt context. Then it removes the fence that prevented the accounting of allocations made from an interrupt context. It also contains a couple of optimizations/code refactorings. This patchset doesn't directly enable accounting for any specific allocations, but prepares the code base for it. The bpf memory accounting will likely be the first user of it: a typical example is a bpf program parsing an incoming network packet, which allocates an entry in hashmap map to store some information. This patch (of 4): Currently memcg_kmem_bypass() is called before obtaining the current memory/obj cgroup using get_mem/obj_cgroup_from_current(). Moving memcg_kmem_bypass() into get_mem/obj_cgroup_from_current() reduces the number of call sites and allows further code simplifications. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827225843.1270629-1-guro@fb.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827225843.1270629-2-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysmm, memcg: rework remote charging API to support nestingRoman Gushchin
Currently the remote memcg charging API consists of two functions: memalloc_use_memcg() and memalloc_unuse_memcg(), which set and clear the memcg value, which overwrites the memcg of the current task. memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg); <...> memalloc_unuse_memcg(); It works perfectly for allocations performed from a normal context, however an attempt to call it from an interrupt context or just nest two remote charging blocks will lead to an incorrect accounting. On exit from the inner block the active memcg will be cleared instead of being restored. memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg); memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg_2); <...> memalloc_unuse_memcg(); Error: allocation here are charged to the memcg of the current process instead of target_memcg. memalloc_unuse_memcg(); This patch extends the remote charging API by switching to a single function: struct mem_cgroup *set_active_memcg(struct mem_cgroup *memcg), which sets the new value and returns the old one. So a remote charging block will look like: old_memcg = set_active_memcg(target_memcg); <...> set_active_memcg(old_memcg); This patch is heavily based on the patch by Johannes Weiner, which can be found here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/5/28/806 . Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200821212056.3769116-1-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Dan Schatzberg <dschatzberg@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysia64: fix build error with !COREDUMPKrzysztof Kozlowski
Fix linkage error when CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF is selected but CONFIG_COREDUMP is not: ia64-linux-ld: arch/ia64/kernel/elfcore.o: in function `elf_core_write_extra_phdrs': elfcore.c:(.text+0x172): undefined reference to `dump_emit' ia64-linux-ld: arch/ia64/kernel/elfcore.o: in function `elf_core_write_extra_data': elfcore.c:(.text+0x2b2): undefined reference to `dump_emit' Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200819064146.12529-1-krzk@kernel.org Fixes: 1fcccbac89f5 ("elf coredump: replace ELF_CORE_EXTRA_* macros by functions") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
2 daysMerge branch 'akpm-current/current' into masterStephen Rothwell
2 daysRevert "x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation"Stephen Rothwell
This reverts commit e33ea6e5ba6ad94115c7f07754607cdaff9428d2. Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'memblock/for-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'notifications/notifications-pipe-core' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'mhi/mhi-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'trivial/for-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'pidfd/for-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'kgdb/kgdb/for-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'hyperv/hyperv-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'xarray/xarray' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'nvmem/for-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'kspp/for-next/kspp' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'seccomp/for-next/seccomp' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'ntb/ntb-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'at24/at24/for-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'nvdimm/libnvdimm-for-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
# Conflicts: # arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h # lib/iov_iter.c
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'rtc/rtc-next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'coresight/next' into masterStephen Rothwell
3 daysMerge remote-tracking branch 'livepatching/for-next' into masterStephen Rothwell