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path: root/fs/crypto/keyring.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto/keyring.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keyring.c122
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
index ab41b25d4fa1..e24eb48bfbe1 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
@@ -44,8 +45,9 @@ static void free_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);
for (i = 0; i <= __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX; i++) {
- crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_direct_tfms[i]);
- crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_tfms[i]);
+ crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_direct_keys[i]);
+ crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[i]);
+ crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[i]);
}
key_put(mk->mk_users);
@@ -424,9 +426,9 @@ static int add_existing_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
return 0;
}
-static int add_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
- struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
- const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
+static int do_add_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
+ const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
{
static DEFINE_MUTEX(fscrypt_add_key_mutex);
struct key *key;
@@ -465,6 +467,35 @@ out_unlock:
return err;
}
+static int add_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
+ struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (key_spec->type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) {
+ err = fscrypt_init_hkdf(&secret->hkdf, secret->raw,
+ secret->size);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /*
+ * Now that the HKDF context is initialized, the raw key is no
+ * longer needed.
+ */
+ memzero_explicit(secret->raw, secret->size);
+
+ /* Calculate the key identifier */
+ err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&secret->hkdf,
+ HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, NULL, 0,
+ key_spec->u.identifier,
+ FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ return do_add_master_key(sb, secret, key_spec);
+}
+
static int fscrypt_provisioning_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload = prep->data;
@@ -609,6 +640,15 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Only root can add keys that are identified by an arbitrary descriptor
+ * rather than by a cryptographic hash --- since otherwise a malicious
+ * user could add the wrong key.
+ */
+ if (arg.key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EACCES;
+
memset(&secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
if (arg.key_id) {
if (arg.raw_size != 0)
@@ -626,48 +666,17 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
goto out_wipe_secret;
}
- switch (arg.key_spec.type) {
- case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR:
- /*
- * Only root can add keys that are identified by an arbitrary
- * descriptor rather than by a cryptographic hash --- since
- * otherwise a malicious user could add the wrong key.
- */
- err = -EACCES;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- goto out_wipe_secret;
- break;
- case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER:
- err = fscrypt_init_hkdf(&secret.hkdf, secret.raw, secret.size);
- if (err)
- goto out_wipe_secret;
-
- /*
- * Now that the HKDF context is initialized, the raw key is no
- * longer needed.
- */
- memzero_explicit(secret.raw, secret.size);
-
- /* Calculate the key identifier and return it to userspace. */
- err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&secret.hkdf,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
- NULL, 0, arg.key_spec.u.identifier,
- FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
- if (err)
- goto out_wipe_secret;
- err = -EFAULT;
- if (copy_to_user(uarg->key_spec.u.identifier,
- arg.key_spec.u.identifier,
- FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE))
- goto out_wipe_secret;
- break;
- default:
- WARN_ON(1);
- err = -EINVAL;
+ err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, &arg.key_spec);
+ if (err)
goto out_wipe_secret;
- }
- err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, &arg.key_spec);
+ /* Return the key identifier to userspace, if applicable */
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ if (arg.key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER &&
+ copy_to_user(uarg->key_spec.u.identifier, arg.key_spec.u.identifier,
+ FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE))
+ goto out_wipe_secret;
+ err = 0;
out_wipe_secret:
wipe_master_key_secret(&secret);
return err;
@@ -675,6 +684,29 @@ out_wipe_secret:
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_add_key);
/*
+ * Add the key for '-o test_dummy_encryption' to the filesystem keyring.
+ *
+ * Use a per-boot random key to prevent people from misusing this option.
+ */
+int fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec)
+{
+ static u8 test_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ struct fscrypt_master_key_secret secret;
+ int err;
+
+ get_random_once(test_key, FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ memset(&secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
+ secret.size = FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE;
+ memcpy(secret.raw, test_key, FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, key_spec);
+ wipe_master_key_secret(&secret);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
* Verify that the current user has added a master key with the given identifier
* (returns -ENOKEY if not). This is needed to prevent a user from encrypting
* their files using some other user's key which they don't actually know.