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authorWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>2018-02-05 15:34:21 +0000
committerAlex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>2018-03-09 16:38:10 +0800
commite2846a29d791986520f43612009f0e77380325e4 (patch)
tree949493193317c3770ae0ad225768cc0d68d82cd4
parentf6111f90227021a261fd22ced479267d96e571e0 (diff)
arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit
commit c2f0ad4fc089 upstream. A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess routines. This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit. Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h7
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 75363d723262..fc11c50af558 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs);
static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
{
current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
+
+ /*
+ * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding
+ * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation.
+ */
+ dsb(nsh);
+ isb();
}
#define segment_eq(a, b) ((a) == (b))