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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-06-01 10:34:35 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-06-01 10:34:35 -0700
commit1193755ac6328ad240ba987e6ec41d5e8baf0680 (patch)
tree40bf847d7e3ebaa57b107151d14e6cd1d280cc6d /security
parent4edebed86690eb8db9af3ab85baf4a34e73266cc (diff)
parent0ef97dcfce4179a2eba046b855ee2f91d6f1b414 (diff)
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs changes from Al Viro. "A lot of misc stuff. The obvious groups: * Miklos' atomic_open series; kills the damn abuse of ->d_revalidate() by NFS, which was the major stumbling block for all work in that area. * ripping security_file_mmap() and dealing with deadlocks in the area; sanitizing the neighborhood of vm_mmap()/vm_munmap() in general. * ->encode_fh() switched to saner API; insane fake dentry in mm/cleancache.c gone. * assorted annotations in fs (endianness, __user) * parts of Artem's ->s_dirty work (jff2 and reiserfs parts) * ->update_time() work from Josef. * other bits and pieces all over the place. Normally it would've been in two or three pull requests, but signal.git stuff had eaten a lot of time during this cycle ;-/" Fix up trivial conflicts in Documentation/filesystems/vfs.txt (the 'truncate_range' inode method was removed by the VM changes, the VFS update adds an 'update_time()' method), and in fs/btrfs/ulist.[ch] (due to sparse fix added twice, with other changes nearby). * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (95 commits) nfs: don't open in ->d_revalidate vfs: retry last component if opening stale dentry vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): don't throw away file on error vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): inline __dentry_open() vfs: do_dentry_open(): don't put filp vfs: split __dentry_open() vfs: do_last() common post lookup vfs: do_last(): add audit_inode before open vfs: do_last(): only return EISDIR for O_CREAT vfs: do_last(): check LOOKUP_DIRECTORY vfs: do_last(): make ENOENT exit RCU safe vfs: make follow_link check RCU safe vfs: do_last(): use inode variable vfs: do_last(): inline walk_component() vfs: do_last(): make exit RCU safe vfs: split do_lookup() Btrfs: move over to use ->update_time fs: introduce inode operation ->update_time reiserfs: get rid of resierfs_sync_super reiserfs: mark the superblock as dirty a bit later ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c15
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c3
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c17
-rw-r--r--security/security.c51
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c36
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c15
7 files changed, 80 insertions, 72 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 032daab449b..8ea39aabe94 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -490,17 +490,9 @@ static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
}
-static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
- int rc = 0;
-
- /* do DAC check */
- rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
- if (rc || addr_only)
- return rc;
-
return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
}
@@ -646,7 +638,8 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
.file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
.file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
.file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
- .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap,
+ .mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file,
+ .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr,
.file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
.file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index fca889676c5..61095df8b89 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -949,7 +949,8 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mmap);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_addr);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_file);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mprotect);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_lock);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_fcntl);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e771cb1b2d7..6dbae4650ab 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -958,22 +958,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
}
/*
- * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
- * @file: unused
- * @reqprot: unused
- * @prot: unused
- * @flags: unused
+ * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
* @addr: address attempting to be mapped
- * @addr_only: unused
*
* If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
* CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
* capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
* -EPERM if not.
*/
-int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -986,3 +979,9 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
}
return ret;
}
+
+int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5497a57fba0..3efc9b12aef 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -657,18 +660,56 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
}
-int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- int ret;
+ /*
+ * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
+ * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about...
+ */
+ if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
+ return prot;
+ if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+ return prot;
+ /*
+ * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
+ */
+ if (!file)
+ return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+ /*
+ * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
+ * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
+ */
+ if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+ unsigned long caps = 0;
+ struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
+ if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info)
+ caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities;
+ if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP))
+ return prot;
+#endif
+ return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+ }
+ /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
+ return prot;
+}
- ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot,
+ mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
}
+int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr);
+}
+
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fa2341b6833..372ec6502aa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3083,9 +3083,7 @@ error:
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
int rc = 0;
u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -3104,10 +3102,12 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
}
/* do DAC check on address space usage */
- rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
- if (rc || addr_only)
- return rc;
+ return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+}
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
if (selinux_checkreqprot)
prot = reqprot;
@@ -5570,7 +5570,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
.file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
.file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
- .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
+ .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
+ .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
.file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
.file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
.file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 4e93f9ef970..3ad29025128 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1259,12 +1259,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
if (!inode)
goto out;
- ret = -EINVAL;
- len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
- if (len < 0)
- goto out;
-
ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
if (len >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
@@ -1557,19 +1553,10 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- ssize_t rc, len;
- char *page;
unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
-
- page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
- rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
- free_page((unsigned long)page);
-
- return rc;
+ char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
}
static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
@@ -1580,19 +1567,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- ssize_t rc, len;
- char *page;
unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
-
- page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
- rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
- free_page((unsigned long)page);
-
- return rc;
+ char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
}
static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d583c054580..ee0bb5735f3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
}
/**
- * smack_file_mmap :
+ * smack_mmap_file :
* Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
* if mapping anonymous memory.
* @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
@@ -1180,10 +1180,9 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
* @flags contains the operational flags.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
+static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
- unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
- unsigned long addr_only)
+ unsigned long flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_rule *srp;
@@ -1198,11 +1197,6 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
int tmay;
int rc;
- /* do DAC check on address space usage */
- rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
- if (rc || addr_only)
- return rc;
-
if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -3482,7 +3476,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl,
.file_lock = smack_file_lock,
.file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl,
- .file_mmap = smack_file_mmap,
+ .mmap_file = smack_mmap_file,
+ .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr,
.file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner,
.file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
.file_receive = smack_file_receive,