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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2012-04-17 16:26:54 -0400
committerJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2012-04-18 12:37:56 +1000
commitd52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 (patch)
treef982d0bdab54d5ab31cdd3e69cb88a1376797d1f /security
parent09c79b60960bdd4b00916219402eabfa5e479c5a (diff)
downloadlinaro-lsk-d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445.tar.gz
fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared. Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it easier to attack. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c5
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 0cf4b53480a..0ecf4ba321c 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -505,6 +505,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
skip:
+ /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
+ if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
*/