diff options
| author | Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> | 2010-12-02 14:31:21 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-12-02 14:51:16 -0800 |
| commit | 33dd94ae1ccbfb7bf0fb6c692bc3d1c4269e6177 (patch) | |
| tree | c00535d8fe9b29be84b02d057e41cd63d7fe3b6b /kernel/exit.c | |
| parent | a0b0f58cdd32ab363a600a294ddaa90f0c32de8c (diff) | |
do_exit(): make sure that we run with get_fs() == USER_DS
If a user manages to trigger an oops with fs set to KERNEL_DS, fs is not
otherwise reset before do_exit(). do_exit may later (via mm_release in
fork.c) do a put_user to a user-controlled address, potentially allowing
a user to leverage an oops into a controlled write into kernel memory.
This is only triggerable in the presence of another bug, but this
potentially turns a lot of DoS bugs into privilege escalations, so it's
worth fixing. I have proof-of-concept code which uses this bug along
with CVE-2010-3849 to write a zero to an arbitrary kernel address, so
I've tested that this is not theoretical.
A more logical place to put this fix might be when we know an oops has
occurred, before we call do_exit(), but that would involve changing
every architecture, in multiple places.
Let's just stick it in do_exit instead.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: update code comment]
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/exit.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/exit.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 21aa7b3001f..676149a4ac5 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -914,6 +914,15 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code) if (unlikely(!tsk->pid)) panic("Attempted to kill the idle task!"); + /* + * If do_exit is called because this processes oopsed, it's possible + * that get_fs() was left as KERNEL_DS, so reset it to USER_DS before + * continuing. Amongst other possible reasons, this is to prevent + * mm_release()->clear_child_tid() from writing to a user-controlled + * kernel address. + */ + set_fs(USER_DS); + tracehook_report_exit(&code); validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk); |