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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700
commit1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 (patch)
tree0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d /Documentation/keys.txt
Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
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+ ============================
+ KERNEL KEY RETENTION SERVICE
+ ============================
+
+This service allows cryptographic keys, authentication tokens, cross-domain
+user mappings, and similar to be cached in the kernel for the use of
+filesystems other kernel services.
+
+Keyrings are permitted; these are a special type of key that can hold links to
+other keys. Processes each have three standard keyring subscriptions that a
+kernel service can search for relevant keys.
+
+The key service can be configured on by enabling:
+
+ "Security options"/"Enable access key retention support" (CONFIG_KEYS)
+
+This document has the following sections:
+
+ - Key overview
+ - Key service overview
+ - Key access permissions
+ - New procfs files
+ - Userspace system call interface
+ - Kernel services
+ - Defining a key type
+ - Request-key callback service
+ - Key access filesystem
+
+
+============
+KEY OVERVIEW
+============
+
+In this context, keys represent units of cryptographic data, authentication
+tokens, keyrings, etc.. These are represented in the kernel by struct key.
+
+Each key has a number of attributes:
+
+ - A serial number.
+ - A type.
+ - A description (for matching a key in a search).
+ - Access control information.
+ - An expiry time.
+ - A payload.
+ - State.
+
+
+ (*) Each key is issued a serial number of type key_serial_t that is unique
+ for the lifetime of that key. All serial numbers are positive non-zero
+ 32-bit integers.
+
+ Userspace programs can use a key's serial numbers as a way to gain access
+ to it, subject to permission checking.
+
+ (*) Each key is of a defined "type". Types must be registered inside the
+ kernel by a kernel service (such as a filesystem) before keys of that
+ type can be added or used. Userspace programs cannot define new types
+ directly.
+
+ Key types are represented in the kernel by struct key_type. This defines
+ a number of operations that can be performed on a key of that type.
+
+ Should a type be removed from the system, all the keys of that type will
+ be invalidated.
+
+ (*) Each key has a description. This should be a printable string. The key
+ type provides an operation to perform a match between the description on
+ a key and a criterion string.
+
+ (*) Each key has an owner user ID, a group ID and a permissions mask. These
+ are used to control what a process may do to a key from userspace, and
+ whether a kernel service will be able to find the key.
+
+ (*) Each key can be set to expire at a specific time by the key type's
+ instantiation function. Keys can also be immortal.
+
+ (*) Each key can have a payload. This is a quantity of data that represent
+ the actual "key". In the case of a keyring, this is a list of keys to
+ which the keyring links; in the case of a user-defined key, it's an
+ arbitrary blob of data.
+
+ Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact, just be a
+ value stored in the struct key itself.
+
+ When a key is instantiated, the key type's instantiation function is
+ called with a blob of data, and that then creates the key's payload in
+ some way.
+
+ Similarly, when userspace wants to read back the contents of the key, if
+ permitted, another key type operation will be called to convert the key's
+ attached payload back into a blob of data.
+
+ (*) Each key can be in one of a number of basic states:
+
+ (*) Uninstantiated. The key exists, but does not have any data
+ attached. Keys being requested from userspace will be in this state.
+
+ (*) Instantiated. This is the normal state. The key is fully formed, and
+ has data attached.
+
+ (*) Negative. This is a relatively short-lived state. The key acts as a
+ note saying that a previous call out to userspace failed, and acts as
+ a throttle on key lookups. A negative key can be updated to a normal
+ state.
+
+ (*) Expired. Keys can have lifetimes set. If their lifetime is exceeded,
+ they traverse to this state. An expired key can be updated back to a
+ normal state.
+
+ (*) Revoked. A key is put in this state by userspace action. It can't be
+ found or operated upon (apart from by unlinking it).
+
+ (*) Dead. The key's type was unregistered, and so the key is now useless.
+
+
+====================
+KEY SERVICE OVERVIEW
+====================
+
+The key service provides a number of features besides keys:
+
+ (*) The key service defines two special key types:
+
+ (+) "keyring"
+
+ Keyrings are special keys that contain a list of other keys. Keyring
+ lists can be modified using various system calls. Keyrings should not
+ be given a payload when created.
+
+ (+) "user"
+
+ A key of this type has a description and a payload that are arbitrary
+ blobs of data. These can be created, updated and read by userspace,
+ and aren't intended for use by kernel services.
+
+ (*) Each process subscribes to three keyrings: a thread-specific keyring, a
+ process-specific keyring, and a session-specific keyring.
+
+ The thread-specific keyring is discarded from the child when any sort of
+ clone, fork, vfork or execve occurs. A new keyring is created only when
+ required.
+
+ The process-specific keyring is replaced with an empty one in the child
+ on clone, fork, vfork unless CLONE_THREAD is supplied, in which case it
+ is shared. execve also discards the process's process keyring and creates
+ a new one.
+
+ The session-specific keyring is persistent across clone, fork, vfork and
+ execve, even when the latter executes a set-UID or set-GID binary. A
+ process can, however, replace its current session keyring with a new one
+ by using PR_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. It is permitted to request an anonymous
+ new one, or to attempt to create or join one of a specific name.
+
+ The ownership of the thread keyring changes when the real UID and GID of
+ the thread changes.
+
+ (*) Each user ID resident in the system holds two special keyrings: a user
+ specific keyring and a default user session keyring. The default session
+ keyring is initialised with a link to the user-specific keyring.
+
+ When a process changes its real UID, if it used to have no session key, it
+ will be subscribed to the default session key for the new UID.
+
+ If a process attempts to access its session key when it doesn't have one,
+ it will be subscribed to the default for its current UID.
+
+ (*) Each user has two quotas against which the keys they own are tracked. One
+ limits the total number of keys and keyrings, the other limits the total
+ amount of description and payload space that can be consumed.
+
+ The user can view information on this and other statistics through procfs
+ files.
+
+ Process-specific and thread-specific keyrings are not counted towards a
+ user's quota.
+
+ If a system call that modifies a key or keyring in some way would put the
+ user over quota, the operation is refused and error EDQUOT is returned.
+
+ (*) There's a system call interface by which userspace programs can create
+ and manipulate keys and keyrings.
+
+ (*) There's a kernel interface by which services can register types and
+ search for keys.
+
+ (*) There's a way for the a search done from the kernel to call back to
+ userspace to request a key that can't be found in a process's keyrings.
+
+ (*) An optional filesystem is available through which the key database can be
+ viewed and manipulated.
+
+
+======================
+KEY ACCESS PERMISSIONS
+======================
+
+Keys have an owner user ID, a group access ID, and a permissions mask. The
+mask has up to eight bits each for user, group and other access. Only five of
+each set of eight bits are defined. These permissions granted are:
+
+ (*) View
+
+ This permits a key or keyring's attributes to be viewed - including key
+ type and description.
+
+ (*) Read
+
+ This permits a key's payload to be viewed or a keyring's list of linked
+ keys.
+
+ (*) Write
+
+ This permits a key's payload to be instantiated or updated, or it allows
+ a link to be added to or removed from a keyring.
+
+ (*) Search
+
+ This permits keyrings to be searched and keys to be found. Searches can
+ only recurse into nested keyrings that have search permission set.
+
+ (*) Link
+
+ This permits a key or keyring to be linked to. To create a link from a
+ keyring to a key, a process must have Write permission on the keyring and
+ Link permission on the key.
+
+For changing the ownership, group ID or permissions mask, being the owner of
+the key or having the sysadmin capability is sufficient.
+
+
+================
+NEW PROCFS FILES
+================
+
+Two files have been added to procfs by which an administrator can find out
+about the status of the key service:
+
+ (*) /proc/keys
+
+ This lists all the keys on the system, giving information about their
+ type, description and permissions. The payload of the key is not
+ available this way:
+
+ SERIAL FLAGS USAGE EXPY PERM UID GID TYPE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY
+ 00000001 I----- 39 perm 1f0000 0 0 keyring _uid_ses.0: 1/4
+ 00000002 I----- 2 perm 1f0000 0 0 keyring _uid.0: empty
+ 00000007 I----- 1 perm 1f0000 0 0 keyring _pid.1: empty
+ 0000018d I----- 1 perm 1f0000 0 0 keyring _pid.412: empty
+ 000004d2 I--Q-- 1 perm 1f0000 32 -1 keyring _uid.32: 1/4
+ 000004d3 I--Q-- 3 perm 1f0000 32 -1 keyring _uid_ses.32: empty
+ 00000892 I--QU- 1 perm 1f0000 0 0 user metal:copper: 0
+ 00000893 I--Q-N 1 35s 1f0000 0 0 user metal:silver: 0
+ 00000894 I--Q-- 1 10h 1f0000 0 0 user metal:gold: 0
+
+ The flags are:
+
+ I Instantiated
+ R Revoked
+ D Dead
+ Q Contributes to user's quota
+ U Under contruction by callback to userspace
+ N Negative key
+
+ This file must be enabled at kernel configuration time as it allows anyone
+ to list the keys database.
+
+ (*) /proc/key-users
+
+ This file lists the tracking data for each user that has at least one key
+ on the system. Such data includes quota information and statistics:
+
+ [root@andromeda root]# cat /proc/key-users
+ 0: 46 45/45 1/100 13/10000
+ 29: 2 2/2 2/100 40/10000
+ 32: 2 2/2 2/100 40/10000
+ 38: 2 2/2 2/100 40/10000
+
+ The format of each line is
+ <UID>: User ID to which this applies
+ <usage> Structure refcount
+ <inst>/<keys> Total number of keys and number instantiated
+ <keys>/<max> Key count quota
+ <bytes>/<max> Key size quota
+
+
+===============================
+USERSPACE SYSTEM CALL INTERFACE
+===============================
+
+Userspace can manipulate keys directly through three new syscalls: add_key,
+request_key and keyctl. The latter provides a number of functions for
+manipulating keys.
+
+When referring to a key directly, userspace programs should use the key's
+serial number (a positive 32-bit integer). However, there are some special
+values available for referring to special keys and keyrings that relate to the
+process making the call:
+
+ CONSTANT VALUE KEY REFERENCED
+ ============================== ====== ===========================
+ KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING -1 thread-specific keyring
+ KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING -2 process-specific keyring
+ KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING -3 session-specific keyring
+ KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING -4 UID-specific keyring
+ KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING -5 UID-session keyring
+ KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING -6 GID-specific keyring
+
+
+The main syscalls are:
+
+ (*) Create a new key of given type, description and payload and add it to the
+ nominated keyring:
+
+ key_serial_t add_key(const char *type, const char *desc,
+ const void *payload, size_t plen,
+ key_serial_t keyring);
+
+ If a key of the same type and description as that proposed already exists
+ in the keyring, this will try to update it with the given payload, or it
+ will return error EEXIST if that function is not supported by the key
+ type. The process must also have permission to write to the key to be
+ able to update it. The new key will have all user permissions granted and
+ no group or third party permissions.
+
+ Otherwise, this will attempt to create a new key of the specified type
+ and description, and to instantiate it with the supplied payload and
+ attach it to the keyring. In this case, an error will be generated if the
+ process does not have permission to write to the keyring.
+
+ The payload is optional, and the pointer can be NULL if not required by
+ the type. The payload is plen in size, and plen can be zero for an empty
+ payload.
+
+ A new keyring can be generated by setting type "keyring", the keyring
+ name as the description (or NULL) and setting the payload to NULL.
+
+ User defined keys can be created by specifying type "user". It is
+ recommended that a user defined key's description by prefixed with a type
+ ID and a colon, such as "krb5tgt:" for a Kerberos 5 ticket granting
+ ticket.
+
+ Any other type must have been registered with the kernel in advance by a
+ kernel service such as a filesystem.
+
+ The ID of the new or updated key is returned if successful.
+
+
+ (*) Search the process's keyrings for a key, potentially calling out to
+ userspace to create it.
+
+ key_serial_t request_key(const char *type, const char *description,
+ const char *callout_info,
+ key_serial_t dest_keyring);
+
+ This function searches all the process's keyrings in the order thread,
+ process, session for a matching key. This works very much like
+ KEYCTL_SEARCH, including the optional attachment of the discovered key to
+ a keyring.
+
+ If a key cannot be found, and if callout_info is not NULL, then
+ /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain a key. The
+ callout_info string will be passed as an argument to the program.
+
+
+The keyctl syscall functions are:
+
+ (*) Map a special key ID to a real key ID for this process:
+
+ key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID, key_serial_t id,
+ int create);
+
+ The special key specified by "id" is looked up (with the key being
+ created if necessary) and the ID of the key or keyring thus found is
+ returned if it exists.
+
+ If the key does not yet exist, the key will be created if "create" is
+ non-zero; and the error ENOKEY will be returned if "create" is zero.
+
+
+ (*) Replace the session keyring this process subscribes to with a new one:
+
+ key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, const char *name);
+
+ If name is NULL, an anonymous keyring is created attached to the process
+ as its session keyring, displacing the old session keyring.
+
+ If name is not NULL, if a keyring of that name exists, the process
+ attempts to attach it as the session keyring, returning an error if that
+ is not permitted; otherwise a new keyring of that name is created and
+ attached as the session keyring.
+
+ To attach to a named keyring, the keyring must have search permission for
+ the process's ownership.
+
+ The ID of the new session keyring is returned if successful.
+
+
+ (*) Update the specified key:
+
+ long keyctl(KEYCTL_UPDATE, key_serial_t key, const void *payload,
+ size_t plen);
+
+ This will try to update the specified key with the given payload, or it
+ will return error EOPNOTSUPP if that function is not supported by the key
+ type. The process must also have permission to write to the key to be
+ able to update it.
+
+ The payload is of length plen, and may be absent or empty as for
+ add_key().
+
+
+ (*) Revoke a key:
+
+ long keyctl(KEYCTL_REVOKE, key_serial_t key);
+
+ This makes a key unavailable for further operations. Further attempts to
+ use the key will be met with error EKEYREVOKED, and the key will no longer
+ be findable.
+
+
+ (*) Change the ownership of a key:
+
+ long keyctl(KEYCTL_CHOWN, key_serial_t key, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
+
+ This function permits a key's owner and group ID to be changed. Either
+ one of uid or gid can be set to -1 to suppress that change.
+
+ Only the superuser can change a key's owner to something other than the
+ key's current owner. Similarly, only the superuser can change a key's
+ group ID to something other than the calling process's group ID or one of
+ its group list members.
+
+
+ (*) Change the permissions mask on a key:
+
+ long keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key_serial_t key, key_perm_t perm);
+
+ This function permits the owner of a key or the superuser to change the
+ permissions mask on a key.
+
+ Only bits the available bits are permitted; if any other bits are set,
+ error EINVAL will be returned.
+
+
+ (*) Describe a key:
+
+ long keyctl(KEYCTL_DESCRIBE, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
+ size_t buflen);
+
+ This function returns a summary of the key's attributes (but not its
+ payload data) as a string in the buffer provided.
+
+ Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
+ produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
+ than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
+ will take place.
+
+ A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
+ successful.
+
+ If successful, a string is placed in the buffer in the following format:
+
+ <type>;<uid>;<gid>;<perm>;<description>
+
+ Where type and description are strings, uid and gid are decimal, and perm
+ is hexadecimal. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if
+ the buffer is sufficiently big.
+
+ This can be parsed with
+
+ sscanf(buffer, "%[^;];%d;%d;%o;%s", type, &uid, &gid, &mode, desc);
+
+
+ (*) Clear out a keyring:
+
+ long keyctl(KEYCTL_CLEAR, key_serial_t keyring);
+
+ This function clears the list of keys attached to a keyring. The calling
+ process must have write permission on the keyring, and it must be a
+ keyring (or else error ENOTDIR will result).
+
+
+ (*) Link a key into a keyring:
+
+ long keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK, key_serial_t keyring, key_serial_t key);
+
+ This function creates a link from the keyring to the key. The process
+ must have write permission on the keyring and must have link permission
+ on the key.
+
+ Should the keyring not be a keyring, error ENOTDIR will result; and if
+ the keyring is full, error ENFILE will result.
+
+ The link procedure checks the nesting of the keyrings, returning ELOOP if
+ it appears to deep or EDEADLK if the link would introduce a cycle.
+
+
+ (*) Unlink a key or keyring from another keyring:
+
+ long keyctl(KEYCTL_UNLINK, key_serial_t keyring, key_serial_t key);
+
+ This function looks through the keyring for the first link to the
+ specified key, and removes it if found. Subsequent links to that key are
+ ignored. The process must have write permission on the keyring.
+
+ If the keyring is not a keyring, error ENOTDIR will result; and if the
+ key is not present, error ENOENT will be the result.
+
+
+ (*) Search a keyring tree for a key:
+
+ key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_SEARCH, key_serial_t keyring,
+ const char *type, const char *description,
+ key_serial_t dest_keyring);
+
+ This searches the keyring tree headed by the specified keyring until a
+ key is found that matches the type and description criteria. Each keyring
+ is checked for keys before recursion into its children occurs.
+
+ The process must have search permission on the top level keyring, or else
+ error EACCES will result. Only keyrings that the process has search
+ permission on will be recursed into, and only keys and keyrings for which
+ a process has search permission can be matched. If the specified keyring
+ is not a keyring, ENOTDIR will result.
+
+ If the search succeeds, the function will attempt to link the found key
+ into the destination keyring if one is supplied (non-zero ID). All the
+ constraints applicable to KEYCTL_LINK apply in this case too.
+
+ Error ENOKEY, EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED will be returned if the search
+ fails. On success, the resulting key ID will be returned.
+
+
+ (*) Read the payload data from a key:
+
+ key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_READ, key_serial_t keyring, char *buffer,
+ size_t buflen);
+
+ This function attempts to read the payload data from the specified key
+ into the buffer. The process must have read permission on the key to
+ succeed.
+
+ The returned data will be processed for presentation by the key type. For
+ instance, a keyring will return an array of key_serial_t entries
+ representing the IDs of all the keys to which it is subscribed. The user
+ defined key type will return its data as is. If a key type does not
+ implement this function, error EOPNOTSUPP will result.
+
+ As much of the data as can be fitted into the buffer will be copied to
+ userspace if the buffer pointer is not NULL.
+
+ On a successful return, the function will always return the amount of
+ data available rather than the amount copied.
+
+
+ (*) Instantiate a partially constructed key.
+
+ key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, key_serial_t key,
+ const void *payload, size_t plen,
+ key_serial_t keyring);
+
+ If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a
+ key, userspace should use this call to supply data for the key before the
+ invoked process returns, or else the key will be marked negative
+ automatically.
+
+ The process must have write access on the key to be able to instantiate
+ it, and the key must be uninstantiated.
+
+ If a keyring is specified (non-zero), the key will also be linked into
+ that keyring, however all the constraints applying in KEYCTL_LINK apply
+ in this case too.
+
+ The payload and plen arguments describe the payload data as for add_key().
+
+
+ (*) Negatively instantiate a partially constructed key.
+
+ key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_NEGATE, key_serial_t key,
+ unsigned timeout, key_serial_t keyring);
+
+ If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a
+ key, userspace should use this call mark the key as negative before the
+ invoked process returns if it is unable to fulfil the request.
+
+ The process must have write access on the key to be able to instantiate
+ it, and the key must be uninstantiated.
+
+ If a keyring is specified (non-zero), the key will also be linked into
+ that keyring, however all the constraints applying in KEYCTL_LINK apply
+ in this case too.
+
+
+===============
+KERNEL SERVICES
+===============
+
+The kernel services for key managment are fairly simple to deal with. They can
+be broken down into two areas: keys and key types.
+
+Dealing with keys is fairly straightforward. Firstly, the kernel service
+registers its type, then it searches for a key of that type. It should retain
+the key as long as it has need of it, and then it should release it. For a
+filesystem or device file, a search would probably be performed during the
+open call, and the key released upon close. How to deal with conflicting keys
+due to two different users opening the same file is left to the filesystem
+author to solve.
+
+When accessing a key's payload data, key->lock should be at least read locked,
+or else the data may be changed by an update being performed from userspace
+whilst the driver or filesystem is trying to access it. If no update method is
+supplied, then the key's payload may be accessed without holding a lock as
+there is no way to change it, provided it can be guaranteed that the key's
+type definition won't go away.
+
+(*) To search for a key, call:
+
+ struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type,
+ const char *description,
+ const char *callout_string);
+
+ This is used to request a key or keyring with a description that matches
+ the description specified according to the key type's match function. This
+ permits approximate matching to occur. If callout_string is not NULL, then
+ /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain the key from
+ userspace. In that case, callout_string will be passed as an argument to
+ the program.
+
+ Should the function fail error ENOKEY, EKEYEXPIRED or EKEYREVOKED will be
+ returned.
+
+
+(*) When it is no longer required, the key should be released using:
+
+ void key_put(struct key *key);
+
+ This can be called from interrupt context. If CONFIG_KEYS is not set then
+ the argument will not be parsed.
+
+
+(*) Extra references can be made to a key by calling the following function:
+
+ struct key *key_get(struct key *key);
+
+ These need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when they've been
+ finished with. The key pointer passed in will be returned. If the pointer
+ is NULL or CONFIG_KEYS is not set then the key will not be dereferenced and
+ no increment will take place.
+
+
+(*) A key's serial number can be obtained by calling:
+
+ key_serial_t key_serial(struct key *key);
+
+ If key is NULL or if CONFIG_KEYS is not set then 0 will be returned (in the
+ latter case without parsing the argument).
+
+
+(*) If a keyring was found in the search, this can be further searched by:
+
+ struct key *keyring_search(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const char *description)
+
+ This searches the keyring tree specified for a matching key. Error ENOKEY
+ is returned upon failure. If successful, the returned key will need to be
+ released.
+
+
+(*) To check the validity of a key, this function can be called:
+
+ int validate_key(struct key *key);
+
+ This checks that the key in question hasn't expired or and hasn't been
+ revoked. Should the key be invalid, error EKEYEXPIRED or EKEYREVOKED will
+ be returned. If the key is NULL or if CONFIG_KEYS is not set then 0 will be
+ returned (in the latter case without parsing the argument).
+
+
+(*) To register a key type, the following function should be called:
+
+ int register_key_type(struct key_type *type);
+
+ This will return error EEXIST if a type of the same name is already
+ present.
+
+
+(*) To unregister a key type, call:
+
+ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *type);
+
+
+===================
+DEFINING A KEY TYPE
+===================
+
+A kernel service may want to define its own key type. For instance, an AFS
+filesystem might want to define a Kerberos 5 ticket key type. To do this, it
+author fills in a struct key_type and registers it with the system.
+
+The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
+
+ (*) const char *name
+
+ The name of the key type. This is used to translate a key type name
+ supplied by userspace into a pointer to the structure.
+
+
+ (*) size_t def_datalen
+
+ This is optional - it supplies the default payload data length as
+ contributed to the quota. If the key type's payload is always or almost
+ always the same size, then this is a more efficient way to do things.
+
+ The data length (and quota) on a particular key can always be changed
+ during instantiation or update by calling:
+
+ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen);
+
+ With the revised data length. Error EDQUOT will be returned if this is
+ not viable.
+
+
+ (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen);
+
+ This method is called to attach a payload to a key during construction.
+ The payload attached need not bear any relation to the data passed to
+ this function.
+
+ If the amount of data attached to the key differs from the size in
+ keytype->def_datalen, then key_payload_reserve() should be called.
+
+ This method does not have to lock the key in order to attach a payload.
+ The fact that KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED is not set in key->flags prevents
+ anything else from gaining access to the key.
+
+ This method may sleep if it wishes.
+
+
+ (*) int (*duplicate)(struct key *key, const struct key *source);
+
+ If this type of key can be duplicated, then this method should be
+ provided. It is called to copy the payload attached to the source into
+ the new key. The data length on the new key will have been updated and
+ the quota adjusted already.
+
+ This method will be called with the source key's semaphore read-locked to
+ prevent its payload from being changed. It is safe to sleep here.
+
+
+ (*) int (*update)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen);
+
+ If this type of key can be updated, then this method should be
+ provided. It is called to update a key's payload from the blob of data
+ provided.
+
+ key_payload_reserve() should be called if the data length might change
+ before any changes are actually made. Note that if this succeeds, the
+ type is committed to changing the key because it's already been altered,
+ so all memory allocation must be done first.
+
+ key_payload_reserve() should be called with the key->lock write locked,
+ and the changes to the key's attached payload should be made before the
+ key is locked.
+
+ The key will have its semaphore write-locked before this method is
+ called. Any changes to the key should be made with the key's rwlock
+ write-locked also. It is safe to sleep here.
+
+
+ (*) int (*match)(const struct key *key, const void *desc);
+
+ This method is called to match a key against a description. It should
+ return non-zero if the two match, zero if they don't.
+
+ This method should not need to lock the key in any way. The type and
+ description can be considered invariant, and the payload should not be
+ accessed (the key may not yet be instantiated).
+
+ It is not safe to sleep in this method; the caller may hold spinlocks.
+
+
+ (*) void (*destroy)(struct key *key);
+
+ This method is optional. It is called to discard the payload data on a
+ key when it is being destroyed.
+
+ This method does not need to lock the key; it can consider the key as
+ being inaccessible. Note that the key's type may have changed before this
+ function is called.
+
+ It is not safe to sleep in this method; the caller may hold spinlocks.
+
+
+ (*) void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *p);
+
+ This method is optional. It is called during /proc/keys reading to
+ summarise a key's description and payload in text form.
+
+ This method will be called with the key's rwlock read-locked. This will
+ prevent the key's payload and state changing; also the description should
+ not change. This also means it is not safe to sleep in this method.
+
+
+ (*) long (*read)(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen);
+
+ This method is optional. It is called by KEYCTL_READ to translate the
+ key's payload into something a blob of data for userspace to deal
+ with. Ideally, the blob should be in the same format as that passed in to
+ the instantiate and update methods.
+
+ If successful, the blob size that could be produced should be returned
+ rather than the size copied.
+
+ This method will be called with the key's semaphore read-locked. This
+ will prevent the key's payload changing. It is not necessary to also
+ read-lock key->lock when accessing the key's payload. It is safe to sleep
+ in this method, such as might happen when the userspace buffer is
+ accessed.
+
+
+============================
+REQUEST-KEY CALLBACK SERVICE
+============================
+
+To create a new key, the kernel will attempt to execute the following command
+line:
+
+ /sbin/request-key create <key> <uid> <gid> \
+ <threadring> <processring> <sessionring> <callout_info>
+
+<key> is the key being constructed, and the three keyrings are the process
+keyrings from the process that caused the search to be issued. These are
+included for two reasons:
+
+ (1) There may be an authentication token in one of the keyrings that is
+ required to obtain the key, eg: a Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket.
+
+ (2) The new key should probably be cached in one of these rings.
+
+This program should set it UID and GID to those specified before attempting to
+access any more keys. It may then look around for a user specific process to
+hand the request off to (perhaps a path held in placed in another key by, for
+example, the KDE desktop manager).
+
+The program (or whatever it calls) should finish construction of the key by
+calling KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, which also permits it to cache the key in one of
+the keyrings (probably the session ring) before returning. Alternatively, the
+key can be marked as negative with KEYCTL_NEGATE; this also permits the key to
+be cached in one of the keyrings.
+
+If it returns with the key remaining in the unconstructed state, the key will
+be marked as being negative, it will be added to the session keyring, and an
+error will be returned to the key requestor.
+
+Supplementary information may be provided from whoever or whatever invoked
+this service. This will be passed as the <callout_info> parameter. If no such
+information was made available, then "-" will be passed as this parameter
+instead.
+
+
+Similarly, the kernel may attempt to update an expired or a soon to expire key
+by executing:
+
+ /sbin/request-key update <key> <uid> <gid> \
+ <threadring> <processring> <sessionring>
+
+In this case, the program isn't required to actually attach the key to a ring;
+the rings are provided for reference.