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-rw-r--r--arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c10
-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c11
-rw-r--r--fs/open.c8
-rw-r--r--fs/xattr.c11
-rw-r--r--include/linux/audit.h130
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fsnotify.h14
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h33
-rw-r--r--ipc/msg.c5
-rw-r--r--ipc/sem.c5
-rw-r--r--ipc/shm.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.c175
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.h88
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c630
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c834
-rw-r--r--net/core/dev.c7
-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c14
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c98
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c9
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c15
22 files changed, 1580 insertions, 546 deletions
diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
index f51c894a7da..aee14fafd13 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
@@ -252,6 +253,7 @@ out:
static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct tss_struct *tss;
+ long eax;
/*
* make sure the vm86() system call doesn't try to do anything silly
*/
@@ -305,13 +307,19 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk
tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);
+ __asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs\n\t");
+ __asm__ __volatile__("movl %%eax, %0\n" :"=r"(eax));
+
+ /*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+ audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+
__asm__ __volatile__(
- "xorl %%eax,%%eax; movl %%eax,%%fs; movl %%eax,%%gs\n\t"
"movl %0,%%esp\n\t"
"movl %1,%%ebp\n\t"
"jmp resume_userspace"
: /* no outputs */
- :"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)) : "ax");
+ :"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)));
/* we never return here */
}
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
index eaed14aac6a..9887c8787e7 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1656,8 +1656,14 @@ syscall_trace_leave (long arg0, long arg1, long arg2, long arg3,
long arg4, long arg5, long arg6, long arg7,
struct pt_regs regs)
{
- if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs.r10), regs.r8);
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
+ int success = AUDITSC_RESULT(regs.r10);
+ long result = regs.r8;
+
+ if (success != AUDITSC_SUCCESS)
+ result = -result;
+ audit_syscall_exit(current, success, result);
+ }
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
&& (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 712dfc77793..98dc2e13436 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1353,6 +1353,7 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir,struct dentry *victim,int isdir)
return -ENOENT;
BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
+ audit_inode_child(victim->d_name.name, victim->d_inode, dir->i_ino);
error = permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, NULL);
if (error)
@@ -1472,7 +1473,7 @@ int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->create(dir, dentry, mode, nd);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
@@ -1799,7 +1800,7 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
@@ -1876,7 +1877,7 @@ int vfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
@@ -2139,7 +2140,7 @@ int vfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *oldname, i
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->symlink(dir, dentry, oldname);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
@@ -2216,7 +2217,7 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_de
error = dir->i_op->link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
mutex_unlock(&old_dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, new_dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, new_dentry);
return error;
}
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 7d02d19bd0a..c32c89d6d8d 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -626,6 +627,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int fd, mode_t mode)
dentry = file->f_dentry;
inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ audit_inode(NULL, inode, 0);
+
err = -EROFS;
if (IS_RDONLY(inode))
goto out_putf;
@@ -775,7 +778,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int fd, uid_t user, gid_t group)
file = fget(fd);
if (file) {
- error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group);
+ struct dentry * dentry;
+ dentry = file->f_dentry;
+ audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0);
+ error = chown_common(dentry, user, group);
fput(file);
}
return error;
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 80eca7d3d69..e416190f5e9 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -234,12 +235,15 @@ sys_fsetxattr(int fd, char __user *name, void __user *value,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct file *f;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
int error = -EBADF;
f = fget(fd);
if (!f)
return error;
- error = setxattr(f->f_dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ dentry = f->f_dentry;
+ audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0);
+ error = setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
fput(f);
return error;
}
@@ -458,12 +462,15 @@ asmlinkage long
sys_fremovexattr(int fd, char __user *name)
{
struct file *f;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
int error = -EBADF;
f = fget(fd);
if (!f)
return error;
- error = removexattr(f->f_dentry, name);
+ dentry = f->f_dentry;
+ audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0);
+ error = removexattr(dentry, name);
fput(f);
return error;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index da3c01955f3..1c47c59058c 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -33,27 +33,42 @@
* 1200 - 1299 messages internal to the audit daemon
* 1300 - 1399 audit event messages
* 1400 - 1499 SE Linux use
- * 1500 - 1999 future use
- * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages
+ * 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events
+ * 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events
+ * 1700 - 1799 kernel anomaly records
+ * 1800 - 1999 future kernel use (maybe integrity labels and related events)
+ * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages (legacy)
+ * 2001 - 2099 unused (kernel)
+ * 2100 - 2199 user space anomaly records
+ * 2200 - 2299 user space actions taken in response to anomalies
+ * 2300 - 2399 user space generated LSPP events
+ * 2400 - 2499 user space crypto events
+ * 2500 - 2999 future user space (maybe integrity labels and related events)
*
- * Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 are exclusively user
- * space. Anything over that is kernel --> user space communication.
+ * Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 & 2100 - 2999 are
+ * exclusively user space. 1300-2099 is kernel --> user space
+ * communication.
*/
#define AUDIT_GET 1000 /* Get status */
#define AUDIT_SET 1001 /* Set status (enable/disable/auditd) */
-#define AUDIT_LIST 1002 /* List syscall filtering rules */
-#define AUDIT_ADD 1003 /* Add syscall filtering rule */
-#define AUDIT_DEL 1004 /* Delete syscall filtering rule */
+#define AUDIT_LIST 1002 /* List syscall rules -- deprecated */
+#define AUDIT_ADD 1003 /* Add syscall rule -- deprecated */
+#define AUDIT_DEL 1004 /* Delete syscall rule -- deprecated */
#define AUDIT_USER 1005 /* Message from userspace -- deprecated */
#define AUDIT_LOGIN 1006 /* Define the login id and information */
#define AUDIT_WATCH_INS 1007 /* Insert file/dir watch entry */
#define AUDIT_WATCH_REM 1008 /* Remove file/dir watch entry */
#define AUDIT_WATCH_LIST 1009 /* List all file/dir watches */
#define AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO 1010 /* Get info about sender of signal to auditd */
+#define AUDIT_ADD_RULE 1011 /* Add syscall filtering rule */
+#define AUDIT_DEL_RULE 1012 /* Delete syscall filtering rule */
+#define AUDIT_LIST_RULES 1013 /* List syscall filtering rules */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */
#define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */
#define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG 1199
+#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 2100 /* More user space messages */
+#define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2 2999
#define AUDIT_DAEMON_START 1200 /* Daemon startup record */
#define AUDIT_DAEMON_END 1201 /* Daemon normal stop record */
@@ -72,6 +87,13 @@
#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
#define AUDIT_AVC_PATH 1402 /* dentry, vfsmount pair from avc */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD 1403 /* Policy file load */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_STATUS 1404 /* Changed enforcing,permissive,off */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE 1405 /* Changes to booleans */
+
+#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
+#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
+#define AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS 1700 /* Device changed promiscuous mode */
#define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
@@ -81,8 +103,9 @@
#define AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY 0x02 /* Apply rule at syscall entry */
#define AUDIT_FILTER_WATCH 0x03 /* Apply rule to file system watches */
#define AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT 0x04 /* Apply rule at syscall exit */
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE 0x05 /* Apply rule at audit_log_start */
-#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS 5
+#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS 6
#define AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND 0x10 /* Prepend to front of list */
@@ -98,6 +121,13 @@
#define AUDIT_WORD(nr) ((__u32)((nr)/32))
#define AUDIT_BIT(nr) (1 << ((nr) - AUDIT_WORD(nr)*32))
+/* This bitmask is used to validate user input. It represents all bits that
+ * are currently used in an audit field constant understood by the kernel.
+ * If you are adding a new #define AUDIT_<whatever>, please ensure that
+ * AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS is updated if need be. */
+#define AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS 0x0FFFFC00
+
+
/* Rule fields */
/* These are useful when checking the
* task structure at task creation time
@@ -114,6 +144,7 @@
#define AUDIT_LOGINUID 9
#define AUDIT_PERS 10
#define AUDIT_ARCH 11
+#define AUDIT_MSGTYPE 12
/* These are ONLY useful when checking
* at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
@@ -128,8 +159,28 @@
#define AUDIT_ARG2 (AUDIT_ARG0+2)
#define AUDIT_ARG3 (AUDIT_ARG0+3)
-#define AUDIT_NEGATE 0x80000000
+#define AUDIT_NEGATE 0x80000000
+/* These are the supported operators.
+ * 4 2 1
+ * = > <
+ * -------
+ * 0 0 0 0 nonsense
+ * 0 0 1 1 <
+ * 0 1 0 2 >
+ * 0 1 1 3 !=
+ * 1 0 0 4 =
+ * 1 0 1 5 <=
+ * 1 1 0 6 >=
+ * 1 1 1 7 all operators
+ */
+#define AUDIT_LESS_THAN 0x10000000
+#define AUDIT_GREATER_THAN 0x20000000
+#define AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL 0x30000000
+#define AUDIT_EQUAL 0x40000000
+#define AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL (AUDIT_LESS_THAN|AUDIT_EQUAL)
+#define AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL (AUDIT_GREATER_THAN|AUDIT_EQUAL)
+#define AUDIT_OPERATORS (AUDIT_EQUAL|AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
/* Status symbols */
/* Mask values */
@@ -186,6 +237,26 @@ struct audit_status {
__u32 backlog; /* messages waiting in queue */
};
+/* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string
+ * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and
+ * AUDIT_LIST_RULES requests.
+ */
+struct audit_rule_data {
+ __u32 flags; /* AUDIT_PER_{TASK,CALL}, AUDIT_PREPEND */
+ __u32 action; /* AUDIT_NEVER, AUDIT_POSSIBLE, AUDIT_ALWAYS */
+ __u32 field_count;
+ __u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; /* syscall(s) affected */
+ __u32 fields[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
+ __u32 values[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
+ __u32 fieldflags[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
+ __u32 buflen; /* total length of string fields */
+ char buf[0]; /* string fields buffer */
+};
+
+/* audit_rule is supported to maintain backward compatibility with
+ * userspace. It supports integer fields only and corresponds to
+ * AUDIT_ADD, AUDIT_DEL and AUDIT_LIST requests.
+ */
struct audit_rule { /* for AUDIT_LIST, AUDIT_ADD, and AUDIT_DEL */
__u32 flags; /* AUDIT_PER_{TASK,CALL}, AUDIT_PREPEND */
__u32 action; /* AUDIT_NEVER, AUDIT_POSSIBLE, AUDIT_ALWAYS */
@@ -222,22 +293,33 @@ extern void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *task, int arch,
extern void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *task, int failed, long return_code);
extern void audit_getname(const char *name);
extern void audit_putname(const char *name);
-extern void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags);
+extern void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags);
+extern void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
+ unsigned long pino);
+static inline void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode,
+ unsigned flags) {
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+ __audit_inode(name, inode, flags);
+}
+static inline void audit_inode_child(const char *dname,
+ const struct inode *inode,
+ unsigned long pino) {
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+ __audit_inode_child(dname, inode, pino);
+}
/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
-extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq,
- void *data, uid_t loginuid);
extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
extern void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial);
extern int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid);
extern uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx);
-extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode);
+extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args);
extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr);
extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
extern void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
-extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
+extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name);
#else
#define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; })
#define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0)
@@ -245,16 +327,18 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
#define audit_syscall_exit(t,f,r) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_getname(n) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_putname(n) do { ; } while (0)
+#define __audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0)
+#define __audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_receive_filter(t,p,u,s,d,l) ({ -EOPNOTSUPP; })
+#define audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0)
#define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) do { BUG(); } while (0)
#define audit_get_loginuid(c) ({ -1; })
-#define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m) ({ 0; })
+#define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m,i) ({ 0; })
#define audit_socketcall(n,a) ({ 0; })
#define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; })
#define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; })
#define audit_signal_info(s,t) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_filter_user(cb,t) ({ 1; })
+#define audit_set_macxattr(n) do { ; } while (0)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -278,12 +362,11 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
const char *prefix,
struct dentry *dentry,
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt);
- /* Private API (for auditsc.c only) */
-extern void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
- int done, int multi,
- void *payload, int size);
-extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
-extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem;
+ /* Private API (for audit.c only) */
+extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
+extern int audit_filter_type(int type);
+extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq,
+ void *data, size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid);
#else
#define audit_log(c,g,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_start(c,g,t) ({ NULL; })
@@ -293,6 +376,7 @@ extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem;
#define audit_log_hex(a,b,l) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_untrustedstring(a,s) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_d_path(b,p,d,v) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_panic(m) do { ; } while (0)
#endif
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
index f7e517c1f1b..11438eff4d4 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/dnotify.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
/*
* fsnotify_d_instantiate - instantiate a dentry for inode
@@ -64,6 +65,8 @@ static inline void fsnotify_move(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
if (source) {
inotify_inode_queue_event(source, IN_MOVE_SELF, 0, NULL);
}
+ audit_inode_child(old_name, source, old_dir->i_ino);
+ audit_inode_child(new_name, target, new_dir->i_ino);
}
/*
@@ -89,19 +92,22 @@ static inline void fsnotify_inoderemove(struct inode *inode)
/*
* fsnotify_create - 'name' was linked in
*/
-static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, const char *name)
+static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
{
inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE);
- inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, name);
+ inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, dentry->d_name.name);
+ audit_inode_child(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_ino);
}
/*
* fsnotify_mkdir - directory 'name' was created
*/
-static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, const char *name)
+static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
{
inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE);
- inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0, name);
+ inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0,
+ dentry->d_name.name);
+ audit_inode_child(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_ino);
}
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3c19be35124..aaa0a5cdbf7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -869,6 +869,11 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
* @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
* @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ipc_getsecurity:
+ * Copy the security label associated with the ipc object into
+ * @buffer. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer
+ * required. @size indicates the size of @buffer in bytes. Return
+ * number of bytes used/required on success.
*
* Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
* @msg_msg_alloc_security:
@@ -1168,7 +1173,8 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry);
int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
- int (*inode_getsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
+ const char *(*inode_xattr_getsuffix) (void);
+ int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
@@ -1217,6 +1223,7 @@ struct security_operations {
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag);
+ int (*ipc_getsecurity)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
@@ -1680,7 +1687,12 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
return security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name);
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_xattr_getsuffix();
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
{
if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
return 0;
@@ -1875,6 +1887,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return security_ops->ipc_permission (ipcp, flag);
}
+static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+ return security_ops->ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, buffer, size);
+}
+
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security (msg);
@@ -2327,7 +2344,12 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix (void)
+{
+ return NULL ;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
@@ -2510,6 +2532,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/ipc/msg.c b/ipc/msg.c
index 60c1e5c2341..7eec5ed3237 100644
--- a/ipc/msg.c
+++ b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -428,8 +428,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_msqid_from_user (&setbuf, buf, version))
return -EFAULT;
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
- return err;
break;
case IPC_RMID:
break;
@@ -460,6 +458,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_SET:
{
+ if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+ goto out_unlock_up;
+
err = -EPERM;
if (setbuf.qbytes > msg_ctlmnb && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
goto out_unlock_up;
diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
index 31fd4027d2b..59696a840be 100644
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -809,8 +809,6 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
if(cmd == IPC_SET) {
if(copy_semid_from_user (&setbuf, arg.buf, version))
return -EFAULT;
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
- return err;
}
sma = sem_lock(semid);
if(sma==NULL)
@@ -821,7 +819,6 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
goto out_unlock;
}
ipcp = &sma->sem_perm;
-
if (current->euid != ipcp->cuid &&
current->euid != ipcp->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
err=-EPERM;
@@ -838,6 +835,8 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
err = 0;
break;
case IPC_SET:
+ if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+ goto out_unlock;
ipcp->uid = setbuf.uid;
ipcp->gid = setbuf.gid;
ipcp->mode = (ipcp->mode & ~S_IRWXUGO)
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 16fe2786087..6f9615c09fb 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -620,13 +620,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
- return err;
down(&shm_ids.sem);
shp = shm_lock(shmid);
err=-EINVAL;
if(shp==NULL)
goto out_up;
+ if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, &(shp->shm_perm))))
+ goto out_unlock_up;
err = shm_checkid(shp,shmid);
if(err)
goto out_unlock_up;
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index aebd7a78984..ff1c11dc12c 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPUSETS) += cpuset.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IKCONFIG) += configs.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STOP_MACHINE) += stop_machine.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o auditfilter.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSFS) += ksysfs.o
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0a813d2883e..04fe2e301b6 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ static int audit_failure = AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK;
* contains the (non-zero) pid. */
int audit_pid;
-/* If audit_limit is non-zero, limit the rate of sending audit records
+/* If audit_rate_limit is non-zero, limit the rate of sending audit records
* to that number per second. This prevents DoS attacks, but results in
* audit records being dropped. */
static int audit_rate_limit;
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ static struct sock *audit_sock;
* than AUDIT_MAXFREE are in use, the audit buffer is freed instead of
* being placed on the freelist). */
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(audit_freelist_lock);
-static int audit_freelist_count = 0;
+static int audit_freelist_count;
static LIST_HEAD(audit_freelist);
static struct sk_buff_head audit_skb_queue;
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(audit_backlog_wait);
/* The netlink socket is only to be read by 1 CPU, which lets us assume
* that list additions and deletions never happen simultaneously in
* auditsc.c */
-DECLARE_MUTEX(audit_netlink_sem);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_netlink_mutex);
/* AUDIT_BUFSIZ is the size of the temporary buffer used for formatting
* audit records. Since printk uses a 1024 byte buffer, this buffer
@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ static void audit_set_pid(struct audit_buffer *ab, pid_t pid)
nlh->nlmsg_pid = pid;
}
-static void audit_panic(const char *message)
+void audit_panic(const char *message)
{
switch (audit_failure)
{
@@ -186,8 +187,14 @@ static inline int audit_rate_check(void)
return retval;
}
-/* Emit at least 1 message per second, even if audit_rate_check is
- * throttling. */
+/**
+ * audit_log_lost - conditionally log lost audit message event
+ * @message: the message stating reason for lost audit message
+ *
+ * Emit at least 1 message per second, even if audit_rate_check is
+ * throttling.
+ * Always increment the lost messages counter.
+*/
void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
{
static unsigned long last_msg = 0;
@@ -218,7 +225,6 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
audit_backlog_limit);
audit_panic(message);
}
-
}
static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
@@ -300,8 +306,22 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
remove_wait_queue(&kauditd_wait, &wait);
}
}
+ return 0;
}
+/**
+ * audit_send_reply - send an audit reply message via netlink
+ * @pid: process id to send reply to
+ * @seq: sequence number
+ * @type: audit message type
+ * @done: done (last) flag
+ * @multi: multi-part message flag
+ * @payload: payload data
+ * @size: payload size
+ *
+ * Allocates an skb, builds the netlink message, and sends it to the pid.
+ * No failure notifications.
+ */
void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi,
void *payload, int size)
{
@@ -342,15 +362,19 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type)
switch (msg_type) {
case AUDIT_GET:
case AUDIT_LIST:
+ case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
case AUDIT_SET:
case AUDIT_ADD:
+ case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
case AUDIT_DEL:
+ case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
err = -EPERM;
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
+ case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
err = -EPERM;
break;
@@ -376,7 +400,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (err)
return err;
- /* As soon as there's any sign of userspace auditd, start kauditd to talk to it */
+ /* As soon as there's any sign of userspace auditd,
+ * start kauditd to talk to it */
if (!kauditd_task)
kauditd_task = kthread_run(kauditd_thread, NULL, "kauditd");
if (IS_ERR(kauditd_task)) {
@@ -430,6 +455,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
+ case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
if (!audit_enabled && msg_type != AUDIT_USER_AVC)
return 0;
@@ -448,12 +474,23 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
break;
case AUDIT_ADD:
case AUDIT_DEL:
- if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(struct audit_rule))
+ if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule))
return -EINVAL;
/* fallthrough */
case AUDIT_LIST:
err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
- uid, seq, data, loginuid);
+ uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
+ loginuid);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
+ case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
+ if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule_data))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /* fallthrough */
+ case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
+ err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
+ uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
+ loginuid);
break;
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
sig_data.uid = audit_sig_uid;
@@ -469,9 +506,11 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
return err < 0 ? err : 0;
}
-/* Get message from skb (based on rtnetlink_rcv_skb). Each message is
+/*
+ * Get message from skb (based on rtnetlink_rcv_skb). Each message is
* processed by audit_receive_msg. Malformed skbs with wrong length are
- * discarded silently. */
+ * discarded silently.
+ */
static void audit_receive_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
@@ -499,14 +538,14 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sock *sk, int length)
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int qlen;
- down(&audit_netlink_sem);
+ mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
for (qlen = skb_queue_len(&sk->sk_receive_queue); qlen; qlen--) {
skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
audit_receive_skb(skb);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
- up(&audit_netlink_sem);
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
}
@@ -519,8 +558,9 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
THIS_MODULE);
if (!audit_sock)
audit_panic("cannot initialize netlink socket");
+ else
+ audit_sock->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
- audit_sock->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
skb_queue_head_init(&audit_skb_queue);
audit_initialized = 1;
audit_enabled = audit_default;
@@ -600,7 +640,10 @@ err:
return NULL;
}
-/* Compute a serial number for the audit record. Audit records are
+/**
+ * audit_serial - compute a serial number for the audit record
+ *
+ * Compute a serial number for the audit record. Audit records are
* written to user-space as soon as they are generated, so a complete
* audit record may be written in several pieces. The timestamp of the
* record and this serial number are used by the user-space tools to
@@ -612,8 +655,8 @@ err:
* audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them
* all at syscall exit. However, this could delay the reporting of
* significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system
- * halts). */
-
+ * halts).
+ */
unsigned int audit_serial(void)
{
static spinlock_t serial_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
@@ -649,6 +692,21 @@ static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
* will be written at syscall exit. If there is no associated task, tsk
* should be NULL. */
+/**
+ * audit_log_start - obtain an audit buffer
+ * @ctx: audit_context (may be NULL)
+ * @gfp_mask: type of allocation
+ * @type: audit message type
+ *
+ * Returns audit_buffer pointer on success or NULL on error.
+ *
+ * Obtain an audit buffer. This routine does locking to obtain the
+ * audit buffer, but then no locking is required for calls to
+ * audit_log_*format. If the task (ctx) is a task that is currently in a
+ * syscall, then the syscall is marked as auditable and an audit record
+ * will be written at syscall exit. If there is no associated task, then
+ * task context (ctx) should be NULL.
+ */
struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
int type)
{
@@ -661,6 +719,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
if (!audit_initialized)
return NULL;
+ if (unlikely(audit_filter_type(type)))
+ return NULL;
+
if (gfp_mask & __GFP_WAIT)
reserve = 0;
else
@@ -713,6 +774,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
/**
* audit_expand - expand skb in the audit buffer
* @ab: audit_buffer
+ * @extra: space to add at tail of the skb
*
* Returns 0 (no space) on failed expansion, or available space if
* successful.
@@ -729,10 +791,12 @@ static inline int audit_expand(struct audit_buffer *ab, int extra)
return skb_tailroom(skb);
}
-/* Format an audit message into the audit buffer. If there isn't enough
+/*
+ * Format an audit message into the audit buffer. If there isn't enough
* room in the audit buffer, more room will be allocated and vsnprint
* will be called a second time. Currently, we assume that a printk
- * can't format message larger than 1024 bytes, so we don't either. */
+ * can't format message larger than 1024 bytes, so we don't either.
+ */
static void audit_log_vformat(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt,
va_list args)
{
@@ -757,7 +821,8 @@ static void audit_log_vformat(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt,
/* The printk buffer is 1024 bytes long, so if we get
* here and AUDIT_BUFSIZ is at least 1024, then we can
* log everything that printk could have logged. */
- avail = audit_expand(ab, max_t(unsigned, AUDIT_BUFSIZ, 1+len-avail));
+ avail = audit_expand(ab,
+ max_t(unsigned, AUDIT_BUFSIZ, 1+len-avail));
if (!avail)
goto out;
len = vsnprintf(skb->tail, avail, fmt, args2);
@@ -768,8 +833,14 @@ out:
return;
}
-/* Format a message into the audit buffer. All the work is done in
- * audit_log_vformat. */
+/**
+ * audit_log_format - format a message into the audit buffer.
+ * @ab: audit_buffer
+ * @fmt: format string
+ * @...: optional parameters matching @fmt string
+ *
+ * All the work is done in audit_log_vformat.
+ */
void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
@@ -781,9 +852,18 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
va_end(args);
}
-/* This function will take the passed buf and convert it into a string of
- * ascii hex digits. The new string is placed onto the skb. */
-void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
+/**
+ * audit_log_hex - convert a buffer to hex and append it to the audit skb
+ * @ab: the audit_buffer
+ * @buf: buffer to convert to hex
+ * @len: length of @buf to be converted
+ *
+ * No return value; failure to expand is silently ignored.
+ *
+ * This function will take the passed buf and convert it into a string of
+ * ascii hex digits. The new string is placed onto the skb.
+ */
+void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len)
{
int i, avail, new_len;
@@ -812,10 +892,16 @@ void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
skb_put(skb, len << 1); /* new string is twice the old string */
}
-/* This code will escape a string that is passed to it if the string
- * contains a control character, unprintable character, double quote mark,
+/**
+ * audit_log_unstrustedstring - log a string that may contain random characters
+ * @ab: audit_buffer
+ * @string: string to be logged
+ *
+ * This code will escape a string that is passed to it if the string
+ * contains a control character, unprintable character, double quote mark,
* or a space. Unescaped strings will start and end with a double quote mark.
- * Strings that are escaped are printed in hex (2 digits per char). */
+ * Strings that are escaped are printed in hex (2 digits per char).
+ */
void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string)
{
const unsigned char *p = string;
@@ -854,10 +940,15 @@ void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix,
kfree(path);
}
-/* The netlink_* functions cannot be called inside an irq context, so
- * the audit buffer is places on a queue and a tasklet is scheduled to
+/**
+ * audit_log_end - end one audit record
+ * @ab: the audit_buffer
+ *
+ * The netlink_* functions cannot be called inside an irq context, so
+ * the audit buffer is placed on a queue and a tasklet is scheduled to
* remove them from the queue outside the irq context. May be called in
- * any context. */
+ * any context.
+ */
void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
if (!ab)
@@ -878,9 +969,18 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
audit_buffer_free(ab);
}
-/* Log an audit record. This is a convenience function that calls
- * audit_log_start, audit_log_vformat, and audit_log_end. It may be
- * called in any context. */
+/**
+ * audit_log - Log an audit record
+ * @ctx: audit context
+ * @gfp_mask: type of allocation
+ * @type: audit message type
+ * @fmt: format string to use
+ * @...: variable parameters matching the format string
+ *
+ * This is a convenience function that calls audit_log_start,
+ * audit_log_vformat, and audit_log_end. It may be called
+ * in any context.
+ */
void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
@@ -895,3 +995,8 @@ void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type,
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_start);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_end);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_format);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..bc5392076e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* audit -- definition of audit_context structure and supporting types
+ *
+ * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+
+/* 0 = no checking
+ 1 = put_count checking
+ 2 = verbose put_count checking
+*/
+#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
+
+/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
+ a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
+ the syscall filter. */
+enum audit_state {
+ AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
+ * No syscall-specific audit records can
+ * be generated. */
+ AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ * but don't necessarily fill it in at
+ * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
+ * instead). */
+ AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ * and always fill it in at syscall
+ * entry time. This makes a full
+ * syscall record available if some
+ * other part of the kernel decides it
+ * should be recorded. */
+ AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ * always fill it in at syscall entry
+ * time, and always write out the audit
+ * record at syscall exit time. */
+};
+
+/* Rule lists */
+struct audit_field {
+ u32 type;
+ u32 val;
+ u32 op;
+};
+
+struct audit_krule {
+ int vers_ops;
+ u32 flags;
+ u32 listnr;
+ u32 action;
+ u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
+ u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
+ u32 field_count;
+ struct audit_field *fields;
+};
+
+struct audit_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ struct audit_krule rule;
+};
+
+
+extern int audit_pid;
+extern int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right);
+
+extern void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
+ int done, int multi,
+ void *payload, int size);
+extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
+extern void audit_panic(const char *message);
+extern struct mutex audit_netlink_mutex;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d3a8539f3a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,630 @@
+/* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events
+ *
+ * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include "audit.h"
+
+/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
+ * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
+ * syscall exit time. */
+struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
+#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6
+#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
+#endif
+};
+
+static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
+{
+ kfree(e->rule.fields);
+ kfree(e);
+}
+
+static inline void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
+ audit_free_rule(e);
+}
+
+/* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
+ * buffer. */
+static __attribute__((unused)) char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
+{
+ char *str;
+
+ if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ /* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX
+ * defines the longest valid length.
+ */
+ if (len > PATH_MAX)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
+
+ str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!str))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ memcpy(str, *bufp, len);
+ str[len] = 0;
+ *bufp += len;
+ *remain -= len;
+
+ return str;
+}
+
+/* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
+static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
+{
+ unsigned listnr;
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+ struct audit_field *fields;
+ int i, err;
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+ switch(listnr) {
+ default:
+ goto exit_err;
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY:
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT:
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK:
+#endif
+ ;
+ }
+ if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE &&
+ rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
+ goto exit_err;
+ if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
+ goto exit_err;
+
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!entry))
+ goto exit_err;
+ fields = kmalloc(sizeof(*fields) * rule->field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!fields)) {
+ kfree(entry);
+ goto exit_err;
+ }
+
+ memset(&entry->rule, 0, sizeof(struct audit_krule));
+ memset(fields, 0, sizeof(struct audit_field));
+
+ entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+ entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
+ entry->rule.action = rule->action;
+ entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
+ entry->rule.fields = fields;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+ entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
+
+ return entry;
+
+exit_err:
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/* Translate struct audit_rule to kernel's rule respresentation.
+ * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
+static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+ int err = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ entry = audit_to_entry_common(rule);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry))
+ goto exit_nofree;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
+
+ if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+
+ f->op = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
+ f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
+ f->val = rule->values[i];
+
+ entry->rule.vers_ops = (f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
+
+ /* Support for legacy operators where
+ * AUDIT_NEGATE bit signifies != and otherwise assumes == */
+ if (f->op & AUDIT_NEGATE)
+ f->op = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL;
+ else if (!f->op)
+ f->op = AUDIT_EQUAL;
+ else if (f->op == AUDIT_OPERATORS) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+ }
+
+exit_nofree:
+ return entry;
+
+exit_free:
+ audit_free_rule(entry);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule respresentation. */
+static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
+ size_t datasz)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+ void *bufp;
+ /* size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); */
+ int i;
+
+ entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry))
+ goto exit_nofree;
+
+ bufp = data->buf;
+ entry->rule.vers_ops = 2;
+ for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (!(data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ||
+ data->fieldflags[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS)
+ goto exit_free;
+
+ f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
+ f->type = data->fields[i];
+ switch(f->type) {
+ /* call type-specific conversion routines here */
+ default:
+ f->val = data->values[i];
+ }
+ }
+
+exit_nofree:
+ return entry;
+
+exit_free:
+ audit_free_rule(entry);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */
+static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, char *str)
+{
+ size_t len = strlen(str);
+
+ memcpy(*bufp, str, len);
+ *bufp += len;
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule.
+ * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
+static struct audit_rule *audit_krule_to_rule(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ struct audit_rule *rule;
+ int i;
+
+ rule = kmalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!rule))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ memset(rule, 0, sizeof(*rule));
+
+ rule->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
+ rule->action = krule->action;
+ rule->field_count = krule->field_count;
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ rule->values[i] = krule->fields[i].val;
+ rule->fields[i] = krule->fields[i].type;
+
+ if (krule->vers_ops == 1) {
+ if (krule->fields[i].op & AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+ rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NEGATE;
+ } else {
+ rule->fields[i] |= krule->fields[i].op;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) rule->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
+
+ return rule;
+}
+
+/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule_data. */
+static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ struct audit_rule_data *data;
+ void *bufp;
+ int i;
+
+ data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!data))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
+
+ data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
+ data->action = krule->action;
+ data->field_count = krule->field_count;
+ bufp = data->buf;
+ for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i];
+
+ data->fields[i] = f->type;
+ data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
+ switch(f->type) {
+ /* call type-specific conversion routines here */
+ default:
+ data->values[i] = f->val;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
+
+ return data;
+}
+
+/* Compare two rules in kernel format. Considered success if rules
+ * don't match. */
+static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (a->flags != b->flags ||
+ a->listnr != b->listnr ||
+ a->action != b->action ||
+ a->field_count != b->field_count)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
+ if (a->fields[i].type != b->fields[i].type ||
+ a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op)
+ return 1;
+
+ switch(a->fields[i].type) {
+ /* call type-specific comparison routines here */
+ default:
+ if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+ if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. Protected by
+ * audit_netlink_mutex. */
+static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
+ struct list_head *list)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+
+ /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
+ * addition routine. */
+ list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
+ if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule))
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+
+ if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
+ list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+ } else {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. Protected by
+ * audit_netlink_mutex. */
+static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
+ struct list_head *list)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+
+ /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
+ * deletion routine. */
+ list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
+ if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
+ list_del_rcu(&e->list);
+ call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
+}
+
+/* List rules using struct audit_rule. Exists for backward
+ * compatibility with userspace. */
+static int audit_list(void *_dest)
+{
+ int pid, seq;
+ int *dest = _dest;
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+ int i;
+
+ pid = dest[0];
+ seq = dest[1];
+ kfree(dest);
+
+ mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+ /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
+ always called with audit_netlink_mutex held. */
+ for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
+ struct audit_rule *rule;
+
+ rule = audit_krule_to_rule(&entry->rule);
+ if (unlikely(!rule))
+ break;
+ audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
+ rule, sizeof(*rule));
+ kfree(rule);
+ }
+ }
+ audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */
+static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
+{
+ int pid, seq;
+ int *dest = _dest;
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ int i;
+
+ pid = dest[0];
+ seq = dest[1];
+ kfree(dest);
+
+ mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+ /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
+ always called with audit_netlink_mutex held. */
+ for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+ list_for_each_entry(e, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
+ struct audit_rule_data *data;
+
+ data = audit_krule_to_data(&e->rule);
+ if (unlikely(!data))
+ break;
+ audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1,
+ data, sizeof(*data));
+ kfree(data);
+ }
+ }
+ audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type
+ * @type: audit message type
+ * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages
+ * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages
+ * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
+ * @data: payload data
+ * @datasz: size of payload data
+ * @loginuid: loginuid of sender
+ */
+int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
+ size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+ int *dest;
+ int err = 0;
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case AUDIT_LIST:
+ case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
+ /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
+ * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
+ * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
+ * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
+ * trying to _send_ the stuff */
+
+ dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dest)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ dest[0] = pid;
+ dest[1] = seq;
+
+ if (type == AUDIT_LIST)
+ tsk = kthread_run(audit_list, dest, "audit_list");
+ else
+ tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest,
+ "audit_list_rules");
+ if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
+ kfree(dest);
+ err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_ADD:
+ case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
+ if (type == AUDIT_ADD)
+ entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
+ else
+ entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry))
+ return PTR_ERR(entry);
+
+ err = audit_add_rule(entry,
+ &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d\n",
+ loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+
+ if (err)
+ audit_free_rule(entry);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_DEL:
+ case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
+ if (type == AUDIT_DEL)
+ entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
+ else
+ entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry))
+ return PTR_ERR(entry);
+
+ err = audit_del_rule(entry,
+ &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d\n",
+ loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+
+ audit_free_rule(entry);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right)
+{
+ switch (op) {
+ case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ return (left == right);
+ case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ return (left != right);
+ case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
+ return (left < right);
+ case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+ return (left <= right);
+ case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
+ return (left > right);
+ case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+ return (left >= right);
+ }
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
+ struct audit_krule *rule,
+ enum audit_state *state)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ int result = 0;
+
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_PID:
+ result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_UID:
+ result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_GID:
+ result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
+ result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!result)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ switch (rule->action) {
+ case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
+ case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
+ case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ enum audit_state state;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
+ if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
+ if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return ret; /* Audit by default */
+}
+
+int audit_filter_type(int type)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ int result = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE]))
+ goto unlock_and_return;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE],
+ list) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+ if (f->type == AUDIT_MSGTYPE) {
+ result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val);
+ if (!result)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (result)
+ goto unlock_and_return;
+ }
+unlock_and_return:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return result;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c4394abcd5e..7f160df21a2 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
* Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
*
* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
+ * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -27,11 +29,22 @@
* this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
* okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
*
+ * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
+ * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
+ *
+ * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
+ * filesystem information.
+ *
+ * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
+ * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <asm/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/types.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
@@ -39,16 +52,16 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
-#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+
+#include "audit.h"
-/* 0 = no checking
- 1 = put_count checking
- 2 = verbose put_count checking
-*/
-#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
+extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
extern int audit_enabled;
@@ -62,29 +75,6 @@ extern int audit_enabled;
* path_lookup. */
#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
-/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
- a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
- the syscall filter. */
-enum audit_state {
- AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
- * No syscall-specific audit records can
- * be generated. */
- AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * but don't necessarily fill it in at
- * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
- * instead). */
- AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * and always fill it in at syscall
- * entry time. This makes a full
- * syscall record available if some
- * other part of the kernel decides it
- * should be recorded. */
- AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * always fill it in at syscall entry
- * time, and always write out the audit
- * record at syscall exit time. */
-};
-
/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
* pointers at syscall exit time).
@@ -93,12 +83,13 @@ enum audit_state {
struct audit_names {
const char *name;
unsigned long ino;
+ unsigned long pino;
dev_t dev;
umode_t mode;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- unsigned flags;
+ char *ctx;
};
struct audit_aux_data {
@@ -115,6 +106,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
mode_t mode;
+ char *ctx;
};
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
@@ -167,290 +159,72 @@ struct audit_context {
#endif
};
- /* Public API */
-/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
- * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
- * syscall exit time. */
-static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
-#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
-#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
-#endif
-};
-
-struct audit_entry {
- struct list_head list;
- struct rcu_head rcu;
- struct audit_rule rule;
-};
-
-extern int audit_pid;
-
-/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
-static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
- && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
- && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
- return -1;
- if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
- return -1;
- if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -1;
-
- d->flags = s->flags;
- d->action = s->action;
- d->field_count = s->field_count;
- for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
- d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
- d->values[i] = s->values[i];
- }
- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and
- * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
-static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (a->flags != b->flags)
- return 1;
-
- if (a->action != b->action)
- return 1;
-
- if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
- return 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
- if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
- || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
- return 1;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
- if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
- struct list_head *list)
-{
- struct audit_entry *entry;
-
- /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
- * addition routine. */
- list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
- if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
- return -EEXIST;
- }
- }
-
- if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
- kfree(entry);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
- entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
- } else {
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
- kfree(e);
-}
-
-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
- struct list_head *list)
-{
- struct audit_entry *e;
-
- /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
- * deletion routine. */
- list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
- if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
- list_del_rcu(&e->list);
- call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
-}
-
-static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
-{
- int pid, seq;
- int *dest = _dest;
- struct audit_entry *entry;
- int i;
-
- pid = dest[0];
- seq = dest[1];
- kfree(dest);
-
- down(&audit_netlink_sem);
-
- /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
- always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
- for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
- &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
- }
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
-
- up(&audit_netlink_sem);
- return 0;
-}
-
-int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
- uid_t loginuid)
-{
- struct task_struct *tsk;
- int *dest;
- int err = 0;
- unsigned listnr;
-
- switch (type) {
- case AUDIT_LIST:
- /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
- * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
- * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
- * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
- * trying to _send_ the stuff */
-
- dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!dest)
- return -ENOMEM;
- dest[0] = pid;
- dest[1] = seq;
-
- tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
- if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
- kfree(dest);
- err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
- }
- break;
- case AUDIT_ADD:
- listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
- if (!err)
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
- break;
- case AUDIT_DEL:
- listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
- if (!err)
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
- break;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- return err;
-}
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct audit_rule *rule,
+ struct audit_krule *rule,
struct audit_context *ctx,
enum audit_state *state)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
- u32 value = rule->values[i];
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
int result = 0;
- switch (field) {
+ switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
- result = (tsk->pid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_UID:
- result = (tsk->uid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EUID:
- result = (tsk->euid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SUID:
- result = (tsk->suid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_FSUID:
- result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_GID:
- result = (tsk->gid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EGID:
- result = (tsk->egid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SGID:
- result = (tsk->sgid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_FSGID:
- result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_PERS:
- result = (tsk->personality == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_ARCH:
- if (ctx)
- result = (ctx->arch == value);
+ if (ctx)
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EXIT:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
- result = (ctx->return_code == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
- if (value)
- result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+ if (f->val)
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
else
- result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_FAILURE);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
+ if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -460,7 +234,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
+ if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -470,7 +244,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_INODE:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
+ if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
+ audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -480,19 +255,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
result = 0;
if (ctx)
- result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
case AUDIT_ARG3:
if (ctx)
- result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
break;
}
- if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
- result = !result;
if (!result)
return 0;
}
@@ -527,7 +300,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
- * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
+ * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
*/
static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx,
@@ -541,77 +314,19 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
- && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return state;
- }
- }
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
-}
-
-static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
- struct audit_rule *rule,
- enum audit_state *state)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
- u32 value = rule->values[i];
- int result = 0;
-
- switch (field) {
- case AUDIT_PID:
- result = (cb->creds.pid == value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_UID:
- result = (cb->creds.uid == value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_GID:
- result = (cb->creds.gid == value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
- result = (cb->loginuid == value);
- break;
- }
-
- if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
- result = !result;
- if (!result)
- return 0;
- }
- switch (rule->action) {
- case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
- case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
- case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
-{
- struct audit_entry *e;
- enum audit_state state;
- int ret = 1;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
- if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
- if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
- ret = 0;
- break;
+ int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+ int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
+ && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return state;
+ }
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
-
- return ret; /* Audit by default */
+ return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
@@ -654,17 +369,18 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
if (context->auditable
||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
" name_count=%d put_count=%d"
" ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
- __LINE__,
+ __FILE__, __LINE__,
context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
context->name_count, context->put_count,
context->ino_count);
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
context->names[i].name,
- context->names[i].name);
+ context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
+ }
dump_stack();
return;
}
@@ -674,9 +390,13 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
context->ino_count = 0;
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+ char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
+ context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
+ kfree(p);
if (context->names[i].name)
__putname(context->names[i].name);
+ }
context->name_count = 0;
if (context->pwd)
dput(context->pwd);
@@ -696,6 +416,12 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
dput(axi->dentry);
mntput(axi->mnt);
}
+ if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+ if (axi->ctx)
+ kfree(axi->ctx);
+ }
+
context->aux = aux->next;
kfree(aux);
}
@@ -721,10 +447,15 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
return context;
}
-/* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
+/**
+ * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
+ * @tsk: task
+ *
+ * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
* if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
* specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
- * needed. */
+ * needed.
+ */
int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
@@ -775,7 +506,37 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
}
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ ssize_t len = 0;
+
+ len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ if (len != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
+ if (len < 0 )
+ goto error_path;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+ return;
+
+error_path:
+ if (ctx)
+ kfree(ctx);
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+ return;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
@@ -788,6 +549,10 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!mm)
return;
+ /*
+ * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
+ * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
+ */
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = mm->mmap;
while (vma) {
@@ -801,6 +566,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
vma = vma->vm_next;
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
}
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
@@ -808,6 +574,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
int i;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+ const char *tty;
ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
@@ -820,11 +587,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
+ if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name)
+ tty = current->signal->tty->name;
+ else
+ tty = "(none)";
audit_log_format(ab,
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
" pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
context->argv[0],
context->argv[1],
context->argv[2],
@@ -835,8 +606,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
context->uid,
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
- context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
- audit_log_task_info(ab);
+ context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
@@ -849,8 +620,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
case AUDIT_IPC: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
- axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
+ axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
break; }
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
@@ -885,42 +656,62 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
}
}
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+ unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
+ unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
+
ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
- if (context->names[i].name) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ if (context->names[i].name)
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
- }
- audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
-
- if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
- audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
- " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
- context->names[i].ino,
- MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
- MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
- context->names[i].mode,
- context->names[i].uid,
- context->names[i].gid,
- MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
+
+ if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino);
+ if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino);
+ if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
+ audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
+ " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
+ MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
+ context->names[i].mode,
+ context->names[i].uid,
+ context->names[i].gid,
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
+ if (context->names[i].ctx) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
+ context->names[i].ctx);
+ }
+
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
-/* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
- * __put_task_struct. */
+/**
+ * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
+ * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
+ *
+ * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ */
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
- task_lock(tsk);
+ /*
+ * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free()
+ * then the task has no external references anymore, and
+ * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses
+ * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq
+ * contexts as well, via RCU.)
+ */
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
- task_unlock(tsk);
-
if (likely(!context))
return;
@@ -934,13 +725,24 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
audit_free_context(context);
}
-/* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
+/**
+ * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
+ * @tsk: task being audited
+ * @arch: architecture type
+ * @major: major syscall type (function)
+ * @a1: additional syscall register 1
+ * @a2: additional syscall register 2
+ * @a3: additional syscall register 3
+ * @a4: additional syscall register 4
+ *
+ * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
* per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
- * be written). */
+ * be written).
+ */
void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
@@ -950,7 +752,8 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
BUG_ON(!context);
- /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
+ /*
+ * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
* calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
* with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
* architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
@@ -966,11 +769,6 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
if (context->in_syscall) {
struct audit_context *newctx;
-#if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
- /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
- if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
- return;
-#endif
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
printk(KERN_ERR
"audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
@@ -1014,11 +812,18 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
}
-/* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
+/**
+ * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
+ * @tsk: task being audited
+ * @valid: success/failure flag
+ * @return_code: syscall return value
+ *
+ * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
* auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
- * free the names stored from getname(). */
+ * free the names stored from getname().
+ */
void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
{
struct audit_context *context;
@@ -1053,7 +858,13 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
put_task_struct(tsk);
}
-/* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
+/**
+ * audit_getname - add a name to the list
+ * @name: name to add
+ *
+ * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
+ * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
+ */
void audit_getname(const char *name)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1082,10 +893,13 @@ void audit_getname(const char *name)
}
-/* Intercept a putname request. Called from
- * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
- * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
- * exit. */
+/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
+ * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
+ *
+ * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
+ * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
+ * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
+ */
void audit_putname(const char *name)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1100,7 +914,7 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
context->names[i].name,
- context->names[i].name);
+ context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
}
#endif
__putname(name);
@@ -1122,9 +936,52 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
#endif
}
-/* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
- * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
-void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
+void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ int len = 0;
+
+ if (!suffix)
+ goto ret;
+
+ len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
+ if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ goto ret;
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
+ context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
+ goto ret;
+
+error_path:
+ if (ctx)
+ kfree(ctx);
+ audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
+ret:
+ return;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
+ * @name: name being audited
+ * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
+ *
+ * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
+ */
+void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1150,15 +1007,105 @@ void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
++context->ino_count;
#endif
}
- context->names[idx].flags = flags;
- context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
+ if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
+ (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
+ context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
+ context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino;
+ } else {
+ context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
+ context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
+ * @dname: inode's dentry name
+ * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
+ *
+ * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
+ * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
+ * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
+ * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
+ * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
+ * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
+ * unsuccessful attempts.
+ */
+void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
+ unsigned long pino)
+{
+ int idx;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (!context->in_syscall)
+ return;
+
+ /* determine matching parent */
+ if (dname)
+ for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
+ if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
+ const char *n;
+ const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
+ int dlen = strlen(dname);
+ int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
+
+ if (nlen < dlen)
+ continue;
+
+ /* disregard trailing slashes */
+ n = name + nlen - 1;
+ while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
+ n--;
+
+ /* find last path component */
+ n = n - dlen + 1;
+ if (n < name)
+ continue;
+ else if (n > name) {
+ if (*--n != '/')
+ continue;
+ else
+ n++;
+ }
+
+ if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
+ goto update_context;
+ }
+
+ /* catch-all in case match not found */
+ idx = context->name_count++;
+ context->names[idx].name = NULL;
+ context->names[idx].pino = pino;
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+ context->ino_count++;
+#endif
+
+update_context:
+ if (inode) {
+ context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
+ context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
+ context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
+ context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
+ context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
+ }
}
+/**
+ * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
+ * @ctx: audit_context for the task
+ * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
+ * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
+ *
+ * Also sets the context as auditable.
+ */
void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
{
@@ -1170,6 +1117,15 @@ void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
ctx->auditable = 1;
}
+/**
+ * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
+ * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
+ * @loginuid: loginuid value
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ *
+ * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
+ */
int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
{
if (task->audit_context) {
@@ -1188,12 +1144,59 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
+ * @ctx: the audit_context
+ *
+ * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
+ */
uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
}
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
+static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ int len = 0;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return NULL;
+
+ len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
+ if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ goto ret;
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error_path:
+ kfree(ctx);
+ audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
+ret:
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * @qbytes: msgq bytes
+ * @uid: msgq user id
+ * @gid: msgq group id
+ * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1201,7 +1204,7 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
if (likely(!context))
return 0;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1209,6 +1212,7 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
ax->uid = uid;
ax->gid = gid;
ax->mode = mode;
+ ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
@@ -1216,6 +1220,13 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
+ * @nargs: number of args
+ * @args: args array
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
{
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
@@ -1237,6 +1248,13 @@ int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
+ * @len: data length in user space
+ * @a: data address in kernel space
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
{
struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
@@ -1258,6 +1276,15 @@ int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
+ * @dentry: dentry to record
+ * @mnt: mnt to record
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ *
+ * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
+ */
int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
@@ -1279,6 +1306,14 @@ int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
+ * @sig: signal value
+ * @t: task being signaled
+ *
+ * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
+ * and uid that is doing that.
+ */
void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
@@ -1295,4 +1330,3 @@ void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
}
}
}
-
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index e0489ca731c..8e1dc305122 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
#include <linux/wireless.h>
#include <net/iw_handler.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
/*
* The list of packet types we will receive (as opposed to discard)
@@ -2147,6 +2148,12 @@ void dev_set_promiscuity(struct net_device *dev, int inc)
printk(KERN_INFO "device %s %s promiscuous mode\n",
dev->name, (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) ? "entered" :
"left");
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS,
+ "dev=%s prom=%d old_prom=%d auid=%u",
+ dev->name, (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC),
+ (old_flags & IFF_PROMISC),
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
}
}
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index a678f094b72..fd99429278e 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
return 0;
}
-static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
@@ -393,6 +393,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu
return 0;
}
+static const char *dummy_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -558,6 +563,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return 0;
}
+static int dummy_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return 0;
@@ -931,6 +941,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_xattr_getsuffix);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
@@ -965,6 +976,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ccaf988f372..b61b9554bc2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -119,6 +119,32 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
+/* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
+ length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
+static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+ char *context;
+ unsigned len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (!buffer || !size)
+ goto getsecurity_exit;
+
+ if (size < len) {
+ len = -ERANGE;
+ goto getsecurity_exit;
+ }
+ memcpy(buffer, context, len);
+
+getsecurity_exit:
+ kfree(context);
+ return len;
+}
+
/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -2210,6 +2236,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
return -EACCES;
}
+static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+{
+ return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
+}
+
/*
* Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
* getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
@@ -2217,47 +2248,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
*
* Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
*/
-static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- char *context;
- unsigned len;
- int rc;
-
- if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) {
- rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
- goto out;
- }
-
- rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- /* Probe for required buffer size */
- if (!buffer || !size) {
- rc = len;
- goto out_free;
- }
- if (size < len) {
- rc = -ERANGE;
- goto out_free;
- }
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (err > 0) {
- if ((len == err) && !(memcmp(context, buffer, len))) {
- /* Don't need to canonicalize value */
- rc = err;
- goto out_free;
- }
- memset(buffer, 0, size);
- }
- memcpy(buffer, context, len);
- rc = len;
-out_free:
- kfree(context);
-out:
- return rc;
+ return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
}
static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
@@ -4054,6 +4052,13 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
+static int selinux_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+
+ return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
+}
+
/* module stacking operations */
static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
@@ -4095,8 +4100,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- u32 sid, len;
- char *context;
+ u32 sid;
int error;
if (current != p) {
@@ -4105,9 +4109,6 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
return error;
}
- if (!size)
- return -ERANGE;
-
tsec = p->security;
if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
@@ -4124,16 +4125,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
- if (error)
- return error;
- if (len > size) {
- kfree(context);
- return -ERANGE;
- }
- memcpy(value, context, len);
- kfree(context);
- return len;
+ return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
}
static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -4291,6 +4283,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
.inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
.inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
+ .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
.inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
.inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
.inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
@@ -4328,6 +4321,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
+ .ipc_getsecurity = selinux_ipc_getsecurity,
.msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
.msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 85e39925983..b8f4d25cf33 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
{ AUDIT_LIST, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
{ AUDIT_ADD, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ AUDIT_DEL, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_LIST_RULES, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
+ { AUDIT_ADD_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_DEL_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ AUDIT_USER, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY },
{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
};
@@ -152,8 +155,10 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
break;
case SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET:
- if (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
- nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) {
+ if ((nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
+ nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) ||
+ (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 &&
+ nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) {
*perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY;
} else {
err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms,
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index f5d78365488..a4efc966f06 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/major.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/semaphore.h>
@@ -127,6 +128,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
if (length)
goto out;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+ "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u", new_value,
+ selinux_enforcing,
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
selinux_enforcing = new_value;
if (selinux_enforcing)
avc_ss_reset(0);
@@ -177,6 +182,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
length = selinux_disable();
if (length < 0)
goto out;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+ "selinux=0 auid=%u",
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
}
length = count;
@@ -262,6 +270,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
length = ret;
else
length = count;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+ "policy loaded auid=%u",
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
out:
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
vfree(data);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 63e0b7f29cb..61492485de8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1759,19 +1759,22 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
goto out;
}
- printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { ");
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u",
+ policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
+ !!values[i],
+ policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
+ }
if (values[i]) {
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
} else {
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
}
- if (i != 0)
- printk(", ");
- printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
- policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state);
}
- printk(" }\n");
for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);